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IS ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE POSSIBLE?
A COMMENTARY ON MacINTYRE AND McMULLIN

JEAN DE GROOT

IN THEIR AQUINAS LECTURES, given at Marquette University in 1990 and 1992 respectively, Alasdair MacIntyre and Ernan McMullin offer a defense and a critique of Aristotle's theory of science in the *Posterior Analytics*.[1] McMullin's interpretation, informed by a lifetime of accomplishment in contemporary philosophy of science, is negative about the treatise as either an adequate description of natural science or a normative account of it. MacIntyre's engaging and penetrating essay deals generously with the picture of science in the treatise. I shall argue, however, that the two philosophers share an incorrect interpretation of the science of the *Posterior Analytics* as deductivist and perfectionist. Both miss the true focus of Aristotle's treatise on science, namely, distinguishing the necessary and accidental in things themselves. They share twentieth-century presuppositions about the proposition that obscure the import of the theory of demonstration, especially with respect to the role of νοῦς in an Aristotelian science.

MacIntyre sets as his aim to render plausible the classical belief in first principles, but an underlying and more important aim seems to be to lay out a strategy by which Aristotelian/Thomistic philosophy may enter contemporary philosophical discussion in a way that contemporary philosophers cannot refuse. Accordingly, he highlights the teleological implications of philosophical language about knowledge, arguing that thinkers like Rorty have failed to banish from their own

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[1] Alasdair MacIntyre, *First Principles, Final Ends and Contemporary Philosophical Issues* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1990) hereafter cited as *Principles*, and Ernan McMullin, *The Inference That Makes Science* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1992), hereafter cited as *Inference*. References to Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* are from *Analytica Priora et Posteriora*, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), hereafter cited with book and chapter numbers within the paper as *AP*. Translations from the Greek text are my own.

discourse a claim of truth that presupposes principles. MacIntyre explains Aristotle's conception of science in terms of science's own τέλος as knowledge, placing the requirement for first principles in a context of the growth of knowledge as guided by its final end. The end of knowledge includes unmiddled first principles that ground demonstrated conclusions about what cannot be otherwise. Nevertheless, while science grows, candidates for first principles remain subject to change. One task of Thomistic philosophy of science is to provide genealogies of scientific change written from a perspective of the growth of knowledge toward its τέλος.[2]

MacIntyre is implicitly responding to a charge that McMullin makes very explicit, namely that Aristotle's picture of science has no place for the fallibilism, which, as we have learned in modernity, is a constant feature of the practice of science.[3] This charge originates in interpretations of *AP* 1.2–3. In these chapters, Aristotle presents what seem to be logical requirements for the structure of science. He presents an axiomatic system in which there are principles taken by the knower as prior and primary, embodying what is first in nature.[4] He says:

> If, then, scientific knowing is as we hold it to be, demonstrative knowledge must be from [premises that are] true, first, unmiddled, more known, prior to, and causes of the conclusion (ἐξ ἀληθῶν τ'εἶναι καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων καὶ προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος).[5]

These first principles must be capable of generating by deduction all truths dependent on causes. From the modern standpoint, of course, the logical structure of an axiomatic system precludes any proof of first principles, and hence any unchangeable (ἀμετάπειστον[6]) conviction in the knower concerning them. Following upon this logical feature of deduction, there is persistent indeterminacy accompanying any first principles in science, because empirical results are never enough to decide between competing theories.

Following Kosman and Burnyeat,[7] most interpreters of the *Posterior Analytics* parry the fallibilist objection by saying that Aristotle's

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[2] MacIntyre, *Principles*, 48–9.
[3] Ibid., 25; McMullin, *Inference*, 41–7.
[4] *AP* 1.2.71b34–72a4.
[5] *AP* 1.2.71b19–21.
[6] *AP* 1.2.72b4

treatment of the structure of science is never purely logical anyway but is always embedded in an account of what constitutes a good explanation. Science (ἐπιστήμη), is a normative term, and theory of science brings out implicit criteria for knowing by means of causes. The key is the role of causes in knowledge. McMullin's criticism on the basis of fallibilism takes this parry into account, however. His point is that, as explanatory, Aristotle's principles cannot qualify as first. Two points are crucial in McMullin's critique. One is the problem of the necessity, and hence uniqueness, of causes hit upon in investigation. For example, in his account of why the planets do not twinkle, Aristotle cannot claim that non-twinkling is essential to the nearness of objects and to nearness alone.[8] The theory of demonstration provides no means of ruling out other causes. Hence, knowledge through causes never has the bi-conditional necessity which Aristotle requires for his major premise.[9] The second point is related to the first. McMullin contends that fruitful science relies on theory, and that there is precious little theory in Aristotle's conception of science or his practice of it.[10] Specifically, he charges that Aristotle's scientific universals are tied too closely to perception, and that his causes are linked to essences conceived holistically and based on the look of something.[11] Real structures in nature are simply inaccessible on this basis.[12]

We see that, in the accounts of Aristotelian science offered by MacIntyre and McMullin, both the status of first principles, or unmediated causes, and the fallibilism characteristic of any stage of the development of a science are central. Answers to the problems they raise, however, can be pursued by considering scholarship on the *Posterior Analytics* recently available at the time of their writing, which they did not take into account. For instance, both say that Aristotle's scientific practice in biology, regarded as piecemeal in method and *a*

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[7] L. A. Kosman, "Understanding, Explanation, and Insight in the *Posterior Analytics*," *Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy presented to Gregory Vlastos*, in *Phronesis*, suppl. vol. 1 (1973): 374–92, and Miles Burnyeat, "Aristotle on Understanding Knowledge," *Aristotle on Science: The Posterior Analytics*, ed. Enrico Berti (Padua: Editrice Antenore, 1981), 97–139, hereafter cited as "Understanding Knowledge."

[8] McMullin, *Inference*, 12–14. Aristotle treats this case in *AP* 1.13.

[9] Ibid., 18.

[10] Ibid., 14–16.

[11] Ibid., 8–9.

[12] Ibid., 23–4.

posteriori, is in stark contrast to the *a priori* deductivism of his theory of science.[13] This contention was made familiar by Jonathan Barnes, but a strong dissent to it had already been lodged by Lennox and Bolton.[14] They maintained that the structure of science described in the *Posterior Analytics* guided Aristotle's research in biology and that this structure is not strictly deductivist.

In addition, a strong counterargument to the deductivist interpretation of the treatise (based on *AP* 1.2–3) can be found in the relation of definition and demonstration presented by Aristotle in *AP* 2.7–10. New interest in the issue of signification had brought these chapters under the scholarly microscope in the 1970s and 80s (Bolton, Ackrill, Irwin, Demoss and Devereux[15]). It was becoming clear that, in Aristotelian science, the property belonging to a subject (namely, the predicate of the conclusion, or the major term) has certain implications, because of its both existing and being demonstrated, for the status of the definition in the minor premise. This discovery, I will show, bears on both the meaning of holding definitions by νοῦς and the direction of reasoning in demonstration.

Aristotle begins his account of definition and demonstration with a view of definition recognizable to a modern philosopher: definitions cannot be proven. While a definition says what something is, it can-

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[13] MacIntyre, *Principles,* 24; McMullin, *Inference,* 21–3.

[14] Jonathan Barnes, "Aristotle's Theory of Demonstration," in *Articles on Aristotle I: Science,* ed. Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield, and Richard Sorabji (London: Duckworth, 1975), 65–87; James Lennox, "Divide and Explain: The *Posterior Analytics* in Practice," hereafter cited as "Divide and Explain," and Robert Bolton, "Definition and Scientific Method in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* and *Generation of Animals,*" both in *Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology,* ed. James Lennox and Allan Gotthelf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 90–166.

[15] Robert Bolton, "Essentialism and Semantic Theory in Aristotle: *Posterior Analytics* II.7–10," *Philosophical Review* 85 (1976): 514–44, hereafter cited as "Essentialism"; J. L. Ackrill, "Aristotle's Theory of Definition: Some Questions on *Posterior Analytics* II.8–10," in *Aristotle on Science: The* Posterior Analytics, ed. Enrico Berti (Padua: Editrice Antenore, 1981), 359–84; Terence H. Irwin, "Aristotle's Concept of Signification," in *Language and Logos,* ed. Martha Nussbaum and Malcolm Schofield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 241–66; David Demoss and Daniel Devereux, "Essence, Existence, and Nominal Definition in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* II.8–10," *Phronesis* 33.2 (1988): 133–54, hereafter cited as "Nominal Definition." Other treatments of the same issue include Blake Landor, "Aristotle on Demonstrating Essence," *Apeiron* 19 (1985): 116–32, and Greg Bayer, "Definition through Demonstration: The Two Types of Syllogisms in *Posterior Analytics,*" *Phronesis* 40.3 (1995): 241–64.

not establish anything concerning the existence of what is defined. In *AP* 2.8, however, Aristotle adds to this view, so that by chapter 10, he names three (and possibly four) kinds of definition, all related by him in some way to demonstration. Besides the indemonstrable formula of whatness (λόγος τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἀναπόδεικτος), one type of definition is a deduction of whatness, differing from a demonstration only in form. Another type is the conclusion of a demonstration of whatness.[16] Besides these three types of definition, explicitly named in *AP* 2.10, he mentions at the beginning of that chapter the so-called nominal definition (λόγος νοματώδης), which gets scientific investigation started by being that for which a cause is sought.

On his way to chapter 10, Aristotle shows that definition and demonstration overlap in the case of defining what has a cause other than itself. Where the cause is a middle term, the definition is a kind of demonstration, because definition must include the cause (*AP* 2.9). Also important is the distinction he makes between definitions of real versus nonexistent things, such as thunder versus goatstag. No one knows the whatness of something nonexistent, he says.[17] Only things that exist have τί ἐστι, whatness or essence. Of τραγέλαφος (goatstag) we have only what the formula or the name says or signifies. This distinction leads to an important insight on the role of deductive structure in scientific knowing for Aristotle, namely that knowledge of the existence of a cause (understood as some cause or other) grounds the entire deduction.

Aristotle contends, in chapter 8, that we do not know what something is without knowing that it exists. He is thinking of things that can be demonstrated, for he says it is the same thing to know the τί ἐστι of something and to know the cause of its existing.[18] Applied to a scientific investigation underway, he calls this having something of the whatness (τι τοῦ τί ἐστι).[19] He says:

> To seek the 'what it is' without having 'that it is' is to seek nothing. But, for as many of those things for which we have something [of what they are], it is easier. So that insofar as we have 'that it is,' in this way we also have [something] toward the 'what it is.'[20]

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[16] *AP* 2.8.94a11–14.
[17] *AP* 2.7.92b5.
[18] *AP* 2.8.93a4.
[19] *AP* 2.8.93a29.
[20] *AP* 2.8. 93a26–9.

The "something" (τι) is an observed trait known or suspected to belong to a subject in a nonincidental way. Such a trait is a bridge between a definition and a demonstration, because it is just the sort of thing to be a major term in a demonstration, and hence to appear in the conclusion of a demonstration whose middle term is the cause of the trait. An example is an eclipse, insofar as it is a certain kind of deprivation of light from the moon. Knowing an eclipse simply by the fact of shadows not being cast at full moon would be incidental knowledge. For an eclipse is not just the moon's failing to cast shadows; that may happen on a cloudy night. Rather, an eclipse is the sort of deprivation of light that is the failure to cast shadows at full moon on a clear night with no obstructions in sight. The point is that such an unusual trait does not stand alone but depends on some cause. The search for an explanation of the trait implicates its unmiddled statement of τί ἐστι (the cause outside the thing): in this case, the interposition of the earth between the moon and sun. For Aristotle, then, a nominal definition of an observed trait of this sort does show the existence of the thing, insofar as the nominal definition gives τι τοῦ τί ἐστι, something of what the thing is. The nominal definition appropriately gives way, however, to a proper predication. To cite another of Aristotle's examples, "Thunder is a noise in the clouds," (the nominal definition) is reformulated as, "Thunder (that is, loud noise) belongs to clouds," a predication serving as the conclusion in a demonstration of whatness. Once Aristotle sorts out the different types of definition, he tells us that the indemonstrable definition is the minor premise giving the cause, and the nominal definition corresponds to the conclusion. Aristotle treats the entire demonstration as a definition of something having a cause outside itself.

The picture of science as demonstration that emerges from these considerations is quite different from the picture of Aristotelian science offered by McMullin. First of all, note that, on Aristotle's account in *AP* 2.10, a demonstration, as explanation, is a sort of fabric. That is, statements of whatness (minor premises) and claims of existence (conclusions) are interdependent. One supplies what the other lacks, their combination producing something more than either amounts to by itself. Bolton, writing in 1975 on the issue of nominal definitions and signification, said that nominal definitions carry a claim of existence for their subjects, while relying upon unmiddled definitions to give the essence of what exists. What is named in the

predicate would not exist without that cause.[21] We could hope that definitions, which figure as premises of demonstration, share in the existence claim of the conclusion, because they give the causes of signifying definitions. Scholars writing in the next ten years did not see such a strong connection between the existence of the subject of nominal definition and the unmiddled definition, however. Ferejohn sees unmiddled definitions in demonstrations being deployed across a subject matter already known to exist, simply because it is the subject of scientific investigation. Demoss and Devereux say that Aristotle thinks nominal definitions, taken in relation to demonstration, show existence in the sense of making us able to discern genuine instances of eclipse or thunder when confronted with them.[22] A cautious assessment is that, by the time he makes his summary in chapter 10, Aristotle means by τί ἐστι "cause plus observable property," and this τί ἐστι requires the whole demonstration to be shown. In this analysis of demonstration, science starts not with first principles but with significant observable traits of things or states of affairs. Moreover, first principles are rendered convincing[23] by their involvement with these observables, which are understood to be such persistent features as to be necessary to their subjects, whether part of essence or not. Reasoning in Aristotelian science thus begins with the relation between something at the end of a deduction, an observed feature constantly in evidence, and something in the middle, a cause to be determined.

Let us consider how the view of definition and demonstration summarized in this sketch affects assumptions made by McMullin and MacIntyre. Note first that unmiddled definitions are among the types of premises held by the cognitive faculty Aristotle calls νοῦς. McMullin defines νοῦς in the way most susceptible to interpretation as yielding only unprovable hypotheses: "Νοῦς is a direct grasp of the universals already implicit in perception, and is brought about by

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[21] Bolton, "Essentialism," 533–8.

[22] Michael Ferejohn, *The Origins of Aristotelian Science* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 50; Demoss and Devereux, "Nominal Definition," 145–6. Demoss and Devereux say that nominal definitions do not give fully convertible predications but rather statements in which subject and predicate are convertible for the observable instances under consideration.

[23] It is anachronistic to speak of proof in relation to Aristotle's theory of science. Proof for Aristotle would have to combine two notions: showing or showing forth (δηλοῦν, ἐπιδεικνύναι) and conviction (πίστις). He does not have a modern conception of proof.

ἐπαγωγή."[24] Νοῦς is just the result of induction. In his footnote on this statement, McMullin acknowledges interpretations of νοῦς that make it a separate faculty from ἐπαγωγή but provides no argument against them. He seems to ignore the doctrine of intellectual capacities laid out in *Nicomachean Ethics* 6 and developed further in *AP* 2.19, that provides for different epistemic attitudes for the knower in relation to the content of his thought. McMullin thus interprets νοῦς in a very modern way as the holding of a generalization derived from immediate and unrefined perception. Guided by the requirements of reasoning deductively from hypotheses within an axiomatic system, these generalizations must abide by the rules of verification and falsification.

In the picture of *AP* 2.7–10 sketched above, however, the first principles of a science may not be first in the order of knowing, something Aristotle himself tells us.[25] Νοῦς, however, is involved even in the initial grasp of whatness—the τι τοῦ τί ἐστι—because as Aristotle explicitly says, one does not know enough to seek a cause of a thing without having grasped something of the whatness of the thing. Νοῦς gets an investigation started by its partial grasp of whatness in terms of a trait that may turn out to be either part of essence or a proper accident. In his account of packing middle terms in *AP* 1.23, Aristotle says that we find causes by thickening the middle, that is, by adding unmiddled connections within the deductive structure. In this context, he says the unit in demonstration is νοῦς.[26] Accordingly, νοῦς is involved throughout the investigative process.

The chapters we have examined from *AP* 2 show also that the relation of premises and conclusion works differently in an Aristotelian demonstration than in a hypothetico-deductive system. First of all, the conclusion is necessary, not just by virtue of the form of the deduction, but because of the relation of subject and predicate in the premises. This means that observable traits figuring in conclusions are sifted and analyzed in a context of necessary connections. It is not a particular connection that is assumed—for example, the nearness of the planets and their non-twinkling. What is assumed is a more general structure of necessary connections based on the rela-

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[24] McMullin, *Inference*, 7.
[25] *AP* 1.2.71b34–72a4 and 1.3.72b27–32.
[26] *AP* 1.23.85a1.

tion of subjects to attributes that always belong to them. It is assumed that a trait is situated within some set of necessary connections that includes a proximate cause. The purpose of investigation is to narrow the relevant set of connections that support the trait, so as to settle upon a demonstrative structure. This is accomplished by eliminating conditions that are incidental, or else causal but too broad or too narrow.[27] There will be a back and forth process of reasoning pivoting on the trait special enough to command an assessment of its being necessary. This means too that universals or essences are not being read off immediate perception, but that perceptual traits are figuring in a matrix of necessary connections. Within this context, candidates for proximate cause will be weighed in relation to empirical and theoretical considerations.[28] We could say that, in *AP* 2.7–10, Aristotle separates two aspects of proximate cause (its existence and its exact nature), and this separation renders demonstrative structure consistent with fallibility while still providing criteria for what constitutes knowledge. Let us consider then an Aristotelian response to the unreasonable expectations about knowing first principles.

Using *AP* 1.2–3, McMullin sets up a standard of what he calls "strict demonstration" (ἀπόδειξις).[29] As strict demonstration, science requires a deduction which meets all the requirements for premises mentioned in chapter 2. Premises of genuine science are true, first, unmiddled, more knowable, prior, and causes of their conclusions

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[27] Of eclipse, what always holds might include models that predict recurrence, and the incidental would include other sources of occlusion of the moon's light, like dust storms. Aristotle seems to have in mind this process when, in addressing eclipse, he shifts from the earth as screening the moon to the moon as failing to cast shadows even when there is nothing between us and the moon (*AP* 2.8.93b1).

[28] If we consider explanations outside the actual natural context of the planets and heavens, it might be possible to claim there could be other causes than nearness for the planets not twinkling. Maybe the angels do it by thinking about the planets all the time. Knowing which explanations are plausible depends on background knowledge of various kinds. If we consider reasonable possibilities from the natural setting of the planets, for example, an internal source of illumination like the sun, gaining reasoned conviction follows the path delineated here. William A. Wallace discusses types of foreknowledge in *Modeling of Nature* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 297–300.

[29] What McMullin calls strict demonstration is not Aristotle's ἐπιστήμη ἁπλῶς. Burnyeat had addressed in earlier authors the mistake McMullin makes here. See Burnyeat, "Understanding Knowledge," in particular 99–102.

(72b21). MacIntyre accepts this picture of what constitutes scientific knowledge for Aristotle. He tries to mitigate its effect, however, by delineating a process of dialectical reasoning conducted with the norm of strict demonstration in mind.[30] As McMullin is quick to point out, this leaves MacIntyre with the problem of accounting for how dialectical premises change their status to scientific at some point and saying what would constitute the difference between dialectical and scientific premises in actual practice.[31] This is where both authors are hamstrung by the modern understanding of the proposition as necessary or not, taken as a whole. Demonstration, however, relies upon the relation of subject and predicate to make a proposition scientifically potent. Aristotle thinks that in doing science, one is working all the time within the realm of necessary connections between a subject and an observable trait belonging necessarily to that subject. The epistemic status of propositions does not change from dialectical to necessary when some critical level of certainty is reached. Propositions do not have epistemic dispositions; people do. One can be mistaken about whether one has necessary connections, but apart from this embarrassment, Aristotle's scientist is working within a set of necessary connections all the time.

Accordingly, there is no impediment to considering other sorts of demonstration besides the kind involving the proximate cause as middle term. This is a point Aristotle makes in discussing ὅτι demonstrations.[32] Many demonstrations "of the fact" will have διότι, or *propter quid*, form, but will lack the component of commensurate universality (ᾗ αὐτό of 1.4). There are also demonstrations of διότι form at the level of proximate cause that have not yet defined the proximate cause with precision, as he says in *AP* 2.13–17. Comparing these "imperfect" sorts of demonstrations is how we learn to judge when we have come to rest with genuine causes in an investigation.[33]

Modern interest in the ὅτι demonstration, however, has focused mainly on the kind that contrasts with διότι form, where the reasoner moves from knowledge of the effect to conclude to the cause, converting the terms of the major premise so that the cause is predicated of the effect. Both MacIntyre and McMullin deny that there could be such a form of reasoning, one which is not dialectical but scientific.[34]

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[30] MacIntyre, *Principles*, 24, 34–40.
[31] McMullin, *Inference*, 43–6.
[32] *AP* 1.13.78a23, b13–15.
[33] See Lennox's treatment of *History of Animals* in Lennox, "Divide and Explain," 104–6.

This form of reasoning makes more sense, however, in the context of *AP* 2.7–10. If there are necessary connections of the sort Aristotle envisions between subjects and observable traits—and in propositions, between subjects and signifying predicates—then these connections are, for the investigator, a ladder traversable in either direction. We can treat a connection of subject and observable trait as a biconditional, as long as we have reasonable expectation that the observable is a property. This is the form of reasoning of many contemporary scientific articles. The aim is to convince the reader that the investigators' ascription of cause or dependency is correct by tracing a path of *a posteriori* reasoning in accordance with the necessity newly brought into relief by the investigators. The path to conviction, it is assumed, is an *a posteriori* route.

How, then, should one interpret *AP* 1.2–3, including those elements that seem to make ἐπιστήμη an axiomatic system defined by logical rigor and the certainty of its first premises? In *AP* 1.2, ἐπιστήμη ἁπλῶς (scientific knowledge in the proper sense, or knowledge *simpliciter*) is defined by Aristotle, not in terms of its degree of perfection or impossibility of error, but in terms of its proper object. Scientific knowledge is of what cannot be otherwise.[35] He reiterates the connection of ἐπιστήμη ἁπλῶς and "not capable of holding otherwise" in later chapters.[36] Demonstration is understood as following upon this connection, being a syllogism productive of knowledge of the necessary (ἐπιστημονικόν).[37] The treatment of the character of premises of demonstration comes third in this account of scientific knowledge.

The connection between necessity and knowledge *simpliciter* is key to understanding Aristotle's list of requirements for premises of

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[34] MacIntyre, *Principles*, 35; McMullin, *Inference*, 17–18. See also McMullin, "Truth and Explanatory Success," in *Aristotle and Contemporary Science I*, ed. Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou (New York: Peter Lang, 2000), 60–71.

[35] *AP* 1.2.71b15.

[36] *AP* 1.4.73a21 and 1.6.74b6, 74b15.

[37] *AP* 1.2.71b18. Demonstration also involves awareness on the part of the knower that the premises give necessary connections. In *AP* 1.33, Aristotle says that one may deduce using observables and causes that are necessary without being aware of their necessary connections. In that case, one is not demonstrating. Indeed, two people may hold the same syllogism, one as a matter of fact, the other as a demonstrated necessity. This contrasting case speaks to the significance of Aristotle's statement about ἐπιστήμη ἁπλῶς at the beginning of *AP* 1.2 (71b11), that one knows not only the cause but also knows that the cause is the cause of the very thing under consideration.

demonstration in chapter 2—true, primary, unmiddled, more know-
able, prior, and cause of the conclusion.[38] These requirements are like
the first lines drawn in a preliminary sketch of demonstration. A more
complete picture requires the types of καθ' αὐτό predication in chap-
ter 4, because there Aristotle treats the subject/attribute structure of
necessity in things. The essential element in the preliminary sketch is
presented in terms of a point relevant to his wider philosophical con-
cerns:

> For that because of which (δι'ὅ) a trait belongs [to a subject] has the
> trait to a greater degree—for example, that because of which we love is
> more dear. So, if we know and hold conviction through primary
> [things], these also we both know and are convinced of to a greater de-
> gree, because through those also the consequents (τὰ ὕστερα) hold.[39]

The priority of that on account of which we love and that by which we
know is causal priority, but it is inevitably also a priority in knowl-
edge. An example of this dual priority would be knowing that the
earth casts a circular shadow on the moon because it is a sphere. Of
the two statements,

> 1) a sphere is a circle when projected on a surface, and

> 2) in the present case of lunar eclipse, the earth is casting that circular
> shadow on the moon as part of its being a spherically shaped body,

we understand 1) in a more fundamental way and with a clearer con-
viction than 2). The connection of sphere and circle is more known
(γνωριμώτερον) because it is the cause in the way outlined by his ref-
erence to τὸ φίλον. Causal connections are taken and known as un-
middled in demonstration, and the most fundamental causal connec-
tions remain unmiddled even with further investigation. "Unmiddled"
is the criterion closest in meaning to "first" in Aristotle's list of re-
quirements of premises.

It is sometimes thought that premises of demonstration must al-
ways be absolutely first, because of Aristotle's reference to the one
having scientific knowledge (τὸν ἐπιστάμενον ἁπλῶς) being steadfast
in his conviction (ἀμετάπειστον)[40]—more literally, unchangeable in
belief or not subject to change by persuasion.[41] I suggest, however,

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[38] AP 1.2.71b20–2.
[39] AP 1.2.72a30–32.
[40] AP 1.2.72b4.

IS ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE POSSIBLE?

that unchangeability of conviction has to do with the priority criterion for premises. As early as *AP* 1.1, Aristotle has begun to build the case that demonstration, if it is a coherent notion at all, involves priority. He resumes this point at the end of chapter 2, saying it makes no sense that one could be more convinced of conclusions than one is convinced of the premises from which conclusions follow.[42] What is most required for one to be demonstrating is to be clear about what is prior and what is consequent among necessary predications.

Aristotle's reference to unchangeability of conviction comes immediately after this comment and just before his rebuttal, in chapter 3, of those who present problems for demonstration. There are 1) those who say there are no first premises and so no demonstration because of the infinite backward regress set afoot, and 2) those who make all propositions about necessary connections demonstrable, so that every premise is also always a conclusion of some demonstration. Priority is crucial to seeing the flaw in the claim of the circular demonstrators,[43] but it is also involved in his rebuttal of the infinite regress argument. For if premises are prior, as those who deny infinite regress admit, then for demonstration to be possible, there must be a stop to the backward reach for premises. This means there is indemonstrable knowledge.[44] Aristotle readily accepts this consequence of priority, because of the causal priority he makes central to his account. Some effect will follow without mediation from a cause. Other effects are mediated by additional conditions or circumstances.

Certainly, at this point, demonstration begins to take the shape of an axiomatic deductive structure. There is no indication, however, that Aristotle seeks to reduce the number of first principles to an economical Newtonian, or even Euclidean, number for every science. Furthermore, demonstration is not sharpened by redesigning premises so that more conclusions follow from them (the route toward perfection in a modern axiomatic system). Instead, Aristotle seeks the level of commensurate universality that will capture the cause

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[41] Aristotle may have in mind that the belief of the scientific knower is just not the type to be subject to persuasion (πείθειν or συμπείθειν [71a9]), since it is about what cannot be otherwise. See also *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.6.

[42] *AP* 1.2.72a33.

[43] *AP* 1.3.73a4–6

[44] *AP* 1.3.72b19.

without remainder in a demonstrative syllogism within the deductive structure.[45] Most importantly, demonstration does not depend entirely on premises being unmiddled but can proceed from premises that are deducible, as long as those premises are prior and related to the proximate cause of the thing. He reiterates that demonstration is from necessary premises and what is demonstrated otherwise cannot hold,[46] and he presses home the point by saying that, if premises are necessary, one cannot help but demonstrate.[47] Necessity and priority, even more than firstness or commensurate universality, are the salient features of premises of ἐπιστήμη ἁπλῶς.

More could be said, by drawing upon examples of different kinds of ὅτι demonstrations, to substantiate this approach to the place of first principles in Aristotle's account of demonstration. These passages from the first six chapters of AP 1 provide at least the framework for understanding how one might have a grasp of necessary connections imperfectly but still be demonstrating, as long as the investigator is on the trail of genuine connections. Nominal definitions of things that have a τί ἐστι provide the empirical data that sustain this process. It is by seeking the τί ἐστι that causal priority is established within the demonstrative structure.

I have argued that the deductivist reading of Posterior Analytics, common to the interpretations of McMullin and MacIntyre, is handicapped by a narrow conception of νοῦς and a modern preoccupation with the structure of axiomatic systems. The focus of interpretation of Aristotelian science should be the contrast of necessary and accidental. I suggest that AP 1.2–3 should always be read in relation to both Aristotle's treatment of signifying traits in AP 2.7–10 and his account of thickening the middle in AP 1.20–3. Demonstration depends upon a network of necessary connections in things themselves. This

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[45] Since Aristotle says that the καθ'αὑτό and the ᾗ αὐτό (the per se and the commensurately universal) are the same (AP 1.4.73b29), there is an implicit aim to the development of knowledge of any thing, namely, to take for an unmiddled premise an effect predicated of its proximate cause. MacIntyre discerns this directionality in his insightful interpretation of a science as developing in accordance with its own τέλος as knowledge. He characterizes this directionality in terms of "perfected science" (Principles, 27–8). His insight is, nevertheless, helpful in introducing a notion of the ethics of investigation (Principles, 33, 42).
[46] AP 1.6.74b14–15.
[47] AP 1.6.74b17.

network supports reasoning that proceeds either *a priori* or *a posteriori* and that can discern causes either proximate or distant. Reasoning can be messy, incomplete, and *a posteriori,* and still be following the criteria for demonstration in the *Posterior Analytics.*[48]

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SCIENTIFIC DEMONSTRATION IN ARISTOTLE, THEORIA, AND REDUCTIONISM

EDWARD M. ENGELMANN

THE IDEA THAT SCIENTIFIC METHODOLOGY IS CONCERNED with the attainment of *theoria* or intellectual perception of substantial natures is articulated by Aristotle in, for instance, *Parts of Animals:* "Even these, by disclosing to intellectual perception the artistic spirit that designed them, give immense pleasure to all who can trace links of causation, and are inclined to philosophy."[1] Notions such as this do not usually arise in modern discussions of Aristotelian scientific methodology. In this paper, I wish to explore the notion that Aristotelian scientific methodology as formulated in the *Posterior Analytics* is in fact concerned with tracing such "links of causation" in a way that allows entities to disclose their "artistic spirits"—their substantial natures—to the theoretical intellect.

The scientific methodology to be considered offers a counter-reductionist approach to nature. Simply put, reductionism is interested in entities not for their own sake, but only insofar as they lead to effects. Our knowledge of entities is thus exhausted with the apprehension of the effects they produce. Aristotelian methodology as I interpret it, by contrast, is primarily concerned with entities in themselves. Entities are causes, to be sure, but their effects are not simply results, which, after they are produced, have no further relation to

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[1] Aristotle, *Parts of Animals* 1.5.645a7, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941). All references herein to Aristotle are from McKeon, except where noted. Another classic passage from Aristotle on essential attributes as a way of gaining knowledge of the internal essence is Aristotle, *De Anima* 1.1.402b22. A recent author who also advances this notion is Harari: "The essence [of the substance] is articulated and elucidated through the discovery of properties of the substance" (Orna Harari, *Knowledge and Demonstration: Aristotle's Posterior Analytics* [Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004], 83). Unfortunately, Harari does not give a detailed explanation of this in relation to the rest of his interpretation.

their causes. Rather, the effects that arise from entities are manifestations of their formative natures and so refer back to them. Scientific investigation, accordingly, can use such manifestations to gain knowledge of entities. It therefore grants an ontological integrity to entities above and beyond the effects to which they give rise.

Most accounts of Aristotelian methodology suppose that the primary concern of scientific demonstration is not entities and their substantial natures, but the attributes belonging to them. Of course, demonstration is also about attributes. But I contend that the ultimate aim of demonstration is not knowledge about attributes themselves, but knowledge of substantial natures *through* the attributes belonging to an entity. Indeed, the supposition that demonstration is principally about attributes is implicitly reductionist, for attributes are then taken as an effect in the sense that they are necessitated by their cause, the substance to which they belong. As I will show later, this reduces the subject to simply an occasion for attributes. A consideration of this necessitative concept of demonstration will help us to become aware of our own reductionist presuppositions and highlight the counter-reductionist features of the alternative I am presenting.

Because this paper is a conceptual exploration and does not attempt to give a definitive interpretation of Aristotle, I shall occasionally avail myself of the help of philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition, such as Thomas Aquinas. Moreover, I seek to make the ideas of Aristotle an active participant in the current discussion on an adequate approach to nature, and so I will make use of modern philosophers like Edmund Husserl and Ian Hacking. These authors will assist me to present the issues in a way that emphasizes their epistemic and counter-reductionist significance. I shall also bring in ideas from such philosophers as William Ockham and G. E. L. Owen, because they serve as a useful foil for the interpretations I will be advancing. In addition, works of Aristotle other than the *Posterior Analytics* will be found relevant, because Aristotle makes many comments throughout his corpus which help to clarify his scientific methodology.

In this paper, I will first give an overall presentation of how demonstration is used to attain knowledge of substantial natures. I will then discuss the metaphysical background of demonstration as understood in this way. Some elaboration of this background is required in that a methodological stance towards reality always corresponds to presuppositions as to the fundamental nature of the latter. I will then deal with issues that need to be clarified regarding the components of

the demonstrative syllogism: universals, definitions, and propositions. This is necessary in order to make clear what comes afterwards.

The distinction between knowledge and opinion insofar as it relates to their respective objects will be discussed next. It is important to do so because of my claim that knowledge, as *theoria*, is not reducible to the modern notion of justified true opinion. Rather, knowledge as *theoria* is qualitatively distinct from opinion insofar as it represents a distinct cognitive state. This will be followed by a consideration of the idea that demonstration begins with empirical propositions asserted as conclusions of demonstrative syllogisms, and then moves toward premises, which explicate and thus demonstrate the conclusion. Traditionally, this approach is called "analysis" or "resolution." This leads to a discussion of the "necessary middle term" which provides this explication by showing how the subject is essentially connected with its proper attribute. The following section brings everything together by showing that scientific knowledge consists in *theoria* of essential natures by means of the necessary middle, which, as formal cause of the demonstrative syllogism, provides a kind of window to these natures. Finally, as an appendix, I will consider doctrines advanced by William of Ockham about demonstration, in order to throw more light on issues discussed throughout this paper by showing how he anticipates a reductionist understanding of demonstration.

I

Substantial natures and theoria. Aquinas characterizes our idea of demonstration in this way: "The truth of existing things consists fundamentally in the apprehension of the essence of things, an essence that rational souls cannot apprehend immediately by themselves. Instead, the soul scatters itself throughout the proper attributes and effects that surround the essence of the thing, so that from these the soul enters upon its own truth."[2] The immediate apprehension of things does not really attain to knowledge of their

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[2] Thomas Aquinas, *De divinis nominibus*, para. 713 (Rome: Marietti, 1952), 267: "Veritas enim existentium radicaliter consisit in apprehensione quidditatis rerum, quam quidditatem rationales animae non statim apprehendere possunt per seipsam, sed diffundunt se per proprietates et effectus qui circumstant rei essentiam, ut ex his ad propriam veritatem ingrediantur." Translation is my own.

substantial nature, because, as Aristotle puts it, if directly confronted by their intrinsic intelligibility, human reason would be unable to perceive them: "For as the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is the reason in our souls to the things which are by nature most evident of all."[3] In order to obtain insight into what is most evident of all, therefore, our reason must take an indirect approach and gather it through the proper attributes and effects of an entity. These have a substantiality of their own, but one which is secondary relative to that of their subject. They are really distinct from the essential nature of the entity, yet are essentially dependent upon it. Because proper attributes are manifestations of that which is not immediately apparent—the substantial nature—these attributes are said to be better known to us. The substantial nature is better known in itself, because of its intrinsic intelligibility. Beginning with what is better known to us, the scientist in demonstration seeks to attain insight into the substantial nature. Such insight into substantial natures through their effects is the rational soul's natural end.

The metaphysical basis for this approach is that "a thing's operation manifests its form and being, since a thing operates according as it is a being, and its proper operation follows upon its proper nature."[4] The substantial form, as the cause of the being of an entity, is ontologically manifested in the entity's effects or operations. Aristotle says that the form, which is the immediate formal cause of an entity, is thereby the nonimmediate cause of properties belonging to it.[5] Aquinas characterizes this causality as a sort of efficient causality, because the effect is truly distinct from the form as cause. However, this causality is internal to a substance and does not transform anything. For instance, the animal soul causes the attribute of sight, but there is no transition involved in this causation, because the soul in its very essence is such as to be both the source of sight and the actual-

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[3] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b10.

[4] Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles* 2.79, trans. Vernon J. Bourke, vol. 2 (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 4. For a full discussion of this concept, see Edward Engelmann, *Mechanism, Reductionism, and the Artificial in the Light of the Classical Tradition* (Ann Arbor: UMI, 2000), especially chapters 1–3.

[5] "While some things have a cause distinct from themselves, others have not. Hence it is evident that there are essential natures which are immediate . . . On the other hand [there are things which have] a cause of their being other than that being itself" (*Posterior Analytics* 2.9.93b22–7. Hereafter cited as *APo.*). In my understanding, Aristotle's use of the term "effect" in this context is basically as a synonym for "proper attributes" or "properties." These are often second acts or operations.

ization of sight, namely seeing. When Aquinas says second acts are "not of the essence of the thing, but are caused out of the essence as principle," he is referring to such causality.[6] Aquinas refers to this kind of causality as "emanation," to distinguish it from "normal" efficient causality involving change.[7]

I have shown elsewhere that this emanative causal relationship between entity and its attribute is not one of necessitation.[8] That is to say, there is nothing in the nature of the subject that forces it to have the proper attributes it does in fact have. Moreover, because the subject does not necessitate its attributes, the attributes are not necessary conditions for their subject. Rather, it is the case that an attribute necessitates its subject. It does not causally necessitate the subject, of course. The necessitation is one of reference: a proper attribute necessarily refers back to the entity from which it arises. In this respect, an attribute is like a symbol which necessarily refers to the symbolized, but is not itself necessitated by it. Aquinas says that attributes caused by a subject are similitudes of the latter; a similitude is a natural or ontological symbol. In that attributes refer back to the subject from which they arise, the subject is also the ultimate final cause of its attributes. Proper attributes, therefore, arise from the subject and are ultimately for the sake of the subject.[9]

In modern discussions of Aristotelian demonstration, necessitation is in fact usually taken to describe the causal relation between a subject and its effects or proper attributes. This leads to a notion of demonstration as that which shows how such necessitation specifically occurs. This notion of demonstration, I have suggested, is implicitly reductionist. The above clarification of the ontological relationship between subject and attribute is thus essential if demonstration is to be properly understood. I shall return to this topic.

II

The components of demonstrative syllogisms and their origination. For Aristotle, scientific knowledge is based on the empirical

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[6] Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles* 2.79.

[7] Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia, q. 77, a. 1, vol. 11, trans. Timothy Suttor (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970).

[8] Engelmann, *Mechanism, Reductionism, and the Artificial*, ch. 2.

[9] Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia, q. 77, a. 1.

apprehension of particulars. From this apprehension, universals are derived. The origination of the universals, definitions, and propositions formed from universals will now be considered, as my approach to knowledge as *theoria* depends upon an appropriate understanding of these topics.

Here is the way Aristotle presents the relationship between sense perception, universals, and demonstration: "Demonstration develops from universals, induction from particulars . . . But induction is impossible for those who have not sense perception. For it is sense perception alone which is adequate for grasping particulars: they cannot be objects of scientific knowledge, because neither can universals give us knowledge of them without induction, nor can we get it through induction without sense-perception."[10] The materials out of which the *demonstrative syllogism* is constructed are universals. Universals themselves are derived by *induction* from sensible particulars. Scientific knowledge thus depends upon particulars, yet particulars are not the objects of scientific knowledge. It is generally agreed that this means that particulars are not objects of knowledge in their particularity; rather it is particulars as members of a universal species which are the objects. However, just what it means for universals to "develop from" induction, for demonstration to "develop from" universals, and what the relation between sense perception and induction is, are much debated questions in Aristotelian scholarship.

As is well known, Aristotle thought of intellection, in the first instance, as consisting of the reception by the passive intellect of the substantial form derived from a particular entity external to the mind. How this occurs and what role the agent intellect plays in this process is a subject of great controversy. Interesting as this problem is, and however vital the clarification of it is in terms of Aristotle's overall theory of knowledge, this paper must pass over it in silence and address issues more proximate to the acquisition of knowledge thorough scientific methodology.

The form of an entity as it is received by the passive intellect is appropriately referred to by Aquinas as the "impressed species." Now, this reception is not itself a cognition of anything. Rather, an impressed species, in specifying the passive intellect, activates the intellect in such a way that it is able to cognize the entity from which the impressed species originated. This is a second sense of intellection.

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[10] *APo.* 1.18.81a40–81b9.

The intellect achieves this cognition through an "expressed species" that it produces insofar as it is activated. Let us consider the relationship between the expressed species and cognition.

Aristotle makes it clear in a well known chapter at the end of the *Posterior Analytics* that a perceived individual is not some bare particular, devoid of any universality, upon which the intellect tacks on a common name: "Though the act of sense-perception is of the individual, its content is universal—is man, for example, not the man Callias."[11] To be perceived at all, that is, an individual must be perceived as being of a particular kind. An individual is perceived *as* a moose, or *as* a human. Otherwise, the individual Callias could not be perceived at all, for there would be no way to pick out perceptually a bundle of sensations as forming one individual unless these sensations were already organized by the intellect into a *gestalt*. We perceive humans or moose or maple trees, not sensations; perception is an intellectual act whose matter is sensation.[12]

Later writers develop this notion in some detail. The intellectual act, insofar as it is considered from the standpoint of its intrinsic directedness toward an extramental object, is called by Aquinas an "intention." Aquinas speaks of intentionality in the following way: "The intellect, informed by the impressed species, in the act of intellection forms within itself a certain intention of the thing understood which is the *ratio* of the thing, which the definition signifies."[13] This *ratio* is the expressed species. It must be emphasized that "the intention is not in us the thing understood."[14] Rather, the intellect, by forming this intention, apprehends the thing itself. It is only in a reflexive act that the intention itself becomes the thing understood: "Whence it is apparent that it is one thing to know entities and another to know the understood intention itself, which the intellect does when it reflects upon its work."[15] Such objectified intentions formed by reflection are abstract

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[11] *APo.* 2.9.100b1.

[12] Harari points out (*Knowledge and Demonstration*, 32) that in *Nichomachean Ethics* 6.8, Aristotle explicitly makes a distinction between *aisthesis* as sensation and *aisthesis* as that "by which we perceive that the particular figure before us is a triangle" (1142a29). This latter *aisthesis* is akin, Aristotle says, to *phronesis*. Harari's analysis of *APo.* 2.19 in chapter 1 of his work agrees substantially with mine, except that, as we shall see, I think that the induction that Aristotle speaks of in this chapter is a distinct stage in the formation of the universal.

[13] Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles* 1.53.

[14] Ibid., 4.11.

[15] Ibid.

concepts or universals, whose relations with one another are governed by the laws of logic.

John Poinsot, the 17th century founder of semiotics, understands intentions in terms of his notion of the "formal sign." A formal sign is a concept which, without itself being known as an object, enables an apprehension of an extramental object: "By the same act of cognition, both the concept and the thing are directly attained; it is not from the knowledge of the concept that the thing conceived is attained."[16] The formal sign is a medium *in quo* through which the thing signified is known. Poinsot distinguishes the formal sign from the "instrumental sign." An instrumental sign is a concept which first must be apprehended as a distinct object in order to perform its signifying function: "An instrumental sign is known as something extrinsically from the thing known, from the knowledge of which the signified is known."[17] A universal is a kind of instrumental sign. Unlike the cognition of the formal sign from which it is derived, cognition of a universal constitutes an indirect apprehension of the extramental object which it represents.

The work of Edmund Husserl in his *Logical Investigations* provides a link between Aquinas's intentions and Poinsot's formal signs. For Husserl, consciousness is not an entity or place but rather a referential or intentional act. Hence, to be conscious is to be aware of that which is other than consciousness, namely, the object. In a "nominal" intentional act—one involving language—the meaning-content of a word is "lived through." Husserl calls this meaning-content the "expressive sign." The expressive sign is akin to Poinsot's formal sign. The expressive sign is not itself an object of thought but the structure of the referential act. When thinking about a horse, we are peripherally aware of the meaning "horse." But the actual focus of thought is of the horse itself: "All objects and relations among objects only are what they are for us, through acts of thought essentially different from them, in which they [that is, for example, the objects] become present to us, in which they stand before us as unitary items that we *mean.*"[18]

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[16] John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Ars Logica*, pt. 2, q. 22, ed. P. Beautus Reiser (Taurini: Marietti, 1930).

[17] Ibid., q. 22.

[18] Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, tr. J. N. Findlay, vol. 1 (London: Kegan Paul, 1970), Investigation I, §238, p. 283. See also Investigation V.

Husserl emphasizes that even when the object is not sensibly present, the objective reference of the act still exists. A thought of an absent object does not take the meaning itself as an object, but rather directly refers to the particular object. Though an intention may not be fulfilled by what Husserl calls sensible intuition, it still exists as referencing that which is other than itself. Husserl points out that it is because philosophers think that an intention must have a present object that intentionality is taken, in the first instance, to be about concepts in the mind. Then the problem arises of how the mental object can refer to an object external to the mind. For Husserl, such instrumental reference is secondary and based upon the primary referentiality to real things by the intentional act. An intentional act and its object, whether the object is present or absent, are immediately correlative. No gap needing to be bridged exists between intention and reality.

The actual engendering of the universal as instrumental sign from the formal sign is, I contend, characterized by the process of induction Aristotle speaks about in *Posterior Analytics* 2.19. In this much discussed passage, Aristotle describes induction as being a transition from the noetic act of perception to "the universal now stabilized within the soul."[19] He compares this process to a "rout in a battle stopped by first one man making a stand and then another, until the original formation has been restored."[20] As we have seen, in the initial perceptions of something, the formal signs by which they are perceived are not at first reflected upon and objectified. Callias and others are perceived as men, but the universal "man" is not apprehended. The content of the formal signs is intangible or fleeting, like the army in a rout. But suddenly one man turns around and makes a stand. This represents the mind turning back on itself, so that it becomes aware of its content as such. This is immediately followed by similar reflective acts, which further stabilize the sign. The universal as instrumental sign is formed. The transition to the universal stabilized within the soul is and is not instantaneous, like an unpredictable regime change in a dynamic system. But the ultimate outcome is that the universal concept "man" is grasped, a concept that applies not just to Callias, or Plato, or Callicles, but to everything that is a man.

This is a third sense of intellection. The initial human cognition of essential natures is in terms of universal concepts, which, though in

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[19] *APo.* 2.19.100a6.
[20] Ibid. 100a11.

the mind, are ultimately empirically derived from the forms of actual entities. This cognition is indeed a type of knowledge. This knowledge of essential nature, nevertheless, is quite deficient compared to the essence as it is inherently intelligible. In the first instance, the concept, as we have seen, is not an objectified universal but rather a formal sign. Consequently, a universal, as an object of thought, is merely a "such," not a "this."[21] It follows that, insofar as the degree of intrinsic intelligibility of something corresponds to its degree of being and unity, the universal ranks low in this regard. The ultimate reason that we cannot attain better direct knowledge of essential natures, according to Aquinas, is that our empirical apprehension of things involves the bodily senses. Because of this dependence on the senses, our "immediate" knowledge of essential natures is in terms of the universal. Aquinas postulates the existence of intellectual beings who are not embodied, and so they would not be blinded by the intrinsic intelligibility of substantial natures.[22] Such beings would need no discursive thought. But the human intellect, insofar as its knowledge begins with the senses, must discursively "scatter itself throughout the properties and effects that surround the essence" in order to cognize essential natures insofar as they are better known in themselves.

The method for this is given in Aristotle's account of demonstration, which works with the material provided by universals. This methodology shows how universals are discursively combined into complex demonstrative syllogisms. In the process of demonstration itself one is focused on universals, not the things themselves for which the universals stand. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the ultimate ontological source and cognitive end of universals are the things themselves.

Discursive thought begins with definition.[23] Definitions play a vital role in demonstration, as the premises of a demonstrative syllogism are constructed from them. A definition is an explication of a

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[21] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 7.13.1039a.

[22] Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia, q. 57, a.1.

[23] Definition seems to be regarded by Aristotle as on the borderline between apprehension of universals and discursive thought. Like apprehension of universals, definitions cannot be in error, and definition and defined form a single logical unit (see below). Yet, in *APo.* 2.13, he maintains that forming definitions involves the process of division and composition, which it seems can be in error, and in *APo.* 2.3–5 he seems to say that they can fail to state the essence.

universal designating a species, by means of other universals designating the genus and specific difference. In a definition, the genus to which the defined belongs is initially stated, followed by a statement of the specific difference, which specifies how the species differs from other species in that genus. For instance, "rational animal" states the essence of humanity. If a thing were not an animal of the rational sort, it would not be human. Such definitions are therefore necessary. Yet, they are empirically based, since they are of universal concepts derived from external objects. They are consequently called "real definitions," which are to be distinguished from "nominal definitions," whose necessity is *a priori* and merely analytic.

An important feature of definitions in regard to their demonstrative use is that they are immediate.[24] To see what this means, let us contrast definitions with propositions. In a proposition such as "the elephant is pink," the predicate "pink" is asserted as belonging to the elephant. But the elephant is not defined as being pink; hence the predicate and subject are logically distinct from one another. A definition, on the other hand, is not, like a proposition, the "assertion of something concerning something."[25] Because of this, says Aristotle, definition cannot be in error.[26] In order for there to be a falsehood, the subject and predicate must be logically divisible, so that a false predicate rather than a true one can be attached to the subject. But a definition and subject term defined comprise a single unit that is indivisible. For Aristotle, a definition, in that it states the subject's formal nature, acts as a kind of formal cause.[27] Just as the formal cause of an entity is immediate with the entity, insofar as it is that by which the entity is what it is, a definition is immediate with its subject in that the latter would not be what it is were it not as defined.

Turning back to propositions, we must realize that even though the predicate in a proposition is indeed distinct from the subject, the proposition itself is "not actually divided." Aristotle emphasizes that

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[24] *APo.* 1.2.71b21. Immediate premisses are definitions that are known prior to demonstration (*APo.* 1.3.72b20).

[25] Aristotle, *De anima* 3.6.430b28.

[26] Aristotle, *De anima* 3. 6.430b6. See also *APo.* 3.3.90b35, where Aristotle says that, in contrast to subject-attribute conclusions of demonstrations, in definitions "one thing is not predicated of another." In *APo.* 1.15, Aristotle speaks of the subject and predicate in the premises of demonstrations (which we shall find are definitions), as being "atomically connected," in that such connections "involves no intermediate [that is, middle] term."

[27] See *APo.* 2.2 on definition as formal cause.

in a proposition, objects of thought are brought together into a "quasi-unity" by the mind. In the Aristotelian tradition, this unity is often understood as being a single articulated universal composed of a formal principle and a material one. The formal principle would be the connective "is," and the material principle, the subject and predicate. The connective form integrates the judgment into a whole composed of explicitly differentiated parts or *relata*. Aristotle says that a whole judgment is like an undivided line that is apprehended in "undivided time." So even though the line is "composed" of parts, the parts exist only in potential, and so the mind does not separately apprehend each part of the line. Rather, it apprehends all the parts simultaneously.[28]

Husserl's discussion of propositional or categorial intentions presents a phenomenological description of the relation between cognition of complex propositions in undivided time and their objective references. We have already discussed nominal intentions, which refer to an individual through a single word. For Husserl, a categorial intention has as its content a proposition which contains two nominal intentional acts (subject and predicate) as subsumed within the intention as a whole. Such categorical acts, though complex, are not spread over a period of time with each part occurring after another. Rather, all parts occur at the same time. Husserl says that categorial acts are "many-rayed": the two rays pointing to the two aspects (subject and predicate) of the categorial object are unified by the single categorial act.[29] The formal cause of this unification would be the "is." For instance, the "is" unifies the nominal acts "gold" and "yellow" into the complex whole, "gold is yellow."

According to Husserl, just as the subsumed nominal acts have their objects, so also categorical acts refer to an objective unity. "Gold" and "yellow" have their objects, while the categorial act has the complex object gold-being-yellow. Insofar as the act is categorial, the "is" would be the formal cause of the state of affairs of gold-being-yellow. In order that a state of affairs be apprehended, the nonsensible but real "is" constituting the state must be intellectually perceived

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[28] See Aristotle, *De anima* 3.6 for quotes in this paragraph.

[29] Similarly, John Capreolus held that the entire articulated propositional judgment serves as a kind of formal sign or *medium in quo* through which an extramental fact is apprehended. See Norman Nuchelmans, "The Semantics of Propositions," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 207.

in categorial intuition as the fulfillment of a categorial intention. For, like a nominal intention, a categorial intention can be fulfilled or unfulfilled. It is only in a secondary act that the categorial intention itself is reflected upon so that the judgment is transformed from a complex expressive sign into a complex, but unified, universal concept.

Modern philosophy usually understands the connection between subject and attribute (indeed, all syntactic connections) as exclusively being the result of the mind's own synthetic activity. This notion goes back to Locke, who said that these connections come into being as a result of reflection on our mental activities. But such a way of thinking about judgments creates a barrier between linguistically embodied knowledge and perception. For Husserl, it is only because we perceive the categorial object of gold-being-yellow that we can *say* that "gold is yellow." Propositions are grounded in reality because consciousness is intentional.

<div align="center">III</div>

Knowledge and opinion. The matter of the distinction between knowledge and opinion must also be addressed in order for the role of *theoria* in demonstration to be appreciated. For Aristotle and the medieval tradition, the objects of opinion are ontologically distinct from objects of scientific knowledge. Ian Hacking summarizes this concept well, insofar as it contrasts with the modern doctrine:

> The first thing to grasp . . . is the distinction between knowledge and opinion in medieval thought. It is indeed an ancient distinction that we all associate with Plato. . . . It contrasts strongly with all modern epistemology. For a good number of years, now, philosophers have been debating whether knowledge is justified true belief . . . it is widely accepted that if p is true, then one person may believe p while another, in a happier epistemological state, may know the very same proposition p. Knowledge and belief are in the same line of business. If we are to understand the Thomistic doctrine we must adopt a different stance. Knowledge, so far from being justified true belief, does not even have the same objects as opinion.[30]

Objects of opinion are accidental and changeable, while objects of knowledge are necessary and eternal. We have already discussed

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[30] Ian Hacking, *The Emergence of Probability* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 20. For Aristotle on this distinction, see *APo.* 1.33.88b30–89a5.

propositions, which are contingent because the states of affairs they refer to are accidental. Eternal and necessary states of affairs can also be referred to by propositions. For instance, "triangles equal 180 degrees" is a necessary proposition, because it refers to a necessary state.

Husserl's concept of intentionality can help us understand how knowledge and opinion are differing cognitive states insofar as they correspond to, respectively, necessary and contingent objects. As we have seen, Husserl emphasizes that intentional acts, insofar as they are a conscious "tending towards" objects, cannot themselves be objects. Hence intentional acts have a sort of being distinct from their objects, in a way that conceptual objects "in the mind" and corresponding objects in the external world would not. Nevertheless, it is precisely because intentions are not mental objects but mental references toward objects that they are, unlike concepts in the mind, directly aligned with their objects. Intention and object are immediately related to each other in a correlative sense, like convex and concave. This correlativity is what truth consists in, defined by Husserl along with the Scholastics as the "adequation of intellect to the thing."[31] Truth, so to speak, is an event: the experience of intellectual adequation.

Because of the mutual fittedness of intentional act to object intended, metaphysically distinct modes of objectivity will correspond to epistemically distinct modes of intentions. Applied to the consideration of the cognitive states of opinion and knowledge, this means that cognitive states involving contingent propositions are qualitatively distinct from those involving necessary ones. The state of knowledge is a form of awareness distinct from that of opinion, because, insofar as being and truth are convertible, distinct modes of being—contingent and necessary—correlatively involve distinct truths.

In most modern epistemological theories, objects of knowledge and of opinion are taken to be the very same; they are simply neutral objects external to us, about which either opinions or knowledge can be had. Knowledge and opinion as epistemic states are cognitively in "the same line of business." They are not qualitatively distinct: the

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[31] Husserl, *Logical Investigations* VI, §36 (1:762). Husserl uses the original Latin phrase *adaequatio rei ad intellectus*. Note that the *adequatio* is not between an idea and the thing, but the intellect and the thing. The traditional notion of truth as *adequatio* is not the correspondence theory of truth.

sole difference between opinion and knowledge is the degree of justification with which a proposition (about an objective state of affairs) is held. True belief is the correspondence of a proposition and a state of affairs it asserts to be the case. One is to a greater or lesser extent justified in making an assertion. Someone might have little or no justification for a true belief they hold; hence, even if their belief is true, they have no knowledge. Another will be in that "happier epistemological state," because their belief is well justified.[32] An epistemic theory such as this, from the Aristotelian standpoint, would be regarded as an illegitimate reduction of knowledge to opinion, a reduction based on an inadequate theory of truth—often called the "correspondence theory."

Various modern authors beholden to the theory that knowledge is justified true belief have argued that the notion that objects of knowledge are eternal and necessary amounts to a modal confusion.[33] It is said that the necessity of a sentence such as "triangles equal 180 degrees" is wrongly understood as "triangles (necessarily) equal 180 degrees." Rather, the way the sentence should be read, they claim, is "(necessarily) triangles equal 180 degrees." The former says *de re*, triangles are such as *to be* equal to 180 degrees, while the latter simply says that *de dicto*, "triangle" is mathematically synonymous with "equal to 180 degrees." It follows that knowledge would simply be a justified true opinion that a given proposition can never be otherwise, that there will never be a disconfirming instance. Knowledge, this view assumes, is not a direct experience of a necessary state of affairs. Knowledge is directly of the proposition and indirectly of the state of affairs; it is not, as has been argued, directly of a state of affairs through a proposition. The presupposition behind this modal confusion theory, of course, is the Humean one that all truths are divided into relations of ideas (necessary) and matters of fact

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[32] As has been the case since Descartes, knowledge in this view is taken as being a question of certainty.

[33] See Montgomery Furth, "Elements of Eleatic Ontology," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 6.2 (April 1968): 111–32. G. E. L. Owen makes much the same point in terms of the supposed confusion between tenseless statements and statements of eternal truth. For instance, "three is an odd number" is not an eternal truth about the number three; rather, it simply doesn't make any sense to say that "three *was* an odd number." G. E. L. Owen, "Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present," *The Monist*, 50 (1966): 317–40. Since Saul Kripke's *Naming and Necessity*, with its argument for necessary *a posteriori* truths, approaches such as those of Furth and Owen have been less influential. Nevertheless, they still form a kind of tacit background for many discussions of traditional philosophy.

(contingent). This presupposition, moreover, is that upon which the doctrine is based that knowledge is justified true belief in a proposition.

<div align="center">IV</div>

Analysis and demonstration. The methodological starting point for an actual demonstration is the positing of an empirically based proposition as conclusion for a prospective demonstrative syllogism. According to Alexander of Aphrodisias, in such a syllogism, "the major term is the predicate of a problem whose provability is to be investigated by the construction of a syllogism."[34] The conclusion is a kind of hypothesis which is to be proven. Aristotle, using astronomy as an illustration, puts it this way: "Once the phenomena were adequately apprehended, the demonstrations of astronomy were discovered. . . . Consequently, if the attributes of the thing are apprehended, our business will then be to exhibit readily the demonstrations."[35] The empirically apprehended phenomena are formulated as propositions which posit attributes as properly belonging to an entity. For instance, it might be posited that twinkling necessarily belongs to stars (as opposed to planets); this hypothesis is proven in the premises of a demonstration which show how distance from the earth is responsible for this attribute.

Traditionally, this bottom-up approach to syllogistic construction is termed "analysis" or "resolution." The term resolution is today especially apt, because of its optical connotations. A telescope resolves a double star, in that a single image is resolved into two distinct ones. Similarly, the connectivity of the subject and predicate in the conclusion is resolved or articulated in the premises. The converse of resolution is called "synthesis" or "composition," which takes the more obvious top-down approach from premises to conclusion to syllogistic construction. Synthesis takes place, however, only after analysis.[36] In synthesis, the conclusion that had been *posited* as a necessary proposition is shown to be in fact necessary, because it follows from the necessity shown in the premises.

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[34] William Kneale and Martha Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 70.

[35] Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* 1.30.46a20.

The predicate of a proposition posited in the conclusion, Aristotle emphasizes, must be commensurately universal with its subject. In a commensurately universal proposition, the subject and predicate are convertible, that is, if the proposition is true, the converse is also true. This is because an attribute which necessarily belongs to a subject uniquely characterizes that subject. An attribute does so because of the ontological fact that (as we have seen) it is a sufficient condition for the subject from which it arises, and so the term designating that attribute must refer to that subject only. For instance, the attribute "equals 180 degrees" uniquely characterizes triangles. Hence, a reference to this attribute by the predicate term must also be a reference to a triangle by the subject term, and conversely. A posited conclusion of demonstrative syllogism should be commensurately universal, for only then is it possible for the scientist to go on to show that the relationship between attribute and subject is in fact one of proper belonging.[37]

Insofar as it is merely posited, a commensurately universal proposition is only a matter of opinion. Even though the proposition might be necessary, it is not known as necessary. Only after a successful demonstration is the proposition established as one that is truly commensurately universal, and so a matter of knowledge. This sort of methodological transformation might seem to violate the aforementioned principle that the objects of opinion and of knowledge are metaphysically distinct. Aristotle, however, takes some pains in explaining how this is possible, in *Posterior Analytics* 1.33. After establishing the distinction between knowledge and opinion, Aristotle

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[36] For traditional discussions of analysis and synthesis, see the quote from Pappas in Sir Thomas L. Heath, *The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements*, vol. 1, (New York: Dover, 1956), 138. See also: "Urban the Averroist," in William A. Wallace, *Causality and Scientific Explanation*, vol. 1, *Medieval and Early Classical Science* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981), 120–1; and "Hugo of Sienna," also in Wallace 1:126–7. Aristotle also refers to analysis in *Prior Analytics* 1.27, especially 43b1–14, and in *Parts of Animals* 1.1.8–11. Although this notion of analysis is not brought up in most modern treatments of Aristotelian demonstration, more recent studies are very conscious of it. See, for example, Patrick H. Byrne, *Analysis and Science in Aristotle* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 58; Harari, *Knowledge and Demonstration*, 137–8. Even though Aristotle takes both the analytic and synthetic approaches in his logical works, he never makes explicit the difference between the two, and so never announces when he is using one or the other. I suspect this accounts for some of the difficulties in the interpretation of the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*.

[37] On the commensurate universal, see *APo.* 1.4–5.

asks, "[I]n what sense, then, can the same thing be the object of both opinion and knowledge?" His answer is that "the object of opinion and knowledge is not quite identical; it is only in a sense identical, just as the object of true and false opinion is identical." How so? Aristotle goes on to explain: "If a man grasps truths that cannot be other than they are . . . he will have not opinion but knowledge: if on the other hand he apprehends these attributes as inhering in their subjects, but not in virtue of the subject's substance and essential nature, he possesses opinion and not genuine knowledge."

Whether a proposition is an object of knowledge or opinion, therefore, is a matter of the intentional act by which it is apprehended. An initial (true) opinion regarding a commensurably universal state of affairs is potentially scientific knowledge of the very same state of affairs. That is to say, when through demonstration the ontological status of the attribute is resolved in the premises as being one of proper belonging (that is, when the attribute is known as an attribute belonging properly rather than merely contingently), then potential knowledge, which consists of a probable opinion regarding a commensurably universal relationship, is actualized as scientific knowledge. Here there is a movement from the better known to us to the better known in itself. The necessity shown in the premises is then synthetically imported into the conclusion, so that from an initial statement of opinion, it is transformed into a statement involving knowledge.

V

The necessary middle term and demonstration. The vital role played by the "necessary middle term" contained in the premises of a demonstrative syllogism will now be addressed. Aristotle holds that "demonstrative knowledge must be knowledge of a necessary nexis, and therefore must clearly be obtained through a necessary middle term; otherwise its possessor will know neither the cause nor the fact that his conclusion is a necessary connection."[38] The necessary middle in the premises is what proves the proper belonging of the attribute to the subject. A given demonstrative middle is necessary in the sense that it is the only middle term possible if the syllogism is in

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[38] Ibid. 1.6.75a13.

fact to be demonstrative. For any demonstrated conclusion, the middle term proving it is unique.[39] Scientific knowledge is apprehension of a unique middle term. The middle is therefore responsible for the essential connection between subject and attribute, as well as for our knowledge of that connection.

In regard to syllogistic structure in general (not only demonstrative syllogisms), the middle term is the most important component. A syllogism establishes a connection between the major and minor terms, and the syllogism is founded upon the presence of a middle term connecting these. In a sense, the middle term is the formal cause of the syllogism with the major and minor terms being the matter; the entire syllogism is a whole composed of the middle as form and the terms as matter. In Aristotle's logic, the syllogism as a whole is the basic logical unit, with the terms and sentences playing subordinate roles. In a syllogism, that is, neither the individual terms nor the individual sentences are the basic units; the basic unit is the entire configuration of major term and minor term *as* connected by a middle.[40]

The major and minor terms in the premises of any syllogism are logically invariable, insofar as they are already established by the subject and predicate in the conclusion to be proven. It follows that the middle term itself can be thought of as deductively necessitating the conclusion.[41] Now, generally speaking, such a middle is itself variable, insofar as another middle can be substituted for the given middle such that the premises (and thus the conclusion) remain true. Such a variable or "contingent middle term" is like the form of an artifact such as a saw: an artifactual form is accidental in that it is the form of the whole, but not of the parts. For instance, the iron of the saw is not substantially transformed by the accidental form, and can exist as iron when the saw is destroyed.[42] The iron can then be made into some other artifact such as an axe, which has its own accidental form. This

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[39] There are qualifications to this. In *APo.* 1.29, Aristotle says that two different middles can be used in a demonstration, but one must be predicable of the other.

[40] See Engelmann, *Mechanism, Reductionism, and the Artificial,* 128.

[41] "The things whose existence necessitates the existence of something else cannot be shown when only one premise is granted . . . it is shown with two premises when these have a common middle term; so the conclusion necessarily follows when one middle term is granted"; Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* 2.11.94a24–6.

[42] Engelmann, *Mechanism, Reductionism, and the Artificial,* 128.

corresponds to the extreme terms being connected by a different middle.

In a demonstrative syllogism, on the other hand, the middle term cannot be other than it is. It is thus like a substantial form, which is the form of the whole as well as the parts. The major and minor terms are completely subsumed into a whole whose form is the middle term.[43]

Let the minor = A, middle = M, and major = C. When the middle term is necessary, then "A—M—C" taken together as a whole is necessary, for in a given demonstrative syllogism the composite of minor term, middle term, and major term cannot be other than it is. If the middle term were not necessary in this way, then the syllogism would not be demonstrative. Syntactically, this means that the conclusion would not be commensurately universal—and so it would not express the proper belonging of the attribute to the subject. Now it is often thought that when Aristotle says that the premises must be necessary, he means only that the premises taken individually must be necessary. In particular, the subject is taken as being a proximate necessitating cause of the middle (and a remote necessitating cause of the attribute), while the middle is taken as a proximate necessitating cause of the attribute.[44] However, the individual necessity of premises of this kind does not guarantee the commensurate universality of the conclusion.

Consider a syllogism that is not demonstrative, yet contains individually necessary premises. Such a syllogism would have individually necessary conditional premises of the form A—necessarily—>B.

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[43] See Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia, q. 76, q. 8, for a discussion of this concept of form being and not being "of the parts."

[44] The assumption that the middle is a necessitating cause is found in, for example, Mure's translation of *APo.* 1.6.75a35: "To have reasoned knowledge of a conclusion is to know it through its cause. We may conclude that the middle must be consequentially connected with the minor, and the major with the middle." On the other hand, Apostle renders this passage much more neutrally: "But to know the reason is to know through the cause; hence the middle term should belong to the minor term through it [that is, the minor term], and the major term should belong to the middle term through it [that is, the middle term]. Tredennick's translation is similar to Apostle's. Another example of the necessitating interpretation: "Full-fledged scientific knowledge of something requires understanding of its necessitating cause." E. Serene, "Demonstrative Science," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, 497–8. She calls the middle term the "proximate cause" of the effect.

Here, the antecedent A is the necessitating cause for the consequent B, and the consequent is the necessary condition for the antecedent. In such a syllogism with conditional premises, the middle might be replaceable by another middle such that the truth and necessity of the individual propositions are preserved. For example, in "Athenians were hotheaded; hotheaded people are warlike; hence Athenians were warlike," the middle term "hotheaded" can be replaced by another term, like "xenophobic." Here, the middle is not unique, since it is quite possible that a different necessary condition for the subject accidentally coincides with a different necessitating condition for the predicate. The new middle serves to necessitate deductively the original conclusion, which is itself a conditional proposition asserting a necessary linkage between the major and minor.

Such a conclusion, however, would not be commensurately universal, for a conditional cannot be converted. Hence, as we have seen, the conclusion cannot express the attribute's essential belonging to the subject. In sum, if the middle is not unique, such that the conclusion is at most a necessary conditional proposition, then no essential connection can exist between subject and attribute.

If the foregoing interpretation of demonstration involving remote and proximate causes is assumed, it shifts the focus of demonstration away from the subject to the attribute. With the middle being only a necessary condition for the subject, and thus contingent, the subject itself is contingent, in the sense that any subject is adequate so long as it necessitates a given middle serving as proximate cause of the attribute. For, in general, there are multiple alternative necessitating causes for a given effect. The subject is thereby reduced to simply being an occasion for the attribute. For those who fall under the spell of this way of thinking, demonstration becomes thought of as "deducing properties from the essence of the subject."[45] According to this notion, the ontological necessity of properties given by the subject is paralleled by the deductive necessity of properties taken from the subject. The hypothesis of this paper, by contrast, is that properties, as effects, are not necessitated by the subject; rather, they are manifestations of a subject's essence. Demonstration, on this reading, will be concerned with exhibiting the essential connection between

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[45] Harari, *Knowledge and Demonstration*, 72. Harari should know better, but it seems that one falls into this kind of language when the ontological status of the subject-attribute relationship remains unclarified.

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properties and their subject in such a way as to manifest the essential nature of the latter.[46]

Coming back to the necessary middle, to further understand the nature and significance of its necessity, let us consider it from a semantic viewpoint. It is one of Aristotle's basic requirements for demonstration that the premises must both be definitions.[47] The reason for this is that the premises in a demonstration must themselves be indemonstrable. Otherwise, there would be no ultimate ground for demonstration, as the premises would require demonstration, *ad infinitum*. As we have seen, definitions are acquired not by demonstration but by the explication of universals.

In *Posterior Analytics* 2.2, Aristotle makes it clear that in demonstration, the subject and attribute terms are that which are defined. The term defining the subject, then, must be the same as the term defining the attribute. This is the necessary middle. The middle term can be an element in the definition of both the subject and proper attribute, because the definition of a proper attribute must include the subject to which it belongs. This is a logical corollary of the metaphysical fact that a proper attribute intrinsically refers to the subject from which it arises. In the definition of a proper attribute, the subject referred to represents the genus in the definition, while their manner of belonging to the subject represents the specific difference.[48] The definitions of subject and attribute in the premises are thus interlocking, with the specific difference of the attribute constituting the

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[46] Even though Aristotle does use the necessitating cause in several examples for ease of exposition, this sort of cause is in fact relatively unimportant for Aristotle. A necessitating cause, indeed, is merely a type of material cause: it could be said that although it necessitates, it is not eternal. Hence, it cannot be an object of unqualified knowledge. The necessary middle term of a demonstrative syllogism is indeed a cause, but not (normally) in the sense of being a necessitating cause. In *APo.* 73b10–15, Aristotle gives this as an example of a consequential connection: "[I]f a beast dies when its throat is cut, then its death is essentially connected with the cutting." But consideration of this type of connection comes almost as an afterthought, following other much more important types of essential connections. For necessitating causality as a type of material causality, see Engelmann, *Mechanism, Reductionism, and the Artificial*, 188–91 and 200–4. For the connection between the necessitating cause and mechanical causality, see Engelmann, chapter 9.2.2, "*Techne* as Paradigm for Nature."

[47] *APo.* 1.2.

[48] "The subjects to which they belong are contained in the attributes' own defining formula" (*APo.* 1.4.73b37). In *APo.* 2.10, Aristotle makes it clear that the specific difference is the manner of belonging.

necessary middle. An example Aristotle gives is that of thunder as a proper attribute of clouds. Thunder is defined as the noise arising from the collision of clouds. So the genus is the subject to which thunder belongs (namely, the clouds), and the factor differentiating thunder from other attributes of clouds is the necessary middle "noise arising from collision."

Aristotle also describes the dependency relationship of proper attributes to their subject as existing through the causality of the middle term: "The cause through which a thing is—not is this or that, that is, has this or that attribute, but without qualification is—and the cause through which it is—not is without qualification, but is this or that as having some essential attribute or some accident—are both alike the 'middle.'"[49] Just as the form is the ontological formal cause of the entity which embodies it, so too, in the context of demonstration, the middle term as stating essential nature corresponds to the subject's demonstrative formal cause. This is what Aristotle means when he says that the middle is the cause through which the thing "without qualification *is*." Moreover, the form as ontological formal cause of an entity is thereby also the emanative cause of the entity's proper attributes.[50] Since the attribute depends upon an entity, the attribute exists *qua* belonging to it. This is what Aristotle means when he says that, in the demonstrative context, the middle is also the cause of something *qua* having some essential attribute.

The connectivity between subject and proper attribute is also explained by Aristotle in terms of the necessary middle term's formal causality. Because the necessary middle is an element common to the definitions of both subject and attribute, the middle is simultaneously the formal cause of both. As the common formal cause of subject and attribute, says Aristotle, the middle is the cause of the essential connection between them.[51] In fact, the middle, as the formal cause of both subject and attribute, *is* the connection between them, one that is essential rather than contingent. The necessary middle term, therefore, in constituting the connection between subject and attribute, is thereby the formal cause of the syllogism *qua* being demonstrative. We have seen, moreover, that a definition, as formal cause of the thing defined, is immediate with it.   That is why a definition is

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[49] Ibid. 2.2.90a10.
[50] See Section II of this article.
[51] *APo.* 2.2.

indemonstrable: it has no middle term. The middle term, in being the joint formal cause of subject and attribute, is thus immediately related to both; in so being related to both, the middle mediates between them. Hence, the connection there between subject and attribute, though necessary and essential, is not itself immediate.

Because of the mediation by the necessary middle, the conclusion can represent an attribute as being essentially related to its subject, yet not immediate with it. Metaphysically speaking, this corresponds to the notion that powers or second acts, which are proper attributes, are really distinct from their subjects. They are in no way included in the substantial nature to which they essentially belong. For if they were so included in the substantial nature, they would be immediate with it, insofar as a part is immediate with its whole. This also means that they are not necessitated by the substantial nature, for inclusion implies necessitation. Aquinas insists on the real distinction between powers and substance, because if there were not, the multiplicity of powers would endanger the essential unity of the substantial nature—and also the role the nature plays as cause of an entity's unity and being.[52]   The ontological integrity of entities would thereby become problematic.

VI

Theoria and the necessary middle term. We have already taken note of Aristotle's assertion that scientific knowledge is provided by the middle term connecting subject and attribute. Our analysis above indicates that this means that the demonstrative middle term *qua* joint formal cause of subject and attribute provides knowledge by revealing substantial nature.[53]   Unlike the substantial nature in itself,

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[52] See *Summa Theologiae*, Ia, q. 77. For a discussion on how powers and second acts are proper attributes, and why they are not necessitated, see Engelmann, *Mechanism, Reductionism, and the Artificial*, ch. 2.

[53] Harari (*Knowledge and Demonstration*, 38) claims that the main purpose of Aristotelian demonstration is to define the proper attribute found in the conclusion. Subjects, he says, are known through definition prior to demonstration, while attributes can only be known after demonstration through their definition provided in demonstration. But this means that attributes are not defined prior to demonstration. Aristotle, however, indicates in several places that such attributes are predefined also. See, for example, *APo.* 1, chapters 2 and 3.

which would overwhelm the human intellect because of its inherent intelligibility, the substantial nature as revealed by the middle is more commensurable with the intellect. The revelation of substantial nature obtained through resolution is then synthetically imported into the conclusion, so that the proposition that at first was an object of opinion becomes an object of knowledge, one expressing the proper belonging of attribute to subject.

In the second part of this paper, it was suggested that the basis for demonstration being *theoria* of substantial natures is the idea that proper attributes ontologically manifest the substantial nature of their subjects. It follows that to such an ontological manifestation there corresponds an epistemic manifestation: substantial natures are manifested to us by their attributes. Nevertheless, since our initial apprehension of attributes in relation to their subjects is one of accidental belonging only, attributes do not immediately manifest substantial natures. The demonstrative middle, however, enables us to apprehend attributes in terms of their proper belonging. By resolving the internal connection between subject and ontologically manifesting attribute, the demonstrative middle manifests the subject's nature.

The demonstrative middle shows the subject as expressing itself in the attribute, the attribute as expressing the subject. We have seen that the middle is a kind of specific difference, because it resolves the internal connection between an attribute and subject in terms of the attribute's specific manner of dependence. Hence, a middle reveals the subject in terms of a particular attribute. Consequently, its revelation is limited, since it is from a single perspective only. Yet, because each member of the manifold of a subject's proper attributes is differentiated by its own middle, there can be a manifold of demonstrations for a subject, each corresponding to a property belonging to it. In this way, one can better elucidate the substantial nature by showing how it is revealed in various contexts. At the same time, as I have shown elsewhere, a substantial nature can never be exhaustively revealed by any number of attributes with their specific middle terms.[54]

Aristotle insists that neither in the premises nor in the conclusion does demonstration discursively say what the essential nature is.[55]

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[54] This is because attributes are not included in and necessitated by their subjects. See Engelmann, *Mechanism, Reductionism, and the Artificial*, ch. 2, for a full discussion.
    [55] *APo.* 2.3–7.

Although a demonstration is discursive in form, the essential nature is not itself stated in demonstration. Availing ourselves of Wittgenstein's distinction between showing and saying, in the discursive "saying" of the entire demonstrative syllogism, essential nature is "shown." The knowledge acquired in demonstration is not "knowledge-that" something is the case, but rather "knowledge-of" the essential nature. We have seen that a categorial intentional act involves a categorial intuition which cognizes the formal cause—the "is"—of the proposition as a whole. Similarly, scientific knowledge can be understood to involve a kind of categorial act. The act cognizes the essential nature relative to a given attribute through the formal cause of the demonstrative syllogism.

This cognition is *theoria*, the intellectual perception of "the inward depths of things." This is a fourth and most complete sense of "intellection." This intellection is the *telos* of a discursive process starting with a perceptual opinion as posited conclusion of a demonstration. Aquinas claims that scientific knowledge, though imperfect, does resemble a hypothetical direct intuition belonging to higher, intellectual beings: "Although the knowledge which is most characteristic of the human soul occurs in the mode of *ratio*, nevertheless there is in it a sort of participation in the simple knowledge which is proper to higher beings, of whom it is therefore said that they possess the faculty of spiritual vision."[56]

VI

Appendix: William of Ockham and Demonstration. A consideration of passages from William of Ockham on demonstration is of interest, because they highlight several of those features I have emphasized. They do so in a negative way: the features I have emphasized that support a counter-reductionist notion of demonstration are the very ones that Ockham wants to discard. The ultimate reason why Ockham seeks to do so, I suspect, is because his metaphysics no longer gives substantial form the importance it has for earlier thinkers. In effect, Ockham thereby reduces entities to their component parts. How that is the case has been discussed elsewhere.[57]

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[56] Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* 15.1, trans. James P. McGlynn (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994).

Ockham holds that there are different meanings of "scientific knowledge" or *"scientia"*: one is evident cognition of contingent truths, another is evident cognition of necessary truths, and another is "evident cognition of some necessary truth caused by the evident cognition of the necessary premises and a process of syllogistic reasoning."[58] Regarding these different meanings, "one is not subordinated to the other," for they all fall under the category of scientific knowledge.[59] It follows, therefore, that

> if it should be asked whether cognition of the same conclusion acquired through experience and that acquired through demonstration are of the same species; and similarly whether cognition acquired through diverse [sets of] premises is of the same species, it can probably be said that if such a cognition should be precisely cognition of the conclusion and nothing else, it is not inappropriate to posit that such a cognition is of the exact same species.[60]

Ockham is asserting here that scientific knowledge is not qualitatively different from "knowledge" through sense experience. It follows that Ockham is rejecting the traditional qualitative distinction between opinion and knowledge. By collapsing knowledge into opinion, Ockham points the way to the modern notion of knowledge as justified true belief.

Ockham, moreover, indicates in this passage that sets of necessary premises other than those actually used in a particular demonstration can lead to the same conclusion: that is, that the middle is contingent. Apparently, if the necessary premises are such as to lead deductively to a conclusion, that conclusion is considered to be demonstrated and therefore an object of knowledge. Since the middle is contingent, the middle term is important only to the extent that the premises containing it do happen to lead to the conclusion. For if the middle is not unique, how could it express the formal nature of the subject through a particular attribute?

One might ask, since a conclusion can be scientifically known with or without demonstration, what is the rationale for demonstration?

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[57] See Engelmann, *Mechanism, Reductionism, and the Artificial*, ch. 7.
[58] William of Ockham, *Prologue to the Expositio super viii libros Physicorum* 2, trans. P. Boehner, in *Ockham: Philosophical Writings*, ed. P. Boehner and S. Brown (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1990), 5.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ockham, *Summa logicae* 3.2.11, trans. E. Serene, in *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, 514.

Duns Scotus, who also holds that evident cognition of truths apart from demonstration is *scientia*, provides a clue. He says that in demonstration, the same "conclusion which at first was known only by experience now is known . . . with even greater certainty."[61] It seems that experience can provide knowledge of necessary truths such as "all gold is yellow," while demonstration would provide greater certainty—greater justification—for this truth.

A consideration of Ockham's treatment of remote and proximate efficient causality suggests how demonstration would provide greater certainty. Ockham maintains that a cause, properly speaking, must be an immediate cause, since a remote cause is really no cause at all: "A remote cause is not a cause because the effect does not attend its presence. Otherwise Adam could be said to be the cause of me—which is not true, since what is not a being cannot be a cause of being."[62] Only a cause that is proximate, that directly effects a result, can be accepted as a true cause of an effect. It is clear, therefore, that Ockham thinks of efficient causality exclusively as necessitating.[63]

Demonstration would then provide a kind of knowledge of the proximate cause, which I have termed "operative knowledge."[64] Such demonstration does not provide knowledge in the traditional sense, because the middle term is not necessary. The existence of a variety of possible middle terms leading to a single necessary conclusion, however, would not be a problem for Ockham, since they all do in fact lead to that conclusion. So even though cognition of the conclusion through an intermediate middle term is not qualitatively distinct from direct cognition of the conclusion taken alone, analysis of premises, in providing a proximate cause, would give one a more detailed understanding of how the subject necessitates the attribute. The degree of certainty would be increased, just as, if the police have a gun with fingerprints, the degree of certainty is increased that the person whose fingerprints are on the gun committed the crime.

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[61] Duns Scotus, *Opera oxoniense* 1, dist. 3, trans. Allen Wolter, in *Scotus: Philosophical Writings*, ed. Allen Wolter (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), "Concerning Human Knowledge," 110.

[62] William of Ockham, *Opera Philosophica*, vol. 5, §61, in Marilyn McCord Adams, *William Ockham* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 772.

[63] Ibid., 752.

[64] See Engelmann, *Mechanism, Reductionism, and the Artificial*, ch. 13, 14.

THE RELATION BETWEEN LOGIC
AND ONTOLOGY IN THE *METAPHYSICS*

CHARLOTTA WEIGELT

T HE QUESTION CONCERNING THE RELATION between logic and ontology
in Aristotle's thought has recently attracted renewed attention, as sev-
eral scholars have found reason to reconsider the argumentative
structure of the seventh book of the *Metaphysics*. What initially pro-
voked discussion was Myles Burnyeat's study *A Map of Metaphysics
Zeta* and its suggestion that, in order to understand the aim and direc-
tion of that particular book, we should distinguish between two differ-
ent levels of discourse within it, the one "logical" and the other "meta-
physical" in kind.[1] Whereas the logical level of discourse explores
such concepts and principles that must be assumed by any ontology
whatsoever, the metaphysical level conveys precisely Aristotle's on-
tology with its specific assumptions as regards the nature of reality.
Burnyeat's proposal has been met with approval by many scholars,
who, though they sometimes prefer a different terminology from his,
in general agree that the suggested distinction provides us with a use-
ful tool for the interpretation of this notoriously difficult book.[2] For
example, if part of Aristotle's discussion here is "logical" in the sense

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    [1] Myles Burnyeat, *A Map of Metaphysics Zeta* (Pittsburgh: Mathesis Pub-
lications, 2001).
    [2] See Alan Code, "Aristotle's Metaphysics as a Science of Principles," *Re-
vue Internationale de Philosophie* 3 (1997): 357–78; Mary Louise Gill, "Com-
mentary on Lewis," and Frank Lewis, "The Hitchhiker's Guide to Metaphysics
Zeta," both in *Proceedings of the Boston Area in Ancient Philosophy* 15
(1999): 129–35 and 101–28 respectively; Michael Wedin, *Aristotle's Theory of
Substance: The Categories and Metaphysics Zeta* (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000), 200–5. Note that these authors had access to Burnyeat's study
before it was published; that is why their works predate it. While being sym-
pathetic toward Burnyeat's distinction between logic and metaphysics, they
all criticize his other main idea, namely that Book Z has not a linear structure,
but displays several distinct arguments that independently of each other lead
to the conclusion that substance is form. This is a point I will not discuss in
the present article.

of not presupposing any specific metaphysical notion of substance, then this may explain why he refrains from drawing upon his own concept of form in what seem to be pivotal passages as regards the inquiry into substance, but instead speaks with a more or less Platonic tongue.[3] Accordingly, recognizing two distinct levels of argument in the discussion of substance might also enable us to shed new light on Aristotle's attitude toward Plato, and perhaps even toward the tradition in general, in ontological matters.

This approach toward Aristotle's logic has found several proponents in the recent literature. More precisely, it is a rather common belief today that Aristotle's logic can be regarded as a kind of prolegomenon to his ontology, providing a "general essentialism"[4] which serves as a basis for the metaphysical inquiry into substance. One apparent consequence of this belief is the recurrent attempt to come to grips with the problems facing the discussion of substance in the *Metaphysics*, not least that of deciding whether substance as form is to be understood as a particular or universal entity, by means of distinguishing between different kinds of predication, so that form is allowed to be predicated of matter but not of its object.[5] In this way, one assumes that the question of *ousia*, at least in important respects, may profitably be treated as a question of logic.[6]

In this article, I will elaborate a different view of the so-called logical level of discourse in the *Metaphysics* as well as of its relation to

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[3] See for example the discussion of essence in Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 7.6, ed. Werner Jaeger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957) [hereafter "Met.", referring to book and chapter respectively]. When quoting from this work, I follow W. David Ross's translation in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), unless the quotations are from Books 7 or 8, in which case I follow David Bostock's translation in *Aristotle, Metaphysics, Books Z and H* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).

[4] This is Code's expression in "Aristotle's Metaphysics as a Science of Principles," 360.

[5] See Joan Kung, "Can Substance be Predicated of Matter?," and Michael Loux, "Form, Species and Predication in Metaphysics, Z, H, and Θ," both in *Aristotle: Substance, Form and Matter*, ed. Terence Irwin (London: Garland Publishing, 1995), 120–39 and 249–71 respectively; Frank Lewis, *Substance and Predication in Aristotle* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Wedin, *Aristotle's Theory of Substance*. I return to this point below.

[6] This attitude is present also in Daniel Devereux, "Inherence and Primary Substance in Aristotle's Categories," *Aristotle: Critical Assessments I* (London: Routledge, 1999), 52–72, though he focuses almost exclusively on the *Categories*.

ontology. While not denying that Aristotle refrains from introducing his own ontological theory in his logical discussion, I will nevertheless suggest that the latter, far from being free from metaphysical presuppositions, is on the contrary in conflict with the ontology presented at the metaphysical level, in such a way that it has implications for the nature of substance which Aristotle cannot accept straight off. More precisely, the idea is that Aristotle himself discovers problems that emerge out of the logical perspective, so that a major task of the inquiry at the ontological level is precisely to come to grips with these problems. In the first part of the article, which seeks to determine the aim and nature of "logical" discussions, I suggest that the conflict between different levels of discourse should be understood as a conflict between different approaches to ontology pursued by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*, all of which are not of his own making but primarily retrieved from the tradition. This means that a major problem Aristotle is facing in the *Metaphysics*, notably in Book 7, is that of reconciling different extant discourses on reality within his own project, so that each of them is granted its proper, delimited place. The difficulty of this task is what makes this book so difficult to understand.

Having given a brief review of the project of the *Metaphysics* and the role it grants to logical arguments, I turn in the second part to the defense of the principle of noncontradiction elaborated in Book 4, regarded as a logical reflection that is absolutely decisive for Aristotle's project, in that its task is to secure the very possibility of ontology. In part three, I proceed to a discussion of the ontological results of Book 4, especially the idea that the model of predication can serve as a basic principle in the subsequent search for *ousia*. After an evaluation of the tasks and problems these ontological findings pose to Aristotle, I discuss in part four his attempt to respond to this situation at the ontological level, which here is taken to involve a turn toward nature as the basic thematic field of metaphysics. I will then suggest that this level also needs to be differentiated, so that one distinguishes between the metaphysical analysis of things into matter and form on the one hand, and the teleological interpretation of this distinction on the other. The teleological level is thought to represent Aristotle's most far reaching attempt to transgress the boundaries of logic, since it is only with this step that it becomes possible to properly comprehend the unity of substance. Finally, I will conclude by asking whether it might not be the case that the possibility of resolving the problem of unity is

attained at the price of losing the possibility of providing a scientific explanation of substance, and that this is a major reason why the explication of substance developed in the *Metaphysics* has to involve different levels of articulation, that is, both the logical and the metaphysical level of discourse.

<div align="center">I</div>

When suggesting that Aristotle's logic in some way or other serves as a basis for his ontology, the critics who have taken part in the debate on Book 7 actually concur in what has long been a major assumption within the phenomenological tradition of Aristotelian scholarship, initiated by Heidegger. But, whereas the former group of scholars do not seem to pay much attention to the question of why Aristotle would have structured his ontological investigations in this way,[7] this question comes into the foreground in phenomenology. This is due to its focus on the epistemological conditions of ontological research. Accordingly, in Heidegger's view, the reason why Aristotle could let logic, understood in the broad sense as a reflection upon *logos*, constitute a philosophical point of departure is that his ontological investigation sets out not simply from the world "in itself" (whatever that could mean) but from the way in which it is experienced and articulated.[8] We shall see, I hope, that an examination of the way in which Aristotle makes use of his logic in the *Metaphysics* strengthens the phenomenological approach to it.

At this point, it is important to bear in mind that "logic" in modern times has acquired a different sense as compared with antiquity, largely due to the development of symbolic logic in the last century, which has promoted a conception of logic as a separate discipline, to

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[7] Burnyeat, for example, says nothing on this point, though he seems to think that the discernment of a logical mode of discourse is at least partly motivated by the historical fact that Aristotle's logical treatises once were collected under the heading "Organon" and in this way distinguished from metaphysics; see *A Map of Metaphysics Zeta*, 8.

[8] Among Heidegger's many works on Aristotle, the phenomenological perspective is particularly manifest in *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2002). In this context, one should also mention Pierre Aubenque's study *Le problème de l'être chez Aristote* (Paris: PUF, 1962, repr. 1997), which argues that Aristotle's ontology is based upon a reflection on *logos* in the sense of communication.

be sharply distinguished from metaphysics.[9] This step is not yet taken in Aristotle, though he no doubt is paving the way for it, not least in virtue of his distinction between different perspectives or modes of investigation, one of which he terms as exactly "logical" (λογικός). However, it only takes a quick glance at the *Categories*, for example, to see that Aristotle's logic is anything but free from metaphysics; thus the notion of a distinction between logic and ontology in Aristotle does not by itself entail the possibility of maintaining an absolute boundary between the two. On the contrary, one of the points in using this distinction as an interpretative device in connection with Aristotle is that it eventually lets us discover the complex nature of the relation between logic and ontology in his works.[10]

In connection with the present problem regarding the status of logic in the *Metaphysics*, one does not normally identify logic with the study and *analusis* of inferences but understands it in a broader sense, inspired by Aristotle's use of the term λογικῶς, as in the expression σκοπεῖν λογικῶς, "to investigate logically."[11] A discourse that is λογικός aims at the elaboration of certain formal principles and concepts, and as such, it could perhaps be described as a kind of meta-analytic discussion, in that it elucidates such principles that are presupposed by, for example, the analyses of inferences pursued in the *Prior Analytics*. Moreover, as noted above, it is generally agreed that, to the extent that Aristotle deals with ontological issues within the

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[9] It is only against the background of this development that the question arises concerning what should be considered as more basic, logic or metaphysics. For two different approaches to this question, compare Martin Heidegger's *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1978) with Michael Dummett's *The Logical Basis of Metaphysics* (London: Duckworth, 1991).

[10] Therefore, I will not, like Burnyeat and others, try to track the exact location of the logical and the metaphysical arguments, that is, with respect to their respective beginnings and ends. Rather, I will try to show that Aristotle's discussion of substance is generally too complex and subtle to admit of such classification, except as formulated in very broad and tentative terms.

[11] In *Physics* 3.5.204b4–10, ed. W. David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950) [hereafter *Phys.*], this kind of investigation (λογικῶς σκοπεῖν) is demarcated from the mode of reflection peculiar to physics (φυσικῶς θεωρεῖν). For Aristotle's use of λογικῶς in the *Metaphysics*, see 7.4.1029b13, 7.4.1030a25, 7.17.1041a28, 12.1.1069a28. It is thus to be noted that Aristotle in this context for the most part uses the adverb λογικῶς, whereas I prefer a mode of expression involving the adjective (λογικός), since it is often more convenient to speak of, for example, "a logical discourse" than of "to discourse logically."

logical context, his aim at this stage is primarily to assess critically the views of his predecessors, rather than to advance a complete or fully developed ontology of his own, as is clearly the case in 7.6, where his "logical" discussion of essence takes on the form of a critical evaluation of Plato's theory of forms. Insofar as the confrontation with extant opinions and theories is part of Aristotle's inquiry into how we speak, as distinct from the examination of how things are,[12] his critique of already established theories is primarily directed toward their mode of articulation. For reasons to be further specified below, I will keep to the abovementioned interpretation of logic as a reflection on *logos*, on speech, or articulated experience, as I think it unites the various senses of logic now under consideration. Thus, the achievement of formal distinctions and principles will be made possible by a critical reflection on the tradition and its sayings.[13] Thus, a major reason that the logical discourse makes up a necessary starting point in philosophy, including ontology, is that it involves a dialogue with the tradition, which alone can provide philosophy with an overall framework of inquiry.

That Aristotle did not believe his own philosophy to be based on some kind of simple, presuppositionless inspection of reality, is today more or less generally acknowledged, not least because of an increased awareness of the important role played by dialectic in his works.[14] Even though Aristotle was not prepared to grant to dialectic

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[12] See *Met.* 7.4.1030a27–8.

[13] Lewis ("The Hitchhiker's Guide to Metaphysics Zeta," 106–7, n. 11) distinguishes between three senses of a "logical" discussion: (i) what is based on reputable premises; (ii) what is primary in pedagogical respect; (iii) basic principles not peculiar to any specific discipline. Lewis does not discuss the interrelation between these senses, but is content to vote in favor of the third, noting that it is not necessarily incompatible with the others. The authors mentioned above (notes 1 and 2) take essentially the same view as he, though without mentioning any alternative to (iii). My view that the logical discourse is concerned with speech or articulation in general, not only with exclusively formal matters, comes rather close to the interpretation of λογικῶς given by Gwilym E. L. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle," *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century*, ed. Ingmar Düring & Owen (Gothenburg: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1960), 163–90, and W. David Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, a revised text with introduction and commentary, vol. 2. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924), 168.

[14] The most far reaching attempt to reveal the presence of a dialectical foundation in Aristotle's philosophy as a whole is probably still Terence Irwin's *Aristotle's First Principles* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).

the status of (first) philosophy, it is clear, not only from the *Topics* but even more so from the way in which his philosophical investigations are structured, that he thinks that the search for the basic principles of philosophy requires, as he says in the *Topics*, the examination of *endoxa*, the opinions commonly held by the wise and the many.[15] For, as he puts it in the *Metaphysics*, it is only on the basis of an examination of previous statements of the matter at hand that we may attain an understanding of our own project and the kind of questions it involves.[16] As already indicated, the view that the philosophical findings of Aristotle's works to a great extent are the outcome of a critical encounter with received opinion is also characteristic of the phenomenological approach to Aristotle. In this article, I will continue the course initially entered upon by Heidegger and try to show how reading Aristotle as a kind of protophenomenologist—instead of taking him to represent some sort of simple realism—can help us understand the project of the *Metaphysics*, and in particular the relation between logic and ontology.[17] But before arguing in favor of this approach in more detail, I will briefly sketch the overall framework of interpretation against which it is leaning.

The *Metaphysics* proposes to pose the question of being as being, interpreted as a question concerning the primary causes and principles of *ousia*.[18] Now, in what way might this very question have emerged from a "logical" discussion? If we turn to the first book of this work, we find that Aristotle achieves his understanding of ontology by exploring not only the views held by his philosophical predecessors, but also the opinions of the common man. Moreover, the statement made in Book 4 that there is a science that investigates being as being is confirmed by the observation that all the other sciences

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[15] *Topics* 1.2.101a34–b2, ed. W. David Ross, 6th rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). In spite of its Platonic ring, I will, for the sake of brevity, occasionally use the expression "the wise and the many" to refer to Aristotle's philosophical predecessors and to the common, "unscientific" man respectively, though it must of course be kept in mind that Aristotle is not as suspicious of the latter as Plato.

[16] See *Met.* 3.1.

[17] Even though attempts to put into question the common view on Aristotle as a realist are primarily to be found in works written within the phenomenological tradition, such attempts have also been made by authors of a more analytic bent; see Jan Dejnozka, *The Ontology of the Analytic Tradition and its Origins* (Lanham, Md: Littlefield, 1996).

[18] See for example *Met.* 4.1.1003a21–2.b19.

deal with a specific part of reality but not with reality as such.[19] Accordingly, it seems that we can distinguish between three different approaches to the question of being in the *Metaphysics*: apart from the historical way, which sets out from the earlier thinkers' diverse statements on the nature of being, there is also an everyday way, which investigates the popular opinions about reality. Finally, there is the scientific way, which considers how reality is examined by the particular sciences. These three approaches to reality are all thus based on different experiences of the world, each of which will be tested as Aristotle turns to the examination of the candidates for the role as *ousia* in Book 7, where they will be found to be at odds with each other. In Book 1, however, Aristotle is mainly trying to orient himself within these perspectives on the world, and so each of them is recorded as an initially plausible view in its own right, though the opinions of the common man are given some priority, due to Aristotle's conviction that the first and ultimate task of philosophy is to do justice to our normal, commonly shared understanding of the world. But even though the three *logoi* in question are not on the same level as regards their degree of theoretical articulation, from the point of view of Aristotle's project, they all belong within the realm of the given, that is, they constitute those previously established experiences of reality from which ontology has to take its point of departure. In that sense, they are all discourses on the level of "what is more intelligible to us."[20] Maybe one could also say that they serve as a confirmation to Aristotle of his suspicion that "'being' is said in many ways,"[21] that is, that we use a single word, "being," though in a variety of senses, to speak about all different sorts of things.

It is to be noted, however, that what is given at the outset of the inquiry into being are not merely certain ideas concerning the nature of reality, but also several kinds of linguistic praxis, in which these

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[19] *Met.* 4.1.1003a22–6 and repeated at 6.1.1025b4–18.

[20] Γνωριμώτερος ἡμῖν, as opposed to what is more intelligible by nature (γνωριμώτερος τῇ φύσει); *Met.* 7.3.1029b3–12; *Phys.* 1.1.184a16–18; *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.4.1095b2–4, ed. Ingram Bywater (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1894). This is not to deny that Aristotle often charges the theories held by other philosophers with being in conflict with the opinions of the common man. But, insofar as he is not entirely content with any previously established notion of being, he cannot grant to it the prominence belonging to "what is more intelligible by nature."

[21] For example *Met.* 4.2.1003a33: "Τὸ δὲ ὂν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς."

ideas are expressed.[22] Here we have the connection between the different senses of logic encountered above: in his inquiry into our different ways of speaking about reality, Aristotle achieves an insight not only into the current interpretations of reality, but also into certain formal principles and distinctions, including the logical structure of meaningful speech, which will be of fundamental importance in Book 4, as we shall soon see. This is why a discourse described as *logikos* can be said to be engaged in a critical reflection upon *logos*, with respect to its content as well as to its form. As such, it no doubt touches upon ontological issues, insofar as it deals with extant opinions concerning the nature of reality, though this is done primarily with a view to achieving the formal or conceptual means required to tackle the question of being, whereas the definite evaluation of the content of these opinions is postponed to the ontological inquiry proper. Such logical reflection constitutes a necessary prerequisite for the ontological project envisaged in the *Metaphysics*. For if the question of being gets its motivation from the experience of the manifold meaning of "being" inherent in our various forms of articulation, then the logical task of analyzing these with respect to their formal implications is pursued with a view to the ontological task of classifying the different senses of being in such a way as to reveal their unified basis. This will be possible, Aristotle thinks, if we succeed in finding the reality of reality, namely *ousia*, from which we can learn what the primary sense of "being" is, to which all other senses of being are led back. Hence, Aristotle may draw the conclusion that the question of being fundamentally concerns the nature of *ousia*.[23]

Now, to elucidate the nature of *ousia* will essentially involve a decision as regards the proper way of conceptualizing or in general articulating reality. For if Aristotle investigates the world as experienced, and so affirms as a philosophical starting point the experiences that are available to him in the conviction that there is strictly speaking no world to be known outside them, then the goal of his ontological project, to clarify the nature of being as *ousia*, will be realized with

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[22] Hence, in the beginning of Book 1 in the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle discusses not only the extant ideas concerning reality but also various opinions on the nature of our *knowledge* of reality, that is, what is commonly regarded as characteristic of wisdom, σοφία. In this way, he is concerned not merely with the content but just as much with the form and structure of knowledge.

[23] *Met.* 7.1.1028b2–4.

the proper conceptualization of our experiences of being. If this is true, then Aristotle must think that the domain of ontology is in some way given also to those who are unable to fully articulate it, so that every form of intelligible contact with the world involves some kind of access to the nature of things.[24] This means, further, that in his search for the nature of *ousia*, Aristotle does not really have to invent a new theory of reality, for the theory is in a way already there, first of all in Plato's work, and secondarily in the form of experiences made by the wise and the many in general, even though, in his view, no one has been entirely successful in articulating this experience. So conceived, the task facing Aristotle's project is one of spelling out what is implicit or contained in these different voices on reality, which means that his ontology is essentially a return to something already given, being descriptive rather than speculative in kind. As such, it seeks to do justice to man's various modes of discourse on the world in the sense of according them their proper, while delimited, place. This, however, requires another perspective, or a move beyond previous opinions, which is made possible by another experience, one that is in accordance with what is "more intelligible by nature"; but this can only come about through confrontation with previous opinions. And this is precisely what is at stake in the discussion of the different senses of *ousia* in Book 7. Hence, if the ontological inquiry into the nature of reality is inseparably bound up with questions concerning how this reality is and should be articulated, then ontology in Aristotle's sense cannot ever entirely leave the "logical" perspective behind.

But in order for the interpretation just outlined not to border on mere speculation, it must be sustained by way of following more closely Aristotle's own line of reasoning. I therefore turn to Book 4 to discuss in more detail what is involved in Aristotle's so-called logical discourse and also what ontological implications might be contained in it.

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[24] This is a disputed point, however, and it is above all in connection with the concept of *nous* as the intuition of essences that one has had reason to discuss the scope of man's access to the nature of reality; see Michael Frede's "Introduction," in *Rationality in Greek thought*, ed. Michael Frede (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 1–28; Charles Kahn, "Aristotle on Thinking," ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amelia Rorty, *Essays on Aristotle's* De Anima (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 359–79; Horst Seidl, *Der Begriff des Intellekts (nous) bei Aristoteles* (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1971).

II

Book 4, following upon the aporetic third book, is apparently intended to constitute the first positive or constructive stage within Aristotle's ontological project. After an introductory discussion, which asserts that there is a science which studies being as being and makes manifest the unified nature of this science, Aristotle proceeds, in a way that almost anticipates the spirit in which Descartes launched his attempt at a new philosophical beginning, to look for a secure basis for the science in question. This is because he thinks that he who has knowledge of being as being should be able to articulate the most certain or firm (*bebaiotatas*) principles of reality, and the most certain principle of all is such that it is impossible to be mistaken about it.[25] This is the principle of noncontradiction (PNC), which reads: "The same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect."[26]

As it is introduced and defined, the principle of noncontradiction no doubt gives the impression of being primarily ontological in kind: it is said to be a principle of *things*;[27] stating that they cannot both have and not have one and the same attribute (at the same time and in the same way). Aristotle, however, immediately moves on to a discussion that clearly deals with logical and epistemological issues, spelling out the unacceptable consequences that would follow from its denial insofar as the possibility of knowledge and meaning is concerned. Therefore, what is at stake here is perhaps not so much the nature of reality itself as rather the possibility of scientific knowledge about it.[28] As such, the principle of noncontradiction belongs primarily within a logical framework and should be taken as normative in kind, rather than as an ontological thesis.[29] And, Aristotle continues, requiring a proof of PNC is a sign of bad education, for it does not belong to that which can be proved, since it is, on the contrary, a condition of the

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[25] *Met.* 4.3.1005b8–12.

[26] *Met.* 4.3.1005b19–20: "τὸ γὰρ αὐτό ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό." Following Ross.

[27] *Met.* 4.3.1005b9–10: "ἀρχὰς τοῦ πράγματος."

[28] Compare Irwin, *Aristotle's First Principles*, §§ 98–101, where he develops an interpretation of PNC along similar lines.

[29] This is not to say that PNC to Aristotle is nothing but a methodological device, but the reason why he has to discuss it in this context is best explained by reference to a sensed need on his part to secure the possibility of scientific knowledge.

possibility of giving proofs (that is, of *apodeixis*).[30] To argue in favor of this principle must involve something different from demonstration, and the way in which Aristotle seeks to defend it is by showing not only how its denial is challenged by several of our common philosophical and scientific beliefs (for example, that it must be possible to speak about reality as having a certain nature), but also how it is overthrown by experience and human praxis. Aristotle does not characterize his defense of PNC as *logikos*, but he is clearly conducting it at a level which can be understood as "logical" in the sense outlined above.[31] This is seen not least from the fact that a major point in this connection is that it does not matter what kind of rational activity or human expression we pick, that is, whether we look at a philosophical thesis, a scientific procedure or some conduct characteristic of everyday life: in every case, its examination will lead to a confirmation of PNC. In other words, Aristotle is here in a position to back up his initial reliance on the three *logoi* on reality recorded above, by showing that they all obey at least the most basic principle of rationality. For if we were to annihilate PNC, our speech would be devoid of sense, which is contested by our daily experience of more or less successful communication.[32] He who denies it will never have any reason for choosing one course of action instead of another, though he, like all human beings, naturally makes such a choice all the time.[33] Besides, the very denial of PNC is self contradictory, since it claims to say something true, at the same time as it denies the distinction between truth and falsity.[34] Aristotle adds that if the contestant tries to escape his predicament by refraining from any positive judgment and instead "'thinks' and 'does not think', indifferently, what difference will there be between him and a vegetable?"[35] Therewith, he has shown that the reflection on *logos*, whether this has the form of a philosophical the-

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[30] *Met.* 4.4.1006a5–11.

[31] When introducing PNC, however, he states (4.3.1005b2–4) that the reason why some err in the field of ontology is that they lack education in analytic reasoning (τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν). And at the end of the discussion of PNC in ch. 5, he gives an overall explanation of why logic is needed in ontology, as he suggests that the attempt to challenge PNC may arise out of confusion concerning the realm of experience, namely, when one sees how the same thing can take on contrary qualities.

[32] For example *Met.* 4.4.1006b5–11.

[33] *Met.* 4.4.1008b12–27.

[34] *Met.* 4.4.1006a18–28, 4.4.1008a28–30, 4.8.1012b13–18.

[35] *Met.* 4.4.1008b10–12: "ἀλλ' ὁμοίως οἴεται καὶ οὐκ οἴεται, τί ἂν διαφερόντως ἔχοι τῶν φυτῶν." Following Ross.

sis, ordinary communication, deliberation or whatever, leads to one and the same conclusion: namely, that *logos* as such must obey the principle of noncontradiction. If not, it cannot be counted as meaningful at all.

Since this principle cannot be proved, let alone empirically demonstrated, but, on the contrary, is presupposed in every kind of proof, it could be described as a transcendental condition for the possibility of knowledge and meaning, and more precisely of experience as such. If there is to be a science of being, or any scientific knowledge at all, reality cannot be a Protagorean flux; rather, things have to be such as not to admit any attributes whatsoever (at the same time and in the same way).[36] For "this at least is obviously true, that the word 'be' or 'not be' has a definite meaning, so that not everything will be 'so and not so'."[37] Aristotle is thus asking himself what reality must be like if it is to be an object of scientific inquiry. Therefore, there does not seem to be any reason, in this context at least, to take his line of reasoning to indicate a realist assumption on his part, that is, in the form of a "structural equivalence" between thought, language and reality.[38] For such an assumption presupposes a view from "outside," whereas Aristotle discusses reality *as* knowable and explicable. Or, one could also say, he is concerned with reality insofar as it obeys the basic principle of *logos*, without which it cannot be meaningfully investigated at all. Such a discussion is indeed of a "logical" nature: it does not really presuppose any idea as regards the nature of reality in itself but aims at its possibility of being properly articulated and known.

However, as suggested earlier, even if Aristotle's inquiry at the logical level does not explicitly deal with ontological issues, this should not make us conclude that it is free from every kind of ontological assumption. Some important ontological results do in fact follow from the discussion of the principle of noncontradiction. Minimally, it has established a basic division between things on the one hand and their attributes on the other. Specifically, PNC shows that a given object can be known because we can trust it to be *something* (that is, to have a specific attribute) rather than something else. As such, it

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[36] *Met.* 4.4.1007b18–25, 4.5.1009a6–15.

[37] *Met.* 4.4.1006a29–31: "δῆλον ὡς τοῦτό γ᾽ αὐτὸ ἀληθές, ὅτι σημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι τοδί, ὥστ᾽ οὐκ οὕτως ἔχοι." Following Ross.

[38] For such a view, see Deborah Modrak, *Aristotle's Theory of Language and Meaning* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 3.

seems to establish predication of the form "S is p" as a basic model for the interpretation of reality that is to follow in the subsequent books of the *Metaphysics*. In other words, PNC gives Aristotle certain directives for the ensuing search for *ousia* by suggesting that *ousia* is, logically at least, a subject, to be contrasted with the attributes which can be predicated of it, and in terms of which it can be known. So far, the *Metaphysics* seems to be in accordance with the *Categories* and its claim that primary substance is that which makes up a subject of predication,[39] together with the basic division between substance and the other categories. But as is often pointed out, this claim later comes into conflict with the other criteria for the role of *ousia* enumerated in the *Metaphysics*. In the following part, I elucidate further the problems connected with the logical perspective on *ousia*. Thence I move directly to Book 7, thus disregarding for the moment the somewhat introductory reflections on the nature of the projected science of being that Aristotle pursues in Book 6.

III

The discussion of the principle of noncontradiction makes up an initially important step in the inquiry into substance, in that it establishes that the reality aimed at in ontology displays a basic division between things and their attributes, and that this division is endowed with a determinate, that is, noncontradictory, structure. In this way, the logical reflection undertaken in Book 4 has shown that reality can be made into an object of scientific inquiry. But even if the discussion entertained there suggests that the investigation into *ousia* should direct its search to those kinds of things which can stand as subjects in predicative statements, it did not in any detail circumscribe their nature, which is to say, among other things, that it did not decide whether they are universal or particular. For, to make clear the indubitable character of PNC, it was enough to ask its contestant to "say something which is significant both to himself and to another."[40] Thus the subject of his speech may be both a universal and a particular ob-

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[39] *Categories* 1.4.2a11–13, 1.5.2b15–17, ed. Lorenzo Minio-Paluello (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949). In the *Metaphysics*, this claim appears in 7.3.1028b36–7 (and also in 5.8).

[40] *Met.* 4.4.1006a21: "σημαίνειν γέ τι καὶ αὑτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ."

ject. Still, insofar as Aristotle begins his discussion of substance on the level of what is "more intelligible to us," where we find the objects of ordinary experience, individual objects are from the beginning granted some priority. This is after all one of the major points against Plato: that is, that ontology must do justice to *this* world, the world we live in and talk about, whether we are philosophers or not. When Plato framed his theory of forms, however, he installed a separation between this world and the world of ideas, in spite of his intention to use the latter in order to explain the former.

With this attitude, Aristotle is preserving a central idea of the *Categories*: namely, that concrete sensible objects are the primary substances, though the notion of primacy gets modified in the *Metaphysics*, so that these objects are primary in the sense of being the basic objects of experience. This also seems to be the reason why Aristotle in Book 7 decides to focus on them.[41] At the same time, however, he now realizes that another step must be taken, which consists in interrogating the substances of the *Categories* with respect to their nature. This insight generates a new question which thus is aimed at the revelation of the substance *of* substance.[42] And this question seems to be retrieved from no other than Plato, who inquired precisely into the ideas *of* things. Thus already at the outset of Book 7, a decisive difference between the three approaches to reality is announcing itself, and the conflict between them is also reflected in Aristotle's approach to the question of *ousia*. Following Plato, it seems, Aristotle begins by stating that "being" first of all signifies the what (*to ti esti*) of a thing, which in its turn signifies substance.[43] The primacy belonging to

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[41] In *Met.* 7.3.1029a33–4, Aristotle says that, since it is agreed that some substances are sensible, we should begin our inquiry with them. Then (b3–12) follows a remark stating that we should proceed from what is less to what is more intelligible by nature, which thus seems to explain why the examination of substance in the *Metaphysics* begins with (and more or less restricts itself to) sensible substances. However, this remark is generally regarded as a late insertion, and there has been much discussion as regards its location, beginning with Hermann Bonitz, *Aristotelis Metaphysica*, 2 vols. (Bonn: Marcus, 1848–9); for more recent views, see Burnyeat, *A Map of Metaphysics Zeta*, 17–18; Wedin, *Aristotle's Theory of Substance*, 199–200.

[42] That this is how the question of substance is conceived in the *Metaphysics* is generally agreed on today, with the important exception of Michael Frede and Günther Patzig, *Aristoteles, "Metaphysik Z": Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar*, vol. 1 (Munich: Beck, 1988), 37.

[43] *Met.* 7.1.1028a10–15.

substance is then declared to be conceptual and epistemic, as well as temporal or ontological.[44] Thus, whatever substance may turn out to be, it is clear from the outset that it must serve to explain the nature and foundation of (other) things, as well as their intelligibility, by being the primary explanatory feature and that which first of all exists. However, even though the basic question of ontology is now taken to concern the *ousia of* things, rather than what things are to count as *ousia*, the latter question makes up Aristotle's point of departure, not only inherited from the *Categories*, but also sustained by the foregoing discussion of PNC.[45] Further, it is in agreement with our normal view of the world, as well as with the work of those engaged in natural philosophy, who were seeking the basic element of the world. This twofold use of *ousia*, while no doubt mirroring an absolutely fundamental ontological distinction, nevertheless bestows some ambiguity on this concept and paves the way for a notion of primary *ousia* (as I will call that *ousia* which is a substance *of* things), according to which this kind of substance too is regarded as an entity or a being.[46] Later, I will suggest that Aristotle eventually realizes that such a "reification" of substance is problematic.

Against this background, it comes as no surprise that Aristotle in the beginning of Book 7 records that one usually says that animals, plants, and so forth, are substances.[47] His discourse is thus still decisively "logical," interrogating such notions of reality as are available to him. And in this spirit he introduces in 7.3 the four candidates for the role as substance, that is, the subject or substrate, the essence, the universal and the genus, all of which are thus motivated with reference to the ways in which we speak about substance.[48] In the following, I will not attempt to discuss in any detail Aristotle's examination

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[44] That is to say, it is primary with respect to λόγος, γνῶσις and χρόνος, *Met.* 7.1.1028a32–3.

[45] Already in Book 4.2.1003b16–19, Aristotle has concluded that the task of philosophy is to grasp the principles and causes of substances (note the plural form), the reason for which is that substance is primary and knowledge in the proper sense concerns what is primary. And as we have seen, PNC is later introduced as the most basic principle of *things*. These things are, I take it, substances in the sense of concrete, ordinary objects of the world, not the substances *of* those objects, for that meaning or structure of οὐσία has not yet been introduced.

[46] It is only at the end of Book 7 (15.1039b20–2) that a clear distinction is made between these two senses of substance.

[47] *Met.* 7.2.1028b8–13.

of these candidates, nor even mention all the major problems confronting him in this connection. My chief aim is just to distinguish two basic—and well known—*aporiai* or difficulties which emerge out of the discussion of the subject and the essence, and which in my view are intimately connected with the "logical" perspective on substance.

Aristotle begins his inquiry into substance with the *hupokeimenon*: "For what most seems to be substance is what primarily underlies."[49] The question of what one should make of this candidate has been much debated in the literature.[50] One difficulty with Aristotle's argument in this context is that it is inconclusive. On the one hand, he states that we call the matter, the "shape" (*morphê*), as well as the combination of the two, "substrate." On the other hand, he only discusses the first alternative. One way to understand Aristotle here is that he thinks that, on closer inspection, it turns out that if we make *hupokeimenon* into substance, then only matter can be substance, since on this interpretation, substance is "that of which other things are predicated while it itself is predicated of no underlying thing,"[51] and this can only be matter. But matter cannot be substance, at least not in the proper sense, for separability and "thisness" (*to tode ti*) is thought to belong especially to substance, and matter is devoid of these traits.[52] Hence, even though the examination of substance as *hupokeimenon* sets out from the everyday notion of substance as a concrete object in order to explain it, it leads to a result that runs counter to our original intuitions in this respect. Having drawn this conclusion, Aristotle declares that we must proceed to consider the form, for this is the most perplexing (*aporôtate*) candidate.[53] The way

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[48] *Met.* 7.2.1028b33–4: "Λέγεται δ᾽ ἡ οὐσία, εἰ μὴ πλεοναχῶς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τέτταροί γέ μάλιστα."

[49] *Met.* 7.3.1029a1–2: "μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐσία τὸ ὑποκείμενον πρῶτον." Following Bostock.

[50] A common view, to which I more or less subscribe, is that Aristotle regards it, not as plainly mistaken, but as insufficient to capture the nature of substance; see Rudolf Boehm, *Das Grundlegende und das Wesentliche – Zu Aristoteles Abhandlung "Über das Sein und das Seiende" (Metaphysik Z)* (Haag: Nijhoff, 1965); Frede and Patzig, *Aristoteles, "Metaphysik Z"* 1: 38–9; Wedin, *Aristotle's Theory of Substance*, 6.

[51] *Met.* 7.3.1029a8–9: "τὸ μὴ καθ᾽ ὑποκείμενου ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ οὗ τὰ ἄλλα." Following Bostock. I refer to this criterion as the "impredicability condition" of substance.

[52] *Met.* 7.3.1029a27–8.

[53] *Met.* 7.3.1029a26–33.

in which he approaches the notion of form, however, is by means of a discussion of the notion of essence, seemingly returning to the initial classification of the four candidates. What it could mean for the form to be a substrate or subject is thus far unclear, although several attempts have been made to make sense of such a concept.[54] This constitutes, therefore, an initial *aporia* facing the inquiry into *ousia*.

Another way of explaining the step from subject to essence is by pointing to the fact that the former candidate, whether or not it is identified with matter, cannot meet the requirements on substance implied by the refined conception of the question concerning *ousia*. As we have already seen, the reason that the subject naturally presents itself to us as a prominent candidate for the role of substance, is that we tend to think that subject of speech, to which we constantly relate in our various modes of conduct, must be what first of all exists. And it was exactly this experience that was taken up by the discussion of PNC, which showed that the intelligibility of the world presupposes a basic division between subject and attributes. But as we take a step further in our ontological investigations and realize that the basic question of ontology concerns the substance *of* things, we see that only something like the essence of this subject can provide a satisfactory answer to that kind of question.[55]

When Aristotle turns to the notion of essence (*to ti ên einai*), he enters Platonic ground. For the idea that knowledge of things consists in knowledge of their essences was first prepared for by Socrates, with his formulation of the *ti esti* question, which resulted in a concept of definition. Moreover, this work was continued by Plato as he took on the task of circumscribing the forms or ideas of things. In 7.4, Aristotle purports to begin with some logical remarks on essence,[56] and the following discussion is apparently "logical" in the twofold sense noted earlier: it draws upon the findings of the tradi-

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[54] The solution advocated by Frede and Patzig (*Aristoteles, "Metaphysik Z"* 1:40–1), namely, that form in the *Metaphysics* is indeed regarded as a subject of predication, resulting from a new conception of the subject as compared with the *Categories*, is today generally thought to be untenable. Wedin (*Aristotle's Theory of Substance*, 169–71, 353) has instead suggested that, even though the form cannot constitute a ὑποκείμενον in the logical sense, it can nonetheless be regarded as something that "underlies" a thing in the sense of being responsible for its being.

[55] The idea that the notion of substance as subject still holds itself within the sphere of "what is more intelligible to us" is developed at length in Boehm, *Das Grundlegende und das Wesentliche*.

[56] *Met.* 7.4.1029b13: "πρῶτον εἴπωμεν ἔνια περὶ αὐτοῦ λογικῶς."

tion, and it is concerned with an important formal aspect of essence, its definability, in terms of which Aristotle narrows the notion of "whatness" (*to ti esti*) belonging to essence. In this way, the logical discourse on essence moves beyond the everyday understanding of whatness, which does not involve such a technical notion of this phenomenon. Moreover, the discussion of essence casts further doubt on the impredicability condition of substance, in that it shows that the essence is not that kind of entity that can make up a subject of predication but requires another mode of explication.[57] The analysis of essence in 7.4–6, however, also introduces a major ontological problem, namely, that concerning the relation between particular and universal being, though this problem was prepared for with the very formulation of the question of *ousia*, which emerged as an attempt to take into account conflicting approaches to reality. This conflict may now be described as one between the overall outlook of Aristotle's ontology and the legacy of Plato. According to the former, which seeks to do justice to our normal experience of the world, the essence must account for the individuality of its object, but according to the latter, knowledge in the proper sense concerns the universal.[58] If the essence is not identical with its object, however, knowledge of the latter is not possible.[59] Against the background of the phenomenological approach outlined above, one could say that Aristotle's problem in trying to reconcile these allegedly opposing demands on substance is that he has to bring together two different kinds of experience of substance. For in the eyes of "the many," substance is a concrete, individual object, and as such, it is the subject of our speech, thought and action. But according to "the wise," mainly Plato, this kind of substance may in its turn be examined with respect to its universal form or essence, which thus is substance in a stronger sense. Even though Plato regarded the forms as universal entities, however, he nonetheless made the universal itself individual, when positing the forms as distinct entities of their own.[60] There are therefore conflicting perceptions within the Platonic approach itself. This is in fact also true of the attitude of the many, for even in their view, knowledge concerns the universal.[61] This is thus a second *aporia*, which not merely calls for a decision

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[57] *Met.* 7.4.1030a3–14.
[58] This problem is introduced in 3.4 and 6.
[59] *Met.* 7.6.1031b18–22.
[60] *Met.* 7.15.1040a8–27.
[61] As is clear from the description given in *Met.* 1.2 of our common views concerning the basic traits of the wise man.

regarding which of the recorded views comes closest to the truth, but
also poses Aristotle the task of finding a language or conceptuality
which not only can make room for both of these experiences but also
tie them together, in such a way that substance in the sense of es-
sence or form is allowed to reveal the ontological as well as the
epistemic foundation of concrete substances. To find such a common
mode of discourse, however, is apparently a difficult and maybe even
impossible task. It is thus to be noted that so far, the examination of
the second candidate for the role as substance, namely, the essence,
also seems to contradict our initial assumptions on the nature of sub-
stance, since it is still far from clear how the essence as a universal
entity can be responsible for the being of that particular thing whose
essence it is supposed to be, or contribute to our knowledge of it. In
the next part of the article, I review Aristotle's attempts to come to
grips with the two *aporiai* encountered here.

IV

    Having concluded the discussion of definition and essence in 7.6,
Aristotle proceeds to elaborate his notion of form (*eidos*). In this
way, he launches a new approach to *ousia* as the essential element or
structure of things, rather than introducing a new candidate for *ousia*
in addition to the essence, where the conceptual change from essence
to form signals a transition from a logical to an ontological perspec-
tive. However, this transition is not, as is commonly believed, under-
taken merely for the sake of further explanation, as if the ontological
analyses could simply be built upon the foregoing logical reflections,
which thus would be ontologically neutral. On the contrary, the rea-
son why there is need for a step from logic to ontology is that the logi-
cal discourse on *ousia* has given rise to problems which it itself can-
not solve. Coming to grips with these problems means, in general
terms, explaining the relation between the form and the thing whose
form it is, where the things that are endowed with forms are to be un-
derstood as concrete substances. With the bipartite division between
form and thing, or between two kinds of substance, comes the task of
explaining the unity of the two, in conceptual as well as ontological
respect. That the question of unity, in Aristotle's view, is a highly im-
portant and problematic point is seen not least from the fact that even

though this question is raised already in 7.4, it continues to guide him throughout Book 7 and into Book 8, where he finally seems confident of having given a satisfactory account of it. We have already seen that the reason why the question of unity occupies such a prominent place in Aristotle's ontology is not simply to be found in his conviction that Plato failed to answer it satisfactorily. Aristotle's own discussion of essence served to confirm the problematic nature of this question, in that it seemed to divide reality into two separate regions, that of particular and that of universal being. That there are problems connected with Aristotle's division between thing and form, no less than with Plato's, is also testified in the immense literature on this topic, which frequently expresses bewilderment not only with respect to the question of unity, but also as to how one may reconcile the notion of substance as form with the impredicability condition on substance. This is a point which Aristotle himself does not really discuss, however. I will comment on this apparent neglect below. As stated in the beginning of this article, a common approach to this set of problems is one that sets out from a distinction between different kinds of predication, one of which involves form predicated of matter. Later, I will argue that this kind of "logical" approach, though fruitful in itself, cannot provide a satisfactory answer to the *ontological* question concerning substance. To be able to tackle the latter issue, Aristotle has to introduce a new level of reflection, that of teleology, which to some extent will take us beyond the confines of logic.

The new approach to the question of *ousia* is initiated in 7.7. This chapter (together with ch. 8–9) is today commonly regarded as a late insertion, partly on philological grounds and partly because it is hard to see how it fits into the overall argumentative structure of Book 7.[62] While I do not want to question the philological evidence, the philosophical reasons are in my view more dubious. In 7.7, Aristotle turns to the realm of *phusis*, thus if not leaving, at least expanding the sphere of *logos* within which he has been moving so far. It has been recognized that Aristotle's ontology is largely guided by his understanding of nature, so that the term metaphysics is after all a rather accurate name for it, even though the term was coined only later, and not for philosophical reasons. However, the growing interest in the

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[62] See Burnyeat, *A Map of Metaphysics Zeta*; Frede and Patzig, *Aristoteles, "Metaphysik Z"* 1:22, 31–3; Wedin, *Aristotle's Theory of Substance*, 288.

logical aspects of Aristotle's ontology has led to a relative neglect of his philosophy of nature in this context.[63] But as I will try to show, the step from *logos* to *phusis* provides us with the key to Aristotle's attempt to make plausible his notion of *ousia* as form.

This step is partly motivated by Aristotle's appreciation of the natural philosophers, who did not try to reduce this world to another as Plato did, but remained within it. In this way, their work is closer to our everyday experience of the world. Believing first that matter constituted the primary cause and principle of everything, they were led by "the matter itself" (*auto to pragma*)[64] to inquire into the nature of generation and destruction. This is an approach Aristotle thinks he can benefit from, though it will require elaboration, for the natural philosophers did not have a clear view of what they themselves were doing.[65] More precisely, they were not able to conceptualize properly their experience of nature, as is clear from their difficulties in attaining a conception of form in nature. Against this background, we may describe Aristotle's continuation of his predecessors' work on nature as an attempt to think together *logos* and *phusis*, which means that his own inquiry will be both logical and ontological. Having established and evaluated the formal perspective on reality, Aristotle moves to a hylomorphic analysis of reality which is based upon an examination of the principles of generation and which will eventually be subjected to a teleological interpretation. In this way, Aristotle's ontology constitutes an attempt to reconcile the "logical" legacy of Plato with the metaphysics he has inherited from the earlier natural philosophers, where the turn toward nature is pursued in order to repeat the path traveled by the logical discourse, albeit from a different perspective, which hopefully can throw new light on the ontological problems encountered within the logical approach.

Accordingly, Aristotle now supplements the static approach characterizing his discussion of definition and essence with a genetic per-

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[63] This neglect is reflected not only in the exclusion of 7.7–9 from the interpretation of Book 7, but also in the belief that one can make perfectly good sense of the problematic contained in this treatise without recourse to the teleology of Book 8 (explicitly stated in Wedin, *Aristotle's Theory of Substance*, 9, and this attitude seems to be present in all the works that prefer a "logical" clarification of the question of substance, that is, in terms of different kinds of predication; for references, see above, note 5).

[64] *Met.* 1.3.984a18.

[65] *Met.* 1.4.985a16–17.

spective and turns to the principles of becoming. 7.7 begins with some basic and formal facts about becoming, familiar from the *Physics*, namely, that everything which is generated is generated by (*hupo*) something, from (*ek*) something, and eventually becomes something. Whereas the latter aspect of generation is to be explained in terms of the categories, the two others are analyzed in terms of form and matter respectively.[66] It is thus only after having discussed form and matter as principles of generation that Aristotle pursues a hylomorphic analysis of that which is generated, the reason being that he is setting out from the "natural" view of substance. According to this view, that which is generated, like a man or a plant, is what "we call substance most of all."[67] In this way, he is returning to those concrete things of the world with which the inquiry into substance began, this time from the perspective established in the *Physics* and with the logical reflection on substance as essence in the background.

What benefits are there in this kind of approach? Whereas the foregoing discussion of essence was quite abstract, treating the essence as more or less a separate entity, a major aim of the analysis in 7.7–9 is to make clear how the form belongs to its object and thus to challenge Plato's conception of form as a separately existing entity. For this purpose, natural objects present an exemplary case, since here, the form can be regarded as the shape of the thing, though this is of course only a preliminary determination.[68] And in order to explain the possibility of generation, it is necessary that the form be not itself generated, for what is generated precisely consists of form and

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[66] *Met.* 7.7.1032a12–25. Aristotle proceeds in a similar way in the *Physics*: when discussing in Book 1 the earlier thinkers' views on nature, he eventually states that there is need for a "logical" investigation (1.5.188a30–1: "ἀλλὰ δεῖ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου σκέψασθαι πῶς συμβαίνει."), which establishes that change is always between two opposite states. This notion is later (ch. 7) appealed to in order to assert that change presupposes a substrate, and with this assertion, the formal or "logical" discussion of the principles of change is concluded. But in Book 4, these principles are given a teleological interpretation and explicated in terms of the distinction between potentiality and actuality, which results in the definition of change as "the actuality of the potential being as such" (4.1.201a10–11: "ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια, ᾗ τοιοῦτον").

[67] *Met.* 7.7.1032a19: "ἃ δὴ μάλιστα λέγομεν οὐσίας εἶναι."

[68] As usual, however, Aristotle elucidates the basic traits of natural becoming using artificial production as a model. This is a complication I will not discuss here, but see Heidegger, *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1975), § 11.

matter, which means that, were the form likewise subject to genera-
tion (and destruction), we would get an infinite regress.[69] But this
means that the form is in fact not a "thing" or an entity in the common
sense at all; therefore, it cannot enjoy separate existence in the way
Plato imagined.   This is thus one of the more important points
achieved at the metaphysical level, the consequence of which is that
one of the basic traits of substancehood, separability, must, insofar as
it is ascribed to the form, be conceptual, not ontological in kind.[70] Ac-
cordingly, in Z.8, after having declared that there cannot be, for exam-
ple, a sphere in the sense of form existing besides the particular
spheres, Aristotle claims about form that "it signifies such a kind of
thing, and is not a determinate this; from a this one makes and creates
such a kind of thing, and when it is created it is a this of such a kind."[71]
Hence, to make sense of natural generation, we need not step out of
nature, but only explicate what is already involved in it. In fact,
Plato's work confirms this, for when he believed himself forced to
posit some further objects (the ideas) in addition to those that are
given within this world, he could do nothing but reduplicate the latter.

     But as virtually all commentators acknowledge, the nature and
status of *eidos* is problematic for Aristotle, although, it should be
noted, the problems seem to arise only as he in 7.10 returns to the *log-
ical* questions concerning form, that is, those relating to its possibility
of being defined and known. The benefit of the metaphysical analysis
of generation was that it centered on the thing that is subject to gener-
ation, whereas the form did not come into the foreground as a "thing"
in its own right; rather, it was the thing generated that appeared *as* be-
longing to a certain form. Therefore, there was no need at this stage
to ask whether the form itself is universal or particular, or if it is a
subject of predication, and so on, for that kind of questions is directed
precisely to things. However, insofar as the form is separable concep-
tually, it may be contemplated in isolation as a distinct entity, and
with this perspective the questions just mentioned reappear, though
as logical or conceptual, not ontological issues. And when confronted
with the question of how the form can be properly conceptualized, Ar-
istotle seems to suggest that our conception of form inevitably varies
according to our perspective. Specifically, it depends upon the stand

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     [69] *Met.* 7.8.1033a28–b5.
     [70] Though this is stated clearly only in Book 8.1.1042a26–31.
     [71] *Met.* 7.8.1033b21–4: "ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιόνδε σημαίνει, τόδε δὲ καὶ ὡρισμένον
οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖ καὶ γεννᾷ ἐκ τοῦδε τοιόνδε, καὶ ὅταν γεννηθῇ, ἔστι
τόδε τοιόνδε." Following Bostock.

we take on the material aspect of the concrete thing; whether or not this is to be counted as essential to the thing. In this way, the question concerning form is to some extent rephrased as a question concerning matter.

When Aristotle in 7.7 has asserted that generation presupposes some preexisting matter, he asks whether this means that matter should be included in the concept (*logos*) of the thing thus generated. The answer is that in the case of a bronze sphere, for example, the matter obviously must form part of the concept. However, if we regard generation in a more formal way, namely as a transition from one state to its opposite, we only need the formal element.[72] That is to say, matter can be regarded as a part of the thing when this is considered as a concrete whole (*sunholon*), but not of the thing considered as form. "Each thing may be said to be the form, or the thing qua having the form; but it cannot be said to be in its own right the material part."[73] This is because, as the substance of a thing, the form, as opposed to matter, must be something definite, a *tode ti*.[74] But as we saw above, Aristotle also says that the form is precisely not a "this" but signifies "such a kind," though the latter expression later is reserved for the universal.[75] So it seems that Aristotle wavers between two different ways of conceptualizing the form, as a determinate this and as a universal entity respectively. And if the evaluation of these two perspectives on form involves taking a stand on the conceptual and epistemological status of matter, then Aristotle is facing a particularly difficult issue. For if matter is altogether expelled from the concept of a sensible object, one runs the risk of ending up in exactly the same position as Plato. On the other hand, matter is the cause of accidental being, which is the province of sophistry. To introduce matter is thus a dangerous undertaking, and Aristotle has in fact discarded it from his ontological inquiry already in 6.2.

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[72] More precisely, form and its privation; *Met.* 7.7.1032b31–1033a16.

[73] *Met.* 7.10.1035a7–9: "λεκτέον γὰρ τὸ εἶδος ἔχει ἕκαστον, τὸ δ'ὑλικὸν οὑλικὸν οὐδέποτε καθ'αὑτὸς λεκτέον." Following Bostock.

[74] *Met.* 7.3.1029a27–8, 7.12.1037b27.

[75] The opposition between these two expressions is stated in *Met.* 7.13.1039a1–2. To be sure, the notion of a "this" (τόδε τι) does not necessarily have to be interpreted in terms of individuality, but since it is opposed to the notion "such a kind" it at least involves a sense of particularity or definiteness that marks it off from the universal. For a discussion of this point, see Mary Louise Gill, *Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 31–4; Wedin, *Aristotle's Theory of Substance*, 210–19.

Insofar as the clarification of the relation between form and thing requires a reflection on the conceptual role of matter, ontology cannot confine itself to a "logical" discourse on form as primary *ousia*, treating it as a separately existing entity, but has to approach the form from the perspective peculiar to philosophy of nature. Aristotle does state that the investigation of sensible substances in a way belongs to physics.[76] What characterizes physics is that, though contemplative (*theôrêtikê*), it is about "such being which is capable of change, and about substance conceptually regarded for the most part, and not only as a separately existing entity."[77] Accordingly, Aristotle concludes, we cannot eliminate matter entirely from our inquiry, for sensible things, such as man, cannot be defined without recourse to change (*kinêsis*).[78] But as the province of change, matter, not form, seems to be what bestows individuality on its object. Hence, if matter is not allowed to form part of the thing, the unity of the latter is threatened, not only ontologically but also epistemologically, since knowledge of the thing should be knowledge of it in its entirety, not only of some aspect of it. On the other hand, the form is what can be known in the proper sense, not matter, since matter is indeterminate (*ahoristos*).[79] How, then, can we make sense of the unity of a thing in a way that takes matter into account, which seems necessary if we are to account for the way in which the natural world appears to us, without distorting the distinction between form and matter, that is, without making matter into some formal element of the thing?[80]

Aristotle tries to answer this question in a much quoted passage at the end of Book 7, where he points out that to ask why a thing is, is really to ask why it is something else (and not itself). This might seem strange, however, in connection with simple expressions not to be an-

[76] *Met.* 7.11.1037a14–16.

[77] *Met.* 6.1.1025b26–8: "περὶ τοιοῦτον ὂν ὅ ἐστι δυνατὸν κινεῖσθαι, καὶ περὶ οὐσίαν τὴν κατὰ τὸν λόγον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, οὐ χωριστὴν μόνον." My translation.

[78] *Met.* 7.11.1036b21–30.

[79] *Met.* 7.11.1037a27.

[80] See Irwin (*Aristotle's First Principles*, §§ 129–33), who thinks that Aristotle occasionally includes matter in the definition as well as in the essence. For an elaborate treatment of the ontological status of matter in connection with the problem of unity, see Gill, *Aristotle on Substance*. The conceptual status of matter, or its place within the definition, has been thoroughly dealt with by Matthias Kessler, *Aristoteles Lehre von der Einheit der Definition* (Munich: Berchmans Verlag, 1976).

alyzed in terms of subject and attributes. He thus presents the following suggestion:

> And since the existence of the thing must already be given, it is clear that the question must be why the matter is so-and-so. For instance, the question may be "Why are these things here a house?" (and the answer is "Because what being is for a house belongs to them"), or it may be "Why is a thing here a man?", or "Why is this body in this state a man?" So what is sought is the cause by which the matter is so-and-so, i.e. the form. And that is the substance.[81]

With this statement, Aristotle might seem to want to retain the predicative model also in connection with the task of accounting for the unity of things. For even though the question of why a thing is differs from the question of why it has some attribute, it should be interpreted in terms of the model, "Why does A belong to B?"[82] Probably for this reason, it is thought that the above passage says that form can be predicated of matter, though not of its object, for that would entail exactly those problems Aristotle sees connected with the notion of substance as a universal.[83] However, Aristotle's point is precisely that the relation between form and matter must *not* be understood in terms of predication, for the reason that predication necessarily involves a problematic—ontological—division between subject and predicate. Hence, even though it is perfectly possible to construe a sentence in which form is predicated of matter, this does not settle the ontological question. For this purpose, the logical perspective is insufficient; it cannot on its own reveal the ontological difference

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[81] *Met.* 7.17.1041b4–9: "ἐπεὶ δέ δεῖ ἔχειν τε καὶ ὑπάρχειν τὸ εἶναι, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τὴν ὕλην ζητεῖ διὰ τί <τί> ἐστίν οἷον οἰκία ταδὶ διὰ τί ὅτι ὑπάρχει ὃ ἦν οἰκία εἶναι. καὶ ἄνθρωπος τοδί, ἢ τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο τοδὶ ἔχον. ὥστε τὸ αἴτιον ζητεῖται τῆς ὕλης [τοῦτο δ' ἐστί τὸ εἶδος] ᾧ τί ἐστίν τοῦτο δ' ἡ οὐσία." Following Bostock.

[82] *Met.* 7.17.1041a10–11: "ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ διὰ τί ἀεὶ οὕτως, διὰ τί ἄλλο ἄλλῳ τινὶ ὑπάρχει."

[83] This is thus an attempt to allow for the possibility that the form may turn out to be a kind of universal, but without violating the condition that nothing universally predicated of an object can be the substance of that object (stated in *Met.* 7.13.1038b15–16). For if form is predicated of matter only, the problem disappears, since form is clearly not intended to be the substance of matter. For references, see above, note 5. Wedin (*Aristotle's Theory of Substance*, 449–50), however, thinks that, on this conception of form, we need not even decide between universality and particularity, for in order for the form to do its job as primary substance, what is important is only that it is predicated of matter but not of the object whose form it is.

between statements such as "Socrates is white" and "This matter is man." To understand why the latter involves a kind of unity that the former does not, another perspective is required, namely that of teleology. Even though the metaphysical analysis of generation let the form appear as that which makes its object into a particular thing, it could not give a completely satisfactory treatment of the problems facing the attempt to properly conceptualize the form, which initially were encountered in connection with the logical reflection on substance. These problems just seemed to return at the metaphysical level, when the form was articulated as a determinate this and as a universal entity, although the metaphysical analysis finally decides in favor of the former designation. Still, a way out of this problem has been indicated, insofar as the analysis of generation showed that the form should not be regarded as an entity in the common sense at all. This insight makes up the starting point for the teleological reflection undertaken in Book 8.

There is an important way in which Aristotle's discussion of form and matter in Book 7 is not ontological in the full sense, but rather "ontical," that is, concerned with the nature of entities.[84] This means that, as regards the form, he has so far mainly been concerned with the question of what it is, but not so much with the question of its mode of being. As long as the form is regarded as an entity, however, the possibility remains of understanding it as a kind of predicate (or even as a subject), so that the ontological question concerning form remains unsolved. In Book 8, however, Aristotle spells out the implications of his previously acquired insight that this kind of "reification" of form is problematic, and therefore that the impredicability condition on substance is no longer relevant, for that belongs to the logical perspective on substance. Instead, the proper explication of form requires the perspective of teleology, or, more precisely, its distinction between potentiality and actuality (*dunamis* and *energeia*). Though retrieved from the realm of *phusis*, it must, as the *Metaphysics* tells us, be granted the prominence of a basic division within the different possible senses of "being."[85] Now, to state even in broad outline the basic traits of Aristotle's teleology, which permeates most, not to say

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[84] I use the distinction between the ontical and the ontological in the way it was developed by Heidegger, namely, as a distinction between (an inquiry into) what there is and (an inquiry into) what it means to be (for that which is); see *Sein und Zeit*, 17th ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1993), §§ 3–4.

[85] For example, *Met.* 8.2.1026a33–b2.

all of his work, would take us beyond the scope of this article. Thus I confine myself to briefly indicating those features of the teleological perspective which make it an ontological perspective in the proper sense, to be contrasted with the earlier, more or less "ontical" approaches to reality.

To begin with, it is clear that the distinction between potentiality and actuality is needed in order to give a successful defense of the principle of noncontradiction: "For the same thing can be potentially at the same time two contraries, but it cannot actually."[86] This additional qualification of PNC follows upon Aristotle's initial refutation of its contestants outlined above, which centered on the possibility of knowledge and meaning. Moreover, when introducing the concepts of potentiality and actuality into the discussion, he tries to explain why people may come to deny the principle of noncontradiction—which may not be that easy for the father of logic to understand—namely, because they are unable to recognize one of the most basic divisions in the field of being, the consequence of which failure is relativism.[87] In this way, the logical defense of PNC is sustained and reinforced at the ontological level.

But more important for our present purposes is that the perspective of teleology lets Aristotle explicate the unity of things at the ontological level, that is, with respect to their mode of being, though without distorting the ontical difference between matter and form that has previously been recognized, but which is no longer conceived after the model of predication—thus precisely the kind of explication of ontological unity called for at the end of Book 7.[88] More precisely, it is now possible to explain why a composite substance like a man forms a unit; a possibility that seems to be threatened by the model of predication, which does not provide us with the means of elucidating the relation between matter and form except as a relation between distinct entities. Aristotle states, however, that if we realize that matter belongs to the region of potential being, whereas form is to be interpreted in terms of actuality, the problem disappears:

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[86] *Met.* 4.5.1009a34–6: "δυνάμει μέν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα ταὐτὸ εἶναι τὰ ἐναντία, ἐντελέχεια δ' οὔ." Following Ross.

[87] Apart from Book 4, see also the discussion of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια in 9.3.

[88] This line of interpretation was originally indicated by Heidegger, and I have given an elaborate treatment of it in *The Logic of Life. Heidegger's Retrieval of Aristotle's Concept of Logos* (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International, 2002), ch. 5.

> The reason for their difficulty is that they are seeking both a unifying formula and a differentia for potentiality and actuality. But in fact, as has been said, the final matter and the shape are one and the same thing, one potentially and the other actually, so that it is as if they were asking what was the cause of unity and of being one. For each thing is one, and the potential and the actual are in a way one . . . [89]

At the teleological level, the search for a *cause* of the unity of things is regarded as improper, since here, explanation is no longer given in terms of additional entities besides form and matter, but takes the form of an explication of their mode of being. In this way, teleology explicates the unity of things from within, so to speak, instead of referring to external factors. When viewed in light of the teleological perspective, the hylomorphic analysis of things into form and matter can be interpreted as implying that these things are "real" or actual in an incomplete way. For even though they no doubt are something definite (they have a certain form), as subject to generation and destruction, their existence is such as to consist in the actualization of a potentiality which never is fully consumed (for that would be equal to their final destruction). This means that sensible things in each moment not only are something, but also are not yet something, while on the way toward it. This interplay of potentiality and actuality is what makes up their ontological unity.[90] Further, even if, within this perspective, we make the form rather than the concrete thing into our primary object of attention, it will appear, not as an isolated entity but as a mode of existence which is conceived of in relation to things enacting or fulfilling it—even though they do so in an incomplete way as compared with the form itself, being pure actuality. It therefore seems that the teleological reflection is what finally can provide us with the means to conceptualize the form as such or in itself, but without making it into a separately existing entity, in that the "thisness" characterizing the form is now explicated in terms of actuality,

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[89] *Met.* 8.6.1045b16–21: "αἴτιον δ' ὅτι δυνάμεως καὶ ἐντελεχείας ζητοῦσι λόγον ἑνοποιὸν καὶ διαφοράν. ἔστι δ', ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἡ ἐσχάτη ὕλη καὶ ἡ μορφὴ ταὐτὸ καὶ ἓν, <τὸ μέν> δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ, ὥστε ὅμοιον τὸ ζητεῖν τοῦ ἑνὸς τί αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι, ἓν γάρ τι ἕκαστον, καὶ τὸ δυνάμει καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ἕν πώς ἐστιν." Following Bostock.

[90] For the conception of change, κίνησις, as the incomplete (ἀτελές) actuality pertaining to natural or sensible things, see *Met.* 9.6.1048b18–35; *Phys.* 3.2, 3, in particular 201b27–202a3.

viewed as a mode of being belonging to the concrete thing itself, and not as some element of it.

As the last stage within the ontological inquiry pursued in the *Metaphysics*, the teleological explication of being as *ousia* should provide us with a horizon of interpretation against which the foregoing stages can be viewed in a new light. Now, the investigation of substance initially embraced the point of view of what is more intelligible to us, where *ousia* first of all presented itself as a concrete, individual object of ordinary experience. Moreover, this view was affirmed at the logical level of reflection, which showed that this object makes up a subject of predication and as such can be made into an object of ontological research. The first stage within that kind of research then proved to consist in interrogating this object with respect to its nature, whereby the logical notion of form as essence was established. This notion, however, seemed to result in a conception of substance that cannot do justice to that experience of reality from which the ontological inquiry originally set out. For this reason, a new approach to *ousia* was needed, one that returns to the objects of ordinary experience in order to explain them from a perspective which hopefully is free from the earlier difficulties. Moreover, in virtue of its turn toward nature, metaphysics could take an important step in the clarification of the unity of things in ontological respect, not least because it centered on the concrete substances of natural generation, instead of making the form into the primary object of inquiry. At the same time, however, the "logical" problems concerning the proper conceptualization of substance reappeared at the metaphysical level, now as problems connected with the nature and status of matter. To tackle them, Aristotle eventually moved to the teleological perspective of what is more intelligible by nature, which revealed that the existence of concrete substances ultimately may be interpreted as a union of potentiality and actuality, whereby an ontological explication of the ontical analysis of things into matter and form was achieved.

Ontologically, Aristotle thus seems to have attained his goal, namely, to explicate the unity of substance in a way that was out of reach for his predecessors. And this became possible as he, at the teleological level, managed to move beyond the ontical level of explanation, which inevitably approaches the form as an entity of some kind. Consequently, the two major *aporiai* facing the inquiry into substance disappeared, namely, the problem concerning the relation between

particular and universal being, as well as the problem connected with
the impredicability condition on substance. Accordingly, these prob-
lems are finally resolved rather than solved, for they are discovered to
be simply inapplicable at the ontological level proper, while being ulti-
mately based upon a logical conception of reality as *divided* into dif-
ferent kinds of entities or, more generally, into different regions of be-
ing between which there does not seem to be any communication.
Still, one might ask whether the teleological explication really has ful-
filled its task of throwing new light on the foregoing stages within the
inquiry into substance, so that the different extant *logoi* on reality can
be confirmed as experiences of reality in their own right, rather than
as merely mistaken opinions. These all move, to a greater or lesser
extent, on the level of what is more intelligible to us, where the dis-
tinction between particular objects and their universal essences ap-
parently does play a decisive role, due to its orientation toward enti-
ties. Accordingly, in order for his teleological analysis to be entirely
convincing, Aristotle has to show how this analysis makes it possible
to account for the fact that the form appears to us in different ways,
that is, both as a universal and as a particular entity. In other words,
he has to make it plausible that our experience of the world itself
gives rise to this kind of conflict because our access to things is struc-
tured in such a way as to involve notions both of particular and uni-
versal being. I will conclude with some remarks on the implications
of this task for Aristotle's project with respect to its division between
logic and metaphysics.

In his discussion of essence in 7.6, Aristotle states—against
Plato—that "the essence of a particular thing and that thing itself are
one and the same, and not accidentally so, also because to have
knowledge of a particular thing is to have knowledge of its essence."[91]
This claim is later specified so that only primary substances, such as
the circle considered as such or conceptually, can be said to be identi-
cal with their essence, whereas this is not true of concrete sub-
stances.[92] Therefore, he concludes, our access to individual things
comes through thought (*noêsis*) and perception, not through defini-
tion, though we necessarily speak of them and are familiar with them

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[91] *Met.* 7.6.1031b19–21: "ἓν· καὶ ταὐτὸ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτὸ
ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι γε τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἕκαστον τοῦτό ἐστι, τὸ τί
ἦν εἶναι ἐπίστασθαι." My translation.
[92] *Met.* 7.10.1036a1–5, 7.11.1037a33–b7.

only by means of universal terms.[93] On this account, our experience
of individual things cannot be direct or immediate, which means that
the clarification of the possibility of our ordinary understanding of the
world cannot do without a notion of universal being. But as Aristotle
has tried to show throughout Book 7, not least in his discussion of the
universal in 7.13, the dependency goes in the other direction as well,
so that we could not have any knowledge of universal entities were it
not for our perception of individual objects to which universals may
be ascribed. How this situation should be accounted for in teleologi-
cal terms is indicated in 13.9: knowledge of the universal is as such po-
tential and indeterminate, and it is only as actualized, that is, when it
directs itself toward some specific object, that it becomes endowed
with a determinate structure. On this interpretation, it seems that we
must also say that knowledge of the form as such is universal when re-
flected upon within the logical perspective. It gets its full meaning or
"reality" only when it is enacted in the direction of a particular thing
which is apprehended as something endowed with a particular form.
This step, in fact, is precisely what is provided by the metaphysical re-
flection. As we have just seen, however, this actualization is in its turn
dependent upon potentiality, in that it essentially involves reactivation
of potential universal knowledge, without which particular things
would be incomprehensible.

This conception of knowledge also has bearings upon Aristotle's
own project. Insofar as it aims at universal ontological explanation, it
moves on the level of potential being, which is particularly true of the
logical mode of discourse, with its establishment of formal distinc-
tions and concepts. This is a major reason for the need for philosophy
of nature or metaphysics in ontology, which can serve the purpose of
concretizing and filling the universal results attained at the logical
level. At the same time, however, it is the logical level that provides us
with the conceptual means of handling the basic questions of
ontology; as such, it is scientific in a way that metaphysics, including
teleology, is not. Science has to do with universal being, that which
cannot be otherwise,[94] and this perspective requires the distinction be-
tween things and their attributes established by the principle of

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93 *Met.* 7.10.1036a5–8.
94 *Posterior Analytics* 1.2, ed. Lorenzo Minio-Paluello (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1964), p. 24.

noncontradiction. Thus if teleology in its abandonment of the logical distinction between entities expels the very distinction between universality and particularity, it also leaves the level of scientific explanation.

Hence, even though the teleological perspective reveals what is "more intelligible by nature," its results cannot be taken in isolation, as though they constituted Aristotle's final words on substance. Rather, the argumentative structure of the *Metaphysics* shows that the logical discourse is a necessary part of ontology, in that the elucidation of the question concerning substance requires that substance be allowed to appear from different perspectives. Therefore, it seems more reasonable to say that the answer to the question of being as *ousia* is embedded in the entire path the *Metaphysics* is traveling, from logic to metaphysics, including teleology. Perhaps Aubenque was not so far from the truth, therefore, when he argued that Aristotle's statement that the question of *ousia* is "what is always sought for and always baffles us"[95] shows that Aristotle took this question to be intrinsically aporetic.[96] It is perhaps natural to want to give one final answer to the question of being as *ousia*, but it should be remembered that Aristotle himself never says that he has provided one. The *Metaphysics* actualizes the transition from *logos* to *phusis*, and in doing so points the way from a logical or formal conception of reality toward its concrete fulfillment in our experience of nature. Thereby, however, it displays a conflict between different experiences of reality which cannot be solved by giving one answer or explanation. Instead, it benefits from both a logical and an ontological perspective. Even though the primary task of the latter is to clarify what is involved in the former, rather than to add something to it in the form of other entities or explanatory factors, it finally moves beyond the logical level, which in its outlook on the world centers on entities of different kinds. When it leaves logic behind in this way, ontology reveals its own scientific limits, which presupposes precisely such a logical orientation. Hence, insofar as Aristotle's project pursues different approaches to the question of being which cannot in any simple way be replaced by a single one (not least because it seeks to do justice to such different voices on reality as those of Plato and the natural phi-

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[95] *Met.* 7.1.1028b3: "ἀεὶ ζητούμενον καὶ ἀεὶ ἀπορούμενον."
[96] See Aubenque, *Le problème de l'être chez Aristote*, 198.

losophers), it seems to affirm the view of philosophical research that Aristotle himself introduces in the second book of the *Metaphysics*, namely, that the inquiry into the truth is in one way difficult, and in another easy, for "we do not collectively fail, but every one says something true about the nature of things, and while individually we contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the union of all a considerable amount is amassed."[97]

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[97] *Met.* 3.1.993b1–4: "αὐτῆς μήτε πάντας ἀποτυγχάνειν, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον λέγειν τι περὶ τῆς φύσεως, καὶ καθ' ἕνα μέν ἢ μηθὲν ἢ μικρὸν ἐπιβάλλειν αὐτῇ, ἐκ πάντων δὲ συναθροιζομένων γίγνεσθαί τι μέγεθος." Following Ross.

MICHAEL J. SWEENEY

A̅BU NASR MUHAMMAD AL-FĀRĀBĪ (870–950 A.D.), arguably the most important political philosopher in medieval Islam, discusses at some length in his writings the value of offensive war for the purpose of bringing the conquered to virtue, and thus to happiness, and on occasion even uses the term *"jihād"* or derivatives from it.[1] Although there are remarkably few studies devoted to al-Fārābī's understanding of *jihād*, one can identify three distinct positions among scholars. The first is, *prima facie*, the most literal reading: al-Fārābī is supporting the Islamic notion of *jihād* with philosophy. The methodology of philosophy independently justifies the Islamic call to *jihād*: one can start with either philosophy or religion, for each confirms the other. Ann Lambton and Charles Butterworth see al-Fārābī arguing for a harmony or synthesis between philosophy and Islamic religion with respect to *jihād*.[2] Joel Kraemer represents the second position in which al-

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[1] See al-Fārābī, *Fuṣūl al-Madanī: Aphorisms of the Statesman*, ed. and trans. D. Dunlop (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), especially notes 54 and 63. Also, al-Fārābī, *Al-Siyāsā al-Madaniyya*, ed. Fauzi Najjar (Beruit: Imprimerie Catholique, 1964). A partial translation of this work can be found in al-Fārābī, *The Political Regime*, in *Medieval Political Philosophy*, trans. Muhsin Mahdi (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). Also, al-Fārābī, *Taḥṣīl al-Saʿadah*, ed. Jafar al-Yasin (Beruit: Al-Andaloss, 1981). I will cite the following translation of *Taḥṣīl al-Saʿadah*: al-Fārābī, *Attainment of Happiness*, in *Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle*, trans. Muhsin Mahdi (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), here especially notes 38–48.

[2] "In his political works al-Fārābī seeks to make classical Greek tradition intelligible to Muslim readers in the context of revealed religion. He does not directly quote the Qur'ān or refer to Islamic religious issues; but he uses terms familiar in Muslim law, the Qur'ān and in the traditions, and the impression left by his works on the reader is that his intention is to enable men to see the wide area of harmony between the divine law of Islam and the practical intention of classical political philosophy, and to show that the traditions of classical political philosophy belong to Muslims no less than to Greeks." Ann Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam* (Oxford: Oxford

Fārābī is seen as supporting philosophy with the Islamic notion of *ji-hād*.[3] The philosophy of Plato and Aristotle is al-Fārābī's sole starting point, and he uses it to transform the Islamic notion of *jihād* into the philosophical understanding of just war so that only the linguistic term "*jihād*" remains. Al-Fārābī accommodates the term but not the meaning of Islamic *jihād*, and so he writes esoterically as he quietly substitutes a philosophical meaning for *jihād*. In this reading, philosophy is "jihadist," inasmuch as it advocates a universal virtuous regime, but this regime is ruled by a philosopher for philosophy and not by *sharī'a* for a divinely revealed doctrine.

The most recent and extensive analysis of al-Fārābī's understanding of *jihād* is Joshua Parens's *An Islamic Philosophy of Virtuous Regimes: Introducing Alfarabi* (Albany: State University of New York, 2006), which provides the third interpretation: al-Fārābī is using phi-

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University Press, 1981), 317–18. "His speech, images, and general explanations of the universe as well as of the human soul all point to the great similarity of purpose, even of general understanding, that exists between the revelation accorded Muhammad and the inquiries of the pagan philosophers. By pointing to this similarity, directly as well as indirectly, al-Fārābī preserves the possibility of philosophical inquiry." Charles Butterworth, "Al-Fārābī's Statecraft: War and the Well-Ordered Regime," in *Cross, Crescent and Sword: The Justification and Limitati on of War in Western and Islamic Tradition*, ed. J. Johnson and J. Kelsay (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 93. Erwin Rosenthal's position is similar: "*Itjihād and jihād* as requirements of Muslim law establish beyond question how deeply rooted Al-Fārābī and Ibn Rushd were in Islamic tradition. This suggests that they were first and foremost educated Muslims since *Fiqh* is a primary element of traditional education. It shaped their outlook. They approached Greek-Hellenistic philosophy as Muslims, at any rate where politics were concerned, and took what was akin to their own way of life and thought from Plato and Aristotle, as they came across their ideas in their writings, summaries and commentators, and had to adapt them to Islamic concepts." Erwin Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 139.

[3] "I present this divergence as a cardinal example, or test case, demonstrating the fundamental alienation of the *Falāsifa* [Kraemer focuses on al-Fārābī among the *Falāsifa*] from the ultimate aspirations of the society in which they lived and as a parade instance of their artful accommodation to the Islamic lexicon by means of a hermeneutic and rhetorical reinterpretation of root concepts. This understanding of the task of the *Falāsifa* differs from the more common presentation of their objective as one of harmonizing, synthesizing, or blending the thought of classical political philosophy with Islamic ideology. The word 'accommodation,' I submit, expresses more precisely what they were about. The distinction between accommodation language and harmony idiom is not merely semantic; it bears upon the basic issues concerning the best polity and the purposes of warfare, for instance." Joel Kraemer, "The Jihad of the Falasifa," *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam*," 10 (1987): 291–2.

losophy to criticize the religious notion of *jihād*. This position differs from the second because Parens does not see al-Fārābī as substituting a philosophical for a religious meaning to *jihād*; rather, he is using philosophy to show the impossibility of establishing a universal virtuous regime through religious warfare. Philosophy, as demonstrated by Plato's *Republic*, is skeptical of the possibility of the ideally virtuous regime on any scale,[4] and al-Fārābī brings this skepticism to bear on the question of offensive war in the name of a universal religion.[5] Plato's *Republic* is esoteric, since the argument for the virtuous regime shows its impossibility, and likewise al-Fārābī's argument for *jihād* shows its impossibility.

This article will argue for a fourth interpretation as superior to and more comprehensive than the other three: al-Fārābī is criticizing philosophy with the religious notion of *jihād*. In spite of their differences, Kraemer and Parens both believe that, according to al-Fārābī, the fundamental problem is religion and that philosophy is the solution. In fact, however, the fundamental political problem for Plato, Aristotle and al-Fārābī is that virtue ethics is necessarily coercive. For al-Fārābī, religion provides at least a partial solution to the philosophical problem of compulsion to happiness. He argues that the limitations that the Greek philosophers themselves place on this compulsion to happiness are arbitrary, and that one must look outside philosophy to religion for a more natural limitation to ethical and political coercion.

The principal difference between the third and fourth interpretation concerns the question with which al-Fārābī is wrestling. According to Parens, the fundamental problem is the necessity to unite in the ruler of the virtuous regime theoretical, deliberative, and warlike

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[4] "If the *Republic*'s virtuous city is impossible, then a fortiori Alfarabi's regime of the inhabited world in the *Attainment of Happiness (AH)*—composed of virtuous nations, each of which is composed in turn of virtuous cities—is impossible." Parens, *An Islamic Philosophy of Virtuous Regimes* (Albany: State University of New York, 2006), 29. See also 11–27.

[5] "Although Alfarabi appears at first glance to promote *jihād*, closer analysis revealed a sophisticated and subtle critique of the traditional juridical justifications for *jihād*." Parens, *An Islamic Philosophy of Virtuous Regimes*, 8. "Thus the plan to compel good character, and indeed happiness, among other nations through war proves especially problematic from within Alfarabi's Aristotelian evaluation of offensive *jihād*." Ibid., 76. See also 5, 73, and 103.

virtues.[6] The extreme unlikelihood of uniting these qualities in a ruler or even in a rule restricts the virtuous regime to the realm of speech. The fundamental problem is not compulsion to virtue, because Parens thinks that Plato, Aristotle, and al-Fārābī see compulsion as punishment of the wicked: that is, only the wicked need compulsion, and those who are not vicious (or perhaps not incontinent) can be persuaded.[7] The chief difficulty of the third interpretation is reflected in Parens' puzzlement that al-Fārābī considers warlike force and persuasion to be the same skill or habit.[8] They are the same, for al-Fārābī, because the meaning of compulsion to virtue is wider than punishment and includes persuasion. Thus the fundamental problem for al-

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[6] "Indeed, the strain increases to the breaking point when Alfarabi states forthrightly that character formation, through persuasion and compulsion, derives from 'the very same skill' (42, 32.3). Although he makes this claim in section 42, by section 48, difficulties begin to emerge. . . . Even before the claim that persuasion for character formation and compulsion flows from the very same skill, Alfarabi acknowledges the need to use different groups of rulers to shape the character of the ruled through persuasion and compulsion (42, 31.14–17). Nevertheless, when he enters upon the task of delegating responsibility in earnest (47, 48), he acknowledges rather casually that there is a 'warlike virtue' and a 'deliberative virtue' involved in these activities. It would be best if these were combined in one man. If not, however, the supreme ruler 'should add to the man who forms the character of nations with their consent another who possesses the craft of war' (48, 36.3). Obviously the latter requires the 'warlike virtue' and the former the 'deliberative virtue.' If duties can be so divided along the line of these virtues, then Alfarabi seems to have contradicted his claim that the activities of persuasion and compulsion are rooted in the same skill (section 42)." Parens, *An Islamic Philosophy of Virtuous Regimes*, 42. See also 44–5. Parens also believes that al-Fārābī is skeptical about the degree to which theoretical virtue can be attained: see pp. 103 and following.

[7] "The key [Parens is speaking of Aristotle, whose position here al-Fārābī is said to share] to moving from lacking to possessing self-restraint or from possessing self-restraint to moderation is implementing or coming to possess those beliefs fully through consistent habituation. When people possess such beliefs, usually all they need is to be exhorted or persuaded to implement them (1179b8–11). Yet one wonders where punishment and compulsion enter the equation. Most clearly, they enter in dealing with the immoderate [vicious]. . . . Such a person is most in need of punishment, because only fear of punishment (as opposed to the shame of someone with good beliefs but bad desires) can deter him from fulfilling his bad desires (1179b12–16). . . . It is conceivable, then, that compulsion could play a role in inspiring some individuals to ascend from lacking self-restraint [incontinent] through self-restraint [continent] to moderation [virtue]. But the main role of compulsion is to force the immoderate [vicious] to act well out of fear of punishment." Parens, *An Islamic Philosophy of Virtuous Regimes*, 75–6.

Fārābī comes when the necessity of coercion in all character forma-
tion is joined to his rejection, in the name of philosophy, of the limits
that Plato and Aristotle had placed on such coercion.

The argument for the fourth interpretation will treat first compul-
sion to virtue for Plato, Aristotle and al-Fārābī, then the limits to com-
pulsion for the Greek philosophers and al-Fārābī's philosophical rejec-
tion of those limits in favor of religion, and finally the meaning of
jihād. The conclusion will take up Parens's suggestion that the inter-
pretation of al-Fārābī's views on *jihād* is not a purely academic mat-
ter.[9] The rejection of al-Fārābī's view of *jihād* had, Parens states, a
"deleterious effect on Islam." Whether al-Fārābī's understanding of *ji-
hād* could be exemplary for believers will be the final question.

· I

Aristotle on compulsion to virtue.[10] Al-Fārābī's most intensive
treatment of war may be found in his *Aphorisms of the Statesman*, es-
pecially numbers 54 and 63, where he defines the various types of and
motives for war, but his most comprehensive treatment of compul-
sion, in which he views war in a wider context of force, is found in *At-
tainment of Happiness*, especially paragraphs 38–43. In reading the
Attainment of Happiness, one can begin, as Parens does, by empha-
sizing the "more or less direct references to Plato's *Republic* in *AH*."[11]

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[8] "In section 41, the prince or ruler establishes two groups to engage in
character formation: one uses persuasion, and the other uses compulsion. As
we saw in the previous chapter, Alfarabi claims somewhat surprisingly that
the very same skill enables these two groups to shape character. As long as
one views this within a domestic context, the idea is not so surprising. Cor-
poral punishment can be used to shape character—though there may be rea-
sons to doubt that it can be used to compel happiness! When the compulsion
involved extends to external war, as it does in section 43, it is more surpris-
ing. It is less obvious that punishment can be used to shape the character of
another people, not to mention compel happiness." Parens, *An Islamic Phi-
losophy of Virtuous Regimes*, 73.

[9] "I hope to persuade the reader that the turn in the thirteenth century,
away from Alfarabi's kind of political rationalism in Islam had deleterious ef-
fects." Parens, *An Islamic Philosophy of Virtuous Regimes*, 4.

[10] For the relationship between virtue and happiness in *Nichomachean
Ethics*, see 1.7.1098a15–20, 1.9.1100a3–9, 1.10.1100b17–21, 1.10.1101a14–20,
10.6.1177a1–2, 10.7.1177a12–14.

[11] Parens, *An Islamic Philosophy of Virtuous Regimes*, 30.

The structure and language of this section of the *Attainment of Happiness*, however, closely follows Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics*, especially book 10, chapter 9. Whether one begins with Platonic or Aristotelian elements, both are certainly present, for the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle is one according to al-Fārābī. While the content of the *Republic* is as necessary as *Nichomachean Ethics* for understanding *Attainment of Happiness*, its organization owes more to *Nichomachean Ethics*.

From the beginning of *Nichomachean Ethics*, Aristotle states that the purpose of political life is to make (*poiēsai*) citizens virtuous.[12] Although virtue is not contrary to nature, it is not so natural that individuals can make themselves virtuous: they need to be made virtuous.[13] . Becoming virtuous is, for example, between the natural development of an acorn, which, given the right conditions, must become an oak and the making of bronze into a cup, which is entirely dependent on the exterior efficient cause for its formation. Aristotle maintains that it is natural for human beings to be made virtuous in families, villages and cities. He thus insists, as we shall see, that the force exercised in making human beings virtuous is natural (contrary to the example of artificial production), because families are natural.[14] This is the most generic meaning of "force" with regard to virtue, because there is no specification as to how citizens are to be made virtuous: for example, there is not yet any determination concerning how this "making" pertains to the willing or the unwilling. Determination in the use of ethical force begins in *Nichomachean Ethics* 2.1103a14–19 with the distinction between theoretical and moral virtue. The "making" of citizens, for Aristotle, is a matter of moral but not theoretical virtue. Teaching is the cause of theoretical virtue; habituation is the cause of moral virtue. Political rulers make (*poiousin*) citizens

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[12] "Homologoumena de taut' an eiē kai tois en arkhē. To gar tēs politikēs telos ariston etithemen, hautē de pleistēn epimeleian poietai tou poious tinas kai agathous tous politas poiēsai kai praktikous tōn kalōn." Aristotle, *Ethica Nichomachea* [hereafter *NE*] 1.9.1099b28–32, ed. I. Bywater (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1890), p. 15. As translated by W. D. Ross, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 946: "And this will be found to agree with what we said at the outset, for we state the end of political science to be the best end, and political science spends most of its pains on making the citizens to be a certain character, viz. good and capable of noble acts."

[13] See n. 21 below.

[14] Al-Fārābī will emphasize the naturalness of this "making" through the naturalness of religion. See section V below.

good by habituating them; that is, by making them repeatedly perform good actions.[15] Those who are made to be good are principally, or at least ideally, children: "It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather *all* the difference."[16] For the most part, it is too late to make adults good: it is only children who can truly be "made" or "forced" to be good.

That children are the proper objects of compulsion to virtue and happiness is evident in Aristotle's account of the good as noble, useful, and pleasant—"*kalou, sumferontos, hedeos.*"[17] The good as noble is that which is intrinsically good, that is, good as an end; the good as useful is the goodness of a means to an end, and the good as pleasant is the enjoyment of a good possessed. It is necessary to force habituation to the good as noble because it does not immediately appear as useful or pleasant. Only after one has been conformed to the good as noble through habituation does it appear as useful and pleasant. The unity of the good as noble, useful, and pleasant exists first solely in the external authority who compels repeated noble action; it exists in the agent who learns to perform the action after the habituation is perfected. Hence some kind of compulsion is necessary before that point. In other words, the reason why the good action should be repeatedly performed is not seen by the agent until the good action becomes a habit, at which point it now appears as useful and pleasant. If not compelled to be good from youth, a much more severe form of compulsion is necessary to make one good: "Hence we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought; for this is the right education."[18] The paradigmatic form of ethical compulsion is that directed to children.

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[15] "Marpturei de kai to ginomenon en tais polesin. Hoi gar nomothetai tous politas ethizontes poiousin agathous." *NE* 2.1.1103b2–4; Bywater, p. 24. As translated in Ross, 952: "This is confirmed by what happens in state; for legislators make the citizens good by forming habits in them."

[16] "Ou mikron oun diapherei to houtōs ē houtōs euthus ek neōn ethizesthai, alla pampolu, mallon de ta pan." *NE* 2.1.1103b24–5; Bywater, 25; Ross, 953.

[17] Ibid. 3.3.1104b5–12, 29–35.

[18] "Dio dei ēchthai pōs euthus ek neōv, ōs ho Platōn phēsin, hōste khairein te kai lupeisthai hois dei he gar orthē paideia hautē estin." *NE* 2.3.1104b11–13; Bywater, 27; Ross, 954.

The near impossibility of achieving virtue without compulsion of some sort is evident in Aristotle's example of lyre playing,[19] which we may translate into the more modern example of piano playing and elaborate as follows. Any child that begins to play the piano will quickly find the lessons unpleasant. Habituation to the noble act of piano playing through practice appears to the child as painful and useless. The parent and teacher, however, force the child to practice because piano playing is good in itself, and, after years of practice or habituation, it will appear to the child as pleasant and useful. Since the child is unable to see piano playing as a noble good, the adults offer external rewards and pleasures. Practicing the piano will earn rewards that have no inherent connection to piano playing, such as toys and candy. This is a kind of force or compulsion, since the adult attaches to piano playing a reason that is not piano-playing: the child desires the reward but not the piano playing. Piano-playing as a noble good is still unchosen. Not practicing the piano will earn punishments and pains greater than those of practicing the piano, which is also a kind of force because piano-playing is chosen only as a means of avoiding a stronger pain.

Once the habit is fully formed, the "character" (*heksis*) is an internal cause of the noble act; performance of the act is desired because it is now seen as a good that is noble, useful and pleasant.[20] Aristotle describes this process of making [*poiēsai*] children virtuous as proceeding ideally from an (1) external stimulus [*parormēsai*] to (2) possession [*katokōchimon*] which becomes a (3) virtue [*aretē*] that belongs to and is the agent:

> Now if arguments were in themselves enough to make men good, they would justly, as Theognis says, have won very great rewards, and such rewards should have been provided; but as things are, while they seem to have the power to encourage and stimulate the generous-minded among our youth, and to make a character which is gently born, and a

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[19] Ibid. 2.2.1103b1–9.

[20] "Koinēi men oun peri tōn aretōn eirētai hēmin to te genos tupō, hoti mesotētes eisin kai hoti hexis huph' hōn te ginontai, hoti toutōn praktikai kai kath' hautas, kai hoti eph' hēmin kai hekousioi, kai houtōs hōs an ho orthos logos prostaxē." *NE* 3.5.114b26–30; Bywater, 52. As translated in Ross, 974: "With regard to the virtues in *general* we have stated their genus in outline, viz. that they are means and that they are states of character, and that they tend, and by their own nature, to the doing of the acts by which they are produced, and that they are in our power and voluntary, and act as the right rule prescribes."

> true lover of what is noble, ready to be possessed by virtue, they are not able to encourage the many to nobility and goodness. For these do not by nature obey the sense of shame, but only fear, and do not abstain from bad acts because of their baseness but through fear of punishment.[21]

Internal to the child is a desire for pleasure and a fear of pain. An external stimulus is provided by the parent—an object of pleasure or an object of pain that is associated accidentally, that is through authority, with the action. The former is better because pleasure feels more voluntary and more quickly becomes an internal character through a motion that Aristotle calls "possession." *Katokōchimon*, possession, is used by Aristotle to describe both religious[22] and sexual[23] frenzy.[24] The source of the possession is exterior, whether it is sacred music for religious frenzy, the mate in sexual frenzy, or the arguments (*logoi*) in ethical frenzy. In fact, the agent suffers a kind of madness whereby he is outside himself, but this possession more readily settles down through habituation into stable and self-possessed virtue, in comparison to when the performance of the noble act is moved through the external stimulus of fear. The "arguments" that produce ethical frenzy are rhetorical and poetic rather than demonstrative, an imaginative encouragement (*protrepsasthai*) towards the good.[25] Rhetoric is a kind of force or compulsion inasmuch as it incites a frenzy for the noble good based on pleasures that are not yet the pleasures of the noble act itself. In sum, Aristotle distinguishes here between two kinds of ethical compulsion, neither of which necessarily excludes the other: one based on rhetoric, reward, and pleasure; the other based on law, punishment, and pain. The former should dominate in the education of youth; the latter must dominate in the ethical formation of adults, who are already too badly habituated for rhetoric alone.

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[21] "[E]i men oun ēsan hoi logoi autarkeis pros to poiēsai epieikeis. Pollus an misthous kai megalous dikaiōs epheron kata ton Theognin, kai edei an toutous porisasthai. Nun de phainontai protrepsasthai men kai parormēsai tōn neōn tous eleutherious ischuein, ethos t' eugenes kai hōs alēthōs philokalon poiēsai an katokōchimon ek tēs aretēs, tous de pollous adunatein pros kalokagathian protrepsasthai. Ou gar pepheukasin aidoi peitharchein alla phoboi, oud' apechesthai tōn phaulōn dia to aischron alla dia tas timōrias." *NE* 10.9.1179b4–13; Bywater, 218–19; Ross, 1108.

[22] Aristotle, *Politics* 8.7.1342a6–15.

[23] Aristotle, *History of Animals* 6.18.572a32–3.

[24] Plato also uses it to refer to artistic possession. See *Phaedrus* 245a.

[25] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.3.1358b15.

The chief objections to this interpretation of Aristotle are his assertions that the acts of children as well as animals are voluntary,[26] and that a compulsory act is one that is wholly from the outside—the cause is completely external.[27] Children could not be punished or rewarded if their acts were not voluntary. What Aristotle is arguing, however, is not that an act is always either entirely voluntary or entirely compulsory, but rather that there are degrees between these two extremes. An entirely compulsory act has an entirely external cause, such as being carried by the wind or a military defeat.[28] The only entirely voluntary act is the one done for the sake of the good as noble because, as a result of habituation, the act is internally caused: the act is done for the sake of the act itself and for a pleasure that is internal to the act.[29] Persuasion attaches to the act an external reason for acting until the act becomes internal through habituation. Thus there are, for Aristotle, degrees of ethical force. The act of the child who is moved to perform the noble act through a foreign pleasure undergoes some degree of force; yet it is also voluntary, inasmuch as the pleasure accidentally related to the act appeals to the child's desires and thus provides a reason for the child to perform the act.

<div align="center">II</div>

Al-Fārābī on compulsion to virtue. For al-Fārābī, as for Aristotle, the purpose of political life is to make citizens happy, and this occurs through habituation, which, as in *Nichomachean Ethics* 10.9, proceeds from (1) an external stimulus, to (2) a kind of ethical possession that (3) becomes virtue:

> There are two primary methods of realizing them [virtues]: instruction and the formation of character. To instruct is to introduce the theoretical virtues in nations and cities. The formation of character is the method of introducing the moral virtues and practical arts in nations. Instruction proceeds by speech alone. The formation of character pro-

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[26] See *NE* 3.1.1111a25–6.
[27] Ibid. 3.1.1110b1–2.
[28] Ibid. 3.1.11110a1–4.
[29] Ibid. 3.1.1110b8–17.

ceeds through habituating nations and citizens in doing the acts that issue from the practical states of character by arousing in them the resolution to do these acts; the states of character and the acts issuing from them should come to possess their souls, and they should be as it were enraptured by them. The resolution to do a thing may be aroused by speech or deed.[30]

Again following Aristotle, al-Fārābī distinguishes between intellectual and moral virtue. The external speech and/or the actions of a mentor are the starting point in moral habituation, for there is not yet a sufficient internal cause of the noble act.[31] Moral education in its ideal form involves the incitement of an ethical possession in the agent through which the external cause becomes internalized in habituation.

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[30] "Wa-taḥṣīlhā bi-ṭrīqayyīnī awwalayyīnī: bi-taʻlīmīn watādībīn. W-at-tiʻlīmu huwa ījādu an-naẓarrīyata fī al-umami w-al-muduni, w-at-tādību huwa ṭarīqu ījādi al-faḍaʼila l-khulqīyyata w-aṣ-ṣināʻāta al-ʻamalīyyata fī l-umami. W-at-taʻlīmu huwa biqawlīn faqaṭ, w-at-tādību huwa an taʻawwūd al-ūmama wa-l-madanīyyūna al-afʻāla al-kāʼinata ʻan al-mulkāti al-ʻamālīyyati wa-b-an tanhaḍ ʻazāʼimahum haḥwa fiʼlihā, wa-an taṣir tilka wa-afʻālīhā mas'ūllīyyata ʻalay nufūsihim, wa-yujʻalū k-al-ʻāshiqīna la-hā. Wa-inhāḍu l-ʻazāʼmi naḥwa fiʼli ash-shaīʼi rubbamā kā biqawlīn warubbamā kāna bifiʻlīn." Al-Fārābī, Taḥṣīl al-Saʻadah, ed. Jafar al-Yasin (Beruit: Al-Andaloss, 1981), p. 78, §§ 43–4. The translation I cite is by Muhsin Mahdi [hereafter Mahdi-AH], The Attainment of Happiness, § 39, p. 35. In this and all following quotations from the Arabic, the ḥarakāt (addition of vowels) and transliteration are my own.

[31] See also Al-Fārābī, Al-Siyāsā al-Madaniyya, ed. Fauzi Najjar (Beruit: Imprimerie Catholique, 1964), p. 78, §48: "Wa-liajli mā qīla fī khtilāfi l-fiṭri fī fiṭrati kulla insānīn an yaʻlama min tiqāʼi nafsihi as-saʻādata wa-lā l-ashyāʼa al-latī yanbaghī an yaʻmaluhā bal yaḥtāju fī dhalika ilā muʻallimin wa-murshidīn. Fa-baʻdahum yaḥtāju ilā irshādīn yasīrin wa-baʻdahum ilā irshādīn kathīrīn. Wa-lā aydān idhā arshada ilā hadhīnī fā-huwa lā maḥalatān yaʻmalu mā qad ʻalima wa-ʼrashada ilayhi dūnā bāʼithīn ʻalayyahi min ḥārejīn wa-munhaḍūn naḥwahu. Wa-ʻalay hadhā aktharu an-nasi. Fa-li-dhalika yaḥtājūna ilā man yuʻarrfuhum jamīʻān dhalika wa-yunaḍhum naḥwa fiʼlihā." As translated by Muhsin Mahdi, in Al-Fārābī, Political Regime, in Medieval Political Philosophy, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993) [hereafter Mahdi-PR], 35–6: "In view of what has been said about the differences in the natural dispositions of individual men, not everyone is disposed to know happiness on his own, or the things that he ought to do, but needs a teacher and guide for this purpose. Some men need little guidance, others need a great deal of it. In addition, even when a man is guided to these two [that is, happiness and the actions leading to it], he will not, in the absence of an external stimulus and something to arouse him, necessarily do what he has been taught and guided to."

There are two methods for instilling virtuous character through habituation, one for the willing and one for the unwilling.[32] So distinct are these two methods for al-Fārābī that the ruler designates two separate groups to employ them. One group is assigned to use rhetoric and its persuasive arguments on the willing, and the other exercises compulsion.[33] Here al-Fārābī stresses the dichotomy between these two methods rather than presenting them as two species of the same genus of ethical force. From this separation of the two methods of habituating citizens, and from the fact that only the method exercised on the unwilling is called compulsion, it is natural to conclude at this point, as Parens does, that only the second method involves compulsion or force.[34] In other words, it may appear at this moment that al-Fārābī does not consider all ethical education to involve some kind of ethical force or compulsion—only the habituation of the unwilling entails force. This would be a significant departure from Aristotle, for

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[32] "Fa-'idhan idha kānat faḍīlatu l-maliki aw ṣinā'atuhu hiya isti'mālu af'āl-faḍā'il dhawī l-faḍā'il, wa-ṣinā'āt dhawī l-ṣinā'āt l-juz'īyyat, fa-inahu yalzam ḍarūrita an yakūn man yasta'milhum mīn ahli l-faḍā'ili w-ahli aṣ-ṣanā'i fī tādībi l-'umami w-ahli l-mudunī ṭā'ifatayīni awwalīyyatīni: ṭā'ifata yasta'milhum fī tādībi man sabīlihi an yūddīb kurhān." Al-Fārābī, Taḥṣīl al-Sa'adah, p. 80, §47. As translated in Mahdi-AH, p. 36, §42: "Now since the virtue or the art of the prince is exercised by exploiting the acts of those who possess the particular virtues and the arts of those who practice the practical arts, it follows necessarily that the virtuous and the masters of the arts whom he [the prince] employs to form the character of nations and citizens of cities comprise two primary groups: a group susceptible of having his character formed willingly, and a group employed by him to form the character of those who are such that their character can be formed only by compulsion."

[33] For the identification of rhetoric with the group that ethically educates the willing, see Al-Fārābī, Taḥṣīl al-Sa'adah, p. 79, §47: "Wa-amā l-faḍā'il al-'amālīyyah w-aṣ-ṣinā'at al-'malīyyah, fa-bi-ān ya'awwūdu af'ālinhā wa-dha-lika bi-ṭarīqawwīni: aḥaduhumā bi-l-aqāwīli al-iqnā'iyyati, wa-l'aqāwīli l-anfi'ālīyyati wa-sā'ir al-aqāwī allatī tumakkin fī l-nafsi hadhahi l-af'āl w-al-mulkāt tamkīnān taman ḥatta yaṣīr nuhuḍ 'azā'imahum naḥwa āf'āliha ṭaw'ān. . . . W-aṭ-ṭarīqu an alkharu huwa ṭarīqu al-ikrāhi, wa-tilka tusta'malu ma' al-mutamarrisīni min āhli l-muduni w-al-umāmi alladhina laysū yanfaḍuna aṣ-ṣawaba ṭaw'ān." As translated in Mahdi-AH, p. 36, §41: "They [the princes, imams, etc.] should be habituated in the acts of the practical virtues and the practical acts by either of two methods. First by means of persuasive arguments, passionate arguments, and other arguments that establish these acts and states of character in the soul completely so as to arouse the resolution to do the acts willingly. . . . The other method is compulsion. It is used with the recalcitrant and the obstinate among those citizens of cities and nations who do not rise in favor of what is right willingly."

[34] See n. 8 above.

whom, as we have seen, all ethical education entails some sort of force, including the incitement of ethical possession through speech.

Nevertheless, immediately after distinguishing between the two methods of ethical education, al-Fārābī begins to reunite them. The ruler's supervision of the two groups using the two methods of moral education is likened to the parental exercise of authority within the family:

> This is analogous to what heads of households and superintendents of children and youths do. For the prince forms the character of nations and instructs them, just as the head of a household forms the character of its members and instructs them, and the superintendent of children and youths forms their character and instructs them. Just as each of the latter two forms the character of some of those who are in his custody by being gentle to them and by persuasion and forms the character of others by compulsion, so does the prince.[35]

Both forms of moral education are an exercise of authority, and the authority belongs to a single person. The likeness of the ruler's and the father's use of both methods brings al-Fārābī back again towards Aristotle. Since children are the proper starting-point of moral education, one must habituate the child before reason is fully developed. It is the reason of the parent rather than the reason of the child that moves the child to act, whether through rhetorical arguments that activate the passions or through more direct force and the threat of punishment. Although reason is the ultimate cause of the child moved through persuasion, the persuasion is a kind of force or compulsion because the reason is largely external. Because the passions of the willing are less corrupt, they can be more gently moved from outside, whereas the unwilling are more roughly moved. The parent who tells the child that if he gets ready for bed quickly he will get a story read to him, and the parent who picks up the misbehaving child and puts him into bed are both using force, though, as al-Fārābī would insist, different kinds of force.

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[35] "Wa-dhalika alay mishāli mā yūjadu l-amru alayyahi fī arbābi al-manā-zli. Wa-l-qūwām bi-ṣ-ṣubyāni wa-l-aḥdāthi. Fa-inna l-maliku huwa mūddibu l-umama wa-muallimahā, ka-ma anna rabba l-manzili huwa mūddibu ahla l-manzili wa-muʿallimuhum, wa-l-qīmi bi-iṣ-ṣubyāni, wa-l-aḥdathu huwa mūdd-ibu aṣ-ṣubyāna wa-l-āḥdāthu wa-muʿallimuhum. Wa-kā-ma anna kullu wāhi-din min hadha'īni yūddibu baʿḍa man yuddibāhu bi-r-rifqi w-al-iqnāʿi, wa-yūdd-ibu baʿḍahum kurhān. Ka-dhalika l-maliku, fa-an tādībahum kurhān wa-tādībahum ṭawʿān." Al-Fārābī, Taḥṣīl al-Saʿadah, p. 80, §48; Mahdi-AH, p. 36, §42.

Al-Fārābī then goes beyond saying that the two types of ethical force are analogous and ultimately united in the same person: in fact, he holds that the two methods are the very same skill:

> Indeed it is in virtue of the very same skill that the classes of men who form the character of others and superintend them undertake the compulsory formation of character and the formation of character received willingly; the skill differs only with respect to its degree and the extent of its power.[36]

Ethical force is one, although it is exercised in two different ways, which differ principally in degree, not in kind. It is not surprising that al-Fārābī would assert the unity of persuasion used on the willing and compulsion used on the unwilling because they both have their origin in an external authority. The generic unity of the two methods is at least as important as their specific differences. If one begins with adults rather than with children or youths, the differences between the two methods seem more important because there is such a difference between the passions of the willing and the unwilling. Al-Fārābī, however, clearly shares Aristotle's view of the exercise of ethical force on children as paradigmatic. Although politically the two methods can be divided, philosophically we must recognize their unity.

Another proof that al-Fārābī sees persuasion as the exercise of force towards virtue is his account of the good as noble. Persuasion moves the passions to a kind of possession by the good as noble through images caused by an external stimulus of speech. How then does persuasion do this, and how does this possession become virtue? Whereas Aristotle simply distinguished between the good as noble, useful, and pleasant, al-Fārābī also distinguishes between three types of the good as noble:

> Furthermore, it is obvious what is most useful and noble is in every case either most noble according to generally accepted opinion, most noble according to a particular religion, or truly most noble.[37]

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[36] "Jamī'ān min ajli māhīyattin w-ahidatin fī aṣnāfi an-nalisi alladhina yūddabūna wa-yuqawwimūna. Fa-innamā yutafāḍala fī l-qillati wa-l-kathrati." Al-Fārābī, *Tahṣīl al-Sa'adah*, p. 80, §48; Mahdi-AH, p. 37, §42.

[37] "Thumma ẓāhirūn anna kulla mā huwa anfa'ūn w-ajmalūn, fa-immā an yakūna ajmalū fī l-mashurī, aw ajmalūn fī millatin aw ajmalūn fī l-ḥaqīqati." Al-Fārābī, *Tahṣīl al-Sa'adah*, p. 74, §40; Mahdi-AH, p. 32, §33.

The true good as noble is known only by the fully formed, or fully ha-
bituated, person. A willing but not yet virtuous person can be per-
suaded to act on the good as noble according to generally accepted
opinion or according to a particular religion. The ethical possession
that can become virtue leads the agent to perform the act because it
appears good to one's people: we can be possessed by rhetoric to act
according to our traditions, our heroes, our myths. Our passions can
also be stirred to perform an act because of the authority of religion.
Various religious images are elicited to perform an act which, once it
becomes habitual, can be seen as good in itself. Persuasion to the
good as noble through reasons other than the good as noble itself is
not contrary to the agent's passions, but the agent is compelled by his
passions without understanding through an external stimulus, and
thus such persuasion is a kind of force.

To Aristotle's account of compulsion to virtue through rhetoric
and law, al-Fārābī adds a third type and places them all in a hierarchy:

> Thus the power required for forming the character of nations and for su-
> perintending them is greater than the power required for forming the
> character of children or youths or the power required by heads of
> households for forming the character of the members of a household.
> Correspondingly, the power of the princes who are the superintendents
> of nations and cities and who form their character, and the power of
> whomever and whatever they employ in performing this function, are
> greater. The prince needs the most powerful skill for forming the char-
> acter of others with their consent and the most powerful skill for form-
> ing their character by compulsion.
>
> The latter is the craft of war: that is, the faculty that enables him to excel
> in organizing and leading armies and utilizing war implements and war-
> like people to conquer the nations and cities that do not submit. . . . The
> warrior who pursues this purpose is the just warrior, and the art of war
> that pursues this purpose is the just and virtuous art of war.[38]

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[38] "[W]a fī 'iẓami l-quwwati wa-ṣighrihā wa 'alay qadri 'iẓami quwwati
tādībi l-umami. Wa-yutafāḍalu fī taqwayīmhim alay quwwati tādībi aṣ-ṣubyāni
wa-l-aḥdāthi wa-tādībi arbāba al-manāzili li-ahli l-manāzili. Ka-dhalika 'iẓami
quwwati l-manquwamīna l-mūddibīna alladhīna hum al-mulūku, wa-man
yasta'milu wa-mā yusta'amilu fī tādībi l-umami wa-l-muduni, wa-innahu
yaḥtāju min al-mihani allatī bi-hā yakūnu at-tādibu ṭaw'ān ilā a'ẓamuha quw-
watān, wa-man allatī yūddibu bi-hā kurhān ilā a'ẓamuhā quwwatān, wa-tilka
min al-māhiyyati l-juz'iyyati, wa-hiya l-quwwatu 'alay jawdati l-tadbīri fī quw-
wati l-juyūshi mashalān wa-isti'mālu al-alāta l-ḥarbi w-an-nāsī l-ḥarbīīna fī
mughābati l-umami wa-l-muduni alladhīna lā yat'āduna." Al-Fārābī, Taḥṣīl al-
Sa'adah, pp. 80–1, §48; Mahdi-AH, pp. 36–7, §§42–3.

Lowest in power is the parental authority that forms the ethical character of children. This authority is least, not in importance, but in the degree of force necessary. The possibility of persuasion here is great, although, of course, this method cannot be used exclusively. It is not the child who forms his own character, but the parent who forms the character of the child. Hence this is an exercise of force. Next is the ruler's exercise of force in the city or nation through law: this is the threat of punishment within the regime to move the citizen through fear. Punishment dominates over reward, since the unwilling who are badly habituated must be made to perform the noble act. The greatest degree of force is the ruler's use of war to compel another city or nation to virtue. As law is like in kind to the parental use of force but a stronger degree, so, too, the just ruler's use of war on other cities and nations is like legislation within the virtuous regime but of a stronger degree. War is like legislation inasmuch as it is a means of establishing just law, but it is unlike legislation inasmuch as it extends the making of virtuous law to other cities and nations. Offensive war is the greatest exercise of ethical force, but it is necessary because the legislator and heads of households in the unjust regime have failed to exercise their authority to compel citizens to virtue. The nature of this offensive war and the reasons for it will be elaborated in section VI below.

<div align="center">III</div>

Al-Fārābī's Platonism. Contrary to Aristotle and consistent with Plato, al-Fārābī asserts the necessity of theoretical virtue for any happiness. Even the nonphilosophers, the "many," must attain some likeness of philosophy:

> Until they acquire the theoretical virtues, they [those who will become philosophers] ought to be instructed in things theoretical by means of persuasive methods. They should comprehend many theoretical things by way of imagining them. These are the things—the ultimate principle and the incorporeal principles—that a man cannot perceive by his intellect except after knowing many other things. The vulgar ought to comprehend merely the similitudes of these [theoretical] principles, which should be established in their souls by persuasive arguments.[39]

Whereas the philosopher understands essences through intellect and demonstrative arguments, nonphilosophers are capable only of

imagining them with the aid of rhetoric.[40] Philosophers begin by imagining essences through persuasion, but they pass beyond imagination to intellect and beyond reliance on the authority of another to knowing the first principles with their own reason. In other words, while the few begin with that which is noble according to generally accepted opinion and religion, the philosophers achieve that which is good in itself and know demonstratively why it is good. The many never pass beyond generally accepted opinion or religion; they never achieve philosophical knowledge of why the act is noble. Through an external stimulus, that is, through persuasive methods, the many can imagine the good act, desire it and do it, but they cannot achieve intellectual knowledge of why the act is good. They "know" the good only as authorized by tradition or God.

If the Platonic requirement to have theoretical knowledge of the good for happiness meant that the many had to become philosophers, then the virtuous regime would be impossible for al-Fārābī, since the many are not capable of philosophy. Al-Fārābī, however, requires only that the many participate in theoretical virtue through images and persuasive arguments. It is enough if the many can imagine the good with the aids of tradition and religion. A bigger question is the possibility of philosophers, but, if the philosopher must begin with tradition, myth and religion, then philosophy can arise from tradition, myth and religion. More generally, al-Fārābī shares Aristotle's optimism about the naturalness of political life through the family.[41] Since the family is natural, and the family is political and orientated by nature to virtue, there is a natural basis for the virtuous regime.

The biggest question that al-Fārābī's Platonism raises is not the possibility of the virtuous regime but the possibility of the many, that is, the nonphilosophers, ever achieving independence from compulsion to virtue. In brief, do the nonphilosophers remain perpetually children? Is political authority fundamentally and irrevocably

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[39] "Wa-yanbaghī an yu'allamū al-ashyā an-naẓariyyati b-iṭ-ṭuruqi l-iqnā'iyyati, w-anna kathīran min an-naẓariyyati yafhamunahā bi-ṭarīqi at-takhayīli, fa-hiya allatī lā sabīl ilā an ya'quluhā l-isān illā ba'da an ya'qual ma'lūmātin kathirah jiddan, wa-hiya l-mabādi' al-quṣwā wa-l-mabādi' allatī laysat hiya jismānīyyata. Fa-an tilka yanbaghī an yafham al-'āmmatu mishālātihā wa-tumakkinu fī nufūsihim bi-ṭarīqi l-iqanā'ti." Al-Fārābī, *Taḥṣīl al-Sa'adah*, p. 79, §46; Mahdi-AH, pp. 35–6, §40

[40] See also al-Fārābī, *Political Regime*, 39–40.

[41] See al-Fārābī, *Political Regime*, 32.

paternal, if the compulsion exercised by the parent and the legislator is generically the same? Al-Fārābī's Platonism means that compulsion is necessary not only for moral but for theoretical virtue. The many achieve a likeness to theoretical virtue through persuasion, rhetoric and poetry; that is, ideally the force that is exercised to bring the many to imagine theoretical virtue is persuasion. For the philosopher, this force eventually gives way to the autonomy and self-rule of intellect as generally accepted opinions and religion are left behind for demonstrative knowledge of the good as noble. Since the nonphilosophers never transcend generally accepted opinion and religion, they never escape the need for persuasive authority. Nonphilosophers will always remain dependent on force exercised by a paternal authority that stimulates them to a likeness of philosophy. Thus, for al-Fārābī, some form of compulsion is always necessary for the happiness of nonphilosophers. There is no moral or theoretical virtue without force as persuasion, law, or war. Political rule always entails the exercise of paternal force in the name of happiness.

IV

Aristotle on the limits to compulsion. The most obvious limit that Aristotle places on compulsion to virtue and happiness involves the size of the *polis*. As the village is the unity of several families, so the *polis* or city-state is the unity of several villages.[42] Although Aristotle recognized the existence of a larger political entity—the nation (*ethnos*)—exemplified by Babylon, what Babylon epitomizes is the failure to maintain the natural limits of the *polis* or city-state.[43] Every form has its limits without which its proper activity is impossible, and since the *polis* is natural, it, too, has a limit in the number of citizens and the size of its territory.[44] Aristotle places three limitations on the size of the *polis*: (1) the number of inhabitants must be sufficient for a division of labor that allows for citizenship; (2) the citizens must be able to know each other, that is, know each other's moral characters; and (3) the territory and population must be within that which is humanly visible.[45] The *polis* or city-state thus constitutes the outer limit of compulsion to virtue and happiness.

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[42] See *Politics* 1.2.

Moreover, within the *polis* there is a further limitation to compulsion, inasmuch as it is better if compulsion to virtue originates from within the family rather than from the legislator or ruler. On the one hand, Aristotle does say that a more public care (*koinē epimeleia*) for compulsion to virtue is superior to the anarchy of each family doing what it thinks best.[46] Commands from the *polis* are superior because they can impose a more impersonal (and thus less offensive) force that is stronger with regard to the punishments that can be inflicted,[47] but this more external public force is not necessarily stronger in its ability to move the agent to virtuous action. Parental commands have even more force than the law because the child is afraid to offend the parent who is loved:

> For as in cities laws and prevailing types of character have force, so in households do the injunctions and the habits of the father, and these even more because of the tie of blood and the benefits he confers; for the children start with a natural affection and disposition to obey. Further, private education has an advantage over public, as private medical treatment has. . . . It would seem, then, that the detail is worked out with more precision if the control is private; for each person is more likely to get what suits his case.[48]

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[43] "Homoiōs de kai tōn auton topon katoikountōn anthrōpōn pote dei nomizein mian einai tēn polin; ou gar dē tois teichesin, eiē gar an Peleponnēsō peribalein hen teichos. Toiautē d' isōs esti kai Babulōn kai pasa hētis echei perigraphēn mallon ethnous e poleōs. Hēs ge phasin ealōkuias tritēn hēmeran ouk aisthesthai ti meros tōs poleōs." *Politics* 3.3.1276a25-30, ed. H. Rackham, in Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 182. As translated by B. Jowett, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon, p. 1179: "It is further asked: When are men, living in the same place, to be regarded as a single city—what is the limit? Certainly not the wall of the city, for you might surround all Peloponnesus with a wall. Like this, we may say, is Babylon, and every city that has the compass of a nation rather than a city; Babylon; they say, had been taken for three days before some part of the inhabitants became aware of the fact." See also *Politics* 2.6.12-18.

[44] *Politics* 7.4.1326a12–15 and 1326a26–40.

[45] Ibid. 1326b8–25.

[46] *NE* 10.9.1180a25–32.

[47] Ibid. 1180a14–24.

[48] "Hōsper gar en tais polesin enischuei ta nomima kai ta ēthē, houtō kai en oikiais hoi patrikoi logoi kai ta ethē, kai eti mallon dia tēn suggenian kai tas euergesias prouparchousi gar sterpgontes kai eupeitheis tēi phusei. Eti de kai diapherousin hai kath' hekaston paideiai tōn koinōn, hōsper ep' iatrikēs. . . . Exakribousthai dē doxeien an mallon to kath' hekaston idias tēs epimeleias ginomenēs. Mallon gar tou prospherou tugchanei hekastos." Ibid. 10.91180b3–15; Bywater, 221; Ross, 1110.

This combination of love and fear renders the parental command more forceful (*enischuei*),[49] even though it is more private (*hekastos*). Compulsion exercised by the family is not negated by the compulsion to virtue exercised by the *polis*; in fact, it poses a limit to the compulsion to happiness by the city-state, since the paternal force is more effective and preferable. The city that develops naturally from the village and the family does not eliminate the less perfect forms of political life and compulsion to virtue. In Plato's *Republic*, at least on a literal level, the city does negate the family and its exercise of compulsion to virtue.[50] Whether al-Fārābī will agree with Aristotle or with the literal reading of Plato's *Republic* will decide much, though not all, of his view on limits to forcing virtue and happiness.

<div align="center">V</div>

Al-Fārābī on the limits to compulsion. Al-Fārābī explicitly rejects the city as the natural limit to ethical compulsion, nor does he affirm the superiority of private over public compulsion to virtue, at least with regard to the superiority of familial over legal compulsion. The city is not the most natural political entity; hence it does not provide the most natural limit to compulsion to virtue and happiness. Al-Fārābī adds the nation, which Aristotle had rejected as unnaturally large, to Aristotle's natural political entities (family, village, and city):

> The absolutely perfect human societies are divided into nations. A nation is differentiated from another by two natural things—natural makeup and natural character—and by something that is composite (it is conventional but has a basis in natural things), which is language—I mean the idiom through which men express themselves. As a result some nations are large and others are small.
>
> The primary natural cause of the differences between nations in these matters consists of a variety of things. One of them is the difference in the parts of the celestial bodies that face them. . . . From this follows the difference between the parts of the earth that are the nations' dwelling places.[51]

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[49] For *enischuō* as force applied to an inclination that resists, see Aristotle, *Parts of Animals* 2.7.653a31.

[50] Plato, *Republic* 414d–e. See Parens, *An Islamic Philosophy of Virtuous Regimes*, 15–17.

The nation is more natural than the city, and hence more perfect, because its limits reflect those of nature. The borders of a nation are defined by natural makeup (*bi-l-khuluqi aṭ-ṭabīʿyati*) and natural character (*w-ash-shiyami aṭ-ṭabīʿyati*). Nations are more particular than human nature, but they are less particular than cities; moreover, nature—in the sense of geography that determines weather, diet and physical constitution—is a cause of the likeness within the nation. Nature makes individuals within a nation to be physically similar. Language, perhaps a greater cause of similarity within a nation, has a natural element to it in spite of its obvious conventionality. Because physical constitution (the brain) and language unite to form imagination, a nation reflects a natural imaginative unity.

Perfect universality, that is the most natural political boundaries, would coincide with the intellect and human nature (essence), which is one, rather than with imagination and nation, which are many. Philosophy is not circumscribed by nation or imagination and it alone achieves perfect universality. Religion, on the other hand, is the imitation of philosophy as the image is the imitation of essence:

> Most men, either by nature or by habit, are unable to comprehend and cognize those things; these are the men whom one ought to represent the manner in which the principles of the beings, their ranks of order, the Active Intellect, and the supreme rulership, exist through things that are imitations of them. Now while the meanings and essences of those things are one and immutable, the matters by which they are imitated are many and varied. Some imitate them more closely, while others do so only remotely—just as is the case with visible objects: for the image of man that is seen reflected in water is closer to the true man than the image of a representation of man that is seen reflected in water. Therefore, it is possible to imitate these things for each group and nation, using matters that are different in each case. Consequently, there may be a number of virtuous nations and virtuous cities whose religions are different, even though they all pursue the very same kind of happiness. For religion is but the impressions of these things or the impressions of

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51 "Wa-l-jamāʿatu l-insānīyatu l-kāmilitu alay al-iṭalāqi tanqasimu umamān. Wa-l-ummatu tatmayīzu ʿan al-umamati bi-shayʾīni ṭabīʿyani: bi-l-khuluqi aṭ-ṭabīʿyati w-ash-shiyami aṭ-ṭabīʿyati, wa-bi-shayʾīn thālithīn waḍʿīyīn wa-la-hu madjalūn immā fī ashyaʾi aṭ-ṭabīʿyati wa-huwa al-lisānu aʿnī al-lughata allatī bi-hā yakūnu al-ʿibārati fa-min al-umami mā hiya kibārūn wa-min-hā mā hiya ṣighārūn. W-as-sababu aṭ-ṭabīʿyu l-awwalu fī akhtilafi l-umami fī hudhahi l-umūri ashyāʾūn aḥaduhā ijtilāful ajzāʾi l-ajsāmi as-samāwīyati allatī tusāmatuhum. . . . Wa-yatbaʿu dhalika ikhtilafu ajzāʾu l-arḍi allatī hiya masākinu l-umami." Al-Fārābī, *Al-Siyāsā al-Madaniyya*, 70; Mahdi-PR, 32.

their images, imprinted in the soul. Because it is difficult for the multi-
tude to comprehend these things themselves as they are, the attempt
was made to teach them these things in other ways, which are the ways
of imitation. Hence these things are imitated for each group or nation
through the matters that are best known to them; and it may very well
be that what is best known to the one may not be best known to the
other.[52]

The cause of the nation and the cause of a religion are the same:
imitation of the universality of philosophy, which religion can strive
after but never achieve. Both religion and nation are limited by natural
makeup and character. Matter strives for the form, but the limitations
of matter caused by nature and habit prevent most people from fully
realizing the universality of form. Religion and nation tend to coincide
because they both reflect the striving of the imagination for the intel-
lectual object that imagination can only imitate. The many achieve a
likeness to the good as noble through the good imagined in national
tradition and religion.

As one can rank religion based on the degree to which it limits
the representation of essence, so one can rank political entities based
on the degree to which they limit the ethical compulsion to perfection.
The nation limits compulsion to virtue less artificially than Aristotle's
city, but the nation, however natural its origin, is still limited by myr-
iad accidents of geography, tradition, religion, language, and imagina-
tion. The only essential limit to the ruler's exercise of compulsion to
virtue is human nature.[53] The presumption of the ruler who is virtu-

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[52] "Wa-aktharu an-nāsi lā qudratān la-hum imam bi-l-fiṭrati wa-immā bi-l-
'ādati tafahhumi tilka wa-taṣawūriha.   Yanbaghr an tukhayyala ilayhum
mabādī'a l-mūjūdāti wa-marātibahā wa-l-'aqlā al-fa''ālaw-ar-ri'āsata al-ūlaya
kayfa yakūna bi-ashya'īn tuḥākīhā. Wa-ma'ānī tilka wa-dhawātihā hiya wa-
aḥidatān lā tatbaddal. Wa-ammā mā tuḥākiy bi-hā fa-ashya'ūn kathīratān tuḥ-
talifatān ba'ḍuhā agraba ilā al-muḥā kāti wa-ba'ḍuha ab'ada. Ka-mā yakūnu
dhalika fī l-mubṣarāti: fa-inna khayālu l-insāni l-mar'iyyī fī l-māī huwa
aqarabu ilā l-insāni fī l-ḥaqiyaqati min khayāli timshāli l-insāni l-mar'īyā l-
mar'īyī fī l-mā'i. Wa-l-dhalika amkana an tuḥakī hadhihi l-ashya'a li-kulli ṭā'if-
atīn wa-li-kuli ummatin bı-ghīri l-umuri allati tuḥakā bi-hā li-ṭ-ṭā'ifati l-ujrayi
aw li-l-ummati l-ujrayi. Fa-li-dhalika qad tumkina an yakūnu umamūn fadi-
latūn wa-mudunūn fadilatūn takhtalifu l-millatu wa-an kānū kulluhum yu'am-
mūna sa'ādatān wa-aḥdatān bi-'aynahā. Fa-inna al-millatu hiya rusūmu ha-
dhihi aw rusūmu jayālātihā fī an-nufūsi. Fa-inna l-jumhūru lammā 'asiru
'alayyahum tafahhumu hadhihi l-ashya'u anfusahān wa-alay mā hiya alayhi
min al-wujūdī at-tumsi ta'līmuhum la-hā bi-ujūhīn wa-tilka hiya ujūhu l-
muḥākāti. Fa-tuḥaki hadhihi l-ashyā'u li-kulli ṭā'ifatīn aw ummatīn bi-l-ashyā'i
allati hiya a'rafu 'indahum. Wa-qad yumkinu an yakūna l-a'rifu inda kulli
waḥidūn min-hum rayra l-a'rifu inda l-ajri."   Al-Fārābī,   Al-Sıyāsā al-
Madaniyya, 85–6; Mahdi-PR, 40–1.

ous and who knows the good as noble in itself is that he must exercise compulsion to virtue and happiness universally. The philosophical ruler needs a reason other than philosophy and the essence of the human being to limit his use of ethical force. This necessity comes from the limited ability of the matter of most people to receive perfection, and this limitation is expressed by nation and religion, but it can be overcome by the supranational empire made up of several nations and religions. There is no universal nation, because geography, religion and imagination are not universal, but there can be a more universal political entity composed of several nations, and this would be more perfect than the nation because it would reflect more clearly the universality of the human essence. Hence there is no need to read esoterically al-Fārābī's repeated affirmations in *Attainment of Happiness* of a political entity beyond the nation, for this universal regime would still be quite imperfect and non-utopian. It would entail a multiplicity of national traditions and religions, each of which would only imperfectly imitate the good as noble in itself, but it would constitute the regime closest to the perfect and utopian regime based on the good as noble in itself, that is, the kingdom of philosophers.

Al-Fārābī does not repeat Aristotle's principle that private compulsion to virtue is superior to public and that familial ethical force is superior to that exercised by the city because it is more internal, but the principle is implied in the relationship of religion and nation to the universal regime. Since al-Fārābī sees theoretical virtue as necessary for the attainment of the good as noble in itself, and since the good as noble is achieved imperfectly by the many through tradition and religion, ethics and religion are inseparable for most people: "No one can discover what is most noble according to the followers of a particular religion unless his moral virtues are the specific virtues of that religion."[54] It follows that the reverse is also true: since the good as noble

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[53] "[W]a-tilka min al-māhiyyati l-juz'iyyati, wa-hiya l-quwwatu 'alay jawdati l-tadbīri fī quwwati l-juyūshi mashalān wa-isti'mālu ālāta l-ḥarbi w-annāsa l-ḥarbīyīna fī mughābati l-umami wa-l-muduni alladhīna lā yat'āduna." Al-Fārābī, *Taḥṣīl al-Sa'adah*, p. 81, §48. As translated in Mahdi-AH, p. 37, §43: "The latter is the craft of war: that is, the faculty that enables him to excel in organizing and leading armies and utilizing war implements and warlike people to conquer nations and cities that do not subject to doing what will procure them that happiness for whose acquisition man is made." See also al-Fārābī, *Taḥṣīl al-Sa'adah*, p. 83, §51; Mahdi-AH, p. 39, §43.

[54] "Wa-laysa yumkinu an yastanbiṭu l-ajmala 'inda ahli millatīn mā illā al-ladhi faḍā'iluhu l-khuluqīyatu faḍā'ilūn fī tilka l-millati khāssati." Al-Fārābī, *Taḥṣīl al-Sa'adah*, p. 74, §40; Mahdi-AH, p. 32, §33.

must be imagined by most people through the imitation of philosophy in religion, moral virtues are the virtues of a religion and the compulsion to virtue that is most internally felt by most people is religious law. Whereas Aristotle emphasizes the internally felt commands of the father, al-Fārābī emphasizes the internally felt commands of the religious leader. Whereas Aristotle emphasizes the family as an ethical force that should not be eliminated by the city, al-Fārābī emphasizes religion as an ethical force that should not be eliminated by the supranational regime. As there is a limit in Aristotle's city to manipulation of the family, so there is a limit in al-Fārābī's supranational regime to manipulation of religion and national tradition. The compulsion to virtue and happiness felt by most people should come through religion.

VI

Al-Fārābī on Jihād. Al-Fārābī's following of Plato and Aristotle does not prevent him from an implicit criticism of them with regard to compulsion to virtue and happiness through war. The limits that the Greeks place on war in the name of virtue are artificial and unphilosophical. They limit war to defense of the virtuous city, but the city is not the most natural limit to compulsion to virtue, and the philosopher-ruler's compulsion to virtue recognizes only natural limits. Justice requires that each be given what belongs to him, and what belongs to human beings by nature is a possibility of virtue and happiness: "Man's specific perfection is called supreme happiness; and to each man, according to his rank in the order of humanity, belongs the specific supreme happiness belonging to his kind of man. The warrior who pursues this purpose is the just warrior, and the art of war that pursues this purpose is the just and virtuous art of war."[55] The nation and the supranational empire constitute more natural and just limits to ethical force than the city. Moreover, the philosopher in

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[55] "Fa-alladhī li-l-insāni min hadhā, huwa l-makhṣūṣu b-ismi l-saʿādatu l-quṣwayu wa-mā l-insāni insānīn min dhalika bi-ḥasabi rutbatihi fī l-insānīyati, huwa as-saʿādatu l–quṣwayu allati tajuṣu dhalika al-jinsu. Wa-l-juzʾīu l-kāʾinu l-agli hadhā l-gharidu huwa l-juzʾīu l-ʿādilu, wa-aṣ-ṣināʿatu al-juzʾīyatu allatī gharaḍahā hadhā l-gharaḍu hiya aṣ-ṣanāʿatu l-juzʾīyatu l-ʿādilatu wa-l-fāḍilatu." Al-Fārābī, *Taḥṣīl al-Saʿadah,* p. 71, §49; Mahdi-AH, p. 32, §33.

the fullest sense is not only a ruler and legislator but a warrior. The ruler must have the "power to fight the holy war (jihād) in person; that there should be nothing in his body to prevent him attending to the matters which belong to the holy war."[56] Thus the philosopher/ruler does not merely emerge from the guardian or warrior class, he is a warrior.

The difference between the philosopher and the warrior is not so great when one recognizes that the three degrees of compulsion to virtue, that is the familial, the legal, and the military, belong to the same genus of force without which habituation to the good as noble is impossible. For al-Fārābī, not all war is unjust and not all just war is defensive. Thus he states in *Aphorisms of the Citizen* that there is a just war (ḥarb) that will "bring and force (wa-yastakrihū) people to what is best and most fortunate for themselves apart from others, when they do not know it of themselves and do not submit to those who know it and invite them to it."[57] The verb "to force" (yastakrihū) here is from the same root (krh) used in *Attainment of Happiness* to describe the ethical formation of the unwilling "by compulsion" (kurhān), and hence the prince must have "the most powerful skill for forming their character by compulsion" (kurhān).[58] The most powerful degree of the skill is war, but, as we have seen, the skill is generically the same as the exercise of force through law and paternal command.

While Aristotle is concerned to keep the city small so that its rather few citizens inside are visible to one another, al-Fārābī is concerned with the many and the unhappy outside. Indeed, what al-Fārābī's philosopher-ruler-warrior needs is not a reason to make the unhappy happy—their humanity is sufficient for that—but a reason to stop or limit the war. At what point does force become excessive? Apart from the limit of the city, for Aristotle (and perhaps for Plato, too, if the *Republic* is to be read ironically), it is the family: political

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[56] Al-Fārābī, *Fuṣūl al-Madanī: Aphorisms of the Statesman*, ed. and trans. D. Dunlop (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), p. 50, §54. "[W]a-l-qudratu alay al-jihādi bi-badanihi wa-an la yakūnu fī badanihi shayūn yu'awiquhu 'an muzāwalati l-ashya'i l-jihādīyatii." Ibid., p. 137.

[57] Ibid., pp. 56–7, §63. "[W]a immā li-an yuḥmalu bi-hā qawmūn wa-yastakhrihū alay mā huwa l-ajwadu wa-l-aḥẓiyu la-hum fī alfusihim dūna ghayirihim, mattā lam yakūnū ya'rifūnahu min tilqā'i anfusihim wa-lam yakūnū yanqādūna li-man ya'rifuhu wa-yad'ūhum ilayhi bi-l-qawali." Ibid., p. 146.

[58] See n. 38 above.

force cannot entail elimination of familial or paternal force. For al-Fārābī, it is religion: political force, whether legal or military, cannot eliminate religion as the principal ethical force.[59] On the one hand, al-Fārābī uses philosophy to criticize the limits that Aristotle places on compulsion to virtue. On the other hand, he uses religion to reestablish limits that are more natural. Religion in general cannot be eliminated as the basis for ethical force in most human lives, and, given natural makeup and character, a particular religion cannot be easily replaced with another.

What, then, is religious war or *jihād* according to al-Fārābī? As religion is the imitation of philosophy because it is based on images rather than essences, so *jihād* is an imitation of the philosophical understanding of a just offensive war. As an image can at best be like (but never be) essence, so *jihād* is an imperfectly just war. Since it is rooted in imagination rather than intellect, a religion is necessarily particular, and as particular it cannot be universalized. Strictly speaking, there is no universal religion. To universalize religion is to confuse religion and philosophy, image and essence, which is to be expected of believers but not of the ruler, who should be a philosopher. Without philosophical knowledge of the essences, the believer naturally wants to think that his religion should be universal. Philosophy, that is, the ruler, must place limits on *jihād* and religion, just as religion limits the universal drive of the philosopher to virtue. Although a religion cannot be universalized, there are better and worse religions, as there are images that imitate the essence better or worse than others.[60] This standard of better and worse in comparison to the essence, however, is limited by the suitability of the image for the natural makeup and character of the people in question.[61] A better religion may not be better for a particular people, and hence nature limits religion and *jihād* as it limits the philosophical desire to universalize.

The chief objection to this interpretation of al-Fārābī is as follows: if religion is a limit to the exercise of compulsion to virtue, is not *jihād* a use of force against religion? It may be a religious force used against a religion, but *jihād* is still a forceful manipulation of belief. It would seem, then, that if al-Fārābī considers religion a limit to ethical compulsion he must totally reject *jihād*. It would follow, however,

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[59] The same root (*krh*) that al-Fārābī used for compulsion is used in the Qur'an passage (2:255) that states there is no compulsion in religion.

since persuasion is a kind of force, that even persuading a people to change religion should be rejected. For al-Fārābī to reject *jihād* altogether, the ruler's respect for a particular religion would have to be absolute; that is, he could not compare it to a better religion. Al-Fārābī's affirmation of *jihād* is consistent with his evaluation of better and worse religions. The ruler must make a prudential decision that balances on one side the superiority of a religion with respect to the degree that it imitates philosophy, and on the other side the natural makeup and character of a people and the weight of tradition. That al-Fārābī's ruler would be hesitant to undertake *jihād* is clear, but that he would never undertake it is not clear. What is most clear is that the ruler is responsible for the ethical formation of the people through religion. If the ruler is undertaking an offensive war in the name of virtue, and if ethical formation is normally through religion, an offensive war will be a religious one.

As we noted in the beginning, Joel Kraemer sees no difference in al-Fārābī between the philosophical just war and *jihād*, because al-Fārābī has substituted the meaning of the philosophical just war for the religious war. For al-Fārābī's philosopher, however, to substitute

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[60] "Wa-l-umūru allati tuḥāka bi-hā hadhihi tatfāḍalu fa yakūnu baḍahā aḥkamū wa-atammu takhayīlān wa–ba'dahā anqaṣu takhayīlān, wa-baḍahā aqrabu ilā l-haqiqati wa-baḍahā ab'adu 'anhā, wa-baḍahā mawāḍ'u l-'inādi fī-hi qalīlatūn aw khafīyatūn, aw takūnu mimmā ya'saru 'inādihā, wa-ba'ḍahā mawāḍi'a l-'inādi fī-hi kathīratan aw ṭāhiratan aw takūnu mimmā yashalu 'inādihā wa-tazyīfuha. . . . Fa-idhā kānat kulluhā alay as-swā'i fī jawdati muḥākātihā aw fī qillati mawāḍi'i l-'inādi fi-hā aw khafā'iha istu'imalat kullahā aw ayyahā attafaqa. Wa-in kānat tatfāḍal ikhtīra atammahā muḥākātīn wa-allatī mawāḍi'a l-'inādi fī-hā immā ghira mawjūatīn aṣlān wa-immā yasiratān aw khafīyatān, thumma mā kāna min-ha aqarabu ilā l-haqīqati, wa yuṭraḥu mā kāna ghīra haḍhihi min al-ḥākāti." Al-Fārābī, *Al-Siyāsā al-Madaniyya*, 86–7. As translated in Mahdi-PR, 41: "The imitations of things differ in excellence: some of them are better and more perfect imaginative representations, while others are less perfect; some are closer to, others are more removed from, the truth. In some the points of contention are few or unnoticeable, or it is difficult to contend against them, while I others the points of contention are many or easy to detect, or it is easy to contend against thme and to refute them. . . . Now if they are of equal excellence as regards imitation, or with respect to having only a few or unnoticeable points of contention, then one can use all or any one of them indifferently. But if they are not of equal excellence, one should choose the ones that are the most perfect imitations and that either are completely free of point of contention or in which the points of contention are few or unnoticeable; next, those that are closer to the truth; and discard all other imitations."

[61] See n. 52 above.

the philosophical meaning of just war for *jihād* would be a mistake similar to that of the believer who confuses his particular religion with the universality of philosophy. Joshua Parens sees al-Fārābī's philosophy as showing the impossibility of *jihād* and any universal virtuous regime. While a universal religion is a contradiction for al-Fārābī, it does not seem that al-Fārābī would eliminate *jihād* altogether or that he is wholly skeptical of a universal virtuous regime. Although the naturalness of religion for most people limits the possibility of achieving the good as noble in itself (namely, through philosophy), religion and national tradition allow an imperfect achievement of the good as noble that is accessible to the many, and a supranational universality that is plural in its religion is not impossible for al-Fārābī. What al-Fārābī is not at all skeptical about is that compulsion is necessary for virtue and that normally this compulsion is felt through religion. At least in this sense, al-Fārābī is in favor of *jihād*, where *jihād* means that compulsion to virtue is felt most typically, internally and willingly through religion: with the exception of philosophers, people are usually made as happy as they can be through religion. The harmony between religion and philosophy can be seen in their mutual limitation of ethical force. Compulsion to happiness is inherent in Plato and Aristotle's virtue-ethics, according to al-Fārābī, and the possibility of philosophy unlimited by religion is as disturbing as the notion of *jihād* unlimited by the philosopher-ruler.

<div align="center">VII</div>

Conclusion. Al-Fārābī's understanding of *jihād*, as well as his account of religion in general, is completely unacceptable to the believer. In fact, by accepting it, the believer would cease to be a believer. Al-Fārābī's philosopher is not a believer.[62] Religion is imagining the essences that the philosopher knows demonstratively. Philosophy and religion exist together in the virtuous regime, but they do not exist together in the same person. The believer cannot be a philosopher any more than the image can be the essence. Although one must be either a believer or a philosopher, al-Fārābī offers a third possibility in which the philosopher is respectful of belief and promotes it for the sake of the imperfect happiness of the many. The philosopher who sees the inferiority of religion, including the inferiority

of *jihād*, is tempted to disdain it, or even to try to eliminate it. Al-Fārābī's philosophy is not directed principally to the believer, who is tempted to universalize his religion, but to the philosopher who needs reasons why it is wrong to strive to eliminate religion from the center of political life in the name of philosophical universality. There are two principal reasons that al-Fārābī gives for why religion should be respected and nurtured. First, religion is natural: it is not possible to eliminate religion without eliminating human nature. For most people, it is natural and necessary to believe. Philosophy does not seek the elimination of religion because it does not seek the impossible. Second, philosophy should not strive to eliminate religion because without religion the philosophical tendency to universalize the compulsion to virtue and happiness would become tyrannical. As Aristotle (and probably Plato) pointed to the family as a limit to compulsion in the city, al-Fārābī points to religion.

Al-Fārābī's political rationalism[63] is aware of the need for a limit to political rationalism. He speaks to political rationalists who see philosophy as superior to religion and who are thus permanently tempted to see the elimination of religion as a political necessity for happiness. Philosophers who see faith as superior to philosophy have other temptations, but al-Fārābī did not think that such a position was possible. The modern reader might wish to see al-Fārābī reject *jihād* altogether, especially since this rejection could be consistent with his view of religion as a limit to ethical force, but such a position would

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[62] "Wa-aktharu an-nāsi alladhīna yu'immūna as-sa'ādata innamā yu'immūnahā mutakhi yalatān lā mutasawwaritān. Wa-ka-dhalika l-manādiy'u al-latī sabīlihā an tutqabbal wa-yuqtadā bi-hā wa-tu'ẓẓamu wa-tujallu innamā yatqabbaluhā aktharu anāsi wa-hiya mutkhayyalatūn 'inadahum lā mutaṣawwaratūn. W-alladhīna yu'immūna as-sa'ādta mutṣawwwarata wa-yatqabbalūna l-mabādiy'a wa-hiya mutaṣawwata inadahum lā mutasawwatn hum al-ḥukimā'u. Wa-alladhīna tujadu hadhihi l-ashay'a fī nufūsihim mutkhayyalatān wa-yatqabbalūnahā wa-yu'immūnahā allay annahā ka-dhalika hum al-mu'minūn." Al-Fārābī, *Al-Siyāsa al-Madaniyya*, p. 86. As translated in Mahdi-PR, 41: "Most men who strive for happiness, follow after an imagined, not a cognized form of happiness. Similarly, most men accept such principles as are accepted and followed, and are magnified and considered majestic, in the form of images, not of cognitions. Now the ones who follow after happiness as they cognize it and accept the principles as they cognize them, are the wise men. And the ones in whose souls these things are found in the form of images, and who accept them and follow after them as such, are the believers." See also al-Fārābī, *Political Regime*, p. 79.

[63] See n. 9 above.

THE ACTUAL INFINITE AS A DAY OR THE GAMES

PASCAL MASSIE

T HE TRANSITION FROM ANCIENT TO MEDIEVAL philosophical theology is not a simple matter of substituting monotheism for pantheism, of replacing a divine that admits of multiple manifestations with a God who is one person (who is someone). Rather, it entails a deeper transformation of the concept of being. For the medievals, the claim, "God is," entails that being applies to God in a distinctive and exclusive sense. When characterizing this mutation, historians frequently stress that the Greeks could only conceive being as what maintains itself within its own limits. The ancient concept of "infinity" (ἄπειρον) would thus have designated a purely negative term. The infinite cannot truly be something; at best, infinity is a mere potency. For many historians, it is this limited conception that will eventually be overcome with the later emergence of a truly positive concept of infinity in the form of *ens infinitum*.

No doubt Aristotle uses ἄπειρον to qualify—among other things—the indetermination of matter (a quasi-nothing that can become almost anything) or the incompleteness of mathematical series. These senses, which betray a lack of determination, seem utterly incompatible with the subsequent medieval and Christian proclamation of *ens infinitum* as perfection. Yet Aristotle's thought also admits a concept of actual infinity. Indeed, the significance of the transformation from ancient to medieval thought remains veiled as long as it is understood simply as a matter of changing the "value" attributed to the idea of infinity from a negative to a positive pole.

For Aristotle, ἄπειρον in the particular sense of infinity by addition is not that outside of which there is nothing, but on the contrary that "outside of which there is always something."[1] By contrast to any

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[1] Aristotle, *Physics* 3.6.206b23, in *Loeb Classical Library* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996). Unless otherwise mentioned, all translations are mine.

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definite magnitude, such an infinite fails to ever reach completion. When, however, in the medieval context, God is said to be infinite being, "infinity" does not designate a failure nor a lack of determination; rather it names a perfection that excludes nothingness. The apparent difference between the Greek and the Christian conceptions could not be stronger. Aquinas, for instance, can explain that the true name of God is "being" because this name does not signify anything determinate (*non significat formam aliquam*). But for Aquinas, "not to be a determinate form" (that is, not to be the form of this or that entity) is equivalent to being *an infinite form or perfection*. The negation of all determinations and limitations is tantamount to the affirmation of "unlimited form," a phrase Aristotle would have found unintelligible. In Aquinas's view, God is appropriately called being because the concept of being does not entail any particular form. God can be understood both as "form" and as "unlimited being" if the *esse* signifies the perfection of being itself, for, in such a case, the plenitude of pure activity grants being a positive infinity. "His infinity applies to the sum of his perfections."[2] If divine infinity indicates a sum, that sum cannot signify a final number but is rather the number that ends all calculation.[3] The idea of omnipotence (a power that extends to everything that does not include a contradiction) led medieval thinkers to the discovery of a new concept of infinity. Like omnipotence and omniscience, infinity belongs to the essence of God, because the plenitude of activity (that is, the supreme sense of being) does not admit limits. Such an infinity is not beneath any determination; rather, it is beyond it.

By contrast, it is often stressed that the mathematical sense of infinity in Aristotle or his inquiry about matter can only lead to the concept of a merely potential infinity. Greek infinity would then be a potentiality that excludes the possibility of actuality.[4] The traditional interpretation finds here a proof that Aristotle rejected the hypothesis of an infinity in act and admitted only a potential infinite.

Three major difficulties remain to challenge this interpretation, however. First, would this interpretation entail that ἄπειρον is a potentiality for which there can be no corresponding actuality whatsoever? We would then have to assume an exception to the principle

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[2] Aquinas, *Compendium theologiae* 1, ch. 20 (St. Louis, MO: Herder, 1947).

[3] I have to thank Lauryn Mayer for suggesting this remark.

"*potentia dicitur ad actum*" since, in this case, there would be a potency that cannot be said in relation to any act.[5] Second, even given this assumption, how could Aristotle have "rejected" the concept of actual infinity (as he allegedly did) without being at least able to envision it? So much for the idea that the Greek philosopher was "unable" to conceive an actual infinity. Third, the problem is further amplified by the fact that we do find in Aristotle's corpus (particularly *De caelo*) various explicit statements supporting the claim that infinity can be actuated. The two particular cases of matter and numerical series are far from exhausting Aristotle's views about infinity.

But what is at stake with this question? All this, it seems, is mere history. Indeed, the problem of the sense of ἄπειρον is historical; yet, the risk of all historical inquiry is to fall back into historiography. To understand what is at stake in this query, we must reflect on the fact that the standard interpretation, despite its varied formulations,

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[4] It is impossible to give an exhaustive list to demonstrate that this view constitutes the standard understanding of the issue. May the following survey suffice. A. W. Moore, *The Infinite*, 2ᵈ ed. (London: Routledge, 2001), 40: "It transpires then that the idea of the actual infinite . . . was close to a contradiction in terms for Aristotle"; Heinz Heimsoeth, *The Six Great Themes of Western Metaphysics and the End of the Middle Ages*, trans. Ramon Betanzos (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1994), 85: "It is impossible for the *apeiron* or the boundless to exist. In Aristotle's view, actual, existing, completed infinity, as it were, was nonsense and essentially self-contradictory. . . . One can rightly call infinite the bare indeterminate possibility of existing"; Adam Drozek, "Aristotle's Razor," *Diálogos* 70 (1997): 183: "This state [infinity] cannot, however, be actualized: infinity by increase does not exist in any sense; infinity by division exists only potentially with no prospect of becoming real"; John King-Farlow, "The Actual Infinite in Aristotle," *The Thomist* 52 (1988): 430: "Aristotle strives . . . to uphold and reinforce his somewhat vulnerable conviction that nothing may be both actual and infinite"; Léon Robin, *Aristote*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1944), 144: "Infinity is in potency and it is only this. This is not however the potency of something that, one day, will ever exist 'in act'."

Emmanuel Martineau is one of the very few commentators who has attempted to demonstrate the presence of an actual infinite in Aristotle. See "Aiôn chez Aristote, *De cælo* I, 9: Théologie cosmique ou cosmo-théologie?" *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 84 (1979): 37–40. Drozek (despite the above quote and his attribution to Aristotle of an "horror infiniti") seems to acknowledge a temporal and divine sense of infinity.

[5] This does not mean that we should subscribe to the "plenitude principle" (all that is possible must be actualized at some point of time) that some commentators have attempted to attach to Aristotle. It is clear that a true potentiality must retain the power of not being, alongside the power of being. The problem, however, is that in that case, a potency would be said in relation to what cannot be; it would be said in relation to the impossible.

implicitly admits that it is impossible to hold two concepts of infinity. It assumes that infinity (just like eternity) necessarily entails steadiness and immutability. With this assumption, the so-called "negative" sense of infinity in Aristotle has been decided in advance. To challenge these presuppositions is to contest the idea according to which the contrast between the Greek and the Christian concepts of infinity is a matter of pagan thought's inability to conceive of a positive infinity (*pace* Gilson) or its limitation to the "bad infinite" that is the indefinite (*pace* Hegel).

I

The Actual Infinite. Aristotle writes, "With respect to magnitude, it has been shown that the infinite is not in act, it is only by division."[6] If we stop reading here, it would seem that the case is once for all settled: Aristotle seems to be saying that infinity is not, unless it is in potency. Yet, we need to notice that in *Physics* 3.6 Aristotle is inquiring about a particular kind of infinity, namely, that which results from the act of "removing from" or "adding to" a given magnitude. In these instances, the infinite is not "unless it is in potency." From this, it seems, many critics have been tempted to write in an ending: since potency is opposed to actuality, it follows that if infinity is in potency, it cannot be in act.

There is, however, a problem with this reasoning. Not only did Aristotle never say such a thing; but what follows in the very same sentence casts a totally different light on the first clause: "The infinite is not in act; it is only by division, or it is in act *as we say that the day and the games are in act*, and it is in potency, just like matter."[7] How can this be? Does this mean that the infinite is only in potency but somehow also in act? This seems to be a patent contradiction, unless we recall that: "we do not talk of ἐνέργεια as the same in all cases [οὐ πάντα ὁμοίως], but only by analogy, that is, as A is 'in' B (or related to B), so is C in D (or related to D); for in some cases ἐνέργεια is for potency what motion is for the power of moving [ὡς κίνησις πρὸς δύναμις]; in others, as substance is to this matter."[8] It is not therefore

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⁶*Phys.* 3.6.206b12.
⁷*Phys.* 3.6.216b12–15.

that the infinite *cannot* be said to be in act, but that it is not said so in the *same* sense of act as when we contrast, for instance, a block of marble and a statue (that is, matter and substance) or a motion.

> Infinity and void and other such things are said to be in potency or in act in a *different way* [ἄλλως] than for many other beings such as: "seeing," "walking," or "visible." The latter, at some point of time, can be said in plain truth [ἁπλῶς ἀληθεύεσταί ποτε] to be in potency and in act, for "visible" is sometimes said of what is seen, and sometimes of what is *capable* [δυνατόν] of being seen. The infinite however is not in potency in such a way that it will later have a separate [χωριστόν] actuality, but it is potential inasmuch as it is known. To this never-ending process of division we grant being in actuality and potentiality, but <we do> not <grant> separate existence.[9]

In order to account for this text the following points need to be considered:

First, the plain truth about things like the "visible" is that we can separate actuality and potentiality in our ways of speaking, because such phenomena are indeed different modes of being. It is one thing to say about the tree in the garden that it is visible when it is actually seen, another to say that it is visible when it is not actually seen but remains capable of being seen (when the tree is in utter darkness, for instance).

Second, there is a time when [ποτε] "visible" means "what is seen," and a time when it means "what is capable of being seen." The difference in these instances is, literally, a matter of time, or more precisely, a difference of two times (now the tree is actually seen, now it its not). Without temporal difference (or beyond it), actuality and potentiality would have to be thought in totally different terms.

Third, Aristotle explicitly recalls that we are investigating here the particular problem of division; that is, we are only concerned with the category of quantity. In this case, we encounter an infinity that is only inasmuch as it is known. One must be actually counting, in order for the count to reveal infinity. What Aristotle does not say, however, (and what we have no reason to assume) is that this is the *only* sense of ἄπειρον. But there is a more important reason that should prevent us from assuming that this is what Aristotle nevertheless meant. We

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[8] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 9.6.1048b6–10, in *Loeb Classical Library* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).
[9] *Meta.* 9.6.1048b10–17.

are talking about two distinct senses of actuality (namely, with respect to the infinite, and with respect to the finite).

Fourth, when we engage in counting, the neverending process of division means that there is always something that remains to be counted.[10] The paradox Aristotle is pointing out is that when engaging in division or addition, we do not simply get a reduction or an increase: rather, we are always left with some excess. When dividing a finite quantity (for example, a foot-long line), we are actually losing sight of its unity; for there is always a potential remainder, always something that could be further divided, always some further number. Although the operation itself could go on forever, for us, the act of counting must eventually come to a stop.

Thus, there is a sense in which the same quantity can be said to be finite and infinite. In the second case, however, this does not mean that infinity exists in act as a separate substance. Rather, it must meet two conditions: (a) it is essentially related to an act of knowing; and (b) it has the sense of what cannot be completed (for infinity is what is always in excess of the actual knowledge we have of it). We eventually have to stop dividing the line; yet, we also see that the division itself could go on. As soon as we ask about the measure of the knowable as a whole, we are led to consider the limit of such a whole. Thus, the question of what stands beyond it comes to the fore.

The infinity of division is not to be confused with the infinity of matter: "[F]or what is potentially a statue may turn out to be actually a statue, but this is not so for what is potentially infinite."[11] Out of a stone, a statue can emerge as a definite and actual individual substance—once the marble has been carved, a statue has found its place among the things in the world. No such thing ever happens out of infinite divisibility. Yet, the question remains whether infinity is simply unrelated to ἐνέργεια. In fact, the main challenge to the traditional interpretation is given by Aristotle himself a few lines later:

> But being is said in many ways, and the infinite is so just as the day or the game is; they are always coming into being successively [ἀεὶ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο], and in these instances there is being *in potency and in act*.[12]

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[10] The verb used by Aristotle (ὑπολείπω) means: "to stay behind," "to be left behind," to "leave remaining."

[11] *Phys.* 3.6.206a18.

[12] *Phys.* 3.6.206a21–5.

This refutes the idea that the infinite admits *only* of potency. Rather, with the infinite, the very distinction between act and potency takes on a different signification; the always of infinity contains both potentiality and actuality. The task here is to take in view what Aristotle enunciates analogically. A day is a temporal dimension that embraces all that occurs within its limits. It constitutes the temporal surroundings of what goes on. At any moment, the day has already started and yet, it still remains ahead of us. Similarly, the ἀγών (the season of the Olympic gatherings) goes on for days and days. Yet, this going on has nothing to do with a succession of identical moments or a numerical series; the games always bring something new; as long as they go on, the outcome remains undecided. The day and the games are in potency inasmuch as they do not form a completed whole, but they are also in act in as much as they are ongoing processes. Of these phenomena we must say that as long as they are *actual*, they are precisely not concluded. The day that embraces the now of our existence and the season of the games always contain some unfinished business.

What Aristotle rejects here is not at all the concept of actual infinity *simpliciter*, but the idea that infinity could be actual in the sense of something simultaneously given as a whole: that is, that infinity could be something complete, achieved and separate.[13] The so-called Aristotelian rejection of actual infinity in Book 3 of the *Physics* concerns, in fact, the impossibility of an actually infinite body (a body that would infinitely add something to itself). This, argues Aristotle, is never the way a body is. But it does not follow that infinity can only be in potency and never in act. Furthermore, actual infinity calls for a reference to knowledge (something that is not needed for a body). It is so because the conviction that there is infinity arises from five sources: (a) time ("for it *is* infinite"), (b) the division of magnitude, (c) "generation and destruction inasmuch as they do not come to an end," (d) the consideration of the limit that envelops each being. Finally, (e) "the greatest and most tremendous thing [κυριώτατον] which raises an *aporia* that affects us all is this: numbers and mathematical magnitudes and also what is outside [ἔξω] the heavens appear to be infinite, because in thought [ἐν τῇ νοήσει] they never come to an end."[14]

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[13] See Antoine Côté, "L'infini chez Aristote," *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 88 (1990): 490–1 in particular.
  [14] *Phys.* 3.4.203b24–26.

This greatest *aporia* is thus made manifest by the numerical order and what stands beyond the cosmos (although, as we will see, in quite different respects). In these instances, infinity concerns thinking in an essential way, but it does so with respect to what thought cannot grasp as a whole. To borrow an expression from Kant, we could say that the infinite is what "escapes its representation in a concept."[15] Yet, not being any actual thing is not "not-being" *simpliciter*. Infinity does not have the actuality we grant to a human being, a statue or a temple because there is no such thing as an infinitely large body. In these cases, it is indeed justified to say that there is no infinity in act. Yet, there is a further dimension concerning time and becoming that needs to be investigated. In the mathematical series and "what is outside the heavens," there is an infinity of what always comes into being successively, a process that does not stop. In all cases, infinity appears against the background of an inquiry concerning the idea of an ultimate limit that would once and for all close any further regress.

II

Infinity, Thought and Matter. But first of all, how do we encounter infinity? It seems that with respect to infinity, there is no privileged point of reference. The issue arises when we take into sight what is beyond the heavens, as well as when we consider the lowest degree of being, that is, matter. Infinity occurs at the lowest and the highest levels of being: the almost nothing of matter and the pure actuality of God. In each case, infinity arises at the limit of what we can conceive. The confrontation with infinity is a confrontation with a paradox. Infinity presents itself as what never comes to an end, it is potential inasmuch as it is known but, at the same time, it is unknowable inasmuch as it is infinite.

To claim that infinity is related to knowledge is not equivalent to stating that it exists only in our mind, as the standard interpretation suggests. Certainly, infinity is what our mind cannot fully comprehend, what essentially remains out of reach; but to appeal to thinking

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[15] The question of the sublime in Kant's third *Critique* is in this sense fundamentally related to infinity.

and knowing in this case is not simply a matter of saying that infinity is a conceptual construction; thinking, on the contrary, indicates the proper place of its encounter. The experience of infinity is a thought-experiment of a particular nature. Before the infinite, the intellect becomes restless; as such, infinity puts us out of our minds; it is a demented [*de-mens*] thought, an idea of the mind which, at the same time, is out of the mind. This is why the consideration of knowledge is necessary in order to account for it: since it is infinite, says Aristotle, "it is unknowable [ἄγνωστον]."[16]

To understand this, we need to turn our attention to the case of matter. Infinity already appears when we consider the material character of those beings which, by virtue of their corporeity, are closest to nonbeing. Matter itself does not possess an independent substantial being. Indeed, we never encounter matter *per se*. It is in confrontation with Plato that Aristotle gives us an important indication:

> "The infinite" is unknowable *qua* infinite because matter has no form [εἶδος.] Thus, it is manifest that the infinite is rather in the definition [λόγῳ] of the part, than in the definition of a whole, for matter is a part of the whole: just as bronze is "said" of a bronze statue. Further, if it were to embrace perceivable things [τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς] and intelligible things, the great and the small should also embrace the intelligibles [τὰ νοητά] But it is absurd and impossible for the unknowable and the indefinite [ἀόριστον] to embrace or to limit [περιέχειν καὶ ὁρίζειν].[17]

(a) The first two propositions are articulated in terms of a causal relation: It is *because* (γὰρ) matter lacks form that its infinity is unknowable. There is infinity in matter, because matter as such entails the absence of form. Matter itself is unformed, shapeless. We know matter only by referring it to what it is not—we never encounter bronze *simpliciter* but always the bronze of something. The matter of a statue is not a statue. Matter as such lacks form. It is neither this nor that (and for this reason, it can become either this or that).

(b) This peculiar character of matter allows us to better understand the connection between infinity and knowledge. Knowing matter only by appealing to that of which it is said, we understand matter as that which we cannot know. Aristotle's insistence on the noetic dimension does not mean that the infinite is merely mental (thereby surreptitiously interpreting potentiality as ideal, conceptual, or fictional,

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[16] *Phys.* 3.6.207a26.
[17] *Phys.* 3.6.207a27–33.

and actuality as real, that is, for example, extramental). To its being corresponds a fundamental ignorance. This ignorance, however, is not nothing; rather it is a known ignorance. Inasmuch as we *know* our ignorance, we have already encountered the limit of knowledge. Yet, to posit a limit (even when it is taken to be the "ultimate" one) is to raise the immediate question of what stands beyond it.

(c) The reference to Plato is not a mere illustration of the same argument. Plato and the Pythagoreans understood infinity in terms of the duality of the great and the small (the principles of matter), while the one was construed as the principle of substance. Although endless, matter is nevertheless given a limit when it receives the one which is the principle of all forms (indeed, the one is principle *qua* form). Wherever something constitutes a whole, it is *ipso facto* one thing. But if the one—the principle of substance—is itself something of the order of the great and the small (that is, if the one is itself understood as a magnitude) then we encounter a fundamental contradiction; for in that case, infinity would have to be granted to what gives unity. If the infinite could encompass the intelligibles themselves, then the forms would be infinite, and the one would be many. The unknown and the indeterminate would somehow have to measure the proper limit of knowledge. All this, however, is "impossible and absurd." Matter as such cannot be finite, and form cannot be infinite. Thus, matter must always remain in the definition of the part (it is said *of* something else). By essence, matter has no form (by essence, matter has no essence), whereas whatever constitutes a whole is such that it necessarily is one, but this can be so only through the mediation of a form. The *one* is a metaphysical principle and never simply a question of magnitude.

The case of matter demonstrates one of the two senses in which potency is said in relation to actuality. *Metaphysics* Θ, 6 clearly shows that matter is said to be in potency in relation to a hylomorphic substance. Even though bronze can be turned into a determinate thing (a particular statue, an ornamental plate, a medal), this power reveals that bronze itself remains indeterminate; it is then never *qua* matter that bronze becomes such or such substance. For this reason, the infinite that characterizes matter is properly called indefinite (ἀόριστον). Form brings about what matter is incapable of accomplishing on its own, namely, to embrace (περιέχειν), to limit (ὁρίζειν), to grant a separate existence (χωρίζειν). Matter receives a form

which remains other than the matter in which the form is embodied. It suffers the unity of a form that it itself never becomes.

III

Infinity, Time and Eternity. And yet, the incompleteness of mathematical series or the indetermination of matter do not exhaust the instances of infinity. With respect to time, measure, generation and "what is beyond the heavens," infinity is not said to be actual in relation to a substantial body, but in relation to movement:

> Since being is said in many ways, the infinite is actual in the sense in which we say that a day is, or that the games are actually occurring; that is, they are always coming on and on into being for these are both in potency and in act. Thus, the Olympic games are potentially occurring and are ongoing.[18]

The remarkable feature of these claims is that they do not present potentiality and actuality as two distinct moments. Rather, Aristotle speaks of being "in-potency-and-in-act." Actuality is to potentiality what motion is to the power of moving. But motion (the actuality of potentiality *qua* potentiality) is not dependent on a substance any more. In these cases, infinity is not identical with the indefinite (ἀόριστον) of matter. Rather, it is properly ἄπειρον and entails a conjunction of actuality and potentiality. Infinity is both a potency that admits of a progression and an actuality that is always coming into being. Its potency admits of a progression, and its movement is its actuality. Yet (just like the day or the games), it is never achieved and never reaches completion, for what is in eternal motion is never present "as a whole" at any moment.[19]

Since it is an analogy however, the image of the day and the games also maintains a difference. There will be a time when today or the games will be over, a time when they will be no more and become things of the past. Could such a time come for infinity? Obviously not: if being one means "being a whole," then infinity is excluded from this kind of actualization. Clearly, if we mean by actuality the

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[18] *Phys.* 3.6.206a20–5.

[19] As Leo Sweeney puts it: "We can say of it 'it is being actualized' but never 'it has been actualized'." *Divine Infinity in Greek and Medieval Thought* (New York: Peter Lang, 1992), 150.

separate and subsistent existence of a thing, then infinity is nothing actual. Yet, for this reason, the conclusion is not that infinity cannot be actual, but rather that this sense of actuality is not the proper way of understanding ἐνέργεια in this context. An eternity that could somehow be given *totum simul* is a square circle. This doesn't mean that infinity is not, nor that it cannot be said to be in actuality, but rather simply that infinity cannot be actual in the sense of "all at once." At the same time, however, we have discovered that infinity has a necessity of its own. "Time *is* infinite."[20] Infinity, understood temporally, is eternity. In this context, time is not understood as a linear succession of punctual nows, an empty form indifferent to its content, but in the sense of the seasons' bringing forth.[21]

We now need to turn our attention to the specific sense of infinity that Aristotle attributes to God. The key text is to be found in *De caelo* 1.9. Enquiring into the question of being as a whole, Aristotle encounters the properly philosophical question of God. To consider being as a whole is to consider all that exists in relation to the *aporia* of its outer limit. As such, the question puts to the test the very concept of limit; it arises from the pondering of two questions: where and when? These two basic questions provide us with the starting point of the *aporia*:

(a) *Where* is the world, the totality of what is, as a whole? Is it somewhere, that is, is it in some place? But how could this be, since a place is by definition always surrounded by some further space? Should we rather say then that it is nowhere? But in that case, how could the world be if it is, literally, nowhere to be found?

(b) *When* is the world a whole? Should the world be limited to what exists now? In such a case, it would never form a whole, since it would be cut off from its past and its future. If the world does not extend to all that was, as well as to all that will be, it would always remain incomplete. Thus, the world as a whole cannot either occur in any temporal moment. Could this mean then that the world is in eternity? If it were so, however, how could there be time?

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[20] *Phys.* 3.4.203b17.

[21] This sense of temporality is closer to the "archaic" understanding, as for instance with Heraclitus. In Eugen Fink's words, "Hours and time are not to be taken as the empty form in contrast to the content of time, but as filled time which begets and produces each thing in its own time." Martin Heidegger and Eugen Fink, *Heraclitus Seminar*, trans. Charles Seibert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1993), 37.

The question of being as a whole is, for Aristotle, a matter of philosophical theology, for the question of the divine is raised in relation to nature in general and the heavens in particular. Despite the cycles of generations and destructions that carry the world away, something remains: forms strive to make themselves manifest as the whole realm of φύσις bears witness. It is always the case that, as Aristotle puts it, man begets man. The form "human" is what remains, what survives the births and deaths of particular individuals and entire generations. It is always the same essence that occurs throughout the in(de)finite variety of human beings. The divine is related to being-as-a-whole as to its surroundings; it designates the highest sense of being *qua* pure presence. The divine remains what it is in spite of all that changes; it is the unaltered, the unmoved, that motion itself presupposes. Eternity is therefore the fundamental determination of the divine, for only that which is eternally present can constitute a ground for all that continually enters into and departs from presence. The constancy of the cycles of generations and destructions in all that is alive, the constancy of the heavenly spheres in their circular and perfect motion, the constancy of the cosmos itself call for a divinity that bestows an immutable landmark toward which all that is becoming orients itself.

The metaphysical question of being entails the consideration of cosmology: to ask about being is to enquire about the world, or more precisely, about its limits. We must not decide in advance whether there is here a logical error similar to the paradox of the ensemble that contains all the ensembles, a paradox that contemporary set theory would have resolved once for all. What matters is to acknowledge that a paradox necessarily appears as soon as we speak of "being-as-a whole," of the world as one or of an ultimate limit. And yet, these worries are unavoidable. We cannot acknowledge the existence of various regions of beings without assuming a whole that embraces all these different regions. Everything occurs as if only an ultimate whole could grant beings the space that allows them to be what they are in their specific realms.

Aristotle's word for the wholeness of what is in its cosmological sense is "οὐρανός," a term commonly translated into English as the "heavens." Its Latin rendering, however, still preserves a fundamental ambiguity that has disappeared in our translation: "*caelum*" signifies both the "sky" and "the heavens" (not unlike *der Himmel* in German),

thus pointing both to the things that are out there [τἀχεῖ][22] and to
what is yonder [ὑπέρ]. The heavens show the limit of what we can
see of the universe (the extreme boundary of the visible), thus imme-
diately opening the question of what lurks beyond it. Specifically, Ar-
istotle distinguishes three senses of "Οὐρανός" (a) the sphere of the
fixed, (b) the planetary spheres, and (c) "the whole and 'everything to-
gether' [τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ πᾶν]."[23] *De caelo* bears not only on the heav-
ens in contradistinction to the sublunar world, but also on the relation
of cosmos and heavens to the whole. Asking about the heavens, we
are thus considering being-as-a-whole. "The heavens and the world
[οὐρανός, κόσμος]: this is the synthesis of the whole."[24] Such a whole
is not only the sum total of what is here in the world (τὸ πᾶν) plus
whatever is there in the heavens; it also envelops this sum (τὸ ὅλον).
In this context, the whole does not designate an abstract concept of
totality; rather, it is understood on the basis of a gradual ascension of
various surroundings.

> This is why the things out there [τἀχεῖ] (that is, outside the heavens) are
> not in a place, nor does time make them grow old, there is no change
> [μεταβολή] for what is beyond [ὑπέρ] the most extreme rotation; but
> immutable, impassible, enjoying the best and most independent life,
> they measure through and through the whole eternity [τὸν ἅπαντα
> αἰῶνα].[25]

Aristotle's treatment of the divine in *De caelo* is often expounded
as a paradigm of cosmic or physical theology. In order for οὐρανός
and cosmos to designate different regions of beings, both must be
thought of in relation to (or embraced by) a further whole that encom-
passes them. Without it, there could be neither regions of beings, nor
cosmos, nor heavens. The ultimate surrounding, then, is itself beyond
the most extreme translation of the heavens, and this is the realm of
the divine par excellence.

The fundamental point in this text is that the deity is understood
in terms of αἰών which is to say, in relation to time. Does this mean
that God is "in" eternity, in the sense in which we say that a content is

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[22] Notice that "τἀχεῖ" does not mean what is "up there" or "above us,"
but says more simply (and more ambiguously) what is "out there," the "dis-
tant," by contrast with what is simply "here," present at hand.

[23] Aristotle, *De caelo* 1.9.278b20, in *Loeb Classical Library* (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1971).

[24] *De cael.* 1.10.280a21.

[25] *De cael.* 1.9.279 a18–22.

in a container? Certainly not, for 'Aristotle says of divine life that it "runs through eternity as a whole [διατελεῖ τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα]."[26] Eternity is not a limit within which the heavens stands. Rather, that which is "out there" runs through eternity as a whole. It is true that the word "αἰῶν" also has the common (and somewhat archaic) sense of the "course of a life" (Aristotle himself recalls this use at 279a24). But this sense is mentioned in order to contrast it with what Aristotle is now attempting to consider. The limit [τέλος] of the heavens is analogous to the limit of a particular life. The relation is analogical: the eternal αἰῶν is to God what "αἰῶν" in the mundane sense of "course of life" is to a human life. An analogy is not an identity, however, for in the first case, "the limit of the heavens as a whole, the limit that embraces [περιέχον] all time and infinity is αἰῶν; it takes its name from eternal being [αἰεὶ] immortal and divine."[27] "Limit" here has nothing to do with some termination. The heavens are themselves embraced by this limit, and because of this, they are stirred by a teleological movement allowing them, in turn, to envelop the world.

If the first principle is not infinite in the sense of a separate infinity, it is nevertheless eternal and ceaseless. In other words, it is with respect to time that the question of the so-called positive infinite or infinite in act arises. Eternity is not infinite in the way that a line can be indefinitely prolonged by adding more and more extension to it. With respect to quantitative measure, ἄπειρον has only potential being. This is why even though any sensible body appears to be infinitely divisible, there is no actual infinite body. Αἰῶν, however, calls for a different concept of infinity. Eternity does not signify the everlasting motion (*sempiternitas*) of the divine bodies (that is, the heavens); but the eternity (*aeternitas*) that belongs to God itself—the soul of this body. In this second sense, eternity holds divine life together and designates the temporal horizon of God. But in that case, eternity is not equivalent to immutability, for it is said to be "ceaseless," and αἰῶν cannot be understood as expressing a static order of being.[28] To claim that the first principle is unmoved is not to say that the first principle

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[26] *De cael.* 1.9.279a22.

[27] *De cael.* 1.9.279a26–7.

[28] When Aquinas comments on this, he feels obliged to expound the concept of "αἰῶν" with the further determination, "*totum simul.*" See Aquinas, *In Aristotelis libros de caelo*, §215 (Marietti: Taurini, 1952): "Aeternum est spatium totius temporis . . . totum simul existens."

is something that is fixed, but to say that it is not moved by something else.

In a sober statement, Aristotle declares what many commentators have attempted to deny he ever said[29]: "It is necessary that unceasing mobility belong to the God [ἀνάγκη τῷ θεῷ κίνησιν ἀίδιον ὑπάρχειν]."[30] Unceasing mobility belongs to a nature that is not cosmic anymore but "beyond [ὑπέρ] the outermost motion." What occurs here is, according to Martineau, "nothing less than the creation of a metaphysical God-αἰῶν."[31] The conclusion Martineau does not draw, however, is that while ontotheology demands a constant and absolute presence as its ultimate foundation, it does not follow that the so-called "metaphysics of presence" excludes mobility. Aristotle is not speaking of the circular movement of the heavens, nor of the ether, nor of the celestial divine body; he is pointing to "ὁ θεός" and grants God itself with unceasing mobility, while the circular movement of the heavens is, in turn, understood as a consequence of this divine movement. The transcendence of what is "out there" (beyond the most external translation) is an unceasing mobility which belongs properly to God. If, indeed, the heavens are a divine body, we are now enquiring beyond the heavenly sphere.

> Each being that performs [ὧν ἐστιν ἔργον] exists for the sake of that which it performs; but the activity [ἐνέργεια] of God is immortality, that is, ceaseless life [ζωὴ ἀίδιος]. This is why it is necessary that ceaseless mobility belong to the God [ἀνάγκη τῷ θεῷ κίνησιν ἀίδιον ὑπάρχειν]. And as the heavens [οὐρανός] is such (for it is a divine body), it contains for this purpose a circular body, which, by nature, always moves itself in a circular motion.[32]

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[29] Among others, Leo Sweeney, Paul Moreau, Jean Pépin, Etienne Gilson, W.D. Ross. Despite the fact that this sentence is grammatically unambiguous, William Guthrie translates θεός at line 10 by "divine" and adds a note in which, referring to the authority of Simplicius, he remarks that "by θεός Aristotle means no more than θεῖον σῶμα . . . the coincidence of the terms θεός here with οὐρανός is another indication that the unmoved mover was not yet a part of Aristotle's theology." See Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, (The Loeb Classical Library Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1971, reprint), p. 148–9, note a. Thereby, Guthrie contradicts the very sentence he translates as well as the explicit claim at 279a18–22 which shows that Aristotle does not at all confuse οὐρανός and θεός.

[30] *De cael.* 2.3.286a10.

[31] Emmanuel Martineau, "Aiôn chez Aristote," 54.

[32] *De cael.* 2.3.286a7–12.

Aristotle is considering beings from the standpoint of their performance. All ontological determinations take on here an active and temporal sense. We must, however, distinguish different senses: in one case, the activity must be thought in relation to an œrgon (a task that has to be brought to completion); in another, it is the always of sempiternal motion; in another again, it is the eternal activity of the God itself. This triple temporal order springs from a concern for the limits of time both in the sense of its end and its outer limit (both senses are conveyed by the word "τέλος.") More precisely, the activity of the God itself is distinguished in the following two ways:

(a) With respect to those beings that are active in view of some ἔργον: plants, animals, and humans, inasmuch as they are striving to be what they are. Life in general strives to accomplish itself; it struggles to achieve its essence. The activity of these beings reveals what they are through the various ways they can be said to be "at work." The cycles of generation and destruction that bear upon their existence are such that they must strive in order to achieve what they are. It is a matter of striving, because individuals cannot remain in achievement *qua* individuals; for this reason, their essence (*qua* human beings, dogs, trees, and so forth) is preserved only in the species.

(b) With respect to the always that embraces the heavenly spheres, the continuous circular motion of the divine body. This second type of motion (the first heaven) reveals the bodily manifestation of the immaterial first mover. Yet, by contrast with these two types of activities, what sort of task would God have to accomplish? What kind of mobility can properly be attributed to God, since, by definition, it can neither be with respect to place nor with respect to alteration? Divine psychology is more properly discussed in Book 12 of the *Metaphysics*. Yet, in *De caelo,* this soul is already understood as unceasing mobility in a sense that is demanded by the two other kinds of motions and yet, is essentially distinct from them.

But if there is a distinction between the celestial spheres' unceasing motion and the mobility of God, does it not follow that God is in some sense transcendent? This view challenges the traditional understanding of Aristotle's cosmological theology. One might object that to talk of transcendence in this context cannot be justified for two reasons. First, Aristotle expresses God's being in terms of "τἀκεῖ," "περιέχειν," and "ὑπέρ," but these words are vague and ambiguous; they do not seem to tell us much about whatever stands "out there."

Second, it does not necessarily follow that beyond the most external translation, there is only *one* being. It has been argued that Aristotle remains unclear on the unity or plurality of the God(s).[33]

The answer to these objections sends us back to our initial observation. The abovementioned critiques rest, in fact, on the assumption of a Christian sense of God's transcendence. Clearly, if by "transcendence" we understand eternity and infinity in the sense of *"totum simul,"* there is no doubt that this is not what Aristotle suggests. However, it does not follow that this is the only possible understanding of transcendence. Furthermore, if the words "τἀκεῖ," "ὑπέρ," and "περιέχειν" are, indeed, ambiguous, it does not follow either that they are imprecise.

Let us consider these terms as Aristotle uses them at this juncture.

(a) Τἀκεῖ (a crasis for "τὰ ἐκεῖ," "τὰ ἐκείνων") has no particular connotation of a lofty elevation standing above and beyond something else. The God is not "up there" looking down onto us. Rather, it stands yonder, in that distant place. God's place belongs to what is other than here; indeed no place could contain it, and in a sense God is nowhere. This, however, is not at all equivalent to saying that God is *away* from us, as the Christian *Deus absconditus*. Transcendence is not the mere negation of what is transcended; there is no there without a here. That which is "τἀκεῖ" is understood as other than and beyond the world, but only and always on the basis of the world.

(b) Περιέχειν (to surround, to envelop, to embrace). The God who dwells in the distance is not away or removed; it is, on the contrary, "against" the world,[34] in the sense of covering it, and outside of it. We should recall that "περιέχειν" appears, significantly, in the context of Aristotle's analysis of time ("It is necessary that all the things that are in time be embraced [περιέχεσται] by it").[35] All that is temporal is embraced by time. Whatever enters into being and departs from it is temporally wrapped in a more ample time that also embraces the

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[33] For instance, Etienne Gilson: "If the Greeks were never quite sure how many gods there were, that was precisely because they *lacked* that clear idea of God which makes it impossible to admit more than one." *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, trans. Alfred Downes, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 47 (emphasis added).

[34] "Against": another "ambiguous" term, from the English language this time, which might, in fact, be the most adequate term.

[35] *Phys.* 4.12.221a28.

time of its prior and posterior nonbeing. The time properly allotted to each entity (the seventy years of Socrates' life, for instance—his temporal αἰών) is itself enveloped by the time that precedes and the time that succeeds his existence. By analogy, what envelops all temporal entities must itself be embraced by something else. This is eternity.

However, a further objection to this interpretation needs to be mentioned. If eternity is compatible with some sense of motion, then, as with everything else that is in motion, there ought to be something anterior and something posterior. But if it is so, there ought to be time, since the definition of time depends, at least in part, on the difference of anteriority and posteriority within movement. How then could eternity be distinct from time?

The problem with this objection rests in what it presupposes. The difficulty we encounter with the idea of an eternal ceaseless mobility is that we are prone to identify eternity with a constant presence which, as such, can only disavow movement. This conception, however, does not agree with the Greek sense of αἰών. The eternity that properly belongs to God must indeed be distinguished from the continuous run of the ethereal realm, but it does not follow from this that God ought to be immobile. Rather, as Aristotle states in various instances, God *qua* first principle is necessarily unmoved, that is, not moved by something else: God is not generated but generating. "There is something that always moves the things in motion, and the first mover is itself immovable."[36] "'Ακίηντον" does not mean that the prime mover "stands still," but that it is not put into motion by anything other than itself. This marks the difference between the temporal and the eternal sense of infinite movement. Temporal entities are moved in time, insofar as they come into being and are eventually destroyed. Aristotle himself makes it clear: the proper opposite of "eternal" is not "temporal" but "destructible [φθαρτή]."[37] The eternal, then, is by definition what does not cease to be. Ceaseless being, however, does not entail stillness. God is not indestructible in the sense in which we can say that mathematical objects or Platonic forms are indestructible, and the science that is properly concerned with this kind of immovability is mathematics and not theology.[38] God's movement

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36 *Meta.* 4.8.1012b33.
37 *Meta.* 12.1.1069a32.
38 *Meta.* 6.1.1026a15.

is an ungenerated and unaltered movement toward itself, as the discussion of the noetic activity of the divine intellect in *Metaphysics* 12 demonstrates. As such, God's movement ceaselessly withdraws into itself.

By contrast, temporal beings belong neither to being nor to non-being but to the alternative of being and nonbeing as a whole. Time envelops temporal things, granting each one its own time, and the multiplicity of these times enveloping each entity is itself further enveloped:

> Things that are destructible and generable and in general, things that at one time are and at another are not, all of these must be in time; for there is a 'vaster' time [πλείων] that exceeds [ὑπερέξει] the existence of temporal entities as well as the time measuring their substance.[39]

Inasmuch as it embraces their existence, time is in excess of beings, both delimiting and constituting them.[40] As the analysis of place (*Phys.* 4.1–5) already demonstrated, to "envelop" and to "be in excess" are essentially related. This "vaster time" that envelops all the things that exist in their own and limited time comprehends both their being and their nonbeing. But the inquiry cannot be put to rest with this remark. We are immediately faced with a further question: when is this time that includes all the temporal things surrounded by the οὐρανός? When is the time of times?

If these temporal envelopments reveal a transcendence, this latter term cannot designate anything that would be entirely separate. To say that God is the ultimate activity is not to say that it constitutes a separate and fixed entity. Pure actuality has an essentially reflexive character (as the terms ἐν-τελέχεια, ἐν-έργεια reveal) *qua* "thinking of thinking" or "act that has in itself its own end," this reflexivity constitutes an activity and not a merely static self-identity. Let us note in that respect that the translation of "αὐταρχεστάτη" by "impassive" (Guthrie) suggests a connotation that is not carried by the Greek word. Divine autarchy is not a matter of impassivity, in the sense of

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[39] *Phys.* 4.12.221b30–1.

[40] This corresponds to the phenomenological distinction between ontic and ontological time. The so-called "finite-time theory" usually attributed to *Being and Time* does not entail at all the denial of a time to come "after" Dasein's existence (and even less a morbid predilection for death!) Rather, to say that time is finite is to say that Dasein understands what is beyond itself only on the basis of its own temporal position.

mere inactivity. True autarchy is, on the contrary, the very negation of passivity. To be autarchic is first of all not to be passive (that is, not to be submitted to something else), which is precisely the case for what has unceasing mobility. Αὐταρχεια is the activity of that which is never at rest. Thus, God is transcendent in the sense of a ceaseless activity that transcends the very immanence on the ground of which we apprehend it. "Eternity" names the end of time in the sense of its τέλος—that is, not its cessation, but its accomplishment.

We can see now why transcendence and eternity are necessarily related. Their relation springs from a fundamental concern for time and its end. This end is not simply a point where time stops, a step beyond which nothing occurs anymore. Rather, transcendence must be understood in the active sense of transcending, through which divine activity is perpetually actual. To say that infinity cannot exist "as a whole" is to say that we cannot attribute the mode of being of this or that particular entity to what has unceasing mobility. Transcendence, in this sense, is a matter of horizon, inasmuch as the horizon is the ultimate line of demarcation between the visible as a whole and the invisible. The horizon is a line we can never reach, yet it is "out there," and from it we find our standings and establish a here as our proper dwelling place. Similarly, eternity designates a "there" we cannot reach, yet it constitutes the horizon from which we determine a span of time as our proper time. The end of time is the point where time transcends itself.

But what is this divine activity that does not have to seek its justification in something else? Since God is pure activity, it cannot be or act for the sake of something else. "The activity of God is immortality [ἀθανασία] that is, ceaseless life [ζωή]. It is therefore necessary that ceaseless mobility belong to God."[41] God does not have "something to do" in the sense of being busy with a task to perform. Rather, inasmuch as God finds in itself its own end, "God" names being *qua* pure activity. Just as αἰῶν admits, as we saw, an intra- and an extratemporal sense, similarly life (ζωὴ ἀίδιος) crosses the demarcation between the cyclical movement of generations among living beings and the mobility Aristotle attributes to the God itself (κίνησιν τῷ θεῷ). But this attribution remains, of course, analogical, since divine

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[41] *De cael.* 2.3.286a10–12.

mobility is not akin to the celestial motion along an axis or to the cycle of generations.

IV

Beyond Good and Bad Infinity. Aristotle's concept of divine eternity neither fits with *sempiternitas* (the uninterrupted continuation of an incessant *et cetera*, the eternal return of the celestial cycles) nor with *aeternitas* in the sense of *nunc stans* of an immobile "now." It should be clear by now that the difference between Aristotle's ἄπειρον and the medieval *ens infinitum* cannot be explained away by a appeal to the difference between a merely potential infinity and an actual one, as if it were a matter of simply switching a concept from a negative (and pagan) pole to a positive (and Christian) one. In fact, it is not certain at all that what Hegel calls "the wrong or negative infinity of endless progression"[42] truly describes Aristotle's concept of ἄπειρον, unless we reduce what Aristotle has to say about infinity to the case of mathematical series. What Hegel dubs "wrong infinity" is such that the infinity that is obtained by negating the finite simply reiterates the finite *ad infinitum*. As Hegel puts it, "the progression to infinity never gets further than a statement of the contradiction involved in the finite."[43] Eventually we must give up the contemplation of such an infinity, not because it is too sublime, but because it is too tedious. Note that the reason why such an infinity is "wrong," in Hegel's judgment, is that it depends on "finite and discursive thinking." That is, on a "position that regards the categories as ultimate." A typical characteristic of such a thought is that it considers "finite" and "infinite" as permanent categories, or more precisely, that it understands the finite as a "permanent contradictory to the infinite."[44]   Such a

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[42] Hegel, *Logic (Being Part One of the Encyclopaedia of The Philosophical Sciences* – 1830), trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), § 94, p. 137. When discussing the difference between the Greek and the Christian sense of infinity, Gilson is prompt in identifying the former (Greek) to the "negative" and the latter (Christian) to the "positive" sense of infinity: "The plenitude of its [the Christian God's] actuality of being confers on it, as of full right, a positive infinity unknown to Aristotle." Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, 58.
[43] Hegel, *Logic*, § 94, p. 137.
[44] Ibid., § 28, pp. 48–9.

thinking is clearly bound to produce a concept of infinity that is merely negative, inasmuch as all it knows of the infinite is but the repeated negation of the finite.[45] Hegel contrasts this conception with the "infinite or speculative thought" (that is, dialectical thinking) which, "while it no less defines," does away with the categories understood as finite forms.

It is true that Aristotle maintains an irreducible difference between the finite and the infinite. Moreover there is indeed, in an Aristotelian sense, a contradiction between finite and infinite, since the same thing considered at the same time and in the same respect cannot be both finite and not finite. Yet it does not follow that the relation between these terms is merely a matter of mutual exclusion between "ultimate categories." The qualification "at the same time and in the same respect," that Aristotle is keen to repeat when discussing what properly constitutes a contradiction, is crucial. For Aristotle, the infinite never leaves the finite behind, since there is no there without a here, while, at the same time, these terms can never fall into an identity.

In order to understand God's activity as that which admits of infinity and eternity, we need to go back to the analogy between infinity and the way in which the day or the games exist. The Olympic games or the day will eventually end. Night for the day, the closing ceremony for the games, will mark the point in time when we can say that these are completed, that they are no more. Yet as long as they are actual, their actuality signifies an ongoing process in which there is no point of time when they are actual as a whole. "The Olympic games are as what potentially occurs and what is occurring [καὶ τῷ δύνασθαι γίνεσθαι, καὶ τῷ γίνεσθαι]."[46] Analogically, God's activity is "immortality, that is, ceaseless life," in the sense of a mobility that never comes to pass. To be in act, in this sense, is therefore not to encounter an external limit (as the marble does when it is carved into a particular statue) but to be in a constant process of occurring.

The modal distinction between potency and act can now appear in its full metaphysical sense as the bridge that unifies the questions of being as a whole (theology) and the question of being *qua* being

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[45] The Hegelian analysis would, in a way, fit with what Aristotle shows about infinite numerical series. Each time we reach a finite integer we must deny it (*not* 10, but 10+1, *not* 11, but 11+1, and so forth).

[46] *Phys.* 4.6.206a25.

(ontology). In *De caelo*, the final word about ἐνέργεια is neither eternity nor infinity but immortality (ἀθανασία). God does not need to produce something in order to be active; rather, it endlessly occurs. It cannot have a particular goal, aim, or task to fulfill, for all that it can fulfill is already realized by its own happening. But why then is there still activity when the end is already met? This manner of asking betrays in fact our own conceptual limitations. We cannot understand activity as anything else than a frantic rush for whatever it is that the agent lacks; we assume that activity can only be the anxious search for something which would fulfill a prior deficiency. In other words, our incomprehension reveals the fact that we have grown used to seeing in activity nothing else than production, if not productivity. Yet God's activity is ceaseless in the sense of the pure actuality of ceaseless life. If being in its foremost sense is actuality *qua* activity, then it suffices to itself. Activity is ultimately not what a being does, but what being is.

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FACTS VS. THINGS:
ADAM WODEHAM AND THE LATER MEDIEVAL DEBATE ABOUT OBJECTS OF JUDGMENT

SUSAN BROWER-TOLAND

D RAWING ON ARISTOTLE'S DISCUSSION in the *Categories*, medieval philosophers generally take for granted that reality is fundamentally constituted by entities of two basic kinds: substances (such as stones, trees, human beings) and their accidents (such as this stone's hardness, that tree's height, Socrates' pallor). As a rule, they find the analytical tools afforded by a substance-accident ontology perfectly adequate for addressing philosophical and theological problems generally.[1] As with most rules, however, here too there are exceptions. In this paper I examine one such exception: namely, that provided by a fourteenth-century philosopher, Adam Wodeham (ca. 1298–1358), who, in the course of developing a theory of judgment, in particular, a theory about the nature of the objects of judgment, is led to challenge this standard medieval-Aristotelian paradigm.[2]

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[1] Although the basic correctness of the substance-accident framework itself is usually taken for granted, medieval philosophers often disagree over questions about just what a substance is, about the number and types of accidents that ought to be allowed, or about whether there are universals (in either the categories of substance or accident). For an overview of this framework see Scott MacDonald, "Medieval Philosophy," in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward Craig (London: Routledge, 1998), 269–77, and Alfred J. Freddoso, "Introduction," in Francisco Suarez, *On Creation, Conservation, and Concurrence: Metaphysical Disputations 20, 21, and 22*, trans. Alfred J. Freddoso (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2002), xxix-xlii.

[2] Interestingly, similar challenges arise in the context of twelfth-century discussions of judgment as well. See Gabriel Nuchelmans, *Theories of the Proposition: Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity* (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co, 1973), chs. 9–10, and Norman Kretzmann, "Medieval Logicians on the Meaning of the *Propositio*," *The Journal of Philosophy* 67 (1970): 767–87.

As with nearly every other figure in the history of medieval phi-
losophy, the recovery of Wodeham's legacy is still in its early stages;
indeed, his writings are only now becoming available in reliable Latin
editions.[3] Even so, it has been clear to scholars for some time that
Wodeham was a philosopher of considerable stature, standing at the
center of a number of important philosophical, theological, and scien-
tific controversies in one of the liveliest periods in the history of late
scholasticism. A careful student of William Ockham and John Duns
Scotus, as well as an independent and original thinker in his own
right, Wodeham was a highly regarded figure both at Oxford and at
Paris throughout the fourteenth century.[4] Although Wodeham's philo-
sophical corpus covers a wide range of issues, he is best known to his-
torians of philosophy today for his contribution to the later medieval
debate about the objects of judgment.[5]

The significance of Wodeham's views on this issue has to do with
the fact that, in the course of developing his theory of judgment, he

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[3] The recent publication of the critical edition of Wodeham's *Norwich
Lectures* on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* (Adam Wodeham, *Lectura Secunda
in Librum Primum Sententiarum* [St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure
University Press, 1990]) and of his *Treatise on Indivisibles* (Adam Wode-
ham, *Tractatus Indivisibilibus* [Dortrecht: Kluwer, 1988]) constitutes a sig-
nificant advance in the recovery of Wodeham's philosophical writings. Nev-
ertheless, until a critical edition of his most important work, the *Oxford
Lectures*, has been prepared, much of his philosophy will remain largely in-
accessible.

[4] The most complete introduction to Wodeham's life and times is Will-
iam J. Courtenay, *Adam Wodeham: An Introduction to His Life and Writ-
ings* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978). See also Courtenay, *Schools and Scholars in
Fourteenth-Century England* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).
Other discussions of Wodeham include: Rega Wood, "Wodeham, Adam," in
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig (London: Rout-
ledge, 1998); "Adam of Wodeham," in *A Companion to Philosophy in the
Middle Ages*, ed. Jorge Gracia and Timothy Noone (Cambridge: Blackwell,
2003): 77–85. A fairly comprehensive study of Wodeham's views on cogni-
tion can be found in Onorato Grassi, *Intuizione e significato: Adam Wode-
ham e il problema della conoscenza nel XIV secolo* (Milan: Jaca Book, 1986).

[5] Wodeham's discussion of objects of judgment was, for example,
among the first of his works to appear in critical edition (see Gedeon Gál,
"Adam Wodeham's Question on the 'Complexe Significabile' as the Immedi-
ate Object of Scientific Knowledge," *Franciscan Studies* 37 (1977): 66–102)
as well as to be translated into modern languages (see: Adam Wodeham,
"The Objects of Knowledge," in *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval
Philosophical Texts*, ed. Robert Pasnau [Cambridge University Press, 1994])
and Dominik Perler, *Satztheorien. Texte zur Sprachphilosophie und Wis-
senschaftstheorie im 14. Jahrhundert* [Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buch-
gesellschaft, 1990]).

appears to introduce a new type of entity; one which he himself refers to using the expression *sic esse* ("being such-and-such") and which came to be known among his contemporaries and successors as a *complexe significabile* ("something that can be signified [only] by a propositional expression"). Although it is generally recognized that Wodeham's account of objects of judgment is highly innovative, commentators disagree over the proper interpretation of this account. In general, they have been inclined to see Wodeham either as introducing items that are supervenient on—and nothing in addition to—ordinary substances and accidents, or else as postulating some type of abstract object (for example, abstract meanings or some other intentional entity).[6] In what follows, I argue against both sorts of interpretation: against the first, I argue that Wodeham's *complexe significabilia* are a sui generis type of entity really distinct from individual substances and accidents; and against the second, I argue that, like such substances and accidents, they are concrete (rather than abstract). Indeed, Wodeham's *complexe significabilia* are, as I see it,

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[6] An example of the first sort of interpretation is Dominik Perler, "Late Medieval Ontologies of Facts," *The Monist* 77 (1994): 149–69. The second interpretation is suggested early on by Gabriel Nuchelmans, "Adam Wodeham on the Meaning of Declarative Sentences," *Historiographia Linguistica* 7 (1980): 177–87 and subsequently taken up by a number of other commentators such as Hermann Weidemann, "Sache, Satz und Satzverhalt: Zur Diskussion über das Objekt des Wissens im Spätmittelalter," *Vivarium* 29 (1991): 129–47; Katherine Tachau, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics 1250–1345* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988); and Paul Spade, *Thoughts, Words, and Things: An Introduction to Late Medieval Logic and Semantic Theory* (Version 1.0 available in PDF format at http://pvspade.com/Logic, 1996). Spade, it should be noted, discusses Wodeham's account of *complexe significabila* only in passing. In general, however, he supposes that the "theory is the closest the later Middle Ages came to the present-day notion of a proposition—that is, a bearer of truth-value, and entity that is not a sentence or statement, but rather what is expressed by such sentence or statements" (166). See also Richard Gaskin, "*Complexe Significabilia* and Aristotle's Categories," in *La tradition médiévale des categories (XIIᵉ–XVᵉ siècles)*, ed. Joël Biard and Irène Rosier-Catach (Louvain: Éditions Peeters, 2003), who, while not specifying that *complexe significabilia* are abstract entities, nevertheless suggests that such entities are truth-bearers, and that they are introduced by Wodeham to serve as the meanings for both true and false sentences. It is important to note that the research on Wodeham's theory of *complexe significabilia* is not extensive; what does exist is pioneering in nature. Indeed, none of the discussions listed above are dedicated solely to Wodeham's account—all of them treat his views alongside those of other medieval figures (very often those of Gregory of Rimini who, until recently, was thought to have originated the notion of *complexe significabilia*).

best interpreted as facts or concrete states of affair. If I am right about this, his account of objects of judgment constitutes a fairly radical departure from the standard medieval-Aristotelian substance-accident framework. As I will show, Wodeham himself sees his account of the objects of judgment as involving an important correction to the standard interpretation of Aristotle's *Categories*.[7]

In order to make this argument, I rely on Wodeham's discussion of judgment in distinction 1, question 1, article 1 of the second set of lectures on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* (hereafter d. 1, q. 1).[8] It is in this context—namely, a discussion about the nature of the objects of knowledge(*scientia*)—that Wodeham first invokes the notion of *complexe significabilia* and it is only in this context that he provides any positive account of such entities.[9] Yet, even here, the account is rather limited. This is because Wodeham's primary aim in d. 1, q. 1 is not so much to provide a positive theory of *complexe significabilia* as to force his opponents to acknowledge the necessity of positing

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[7] This is significant since, in general, the radical nature of Wodeham's conclusion about objects of judgment seems to have gone largely unnoticed. This is owing, no doubt, in part to the influence of Gál's initial characterization of Wodeham's position as (a) a kind of careful, "via media" between Ockham's antirealist account of object of judgment and Chatton's realist account, and (b) a view "mutilated" by Rimini, whose own discussion of *complexe significabilia* provoked a largely negative reaction among his contemporaries because of its apparent ontological extravagance ("Adam Wodeham's Question on the *Complexe Significabile* as the Immediate Object of Scientific Knowledge"). Gál's characterization has been repeated many times in the literature. See, for example, Jack Zupko, "How It Played in the Rue de Fouarre: Reception of Adam Wodeham's Theory of the Complexe Significabile in the Arts Faculty at Paris in the Mid-Fourteenth Century," *Franciscan Studies* 54 (1994): 213, 217–18; Tachau, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham*; Chris Schabel, "Oxford Franciscans After Ockham: Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham," in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, ed. Gillian Evans (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 376–7; Wood, "Adam of Wodeham," 80.

[8] Apparently Wodeham lectured on Lombard's *Sentences* three times: at London, Norwich, and Oxford. The *Lectura Secunda* is Wodeham's Norwich lectures. For details on the dating and context of the *Lectura Secunda* see Rega Wood, "Introduction," in Adam Wodeham, *Lectura Secunda in Librum Primum Sententiarum* (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University Press, 1990), 30. All references are to the critical edition of the *Lectura Secunda* (hereafter '*L.sec.*'); volume and page number will be provided in parentheses. All translations are my own.

[9] Wodeham mentions entities "*significabile per complexum*" elsewhere in his *L.sec.* as well as in his later Oxford lectures, but the discussion in *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1 is his only direct treatment of the nature of these entities in the *Lectura*.

something over and above substances and accidents to serve as the
objects of judgment. Accordingly, the bulk of Wodeham's discussion
in d. 1, q. 1 is devoted to demonstrating the inadequacy of standard Ar-
istotelian theories of judgment. The details of his own account are left
largely undeveloped.

It is, no doubt, for this reason that commentators have had some
difficulty assessing the precise nature of the entities Wodeham intro-
duces to serve as objects of judgment. It is possible, however, to re-
construct much of Wodeham's own positive account from a careful
examination of his discussion and criticism of the main alternatives to
it. Indeed, as I hope to show, the sorts of criticisms Wodeham makes
of the standard Aristotelian accounts of judgment reveal a great deal
about his own positive conception of *complexe significabilia*. In
what follows, I refer to the two standard Aristotelian alternatives in
response to which Wodeham develops his view as "Aristotelian real-
ism" and "Aristotelian antirealism" respectively (or just "realism" and
"antirealism" for short).[10] Aristotelian realists hold that the objects of
judgment are ordinary things (*res*)—namely, substances and acci-
dents—whereas antirealists claim that the objects of judgment are a
type of mind-dependent entity. Wodeham begins his discussion in d.
1, q. 1 by setting out each of the standard Aristotelian positions[11]; he
then proceeds with a lengthy discussion and criticism of each, simply
allowing his own view to emerge along the way. In order to appreci-
ate his positive account, therefore, we must trace these criticisms in
some detail. Before turning to this task, however, a few preliminaries
are in order.

I

Because Wodeham's theory of judgment presupposes the techni-
cal apparatus of late-medieval logical and psychological discussions,

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[10] This debate between Aristotelian realists and Aristotelian antirealists
over the nature of objects of judgment should not be confused with the well
known medieval debate between realists and nominalists over the nature of
universals. The two debates are utterly independent of one another.

[11] Wodeham describes these two positions at the outset of his discussion
in *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1. "It might reasonably seem to some," he says, "that an
external thing is the object of an act of knowledge or of any other sort of as-
sent . . . and, similarly, to others it might seem that the object of assent is a
thing in the mind" (1:181).

it will be useful to start with a sketch of the framework and terminology underlying his discussion in d. 1, q. 1. Having done this, I then provide a summary of the sorts of considerations driving his rejection of the standard Aristotelian accounts of judgment.

1. Background and Terminology. Like many medieval philosophers, Wodeham takes for granted that the representational system that underlies human thought is semantically and syntactically language-like. As a result, his theory of judgment is framed in terms of this broader conception of the nature and structure of human (intellective) cognition or thought.[12]

The language of thought, as Wodeham conceives of it, comprises of two basic types of mental act: apprehension and judgment.[13] Acts of apprehension are mental states in which the mind represents or entertains a given content—be it propositional or nonpropositional. These acts provide the basic components of mental language. The simplest such acts, namely, simple apprehensions (that is, nonpropositional apprehensions), function as the atomic units or terms (*termini*) of the language; as such they can be combined via the mental operation of composition to form complex, sentential expressions.[14] Wodeham refers to the simple terms of mental language variously as "concepts" (*conceptus*), "simple understandings" (*simplices intelligentiae*), or as "simple ideas" (*simplices notitiae*).[15] The sentences of mental language are, as he characterizes them, "complex apprehensions" (that is, propositional apprehensions). Although Wodeham himself refers to these complex, propositional states as "mental propositions" (*propositiones in mente*) or just "propositions" (*complexa*,

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[12] There are, however, some late medieval authors who resist the notion of mental language, most notably, William Crathorn and Hugh of Lawton. Such thinkers are exceptions to this general rule. See Dominik Perler, "Crathorn on Mental Language," in *Vestigia, Imagines, Verba. Semitics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts*, ed. Constance Marmo, (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), 337–54 and Hester Gelber, "I Cannot Tell a Lie: Hugh Lawton's Critique of Ockham on Mental Language," *Franciscan Studies* 44 (1984): 141–79.

[13] It is worth noting that while it is standard for medieval philosophers to speak of belief, knowledge, and other such attitudes as mental "acts", they do not mean *activity* or *action*, but rather *actualization*. This is because, on their view, to believe or to know something is just to actualize certain cognitive or rational capacities. Thus, an act of judgment or of cognition generally is to be understood not as a mental activity *per se*, but rather as an actuality—an actual *state* of intellect or mind. In this regard, even dispositional states (what medievals call "habits") are mental acts—they are first actualities.

propositiones), in what follows, I shall refer to them simply as 'mental sentences' so as to avoid confusion with the contemporary notion of proposition.

In addition to acts of propositional apprehension, Wodeham also recognizes another type of propositional act or attitude, namely, judgment. In keeping with the interpretation of thought as an inner, mental language, we can perhaps think of judicative acts as mental assertions, that is, mental sentences that carry a kind of assertoric force.

In general, late medieval philosophers divide judicative acts into two main categories: assent or dissent.[16] As we shall see, Wodeham suggests a third category, namely, "hesitating" (*haesitandum*). Acts of assent and dissent may be further subdivided into more specific propositional—or "judicative"—attitudes such as belief, knowledge, doubt, opinion, faith, and so on. Thus, when one takes a given content as true (say, by believing, knowing, or opining) he is said to assent to it; when he takes it to be false (say, by disbelieving, or doubting) he is said to dissent from it. Wodeham describes such attitudes of assent and dissent as a kind of mental "nod" (*adnuere*). This is because, as he explains, mental states of judgment (assent and dissent) are a kind of "mental concession" by which one "can agree or not agree as if by mentally saying 'yes' or 'no', or by hesitating [between agreeing and

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[14] As Wodeham, explains: "[N]o [mental] sentence is formed without composition, which is an act conjoining (*actus collativus*) something to something else." *L.sec.*, d. 23, q. unica (3:311). The operation of composition is, according to Wodeham, the mental equivalent of using a copula in natural language. As he says, "When the intellect forms a proposition, it composes one thing with another . . . by means of the [mental] sign (*nota*) of composition, which is indicated by the word is. This mental word is a certain concept that conjoins (*conceptus comparativus*) either by the conjoining of one thing to itself or else to some other. And this is either affirmatively in which case it affirms one thing to be the same as itself or as another; or negatively (by attaching a concept of negation), in which case it denies the identity of one thing with itself or as another." *L.sec.*, prol., q. 6 (1:147).

[15] Although the Latin expression *notitia* is often rendered as 'knowledge' in English, it should be clear that, in this context, such a translation would be misleading, since typically knowledge is taken to be a propositional attitude. Clearly, the state Wodeham is referring to here is nonpropositional in nature.

[16] Apparently, however, there was some debate in the later fourteenth century (perhaps beginning with Gregory Rimini) about whether assent is really a distinct type of act from dissent. Rimini argued that there is really just assent to a given content and assent to its contradictory. See Gabriel Nuchelmans, *Judgment and Proposition: From Descartes to Kant* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1983), 90–1.

disagreeing]."[17] Importantly, however, he goes on to suggest that an
act of assent should not be thought of as a "blind" (*caecus*) mental
nod. In other words, we shouldn't think of acts of judging as a mere
nodding or, as it were, an empty cognitive attitude, but rather as a
fully representational state.[18] Thus, Wodeham insists that in some
sense "every assent [or dissent] is a kind of apprehension although
not every apprehension is an assent or dissent."[19] As he sees it, acts of
judgment are a kind of mental sentence, but unlike apprehensions,
such sentences are, as it were, accompanied by something akin to an
assertion sign (or what Frege aptly calls the "judgment stroke").

In addition to taking for granted the distinctions among these dif-
ferent types of mental states (apprehensions vs. judgments, and sim-
ple vs. complex apprehensions), Wodeham also presupposes a certain
analysis of the logical and psychological relations that obtain among
them. In this respect, Wodeham is following his predecessor, William
Ockham.[20] According to this analysis, judgments always presuppose
for their formation the (logically) prior occurrence of certain simple
and complex apprehensions (which ones exactly are determined by
the content of the judgment in question).[21] Thus, on Wodeham's view,
in order to form the judgment SOCRATES IS PALE, we must first have
not only the simple apprehensions or concepts SOCRATES and PALE-
NESS, but also form the complex apprehension which is the mental
sentence involving both of them (namely, SOCRATES IS PALE).[22] It is
clear that we cannot form the judgment unless we possess the rele-
vant concepts. But neither, Wodeham thinks, can we form a judgment

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[17] *L.sec.*, prol., q. 6 (1:173).

[18] Indeed, Wodeham even goes so far as to suggest that acts of assent or
judgment may be classified (as with acts of apprehension) as intuitive or ab-
stractive acts (see *L.sec.*, prol., q. 6 (1:174). Elsewhere, Wodeham also sug-
gests that acts of will (that is, "of seeking and avoiding, and thus enjoying"—
appetendi et odiendi, et ita frui) should also be understood as intrinsically
representational states (see *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 5 [1:278]). Insofar as this way of
characterizing such acts is fairly non-standard, Wodeham tends to be cau-
tious in his statement of such views.

[19] *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 5 (1:278, 280).

[20] Ockham's discussion of the divisions and ordering among mental acts
is in the Prologue of his *Ordinatio*, q. 1. See William Ockham, *Opera Philo-
sophica et Theologica* (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University
Press, 1967–89), *Opera theologica* [*OTh*], vol. 1, pp. 16–22, 51, 58, and follow-
ing. Ockham says that every act of assent presupposes a prior complex ap-
prehension corresponding to, and "partially causing" it.

[21] This is the case, at least in the ordinary course of things. Wodeham,
like other medieval thinkers, makes exceptions for cases of divine interven-
tion.

without first formulating the relevant complex apprehension—that is, mental sentence—from them. This, he says, is because "a simple awareness or concept never suffices for causing an assent unless a propositional act is formed from it."[23] As Wodeham sees it, merely thinking about Socrates or the property of being pale will not suffice to generate the judgment that Socrates is pale. On the contrary, in order to form this judgment we must first entertain the complete thought SOCRATES IS PALE. Indeed, on Wodeham's view, this prior act of propositional apprehension is causally necessary for forming the corresponding judgment.[24]

The foregoing analysis of the ordering among mental acts has an important consequence for the objects of judgment. What it entails is that that we can determine a given judgment's object just by determining the object of the complex apprehension (or mental sentence) which (logically) precedes and causes it. Thus, in order to determine the object of the judgment that SOCRATES IS PALE, we need only determine the object of the preceding propositional apprehension SOCRATES IS PALE. And this is because they share the same content.[25] Because this consequence functions as a kind of rule in Wodeham's thinking, it is worth setting out explicitly:

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[22] Here and in what follows, I use CAPS to mention expressions in mental language, and single quotes plus CAPS to mention a mental expression that, in turn, mentions another mental expression. I use single quotes to mention expressions in natural language. In general, statements which refer to facts or states of affairs (such as *Socrates's being pale*) will be italicized.

[23] *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1 (1:189).

[24] Wodeham is very explicit in claiming that a judgment is (at least partially) caused by the formation of a mental sentence. He argues for this by pointing out that in the case of certain self-evident truths, the act of forming or apprehending a self-evident truth (that is, by forming a mental sentence which expresses it) will immediately cause a corresponding act of assent. Such evident propositional apprehensions are "suited to necessitate the intellect in which they exist to assent that it is the case as that sentence signifies." Wodeham's notion of "evidentness" is a fairly technical one: he distinguishes three ways in which a mental sentence might be called "evident" (see his discussion in *L.sec.*, prol., q. 6 (1:163–4). In the first two of the three ways, the evidentness of the mental sentence is such that its formation is not sufficient to bring about an ensuing act of assent (in most cases an act of will is also required or the formation of other mental sentences). In such cases, however, the formation of such a sentence is still counted as a partial cause of the ensuing judgment. In the case of mental sentences evident in the third way, the mere formation of the sentence is, by itself, sufficient to produce an ensuing act of assent.

[25] Although they share the same content, the two acts differ with respect to force.

> Wodeham's Rule: the object of a given act of judgment is the same as
> the object of the mental sentence that precedes (and causes) that judg-
> ment.

Although this rule figures in Wodeham's reasoning at a number of
points in his discussion, he expressly states it only toward the very
end of his discussion. He initially states the rule in connection with a
specific type of assent (the details of which we can here ignore), but
then goes on to formulate it for assent more generally:

> Speaking of acts of assent that are unqualifiedly evident, the immediate
> object of the act of assenting is the total object of the [mental] sentence
> that necessitates the assent. Speaking of acts of assent more generally,
> the immediate total object [of an act of assent] is the total object or total
> significate of the mental sentence that immediately corresponds, co-
> causes, and is necessarily presupposed by it.[26]

In addition to containing a statement of Wodeham's Rule, this
passage contains two further features worth pausing over. First, no-
tice that in stating the rule, Wodeham speaks of the object of judg-
ment or assent as the "total" object of the prior apprehension or men-
tal sentence. He does so in order to distinguish the object of the
judgment taken as a whole from what he elsewhere refers to as its
"partial" objects, namely, the objects of its constituent concepts. The
distinction is important because Wodeham wants to emphasize that
the object of a judicative attitude is the total object of the prior com-
plex or propositional apprehension and not the objects of any of the
simple apprehensions from which it is composed.

It is also worth noting that in the foregoing passage, Wodeham
characterizes the objects of judgment by speaking of them not only as
the total objects of the mental sentences that precede and cause
them, but also as their total "significates" (*significata*). Indeed,
throughout his discussion, Wodeham habitually speaks of the object
of judgment in semantic terms, namely, as that which "is signified"
both by the judgment and by the mental sentence that precedes it. As
he says elsewhere, "the total object of assent is the total significate of
the mental sentence necessitating the assent."[27] Although the medi-

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[26] "Sexto conclusio est quod immediatum obiectum actus assentiendi
est obiectum totale complexi necessitantis ad assensum, loquendo de as-
sensu simpliciter evidenti. Vel generaliter loquendo, eius obiectum immedia-
tum totale est obiectum totale seu significatum totale propositionis immedi-
ate sibi conformis, concausantis illum et necessario sibi praesuppositae, vel
obiecta totalia multarum propositionum talium." *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:192).
[27] *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:193).

eval notion of signification does not precisely map onto any single notion in contemporary semantic theory, it is clear from the context of Wodeham's discussion as a whole that he understands it to be a broadly referential relation.[28] Thus, as will become clear, the *significatum* of a given sentence or judgment does not function for Wodeham as its representational content or meaning.[29] Instead, as he characterizes it, the "total significate" (and, so, total object) of a judgment is that entity which is uniquely identified or picked out by a judgment as a whole (as well as by the mental sentence preceding it).[30]

2. *The Motivation for* Complexe Significabilia. We are now in a position to see why Wodeham thinks it necessary to go beyond mere substances and accidents to account for the objects or significates of judgment. Consider again the judgment (or mental sentence) SO-CRATES IS PALE. Taken as a whole, this mental state is clearly not just about the individual substance, Socrates, (though it is partially about him). Nor is it just about one of his accidents, namely, paleness (though here again, it is partially about that). Nor again is it plausible to say that it is about the aggregate of Socrates and his pallor. On the contrary, the judgment as whole is about *Socrates's being pale*. But, it

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[28] On the notion of signification in medieval semantics, see Paul Spade, "The Semantics of Terms," in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Earline Jennifer Ashworth, "Medieval Theories of Singular Terms," (2003) in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward Zalta (Spring 2006), forthcoming URL is <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/propositions/>. As Spade and Ashworth both make clear, the notion of signification cannot be assimilated to our contemporary notion of sense or meaning, despite its psychological overtones (to signify something, as medievals often characterize signification, is to "make it known" or to "bring it to mind"). Of course, this is not to say, as Ashworth rightly points out, that medieval thinkers lack the notion of sense or meaning, but only that, as a rule, they do not think of the sense or meaning of an expression as some kind of entity, that is, one to which the expression somehow relates.

[29] See section III.3 below, where I argue that Wodeham is, in fact, committed to distinguishing between the *significatum* (that is, referent) of a judgment and its representational content.

[30] Interestingly, although Wodeham refers to objects of judgment as the entities "signified" by judgments (and by the sentences which express them), he also claims that these same entities are what a judgment and sentence (or, rather, their nominalizations) *supposit* for. Supposition is the semantic function an expression has when used in the context of a given sentence; whereas, by contrast, signification is a semantic property an expression has independently of its use or its occurrence in a sentence.

is hard to see what this entity or object could be if not a fact or con-
crete state of affairs involving Socrates and paleness as constituents.

Wodeham himself develops this line of reasoning by focusing on
certain syntactic features of the expressions we use in natural lan-
guage to express a given judgment. As Wodeham points out, when we
express the judgment SOCRATES IS PALE, we employ not just a subject
and a predicate term ('Socrates' and 'pale', respectively), but also a
copula. That we do so, he thinks, constitutes grounds for thinking
that the judgment expressed by this sentence is not merely about So-
crates or paleness, but about something further, namely, the obtaining
of a connection or relation between them. As he explains,

> [The expression] 'to be' (esse)—which is the sign (nota) of composi-
> tion—signifies either something or nothing. If it does not signify (or
> consignify) anything, there is no reason for it to appear in an expres-
> sion. If it signifies something, it doesn't signify any one thing more than
> another since it relates indifferently to all beings (entium) whatsoever
> and can join any one of them with any other. Thus, whether it signifies
> inherence or composition, or the unity or identity [that exists] in reality
> between the terms of the sentence (or, rather, the things signified by
> those terms), it will always be the case that the sentence [as a whole]
> signifies some thing or things not signified by its subject and predicate
> expressions.[31]

According to Wodeham, the best explanation for the presence of the
copula in speech is that it introduces something in addition to the en-
tities designated by the subject and predicate expressions flanking it.
Given its unique contribution to the semantic value of sentential ex-
pressions, such as 'Socrates is pale,' it follows that the referent of
such expressions (and, likewise, the object of the judgments they ex-
press) is something other than—something in addition to—the indi-

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[31] "Item, aut ly 'esse', quod est nota compositionis, aliquid significat aut
nihil. Si nihil significat nec consignificat, frustra ponitur in oratione. Si aliq-
uid, et non magis unum quam aliud, quia indifferenter respicit quidlibet en-
tium, et quodlibet potest copulare cum quolibet. Et sive significat inhaeren-
tiam sive compositionem a parte rei, sive unitatem et identitatem inter
extrema vel significata per extrema propositionis, semper habebitur quod
propositio significat aliquid vel aliqua quod non significatur per subiectum
vel praedicatum." L.sec., d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:185). Although this passage is
drawn from a section in which Wodeham is presenting the antirealist's view,
it is an argument he returns to later in his discussion when defending his own
position. As will become clear, the antirealist and Wodeham agree with the
conclusion of this passage—that is to say, that what is signified by a sentence
(or judgment) is not the entity signified by its subject or predicate expres-
sions, but rather that signified by the sentence as a whole. Where they dis-
agree is over whether such an entity is mental or extramental.

vidual substance and accidents to which its subject and predicate terms refer. As Wodeham puts it, the referent of sentences (and of judgments) must be something "complexly signifiable" (*complexe significabile*)—that is, it must be something that can be designated by, and only by, a complex (or sentential) expression.

Although Wodeham takes these sorts of considerations to show that an adequate theory of judgment requires the introduction of a type of entity distinct from Aristotelian substances and accidents, he is well aware that Aristotelians have resources available to them for resisting this conclusion. Thus, in order to appreciate the complete case he develops for his view, as well as the specific nature of the entities he means to introduce, we need to turn to details of his discussion in d. 1, q. 1—the bulk of which consists in an in-depth consideration and critique of the two standard Aristotelian accounts of judgment. I begin with his criticism of Aristotelian antirealism.

II

As indicated earlier, Wodeham divides his opponents into two groups, realists and antirealists, depending on whether they think the objects of judgment are mental representations (*signi*) or things (*res*). We can think of these two positions as corresponding to two different sorts of response that Aristotelians might take to the semantic and syntactic considerations Wodeham adduces in favor of *complexe significabilia*. The antirealist, for example, is willing to grant that the syntactic and semantic complexity of judgment (and corresponding sentences) implies a corresponding complexity in its object, but rather than take this as grounds for postulating a heretofore unrecognized type of entity, he takes it as a reason to deny that judgments (taken as a whole) refer to anything in extramental reality. By contrast, realists will simply insist that the syntactic and semantic structure of a given judgment (or of any sentence used to express it) is perfectly consistent with its referring to a simple substance or accident.

Aristotelian antirealists, as Wodeham depicts them, are willing to concede that the object of the judgment SOCRATES IS PALE is not merely Socrates, or his pallor, or even the aggregate of the two; rather, its object is *Socrates's being pale*. Unlike Wodeham, however, the antirealists deny that *Socrates's being pale* is a new type of object, or something in addition to ordinary substances and accidents; on the

contrary, they think it is a mind-dependent object—a way of thinking about ordinary things such as Socrates or pallor. Thus, according to the antirealist, to believe or judge SOCRATES IS PALE is not to assent to Socrates (or to some property or feature of him), but rather to assent to a way of thinking about him.[32]

Although a number of Wodeham's predecessors and contemporaries defend some version of antirealism, Wodeham himself associates the view primarily with his Franciscan predecessors John Duns Scotus (d. 1308) and William Ockham (d. 1347). He not only mentions both explicitly, but also relies heavily on them for his development and discussion of Aristotelian antirealism.[33] According to Scotus and Ockham, as Wodeham interprets them, acts of judgment are not in the first place directed at ordinary extra-mental things, but are rather directed at mental sentences, which are themselves about such things. Thus, the judgment SOCRATES IS PALE, is a mental act or state that takes as its object another mental act or state, namely, the act of apprehending (that is, the mental sentence) SOCRATES IS PALE. According to the antirealist, therefore, judicative states such as belief and knowledge turn out to be what Wodeham refers to as "reflexive" states (or, what we might call "second-order" states), that is, they are mental states that relate to other mental states as object. Accordingly, when Wodeham summarizes Scotus and Ockham's view, he says: "[T]o assent that it is such-and-such in reality is, according to those [who hold this view], just to assent to a mental sentence that signifies as much."[34] Thus, on their view, as Wodeham interprets it, "every assent is a reflexive act."[35]

Wodeham raises two different kinds of objection to the antirealist position. The first focuses on the sheer implausibility of the antire-

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[32] Accordingly, the antirealist position is perfectly compatible with the standard Aristotelian substance-accident scheme. The antirealist will identify ways of thinking with entities falling in the category of Quality—namely, a mental quality (inhering in the mind or intellect).

[33] It is by no means clear, however, that Wodeham has got Scotus and Ockham right, that is, it is not clear that he is correct in characterizing of their views as "antirealist." I shall ignore this complication in what follows.

[34] *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:198).

[35] For, on his view, when the intellect forms a judgment, it does so by forming: (i) a simple act of apprehension directed at some extramental object, say *a*, and then forming, (ii) a propositional act of apprehension, that is, a way of thinking about that object, say *as F*, and then finally, (iii) "there is another act, a reflexive one" by which the intellect assents to the propositional act—that is to say, to the act of thinking 'A IS F'. See *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:198).

alist account of judgment, that is, on what appears patently or imme-
diately false in the view. The second sort of objection goes a bit
deeper. In particular, Wodeham thinks he can demonstrate that anti-
realism, at least the version developed by Scotus and Ockham, is in-
ternally inconsistent. Let us consider each of these objections in turn
beginning with the first, since his criticisms here are fairly intuitive
and can be summarized relatively quickly.

    1. First Objections to Aristotelian Antirealism. To begin, Wo-
deham notes, the antirealist account of judgment conflicts with our
own introspective or phenomenological experience of judging.   In
general, when we form a belief or judgment we don't take ourselves to
be judging about, or, in most cases, even to be aware of, our own men-
tal states.[36] As Wodeham explains,

> [E]xperience shows that one's assent usually refers to something's be-
> ing such-and-such in reality (*sic esse a parte rei*) . . . it is not as if assent
> bears on a mental sentence, rather it is obviously [assent] directly to
> something's being such-and-such in reality.[37]

There may, of course, be cases in which we attend to our own mental
states and form thoughts or judgments about them. Such cases, how-
ever, are the exception, rather than the rule, as the antirealist sup-
poses. What is more, we typically suppose that what we believe,
know, understand (and so on) obtains independently of the mind.
Thus, in general, when we form a judgment, we take it to be directed
at how things really stand in the external world, not about our ways of
thinking or representing it. Wodeham himself puts the point this way:

> The object of, for example, [the judgment or spoken sentence] 'God is
> God' is *God's being God.* Likewise, the significate of 'a human being is
> pale' (or 'paleness inheres in a human') is *a human's being pale* (or
> '*paleness inhering in the human*'). But these objects are not mental
> sentences, since if no such sentence existed in the natural realm, God
> would nonetheless be God, and the human being would [still] be pale
> (or paleness would [still] inhere in the human). . . . And from this I argue
> for my thesis: namely, that something's being such-and-such (*sic esse*)

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[36] Wodeham does go on, however, to note that Scotus attempts a re-
sponse to this sort of objection (see *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 [1:187]). As we shall
see, however, Wodeham's whole case against anti-realism does not rest on
these first, *prima facie*, objections.

[37] "Item, experientia dat quod frequenter assensus cadi supra 'sic esse a
parte rei,' puta assensio quod vos sedetis ibi, et quasi non fertur super com-
plexum sed potissime [et] directe ad 'sic esse in re.'" *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1
(1:186).

in reality or its not being such-and-such (*sic non esse*) does not depend on an act of the mind or on any representation (*signo*).[38]

This point about the mind independence of objects of judgment is, Wodeham thinks, especially significant when it comes to objects of Aristotelian demonstrative *scientia* (which, we may recall, is the attitude in terms of which Wodeham specifically frames his whole discussion). This is because the kind of knowledge yielded by Aristotelian demonstrative science is supposed to be explanatory, that is to say, it is supposed to provide insight into the very nature or essence of things, or in the Aristotelian terminology, into their ultimate "causes."[39] As Wodeham points out, however, if all judgments (including *scientia*) were second-order states directed at other mental states,

> knowing would not be cognizing the cause of a thing. . . . The inference here is clear: since a mental sentence is not the cause of a thing, merely cognizing a mental sentence would not be cognizing [of something] that it is the cause.[40]

Ironically, therefore, Aristotelian antirealism can be ruled out on the grounds that it is incompatible with the dictates of Aristotelian science.

Although the foregoing considerations might seem more than sufficient to dispense with antirealism, Wodeham is willing to grant, for

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[38] "Puta, obiectum huius 'Deus est Deus' est Deum esse Deum; et huius 'homo est albus' vel 'homini inest albedo' significatum est hominem esse album vel homini inesse albedinem. Nec hae sunt propositiones, quia si nulla propositio esset in rerum natura, nihilominus Deus esset Deus, et homo esset albus vel homini inesset albedo . . . Ex hoc arguitur ad propositum: sic esse a parte rei vel sic non esse non dependet ab actu animae vel ab aliquo signo." *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:193–4)

[39] Scientific knowledge, according to the *Posterior Analytics*, is a kind of inferential knowledge arrived at through a demonstrative syllogism. This "knowledge producing syllogism" is, on Aristotle's account, the vehicle for knowledge which is necessary, universal, and deeply explanatory. Although his conception of how knowledge is acquired is certainly not Platonic, Aristotle's characterization of knowledge reveals a Platonic influence, for it concedes—or is at least clearly intended to capture—Plato's notion that knowledge is stable, of essences and their definitions, and is of causes. See *Posterior Analytics* 1.2 (71b10–34).

[40] "Tum quia tunc scire non esset causam rei cognoscere . . . Consequentia patet, quia complexum non est causa rei nec cognoscere complexum praecise esset cognoscere quoniam illius est causa." *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:185–6).

the sake of argument, the antirealists' claim that all judgments are re-
flexive in order to show a further problem with their view. (This is a
characteristic strategy of Wodeham's, namely, to call attention to, and
then set aside, certain implausible features of a view in order to iden-
tify deeper, internal difficulties for it.) In the case of antirealists such
as Scotus and Ockham, Wodeham thinks that he can show that they
are committed by their own principles to the view that something
other than mind-dependent entities serves as the object of judgment.
Because Wodeham's argument here turns both on his analysis of the
details of Scotus and Ockham's account of judgment, and on his par-
ticular conception of what it is for something to be an object of
judgment, it requires a bit more development than this first set of ob-
jections. Nonetheless, because it is both interesting in its own right
and sheds considerable light on Wodeham's own views about the ob-
jects of judgment, I will examine this further objection in some detail.

   2. *Second Objection to Aristotelian Antirealism.* Wodeham's
second objection depends on certain details of the specific philosoph-
ical psychology presupposed by Scotus and Ockham's account of
judgment.[41] As we shall see, this account is similar to that presup-
posed by Wodeham himself, but, as Wodeham goes on to show, this
account is inconsistent with the antirealist's view about the nature of
the objects of judgment. In order to show this, he begins by summa-
rizing their account of the process by which the intellect forms a judg-
ment.

> On this [antirealist] view, the process is as follows. First, a thing is ap-
> prehended in a simple act of understanding *(simplici intelligentia)*.
> Second, a complex thought *(compositio)* is formed—one that is evident
> in the third way.[42] Third, that complex thought (or mental sentence) is
> apprehended by a simple [reflexive] apprehension. Finally, one assents
> to that mental sentence, and does so in such a way that although the as-
> sent itself is a certain sort of apprehension (not, of course, the [preced-
> ing] apprehension by which it is caused), it is not an apprehension that
> something is such-and-such (as the mental sentence signifies) . . . but is
> rather an apprehension only of the mental sentence. By means of this
> [assent] one apprehends the [mental sentence's] correspondence to that
> which is apprehended through it (namely, through that mental

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[41] See *L.sec.2*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:186–8).

[42] As noted above (see n. 24), Wodeham distinguishes three ways in
which a given act might be "evident." The details of this account, however,
need not concern us here.

sentence)—and [does so] through the simple awareness that mediates
between the conceived sentence and the assent.[43]

Although the details of Wodeham's description here require some un-
packing, the overall picture of the judgment-forming process is clear
enough. The process starts with "a simple act of understanding"—
such as the act of apprehending a house or whiteness—followed by
the formation of "a complex thought" (*compositio*) or "mental sen-
tence" (*complexum, propositionem*), for instance, THE HOUSE IS
WHITE (here I use an example to which Wodeham himself, as we shall
see, appeals a bit later on). These first two stages of the process ac-
count for the fact that every judgment presupposes, in the first place,
the possession of certain simple conceptions on the basis of which
the mind is able to formulate or entertain complex, propositional
thoughts.

   These first two stages are not, however, sufficient for the forma-
tion of an act of judgment. For, if all judgments are really reflexive as
Scotus and Ockham assume, there must be a further apprehensive
act—one by which, as Wodeham points out, "the complex thought or
mental sentence is apprehended." This third stage in the process is a
second-order, or reflexive apprehension: It is an apprehension of the
prior propositional act or, in the case of our example, an apprehen-
sion of the mental sentence THE HOUSE IS WHITE. Wodeham assumes
that there must, on the antirealist account, be such a second-order
act, for if judgment is about or directed at an act of thinking as its ob-
ject, there must first be some awareness or apprehension of the act
toward which the judgment is directed. In other words, there must be
an act of apprehending the mental sentence about which a judgment
is formed. For just as one has to have an act of apprehending So-

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   [43] "[S]ecundum istam viam quod iste est processus: primo apprehenditur
res simplici intelligentia; secundo formatur compositio evidens tertio modo;
tertio apprehenditur apprehensione simplici illa compositio seu complexum;
et ultimo assentitur complexo, ita quod licet assensus sit quaedam apprehen-
sio (non illa quidem qua mediante causatur), non tamen apprehensio quod ita
sit sicut per propositionem significatur . . . sed tantum ipsius complexi, quo
apprehenditur conformitas eius ad illud quod per eam (propositionem scil-
icet) apprehenditur, et per notitiam simplicem, mediantem inter proposi-
tionem quae concipitur et assensum." *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:188). Wode-
ham's description here looks like an attempt to explicate some of Scotus's
remarks on the formation of a judgment. Indeed, just before this passage,
Wodeham rehearses several claims Scotus makes in his commentary on Aris-
totle's *Metaphysics* about the nature of judgment (see ibid., 186-7). Wode-
ham is, however, also clearly assuming that the account here fits Ockham's
views as well.

crates in order to judge about him, so also one has to apprehend the mental sentence itself if one is to judge about it.

The fourth and final stage of belief or judgment formation is the judicative act itself, that is, the act by which one assents (or dissents) to the mental sentence thus apprehended. It is important to notice precisely what Wodeham says about the act of judging or assent itself. He says,

> [A]lthough the assent is a kind of apprehension . . . it is not an apprehension that something is such-and-such . . . rather it is an apprehension only of the mental sentence.

In saying this, Wodeham is highlighting the fact that, according to anti-realists such as Scotus and Ockham, the object of a given judgment or assent is not an extramental entity, rather it is something mental or mind dependent. It may be useful to summarize the four-stage process, as we've got it so far, in the following way (see Figure 1):

Figure 1: Judgment formation according to Scotus and Ockham:

(4) **2ⁿᵈ order Judgment** (an act of assenting to the 1ˢᵗ order complex act)

(3) **2ⁿᵈ order Simple Act** (a reflexive act of apprehending the 1ˢᵗ order complex act)

(2) **Complex Act** (an act of apprehending or forming a mental sentence—for example, THE HOUSE IS WHITE)

(1) **Simple Acts** (non-propositional acts of apprehending—for example, THIS HOUSE and WHITENESS

As Figure 1 makes clear, the first two stages of judgment formation involve first-order acts directed at items in extramental reality, whereas both the judgment itself and the apprehensive act that precedes it are reflexive or second-order states taking as their object a first-order "complex act," that is, the mental sentence depicted at stage 2.

This much of Wodeham's description is of the antirealist psychology is clear. What is puzzling, however, is that immediately after claiming that the judgment is, on the antirealist view, an apprehension "only" of the mental sentence, Wodeham immediately goes on to add that "by this assent one apprehends [the mental sentence's] correspondence to what is apprehended through it." What can this mean? How can the judgment simultaneously be an apprehension

only of a mental sentence and at the same time be an apprehension of that sentence's correspondence to reality?[44]

Wodeham's point can be made clear if we draw a distinction between the judgment's object or referent (namely, that entity which it picks out or represents) and its representational content (namely, the way in which it represents that entity). For if we read it with this distinction in mind, we can say that when Wodeham speaks of a judgment as being an apprehension only of a mental sentence, he is calling attention to the antirealist's account of the object of the judgment, namely, his account of that entity to which the judgment refers. On the other hand, when Wodeham speaks of a judgment's being an apprehension of that mental sentence's correspondence to reality, we can interpret him as calling our attention to the judgment's representational content. If something like this is right, it follows from the Scotist and Ockhamist account that the only way a judgment can have another mental act as an object (for example, the mental sentence THE HOUSE IS WHITE) is if the judgment's content represents that mental sentence in some way, for instance, as being true or as corresponding to reality. It is not hard, moreover, to see why Wodeham might think something like this is what the antirealist has in mind. After all, if one is going to assent to a mental sentence (that is, make a mental sentence the object of one's assent), one would do so only because one judges that the mental sentence in question is true or corresponds to reality. Morever, given that judgments are always judgments that such-and-such is the case, it must be the case that the judgment involves predicating something of the mental sentence in question. Finally, provided we have the distinction between a judgment's representational content and its object in mind, one and the same judgment can function as an apprehension only of a mental sentence and also an apprehension of the sentence's correspondence to reality. The content of the judgment is that the prior first-order mental sentence corresponds to reality, whereas the object of the judgment is the sentence itself.

Having set out the antirealist's account of judgment formation, Wodeham now attempts to show that it leads to trouble. In particular, it entails that the object of these second-order judicative states is not merely a first-order mental sentence, but rather a fact or state of af-

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[44] Wodeham's characterization of the assent here resembles Ockham's account of reflexive assent at *Quodlibet* 4.16. See William Ockham, *Quodlibetal Questions*, trans. Alfred Freddoso and Francis Kelly (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 311.

fairs that contains the mental sentence merely as one of its constitu-
ents. His argument proceeds in several steps. He begins by arguing
that, as it stands, the account of judgment formation is psychologi-
cally inadequate. As we have seen, on the antirealist's account, the act
of judging (see stage 4 in Figure 1) is immediately preceded by a "sim-
ple act of apprehending the mental sentence" (see stage 3) to which
assent is given. The idea is that, once one is aware of the mental sen-
tence, one is in a position to form a judgment with respect to it. It is
precisely this claim, however, that Wodeham finds objectionable. For
Wodeham insists,

> [A] simple awareness never suffices for causing assent unless a mental
> sentence is formed on the basis of it. . . . But [on the foregoing picture]
> matters are such that the simple understanding [that precedes the judg-
> ment] is an act of cognizing the mental sentence as object in just the
> way that a house or whiteness is an object [of a simple act of under-
> standing].[45]

On Wodeham's view (and he takes for granted that the antirealist will
concede the point), the mere awareness or apprehension of the men-
tal sentence is not by itself sufficient to generate an act of assent with
respect to it. To see why, we need only recall our earlier discussion of
the logical ordering among mental acts (namely, in section II.1). As
we noted there, every act of judgment or assent presupposes a corre-
sponding complex or propositional apprehension (as illustrated in
Figure 2 below), the object of which will be the same as the object of
the judgment.

Figure 2: Logical ordering of mental acts:

(3) **Judgment**
(2) **Complex Act** (a mental sentence)
(1) **Simple Acts**

Notice that, as it stands, the account offered by Scotus and Ock-
ham has judgment following a simple apprehension, not a complex

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[45] "[N]unquam simplex notitia sufficit ad causandum assensum nisi ex
ea formetur complexum. . . . Modo ita est quod illa simplex intelligentia est
actus cognoscendi propositionem ut obiectum, sicut et domum vel albe-
dinem ut obiectum." *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:189).

one (see again Figure 2). In order to see why this is problematic, we need only consider a parallel example involving a first-order judgment, for instance, in the judgment THE HOUSE IS WHITE. We cannot, as Wodeham points out, form such a judgment merely on the basis of a simple apprehension of a house or of whiteness (or even both). On the contrary, we must first form a predication on the basis of these simple apprehensions. That is, we must first form the propositional thought: THE HOUSE IS WHITE. Now the same thing holds whether we conceive of judgments as first- or second-order mental acts. As it stands, therefore, Wodeham thinks it is clear that Scotus and Ockham's account is incomplete.[46] For, as he puts it, the account as it stands has judgment being preceded by "a simple understanding, that is, an act of cognizing a mental sentence as object in just the way that a house or whiteness is an object [of a first-order simple understanding]."

Thus, Wodeham thinks that, in order to make the account psychologically acceptable, it must be revised. This brings us to what we might think of as the second step in Wodeham's argument. In the second step of the argument, Wodeham introduces the modification that he thinks Scotus and Ockham's account requires. In particular, he argues that their account requires the introduction of another mental act into the process leading up to judgment, namely, a second-order, "complex" or propositional act. For, as Wodeham argues, just as we cannot form a judgment or assent about the house without first forming a mental sentence or predication involving it (THE HOUSE IS WHITE), so also we cannot form a judgment or assent about a mental sentence without forming a further sentence or predication involving it (THIS THOUGHT IS TRUE, or THIS THOUGHT CORRESPONDS TO REALITY). So, according to Wodeham, in addition to the second-order simple apprehension of the mental sentence assented to, there must also be a

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[46] Wodeham assumes that his antirealist opponents will concede the point since, as noted earlier (see n. 20 above), his own views about the logical ordering of mental acts are informed by Ockham's own discussion of the issue. Thus, Wodeham takes himself simply to be drawing out the implications of Ockham's (and, he assumes, Scotus's) own account of the psychology of judgment. In particular, he seems to think they have simply overlooked the point that a reflexive judgment requires not only the formation of a first order mental sentence, but also a reflexive mental sentence (namely, one which predicates truth of the first-order mental sentence).

second-order, complex or propositional apprehension, which will be an act of predicating something of that mental sentence. Accordingly, we may think of Wodeham as emending Scotus and Ockham's account by introducing an additional act, namely, the sort of act described in Figure 3 below:

Figure 3: Wodeham's emendation to Scotus and Ockham's account:

Introduce an additional act (depicted at step 3.5) into the account.

(4) **2nd order Judgment** (assenting to the predication at 3.5: ⌐SOCRATES IS WISE' CORRESPONDS TO REALITY)

(3.5) 2nd order Complex Act (a predication involving the mental sentence at 2: 'SOCRATES IS WISE' CORRESPONDS TO REALITY)

(3) **2nd order Simple Apprehension** (that is, an awareness of the mental sentence at 2: 'SOCRATES IS WISE')

(2) **1st order Complex Act** (a predication involving concepts had at 1: SOCRATES IS WISE)

(1) **1st order Simple Apprehension** (acts of thinking: SOCRATES and WISE)

    This brings us to the third and final step in Wodeham's argument. Once this further act is incorporated into the antirealist account, Wodeham thinks it is easy to see why the object of a judgment cannot merely be a first-order mental sentence (and, hence, something entirely mind dependent as the antirealist assumes). To see this, simply recall Wodeham's Rule. According to Wodeham's Rule, whatever the object of the assent is, it must be the same as the object of the apprehension that immediately precedes and causes it. Thus in order to identify the object of a judgment, one need only consider the object of the act that precedes it. On the emended account, however, the act that precedes the judgment is not a simple act or awareness directed at a mental sentence. Rather, the act that precedes judgment, on the emended account, is an act of apprehending or thinking that the prior mental sentence (namely, that formed at stage 2) is true, and hence, that it corresponds to reality. But clearly, the object of this apprehension (assuming it is true) is not going to be merely the prior mental sentence by itself, but rather an extramental situation—albeit, one that involves the mental proposition as a constituent, namely, the fact

of that sentence's corresponding to reality.[47] And, given Wodeham's Rule, the object of the judgment is, therefore, not the mental sentence itself but its correspondence to reality—its being true. We can, once again, represent Wodeham's point in diagram form:

Figure 4: Results of Wodeham's emendation plus application of Wodeham's Rule:

(4)   **2nd order Judgment** (assenting to the predication at 3.5: ⌐ 'THE HOUSE IS WHITE' CORRESPONDS TO REALITY)

(3.5) **2nd order Complex Act** (a predication involving the mental sentence at 2: 'THE HOUSE IS WHITE' CORRESPONDS TO REALITY.)

(3)   **2nd order Simple Apprehension** (awareness of the mental sentence at 2: 'THE HOUSE IS WHITE')

(2)   **1st order Complex Act** (a predication involving concepts had at 1: 'THE HOUSE IS WHITE')

(1)   **1st order Simple Apprehensions** (acts of thinking: HOUSE and WHITENESS)

Wodeham himself expresses all this by pointing out that, if the account of judgment is emended, the judgment will arise

> in such a way that if, a [second-order] mental sentence is formed (on the basis of that prior [apprehension of the sentence])—say, for example, this: 'the mental sentence corresponds to reality'—then, in that case, given that the assent in question has for its object the total object of that propositional apprehension by means of which it is caused (after all, why would it have more one part than another?), one would immediately apprehend through that assent that something is such-and-such in reality [namely, that the sentence corresponds to reality].[48]

Thus, by applying Wodeham's Rule, in the third step of his argument Wodeham is able to demonstrate that, even if we were to concede the antirealist's assumption that judgment is a kind of second-order mental state, an act of judgment still cannot plausibly be said to have as its total object a first-order mental state, that is, a mental sentence.

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[47] Indeed, the prior mental sentence itself could no more be the total object of the judgment than a house or whiteness could be the total object of the act of judging THE HOUSE IS WHITE. Of course, if the judgment is false there is no fact to which it corresponds, and hence no (total) object for the judgment in question.

[48] "[I]ta quod si ex illa prius formetur complexum, puta istud 'ista propositio est conformis rei,' et assensus habet pro obiecto obiectum totale complexae apprehensionis mediante qua causatur—quia quare magis unam partem quam aliam?—igitur immediate per assensum apprehenditur sic esse a parte rei." *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:189).

What all of this shows, of course, is that the antirealist has failed to provide a genuinely mind-dependent entity to serve as the object of judgment; or at least to do so without presupposing an inadequate account of the psychology of judgment formation. For even supposing that all acts of belief and judgment are second-order mental acts, it still turns out that the objects for such acts cannot be merely other first-order acts, but are rather states of affairs or facts involving such first-order acts (for example, the fact of their corresponding to reality). And though such states of affair include mental sentences as constituents, they are not themselves entirely mind-dependent entities.[49] Thus, as it turns out, a mental sentence can, at most, only be a partial object of a judgment, that is, it can at most be a constituent of the (mind-independent) fact that is the judgment's total object. As Wodeham insists,

> [N]o mental sentence is the total object of any possible assent whatsoever. For every possible assent whatsoever corresponds in object to the mental sentence by which it is caused, so that the total of object of the mental sentence is the total object of the assent. But no mental sentence is the total object of any mental sentence. Therefore, neither is it the total object of any assent.[50]

3. Implications of Wodeham's critique of Antirealism. Before turning to Wodeham's discussion of Aristotelian realism, it is worth pausing briefly to consider what Wodeham's rejection of Aristotelian antirealism reveals about his own views. First of all, note that it is clear from his discussion that he is committed to some form of realism about objects of judgment. Indeed, as his remarks about

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[49] Whether or not a given mental proposition corresponds to reality does not itself depend on any activity of the mind—or at least, none beyond the activity required to preserve the existence of the mental proposition itself.

[50] "Quinta conclusio est quod nulla propositio est obiectum totale cuiuscumque assensus possibilis, quia quilibet assensus possibilis est conformis in obiecto alicui complexo quo mediante causatur, ita quod obiectum totale istius complexi est obiectum assensus. Sed nulla propositio est obiectum totale cuiuscumque propositionis, igitur nec cuiuscumque assensus." *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:192). Wodeham does allow, however, that "a mental sentence is certainly a partial object of some reflexive assent (but of an assent which it does not necessitate). It is, for example, [the object] of an assent by which one assents that the mental sentence is true, or that it corresponds to the signified thing's being such and such, and other assents of this sort. For whatever is apprehended by the mental sentence that necessitates one to some assent is the partial object of that assent, as is clear from what's been said. And, since the first mental sentence is apprehended through the mental sentence that necessitates the assent by which one assents that that mental sentence is true, therefore [that first mental sentence is a partial object of the reflexive assent]." *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:192).

introspection make clear, Wodeham thinks that most judgments are nonreflexive mental states and thus do not have mental entities even as partial objects.

Second, Wodeham's criticisms of antirealism reveal that he takes the extramental entities that serve as judicative objects to stand in a broadly referential relation to the judgments corresponding to them. This feature of his account emerges most clearly from his second objection to antirealism, and particularly from the distinction he draws in the course of that discussion between the representational content of a given judgment, on the one hand, and its object, on the other. If Wodeham does not conceive of the object of a judgment as its representational content, it is natural to suppose that the relation between a judgment and its object is one more akin to reference. Thus, it would seem that, for Wodeham, the object of judgment is just that entity to which the judgment refers, at least, when the judgment in question is true. The added qualification here is crucial, for as Wodeham's discussion of the second objection also makes clear, he is operating with something like a correspondence theory of truth: thus he identifies objects of judgment with the extramental *relata* of the relevant correspondence relations. On his view, therefore, the object of a judgment is an entity to which a true judgment corresponds; it is, in other words, the extramental grounds or truthmaker for the judgment.[51]

Of course, this raises a question about the object of false judgments. As I read Wodeham, false judgments do not, taken as a whole, have objects; that is to say, taken as a whole, they do not refer to or designate anything. This is, presumably, just what it is for them to be false, namely, to lack a truthmaker. Indeed, this view seems to be entailed by his view that the objects of judgment are truthmakers (that is, the entities that ground or explain their truth). There may, of course, be partial objects for false judgments. After all, there may be entities corresponding to their subject and/or predicate terms, but there is nothing corresponding to the judgment taken as a whole.

In this respect, my interpretation differs from that suggested by other commentators who, while sharing the view that *complexe significabilia* are fact-like, also maintain that there are *complexe significabilia* corresponding to false judgments.[52] For, according to these commentators, Wodeham admits the existence of nonobtaining states of affairs. As I see it, however, there is insufficient evidence for

such an interpretation. Admittedly, Wodeham does allow that there are *complexe significabilia* corresponding to true negative judgments (for example, GABRIEL DOES NOT EXIST, MAN IS NOT AN ASS).[53] But this is not tantamount to admitting nonobtaining states of affair; it is only the admission of obtaining negative states of affairs, that is, negative facts. It may be, however, that commentators have been led to the conclusion that Wodeham is committed to nonobtaining states of affair as a result of the kinds of linguistic considerations he advances for the introduction of *complexe significabilia*—considerations which may seem to count in favor of the introduction of a *complexe significabile*, whether the judgment in question is true or false. It is important to see, however, that nothing in Wodeham's arguments from the syntactic structure of judgment (in particular, his comments about the semantic contribution of the copula) entail the introduction of *complexe significabilia* corresponding to false judgments. After all, what Wodeham says is that the copula signifies or refers to "the inherence or composition or the unity or identity [that exists] in reality between the terms of the sentence (or, rather, the things signified by

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[51] Thus, objects of judgment as Wodeham conceives of them are not truth-bearers, but truthmakers. Indeed, at one point in his discussion Wodeham explicitly states that the entities that serve as objects are not truth-bearers. He makes this point toward the very end of his discussion when he returns to an objection the Aristotelian antirealist brings against the view that objects of judgment are extramental. The antirealist objection runs as follows:
1. "What's believed or known by means of an Aristotelian demonstration is true."
2. "The true and false are not found in things (*res*), but in the mind." See *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:181).
3. Therefore, "the object of an act of knowledge is not found in external things, but in the mind."
Wodeham responds to this argument by denying the first premise. Thus, he argues that what is believed or known, namely, something's being such and such, is not true. As he explains: "*Something's being such-and-such* (as the conclusion [of a demonstration] signifies) is true [only] by extrinsic denomination—by means of [its connection to] an act of the soul [namely, to the mental sentence, which is the conclusion of the demonstration and which signifies it]. But the conclusion itself is what is true formally, and the conclusion is not [identical with] *something's being such-and-such* in reality (as that conclusion signifies)." *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:208).

[52] See Gaskin, "*Complexe Significabilia* and Aristotle's Categories," and Perler, "Late Medieval Ontologies of Facts," who, while occasionally characterizing *complexe significabilia* as "facts" or "truthmakers," nevertheless, seem to think that there are *complexe significabilia* corresponding to false judgments.

[53] See *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:194).

those terms)."[54] It is natural to suppose, therefore, that in cases in which no such inherence, composition, unity or identity obtains in reality the copula simply does not refer.[55] As I see it, therefore, if Wodeham's argument does not entail the existence of nonobtaining states of affairs, and if there is likewise no positive indication that he intends to admit the existence of such entities, there is no reason to attribute to him a commitment to such entities.

That Wodeham takes the objects of judgment to be truthmakers is significant for two reasons. First, this conception of objects of judgment lies at the heart of his disagreement with the Aristotelian antirealists (and, as we shall see, with the standard Aristotelian realists as well). Indeed, as is by now clear, it is Wodeham's conception of judicative objects as referents and truthmakers that makes antirealism seem so utterly implausible to him. After all, most judgments are not directed toward our own internal mental states, but refer rather to how things stand in extramental reality. What is more, mental entities, that is, entities such as mental sentences, cannot function as truthmakers for judgments about extramental reality. Nor indeed can they function, at least by themselves, as truthmakers for second-order, or reflexive judgments about our own mental acts or states. For, as we've seen, the object and truthmaker in such cases is not the mental sentence itself, but some concrete state of affairs involving it. In the end, therefore, mental sentences are by their very nature incapable of functioning in the role Wodeham assigns to entities that serve as objects of judgment. As we shall see, moreover, the same issue is at stake in Wodeham's disagreement with the standard Aristotelian realist, namely, whether individual things (*res*), substances and accidents, can function as truthmakers and, hence, as objects of judgment.

The second thing that is significant about Wodeham's commitment to treating objects of judgment as referents and truthmakers (rather than as representational contents or truth-bearers) is that it makes clear that in introducing *complexe significabilia* to serve as objects of judgment he is not introducing any sort of abstract or inten-

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[54] *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:185).

[55] Of course, given that Wodeham recognizes a distinction between a judgment's representational content and its referent or object, he can allow that, in the case of false judgments, the copula makes a contribution to the representational content, that is, the cognitive significance, of the judgment in question.

tional entity. After all, such entities would be ill suited to play the theoretical role Wodeham associates with "objects" in his broader theory of judgment. According to Wodeham, the entities which serve as objects of judgment function as the referent and ontological ground for judgments (indeed, even for Aristotelian *scientia*) about the extramental world.

III

Given what we have now seen both of Wodeham's account of the linguistic structure of judgment and of his critique of anti-realism, it should be clear that he takes the objects of judgment to be not only something extramental, but also something fact-like. As he repeatedly insists, what a judgment relates to (or, as he puts it, "signifies") is *something's being such-and-such* in reality (*sic esse in re*). As Wodeham realizes, however, it is this latter claim that proponents of standard Aristotelian realism will deny. Indeed, as Wodeham himself goes on to point out, the standard Aristotelian realist is likely to respond to any such a claim by simply insisting that

> Whatever you [Wodeham] will have posited as the total object [of a judgment], that thing is either something or nothing. If it is nothing, it follows that nothing is the object of an act of assent. And that is certainly false. But if it is something, it is either God or a creature. And regardless of whether it is the one or the other, it is a substance or an accident. And all such things can be signified by the subject of a sentence.[56]

As the realist sees it, there just isn't anything other than substances or accidents to serve as objects of judgment. So whatever Wodeham introduces to serve as object of judgment, if it is anything at all, it must be a substance or accident (and thus is such that it can be signified by a simple subject expression, as well as a complex sentential one). After all, as the realist insists, everything that exists is "either God or a creature, and regardless of whether it is one or the other, it is a substance or an accident."

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[56] "Quidquid tu posueris eius obiectum totale, illud aut est aliquid aut nihil. Si nihil, igitur nihil est obiectum actus assentiendi. Certum est quod falsum est. Si aliquid: vel Deus vel creatura. Et sive sic sive sic. Igitur est substantia vel accidens. Et omne tale potest significari per subiectum alicuius proposititionis." *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:193).

Taken by itself, however, the realist's response seems to beg the question. It is one thing to say that reality is exhausted by substances and accidents, and hence that if the objects of judgment are something, they must be substances or accidents; it is quite another to show that substances and accidents can actually serve as objects of judgment. As it turns out, the realist thinks he can do this as well. Indeed, the realist goes on to offer a twofold argument aimed at establishing just this conclusion.

The argument begins with an attempt to discharge the linguistic evidence Wodeham offers in support of the existence of *complexe significabilia*. The realist argues that, despite differences in syntactic and semantic structure, complex expressions (such as the sentences used to express judgments) and simple expressions (such as the subject and predicate terms of such sentences) can both refer to the same type of entity, namely, individual substances and accidents. Accordingly, there is no need to postulate a sui-generis entity to function as the unique or distinctive referent for judgments, or sentences. As the realist (or, rather, Wodeham, arguing on behalf of the realist) explains:

> As you, [Wodeham] say, whatever can be the total object of a mental sentence can be the object of assent or dissent. But a simple thing is such [that it can be the total object of a mental sentence]. Therefore, [it can be the total object of an act of assent or dissent as well]. Proof of the minor [that is, the claim that a simple thing can be the object of a mental sentence]: it seems that anything—however simple—can be signified both by a complex expression (*complexe*) and by a simple expression (*incomplexe*). Therefore, it need not be the case that there is a difference in what is signified [by each], rather there need be a difference only in the mode of signifying.[57]

In this way, the realist counters Wodeham's contention that the best explanation for the difference between simple subject/predicate expressions and the complex expressions formed by joining them with a copula is a difference in the ontological type of object referred to by each. For, according to the realist, there is another equally plausible

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[57] "Quidquid potest esse obiectum totale propositionis, potest esse obiectum assensus vel dissensus, per te. Sed simplex res est huiusmodi, igitur. Probatio minoris: quia quaelibet res, quantumcumque simplex, videtur posse significari complexe et incomplexe. Igitur non oportet quod sit ibi differentia in significato sed in modo significandi tantum." *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:193). A more literal translation would render '*complexe*' and '*incomplexe*' adverbially rather than adjectivally (as my translation does). The point of the argument emerges more clearly, I think, from this less literal translation.

explanation: the difference in the syntactic structure of such expressions could be merely a function of a difference in the way the two types of expression represent or "signify" one and the same type of object. Thus, the complex syntactic and semantic structure of the sentences used to express judgments need not entail a corresponding complexity in the object of such judgments. Quite the contrary: according to the realist, the entity that serves as the total object of a judgment is such that it "can be also signified just by the subject term of a sentence" expressing that judgment.[58]

The realist then goes on to argue that not only is there no need to postulate complex, fact-like entities to serve as the unique referent for judgments, there is also no need to appeal to such entities to explain the truth of such judgments. As a way of defending this claim, Wodeham imagines the realist offering the following sort of argument:

> Leaving aside every imaginable thing and positing only God, GOD IS GOD [is true]. Therefore, *God's being God* is nothing other than God. Accordingly, there are those (namely, Chatton and Reading in his Quodlibet V—in the course of undertaking and proving his third conclusion) who suppose that God [alone] is the significate of the mental sentence (though not the uttered one).[59]

Although highly condensed, the argument here is fairly straightforward. The realist (here Wodeham names his contemporaries Walter

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[58] This is the position held, for example, by Walter Chatton, whose views are well known to Wodeham. See Walter Chatton, *Reportatio et Lectura Super Sententias: Collatio ad Librum Primum et Prologus* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies: 1989), where he argues that "the external thing [which serves as object of judgment] is cognized through the subject and the predicate and through the copula since those terms of [the mental sentence] are cognitions of an external thing. Therefore, throughout the whole time in which the mental sentence signifying the external thing is formed in the mind, the external thing is cognized—sometimes by the subject of the sentence, sometimes by the copula, sometimes by the predicate" (Prologue, q. 1, a. 1, p. 24). In general, however, we may think of the realist as merely claiming that the object of judgment can be the referent of the subject term of a sentence that expresses the judgment in question. It need not be the case, however, that the object of the judgment is the referent of the subject term of every sentence expressing that judgment. After all, there may be a number of sentences that express the content of a given judgment—sentences which have different subject terms.

[59] "Circumscripta omni re imaginabili, posito solo Deo, Deus est Deus, igitur Deum esse Deum non est nisi Deus. Et ideo concedant isti quod Deus est significatum illius propositionis mentalis licet non vocalis, scilicet Chatton et Reading, Quolibet suo, quaestione 5, tractando et probando conclusionem suam tertiam." *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:196).

Chatton [d. 1344] and John of Reading [d. 1346]) asks us to consider a
world that contains God and only God.[60] Now, in such a world, the
judgment or mental sentence GOD IS GOD will be true.[61] If the judg-
ment is true, however, there must be something corresponding to the
judgment, that is, something to which the judgment refers and in vir-
tue of which it is true. Perhaps as a kind of concession to Wodeham,
the realist is willing to call whatever it is that serves as the object and
truthmaker of this judgment *"God's being God."* But since, *ex hypoth-
esi*, only God exists in the world in question, it must be God alone that
serves as the worldly referent and truthmaker for this judgment or
mental sentence. Hence, the realist concludes: *"God's being God"*—
that is, the entity that serves as truthmaker and, therefore, object for
the judgment GOD IS GOD "is nothing other than God."

The realist's example is, of course, well chosen. For in this par-
ticular case, that is, in the case of a judgment about God (a perfectly
simple being) and about self-identity, it is in fact quite plausible to
suppose that the judgment's truthmaker is an individual substance.
But can this conclusion be generalized? If the Aristotelian realist is to
succeed, he will need to show that, in general, it is plausible to sup-
pose that individual substances (and/or accidents) are, by themselves,
sufficient to explain the truth of judgments and sentences pertaining
to them.

The foregoing passage does, in fact, provide a basis for a more
general claim. Indeed, the argument contained in it rests on the per-
fectly general principle about the nature of truthmaking—one that ap-
plies equally to any judgment or sentence. The principle (call it TM
for "truthmaker") is just this:

> (TM) If the existence of an entity E necessitates the truth of a given
> judgment J, then E is the truthmaker for J.[62]

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[60] Medieval thinkers typically suppose that God might not have created
and so are willing to allow for a possible world containing only God.

[61] One might wonder how, if only God exists at such a world, there
comes to be such a judgment or sentence. Though answering such a ques-
tion is not central to Wodeham's point, there are, nevertheless, two ways we
can think of the scenario: we could assume that the judgment is God's or pro-
duced by God; or we could simply appeal to the distinction between truth *in*
a world W (which requires the existence of the judgment or sentence in ques-
tion in W) and truth *at* a world (which does not). In this latter case, we are
simply evaluating the truth of a given sentence (say, one existing in the ac-
tual world) with respect to a world in which only God exists.

According to TM, truthmaking is simply a matter of necessitation. Thus, what the realist seems to be supposing is that, in general, the truthmaker for any sentence or any judgment is that entity whose existence is sufficient for its truth. And this principle is not without plausibility, at least in the case of certain judgments. As we have seen, it is perfectly plausible to suppose that God himself is the truthmaker for the judgment GOD IS GOD. Presumably something similar could be said about identity judgments in general. What is more, among contemporary philosophers, TM (or some version of it) is often regarded as a plausible analysis of truthmaking, at least for contingent truths.[63] Hence, given TM, the Aristotelian realist has both a *prima facie* plausible, as well as a perfectly general, defense of the view that individual things (that is, individual substances and accidents) function by themselves as the truthmakers for, and hence total objects of, judicative attitudes.[64]

Now if the Aristotelian realist is right about all this, that is, if individual substances and accidents are indeed adequate to function as both the total referent and truthmaker for judgment, then they would seem to be in a good position to resist the introduction of *complexe significabilia* (for reasons of theoretical parsimony, if not others). Even so, the realists do not succeed, for, as Wodeham's response will show, their argument comes up short on both counts. It fails to establish that individual things (*res*) are sufficient to function as the truthmaker for judicative attitudes and that such things can serve as their total referent. Let us begin, however, by focusing on his criticism of the Aristotelian realist's account of truthmaking.

1. Against Things as Truthmakers for Judgment. Wodeham's strategy for responding to the Aristotelian realist's account of things

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[62] Given that there may be some cases in which more than one entity is required for the truth of a given predication, we can allow that a truthmaker may be an entity *or entities*. It should be noted, moreover, that despite any connotation suggested by the name 'truthmaker,' the necessitation in question is not causal but is rather broadly logical. Indeed, contemporary philosophers habitually speak of truthmakers as entailing the truth of certain statements or predications. See, for example, David Armstrong, *Truth and Truthmakers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 5-7; John Bigelow, *The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist's Philosophy of Mathematics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 125.

[63] For example, David Armstrong, *A World of States of Affairs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) and *Truth and Truthmakers*; see also the discussion in Bigelow, *The Reality of Numbers*.

[64] Although all the examples the realist considers are cases in which substance serves as object and truthmaker, it is consistent with his ontology to allow for cases in which an accident serves as truthmaker.

as truthmakers has two parts. He begins by arguing that the notion of truthmaking on which the account rests, namely, TM, is implausible. He then proceeds to show that, even setting aside considerations of its independent plausibility, granting TM creates internal difficulties for the realist's overall account of objects of judgment. The bulk of his argument for both claims is contained in the following passage, which is worth quoting at length.

> Leaving aside [consideration of] any specific time and positing [the existence of] an angel, [it will be true that] the angel is created or conserved. But the *angel's being created* (or *being conserved*) is not [identical to] the angel. And, neither is an *angel's existing* [identical to] an angel since, if it were, an angel's not existing would include an outright contradiction. And yet, provided we posit only an angel, [it will be true that] an angel exists.

> I say, therefore, that it is one thing to ask "what is that thing which when posited, [makes it true that] God is God or [that] an angel exists?" and yet another thing to ask "what is *God's being God* and an *angel existing*?" With respect to the first question, one must respond "God," or "an angel." But to the second we should not reply in this way. Rather we should reply with another expression (*dictum*)—one composed on the basis of a description of the prior [expression]. Thus, although God is such that when he alone is posited by that very fact [it is true that] God is God, and although an angel is such that when it alone is posited [it is true that] an angel exists, nevertheless, God is not [identical to] *God's being God*, and an angel is not [identical to] an *angel's existing*. Indeed, God is no more [identical to] *God's being God* than an angel is [identical to] an *angel's existing* or to *an angel's existing and God's existing* . . . Or again, just as God is such that when he alone is posited [it is true that] God is God, so also God is that which when he alone is posited, an angel does not exist. Therefore, [according to the realist's theory,] God would be an *angel's not existing*.[65]

There is a great deal going on in this passage, but let us begin with its first couple of sentences. Here Wodeham appears to be tak-

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[65] " . . . circumscripto omni tempore et posito angelo, angelus creatur vel conservatur, et tamen angelus non est angelum creari aut conservari nec angelus est angelum esse, quia tunc angelum non esse includeret repugnantiam aperte, et tamen solo angelo posito angelus est. Dico igitur quod aliud [est] quaerere quid est illud quo posito Deus est Deus vel angelus est [angelus], et quaerere quid est Deum esse Deum aut angelum esse [angelum], quia ad primam respondendum est quod 'Deus' vel 'angelus'; ad secundam non sic, sed respondendum est per unum aliud dictum, compositum ex descriptione prioris. Et praeterea, licet Deus sit illud quo posito eo ipso Deus est Deus, et angelus quo posito angelus est [angelus], tamen Deus non est Deum esse Deum' quam angelus 'angelum esse [angelum] vel quam angelum esse et Deum esse . . . Item, sicut Deus est quo solo posito Deus est Deus, ita Deus est quo solo posito angelus non est; igitur Deus esset angelum non esse." *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:196–7).

ing issue with the realist's analysis of truthmaking in terms of suffi-
ciency. His challenge takes the form of a counterexample to TM:

> Leaving aside [consideration of] any specific time and positing an angel,
> [it will be true that] the angel is created or conserved. But the *angel's
> being created* (or *being conserved*) is not [identical to] the angel.

Wodeham's argument is obviously intended to mirror the realist's
own, though his example involves not God, but an angel (call him
Gabriel). In effect, Wodeham asks us to consider all the possible
worlds in which Gabriel exists. With respect to all such worlds it will
be true that Gabriel is created (or conserved), since he is essentially a
creature.[66] Hence, the mere postulation of Gabriel himself is by itself
sufficient for the truth of the judgment GABRIEL IS CREATED (or GAB-
RIEL IS CONSERVED). But then, given the realist's account of truthmak-
ing, it follows that Gabriel is the truthmaker for this judgment and,
therefore, that *Gabriel's being created* (which, as we've seen, is just a
neutral way of referring to whatever it is that serves as truthmaker for
the judgment) is nothing other than Gabriel himself. But this seems
obviously false. It is not at all plausible to suppose that Gabriel alone
is the truthmaker for "Gabriel is created" (or for "Gabriel is con-
served"). After all, *Gabriel's being created* is a relational fact involv-
ing at least two individuals—as is clear from the fact that "Gabriel is
created" is elliptical for "Gabriel is created by God." Thus, even if it is
true that Gabriel's existence is by itself sufficient for the truth of "Gab-
riel is created by God," Gabriel is not what makes the sentence true;
he is not what explains its truth.[67] Indeed, what seems much more rel-
evant to the explanation of its truth is God's existence, and God's ac-
tivity of creating (or conserving).

Now, even if Wodeham's first objection to the Aristotelian real-
ist's account of truthmakers was decisive, his argument does not end

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[66] This is because Wodeham assumes that Gabriel is by nature a crea-
ture. Whether he is created or conserved will depend on which moment of
his existence we are focusing on: at the first moment of his existence he is
created, whereas at all subsequent moments he is conserved. Evidently, Wo-
deham himself is not concerned with which moment we focus on as his re-
mark about "leaving out [of consideration] any specific time" makes clear.

[67] It is significant that Wodeham's example not only provides a counter-
example to TM, but also provides one that shows its falsity even in the case
of contingent truths. As I noted above (see note 63), contemporary philoso-
phers often find TM plausible, at least when restricted to contingent truths.
But Wodeham's example suggests that even this sort of restriction is prob-
lematic.

here. On the contrary, he proceeds to show that, if we grant the truth of TM, Aristotelian realism faces internal difficulties, even apparent contradiction. Wodeham offers a number of examples to illustrate this point, but since the first follows immediately upon the objection we have just been considering (regarding the angel's being created or conserved), we might as well start with it. Here again is what Wodeham says:

> Nor is an angel [identical to] an *angel's existing*, since then [the judgment that] an angel doesn't exist would involve an outright contradiction. And yet, provided we posit only an angel, [it will be true that] an angel exists.

The argument is highly compressed, but we can begin to make sense of it by observing that Wodeham is presupposing a case in which someone judges that an angel (Michael, for instance) exists. Now, for the sake of argument, let us grant that the realist's acceptance of TM is unobjectionable. In that case, it will follow that, since Michael's existence alone is sufficient for the truth of this judgment, Michael is the judgment's truthmaker and, hence, also its total object. But now comes the trouble. For, if the total object of the judgment MICHAEL EXISTS is just Michael, it follows that the expressions 'Michael' and 'Michael exists' refer to one and the same thing, namely, Michael (since, after all, the total object of a judgment is likewise its total referent or "significate"). Now, while the Aristotelian realist will be happy to accept this result, since, as we've seen, he explicitly allows that the total significate of a sentence is such that it "can also be signified by its subject term," Wodeham argues that it runs him into "an outright contradiction" in the case of the assertion or judgment MICHAEL DOES NOT EXIST. For the subject term of this negative existential would have to refer to an existing Michael!

A bit further on in the passage Wodeham goes on to provide additional examples intended to make the same point, that is, to show that a judgment's total object and significate cannot simply be identified with that entity whose existence necessitates its truth. This is, for example, the upshot of Wodeham's remarks toward the end of the passage where he says:

> God is no more [identical to] *God's being God* than an angel is [identical to] an *angel's existing* or to *an angel's existing and God's existing*. . . . Likewise, just as God is such that when he alone posited [it is true that] God is God, so also God is such that when he alone is posited, the angel does not exist. [Thus, on the realist's theory,] God would, therefore, be the *angel's not existing*.

The point Wodeham seems to be driving at is this: if the object and total significate for a given judgment is, as the realist supposes, just that entity whose existence is by itself sufficient for its truth, then certain absurd results follow. The realist will be committed to saying, for example, that the judgment GOD EXISTS has the angel Michael as its object, or, similarly, that MICHAEL DOES NOT EXIST has God as its object. To see why the realist is committed to this, we need only note that just as the existence of Michael is sufficient for the truth of 'Michael exists,' it is also sufficient for the truth of 'God exists' (after all, Michael's existence entails, as we have seen, that Michael was created by God which, in turn entails that God exists).[68] Given this, however, the realist is committed to the view that Michael is not only the object and truthmaker for the judgment MICHAEL EXISTS, but also for the judgment GOD EXISTS.[69] Likewise, Wodeham goes on to argue, in any world in which God and only God exists, it will be true in that world that Michael does not exist.[70] Hence, according to the realist, God would, therefore, be the *angel's not existing*: that is, God would be the truthmaker and object of the judgment Michael does not exist. But these results look absurd: Michael is obviously not the object of the belief or judgment that God exists, nor does God seem to be the object of the belief that Michael does not exist.

This shows that even if we grant that an individual substance (or perhaps even a given accident) is sufficient for the truth of some

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[68] Obviously, there are substantial theological assumptions lurking in the background of Wodeham's argument here, but it is worth noting that (a) these are not assumptions at which his opponent would baulk and (b) the point he is making is perfectly general (and can be made without appeal to any theological assumptions). Indeed, all Wodeham is calling attention to is the implausibility of saying that whatever necessitates or entails the truth of a given judgment is its object or referent. After all, if this were the case, then it would turn out that (to take a non-theological example) anything whatsoever is the object for the judgment that 2+2=4 (since this is a necessary truth and the existence of anything entails or necessitates its being true).

[69] Wodeham himself expresses this point by saying that, on the realist's account, the angel will turn out to be identical with both "the angel's existing and God's existing."

[70] This example is a bit more puzzling, but I take it that Wodeham's idea is that God's existence at any world in which he alone exists is sufficient for its being true (at that world) that Michael does not exist. Perhaps we could supplement the example by saying that it is God's existence together with certain of his volitions (say, not to create Michael) that is sufficient for this truth. Even so, Wodeham's argument seems less persuasive in this case, given the difficulty of determining the referent (and so object) of negative existentials.

judgment, this does not warrant the realist's claim that such an entity
also serves as its object. Indeed, what Wodeham's response as a
whole is designed to show is the importance of distinguishing be-
tween the entity that necessitates the truth of a given judgment and
what serves as its object or truthmaker. As Wodeham himself puts it:

> [I]t is one thing to ask "what is that thing which when posited, [makes it
> true that] God is God or [that] an angel exists?" and yet another thing to
> ask "what is *God's being God* and an *angel existing*?" With respect to
> the first question, one must respond "God," or "an angel." But to the sec-
> ond we should not reply in this way.

Thus the central problem with the realist's strategy, as Wodeham sees
it, is that it assumes that one can answer questions about what it is in
extramental reality that corresponds to a given judgment by merely
identifying entities that are sufficient to secure its truth. Indeed, inso-
far as this assumption is demonstrably false, the realist has not suc-
ceeded in establishing that substances and accidents are, by them-
selves, adequate to function as the truthmakers and, hence as the total
objects for judgment.

   2. Against Things as Referents of Judgment. Lest the foregoing
objections leave the impression that Wodeham's entire case against
Aristotelian realism rests on the question of truthmaking, we should
not forget that, from Wodeham's point of view, the most direct evi-
dence for the existence of facts or *complexe significabilia* comes
from reflection on the semantic and syntactic structure of judgments
(and of the sentences that correspond to them). As he insists once
again:

> We should say that the total object of a [judgment and] mental sentence
> is its significate. But its significate is either *something's being such and
> such* or *not being such and such* (according as the sentence in question
> denotes). . . . And while every entity of this sort can be signified, it can-
> not be signified by any simple mental act (that is, not by a simple under-
> standing); therefore, it can be signified by means of a composed or di-
> vided sign—that is, by means of an affirmative or negative sentence.[71]

As this passage makes clear, Wodeham maintains that it is simply im-
plausible to suppose that a complete sentence or judgment and one or

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[71] "[D]icendum quod obiectum totale propositionis est eius significatum.
Eius autem significatum est sic esse vel sic non esse sicut per propositionem
denotatur. . . . Et omne huiusmodi est significabile, et non per incomplexum
mentale, id est non per simplicem intelligentiam, igitur per signum composi-
tum vel divisum, id per est propositionem affirmativam vel negativam."
L.sec., d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:193–4).

more of its constituent terms refer to one and the same thing. This is because, as we have already seen, Wodeham thinks the copula (the "mark of composition" as he calls it) makes a distinct contribution to the semantic value (namely, the significate) of the sentence—it introduces something not indicated by either the subject or predicate expressions.

It is to this point about the semantic contribution of the copula that Wodeham specifically returns when responding to the first part of the realist's argument, namely, to his claim that "anything, however simple, can be signified both by a complex expression (*complexe*) and by simple expression (*incomplexe*)," and, therefore that there need not be "a difference in what is signified [by the two types of expression], rather there need be a difference only in the mode of signifying." In response, Wodeham has the following to say:

> [I]t is true that any given thing [that is, substance or accident] can be signified (*est significabile*) in both ways, [that is, either by a complex expression or by a simple expression]. Nevertheless, I claim that it cannot be signified by a complex sign that is wholly fitted (*adequato*) to it. This is because the sign (*nota*) of composition (or any other sign equivalent in its mode of signifying) belonging to any complex sign consignifies at very least a present, past, or future time—which time is not consignified in this way by any simple (*incomplexe*) expression that signifies the thing at least mentally if not vocally.[72]

In this passage, Wodeham's aim is to undermine the realist's argument by calling attention to the fact that the copula designates a feature of extramental reality not indicated by any expression that lacks it. He does so in order to show that the difference between an expression containing a copula (or something equivalent to it) and one that does not cannot possibly be explained as merely a difference in the way one and the same extramental reality is represented. As he says, "any sign (*nota*) of composition (and any sign equivalent in its mode of signifying) consignifies at least a present, past, or future time, which is not consignifed in this way by any simple expression that signifies the thing." As Wodeham sees it, the time at which something exists (and

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[72] "Ad probationem: verum est quod quaelibet res est utroque [modo] significabilis. Sed dico quod non est significabilis signo sibi adaequato complexo, quia nota compositionis cuiuscumque (et omne signum aequivalens in modo significandi) consignificat tempus praesens, praeteritum vel futurum ad minus, quod non sic consignificatur per quodcumque signum significans incomplexe tantum mentale licet non vocale." *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:196). Here again, I render the adverbial '*complexe*' and '*incomplexe*' adjectivally.

exists as pale, wise, or self-identical) is not merely a function of how we represent, or think about thing—it is not merely a function of "the mode of signifying" that thing. It is rather an objective feature of the extramental realities about which we judge and speak, a feature, Wodeham emphasizes, uniquely indicated by the copula.[73]

If this is right, the realist's attempt to discharge the linguistic evidence Wodeham offers for *complexe significabilia*, and thereby, to resist the postulation of such entities, holds little promise. Indeed, according to Wodeham, the realist has made very little progress toward showing that an adequate theory of judgment can be developed from within the standard Aristotelian substance-accident framework. Thus far, the realist has failed to show how substances (and/or accidents) can serve as either the total referent or the truthmaker for judgment (and mental sentences). He has provided very little reason for thinking such entities can serve as their object.

<center>IV</center>

In the end, therefore, it would seem that the *prima facie* linguistic evidence Wodeham offers for the existence of facts or *complexe significabilia* is what drives his conclusion about objects of judgment. The fact that both of the standard Aristotelian alternatives are unable to offer a better, or indeed even a tenable, explanation of judgment shows, Wodeham concludes, that there is no choice but to revise the standard medieval-Aristotelian substance-accident ontology so as to allow for the introduction of *complexe significabilia*—that is, entities that are uniquely designated or "signified" by complex expressions such as sentences and judgments. As he sees it, the introduction of such entities provides not only the most natural, but as it turns out, the only viable explanation for the complexity in the way we represent—that is, judge, apprehend, and speak about—the world: namely, that the world itself is so structured.

As Wodeham himself is well aware, the most pressing question for his account, at least from the perspective of the standard medieval Aristotelian, is this: "What is it that you are calling the total object of a

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[73] Although Wodeham's argument here rests on what is nowadays a controversial notion of time, it is less clear that this conception would have proved controversial among his own contemporaries.

sentence?"[74] Wodeham's initial response to this question is just to re-iterate that the object of judgment (for instance, the object of the judg-ment A MAN IS AN ANIMAL), is neither a mental sentence (*complexum*) as the antirealist maintains, nor a simple, extramental thing (*incom-plexum*) as the realist maintains. Wodeham himself, however, recog-nizes that such an answer is not likely to satisfy. After all, on the stan-dard interpretation of the Aristotelian categorial framework, these two alternatives are exhaustive; thus, to anyone reasoning from within it, Wodeham's answer is not likely to prove illuminating. And so, Wodeham continues (harking back to a point made earlier in con-nection with standard Aristotelian realism):

> But you will say: *a man's being an animal* is either something or noth-ing. I say, however, that neither alternative is to be granted. It is not something, but is rather *a man's being something*, as was said. . . . But you will say: if it is not nothing, then it is something. . . . Accordingly, you will say: So what is it? (*Quid igitur est?*) To which we must reply that it is *a rational animal's being a sensing animate substance.* Or more properly, we reply that *man's being an animal* is not a what (*quid*), but rather a *something's being what.* And so the question is in-ept.[75]

Because *complexe significabilia* cannot be located within the "stan-dard" Aristotelian ontology, Wodeham thinks the line of questioning pursued by his opponent (insofar as it presupposes an interpretation of Aristotle which excludes such entities) is "inept." If Wodeham al-lows that a *complexe significabile* is a something (*aliquid*), or more literally, "some" (*ali-*) "what" (*quid*), this would imply that it is the sort of entity which answers to the Aristotelian question "*Quid est?*"—

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[74] *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:195). This is, in fact, the very first "doubt" that Wodeham considers when he turns to a discussion of likely objections to his view.

[75] "Dices: hominem esse animal aut est aliquid aut nihil. Dico, quod neu-trum est dandum, sed quod non est aliquid; sed [dandum] est hominem esse aliquid, ut dictum [est] . . . Dices: si non est nihil, igitur est aliquid . . . Dices: quid igitur est? Respondendum [est] quod est animal rationale esse substan-tiam animatam sensibilem. Magis tamen proprie respondetur quod hominem esse animal non est quid, sed est esse quid." *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:195). The passage goes on: "In the same way, a question by which it is asked 'What is man is an animal?' would be ill-formed quibbling. For, setting aside every sentence [or thought], man is an animal in reality. [Therefore, man is an ani-mal is not a sentence.] And we should not allow [the reply] that man is an an-imal is a substance, or an accident, or that it is something or that it is nothing as none of these replies would be intelligible—or even say anything. Such questions presuppose something not true."

a question whose answer identifies the definition or essence of any given substance or accident.[76] But since, as Wodeham has now argued, no substance or accident can be the total object and significate of a judgment or sentence, he is forced to say that a *complexe significabile* "is not a something" and, therefore, that it "is not a what (*quid*)." And yet, Wodeham insists, it is not nothing. Indeed, to infer from Wodeham's claim that a *complexe significabile* is not a something (in the strict Aristotelian sense) to the conclusion that it must, therefore, be nothing, simply begs the question against him, for such an inference rests on the assumption that, contrary to the evidence Wodeham has now adduced, there is nothing in extramental reality besides substances and accidents.

Commentators have tended to interpret Wodeham's claim that a *complexe significabile* "is not a something" as an indication of some kind of hesitancy on his part to ascribe genuine ontological status to the objects (or significates) of judgment, at least of the sort accorded to ordinary Aristotelian substances and accidents. Indeed Wodeham's introduction of *complexe significabilia* has not generally been regarded as posing any serious challenge to the standard Aristotelian categorial framework. Instead, the general trend in the literature has been to suppose that it is only when Wodeham's theory is adopted and developed by later thinkers such as Gregori of Rimini that *complexe significabilia* come to be seen as conflicting with the standard substance-accident framework.[77] This is because Wodeham's *complexe significabilia* are typically treated either as sufficiently otherworldly as to mark no significant intrusion into the concrete world of Aristotelian substances and accidents, or else as ontologically derivative on substances and accidents.[78] As I indicated at the outset, and as is by

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[76] This explains why Wodeham is willing to substitute the definitions of the subject and predicate terms (namely, MAN and ANIMAL, respectively) in the judgment A MAN IS AN ANIMAL. For such terms do designate substances and so clearly admit of a definition (and hence, an answer to the *"quid est"* question), but the sentence or judgment taken as a whole does not. Moreover, as a result, no Aristotelian definition may be provided for it.

[77] See for example Zupko, "How it Played in the Rue de Fouarre"; Nuchelmans, "Adam Wodeham on the Meaning of Declarative Sentences," 138–86. See also n. 7 above.

[78] For examples from the literature, see note 6 above. An exception to both sorts of interpretation may be found in Elizabeth Karger, "William of Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Adam Wodeham on the Objects of Knowledge and Belief," *Vivarium* 33 (1995): 171–86.

now clear, given what we have seen of Wodeham's discussion, both sorts of interpretation miss the mark.

Commentators who advance the first of these two sorts of interpretation infer from Wodeham's claim that a *complexe significabile* is not a "thing" or "a something," that he intends to distinguish this sort of entity from concreta, that is, from genuine objects which are classified by the *Categories* and which can be named. According to such commentators, *complexe significabilia* are not named by sentences or judgments, but are merely "expressed" by them. Accordingly, they tend to read Wodeham as introducing some kind of nonobjectual, abstract entity—meanings, or other type of intentional entity.[79] It should be clear enough by now, however, that any such interpretation rests on a failure to appreciate the ontological or explanatory role that *complexe significabilia* are called on to play in Wodeham's theory of judgment.[80] As we have noted already, Wodeham distinguishes between a judgment's representational content and the entity that serves as its object. Moreover, he explicitly denies that *complexe significabilia* are truth-bearers.[81] Given this, it is a mistake to suppose that the entities Wodeham introduces to serve as objects of judgment are intended by him to function as meanings or intentions expressed by judgments.[82] What is more, given their role as truthmakers, as objects of Aristotelian science, and as temporal entities, that is, as entities obtaining at times indicated by the copula in expressions which refer to them, it is simply implausible to think that *complexe significabilia* are anything other than full-fledged constituents of concrete reality, that is, of the realm of individual, concrete substances and accidents.

Not only do *complexe significabilia*, as Wodeham conceives of them, belong to the realm of substances and accidents, but they also

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[79] See, for example, Weidemann, "Sache, Satz und Satzverhalt."

[80] Even if this interpretation were right, however, it would still follow that Wodeham's account of objects of judgment constitutes a fairly significant departure of the standard Aristotelian substance-accident framework. After all, medieval adherents of this framework typically suppose the division between substances and accidents is exhaustive—that is, that there is nothing else, concrete or abstract.

[81] See n. 51 above.

[82] Indeed, Wodeham explicitly claims that *complexe significabilia* can be named in just the way any ordinary substance and accident can. According to Wodeham, subject expressions formed from the nominalization of sentences can *supposit* for *complexe significabilia*: "'homo esse animal' potest supponere et sumi pro isto dicto propositionis . . . vel pro eo quod per huiusmodi dictum significatur." *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:194). See also n. 84 below.

constitute a significant ontological addition to this realm.[83] To think otherwise seems to ignore Wodeham's own repeated insistence on the distinction between substances, for instance, God and entities such as *God's being God,* or likewise between Michael and *Michael's existing.* More importantly, it ignores Wodeham's own positive reasons for introducing *complexe significabilia* in the first place: things belonging to the category of substance and accident are simply not the type of entity suited to serve the ontological roles Wodeham ascribes to objects of judgment; hence, the need for an altogether new type or category of being.[84]

That Wodeham intends *complexe significabilia* as entities distinct from and additional to individual substances and accidents is made perhaps even clearer by his own remarks on the proper interpretation of Aristotle's discussion in the *Categories.* Like other medieval philosophers, Wodeham views the categories as a classification of the fundamental types of being made on the basis of an analysis of the fundamental types of expression. Wodeham goes on to argue, however, that just as there are different types of entity corresponding to each of the different type of noncomplex expressions, so also is there a distinct type of entity corresponding to complex expressions. As he explains:

> This [conclusion, namely the introduction of *complexe significabilia*] agrees with Aristotle who, in the *Categories,* says that each [sort] of non-complex expression 'signifies a substance or a quality or a quantity' etc. But, he does not say that each and every [type of expression] signifies a substance or quantity, etc. For some signs do not signify precisely (*adequate*) a substance, but rather signify *something's being a*

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[83] *Pace* Perler, "Late Medieval Ontologies of Facts," who insists that Wodeham does not intend to "reify" *complexe*, and that such entities supervene on and are nothing in addition to substances and accidents on which they supervene. Merely saying that *complexe significabilia* "supervene" on substances and accidents does not, by itself, guarantee that they are nothing over and above substances and accidents—there must also be evidence for thinking that Wodeham thinks what supervenes is reducible to what it supervenes on.

[84] That the introduction of such beings carries ontological commitment to a new class of beings is also signaled by Wodeham's insistence that sentential nominalizations "supposit" for (where supposition is universally taken to involve existential import) precisely those entities *signified* by the sentence in question. For example, Wodeham thinks that the expressions 'Man's being an animal' and 'man' and 'animal' all have *supposita,* but he also is also explicit in saying that their *supposita* are distinct. See *L.sec.,* d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:194). Karger calls attention to this same point in "William of Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Adam Wodeham on the Objects of Knowledge and Belief," 192–3.

substance (and so on for the other categories); other signs signify *something's not being a substance* (and so on for the other categories). Likewise, elsewhere in the *Categories*, [Aristotle says]: "a statement [is said to be] true or false, because a thing exists or does not exist." But he does not say [that a statement is true] 'because of a thing or non-thing.' Again, in the chapter of the *Categories* that begins, "Often what is customarily opposed," he says: "For in just the way that an affirmation is opposed to its contrary negation—as, for example, 'he sits' is opposed to 'he does not sit'—so also for the thing posited as underlying each—that is, sitting versus not sitting."[85]

According to Wodeham, Aristotle's various remarks in the *Categories* show that the world Aristotle envisions is one that not only includes *complexe significabilia*, but even includes them as in some sense fundamental entities. For, as Wodeham sees it, the *Categories* tells us that the extramental correlate for claims about what exists is not any thing (that is, any substance, quality, quantity, and so on), but is rather an existential fact—a thing's existing (where the latter is understood to be something other than, or distinct from, the former). This suggests that, for Wodeham, the substances and accidents are not only distinct from, but indeed function as parts or constituents of existential *complexe significabilia* which are, in turn, the fundamental structures comprising reality.

Although Wodeham proposes a fairly radical departure from the standard interpretation of the Aristotelian substance-accident framework, it is important to note that he appeals to (and, indeed, find support in) Aristotle's discussion in the *Categories* to support his views. Yet, whether or not Wodeham's theory of *complexe significabilia* does in fact possess the Aristotelian credentials he claims for it, the theory does clearly run against the grain of the dominant medieval interpretation of Aristotle's ontology. Given this, it should be clear that Wodeham's account of objects of judgment constitutes both a significant departure from and challenge to the substance-accident framework presupposed by his contemporaries. In fact, it appears that

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[85] "Et hoc congruit Aristoteli, qui in Praedicamentis dicit quod singulum incomplexorum significat substantiam aut quantum aut quale etc., et non dicit quod omne singulum significat substantiam aut quantum etc. Aliquod enim signum non significat adaequate substantiam sed significat aliquid esse substantiam, et ita de aliis; et aliquod significat aliquid non esse substantiam, et ita de aliis. Item, alibi in Praedicamentis: 'Eo quod res est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa [dicitur esse],' et non dicit 'eo quod res vel non res'. Et iterum, isto capitulo Praedicamentorum, 'Quotiens autem solet opponi' dicit sic: 'Sicut enim affirmatio adversum negationem opposita est, ut quod sedet ei quod non sedet, sic et res quae sub utroque posita est, id est sedere ad non sedere.'" *L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 (1:195).

Wodeham is not merely arguing for the addition of one more category of being to be included alongside (or somehow dependent on) the categories of substance and accident, but is rather reconceiving the "standard" Aristotelian framework itself—reconceiving, that is, the very building blocks of reality.[86] The world, at its most fundamental level is not, according to Wodeham, a world of things, that is, of substances and accidents, but of *"things being such-and-such,"* that is, a world of *complexe significabilia;* or, as we would put it nowadays, a world of facts or concrete states of affair.[87]

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[86] Having acknowledged that Wodeham does make an important break with the standard medieval-Aristotelian tradition in introducing facts, it would be a mistake to suppose he means to offer anything like a fully developed account of facts. Still, it is worth noting that we can glean the beginnings of such an account from what he does say over the course of his discussion in d. 1, q. 1. For example, unlike most contemporary philosophers who endorse a fact ontology, Wodeham does not attempt to restrict his ontology just to positive facts, but is willing to countenance negative facts as well. This is suggested in a number of passages we have already considered, but is perhaps most clear from his remarks in the following passage: "Just as I have said for affirmative [judgments] so I say for negative ones. The object of [the judgment] MAN IS NOT AN ASS is *man's not being an ass.*" (*L.sec.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1 [1:194]). In addition to negative facts, Wodeham also allows for the following: facts of different orders (that is, both first-order facts such as *Socrates' being pale*, as well as second-order facts as the fact that the sentence 'Socrates is wise' corresponds to the (first-order) fact of Socrates' being wise); existential facts (for example, *Michael's existing*)—including negative existential facts (such as *Michael's not existing*); and, finally, relational facts (for example, *Gabriel's being created by God*).

Of course, much more is required before we get anything like a complete theory. For example, although Wodeham seems to think there are negative facts, it is not at all clear what he is going to take the constituents of such facts to be—especially in the case of those negative facts that correspond to judgments about the nonexistence of some individual. Likewise, Wodeham has told us nothing about the facts that make true disjunctions, conjunctions, general statements, and the like. Does he want to say there are distinct kinds of fact corresponding to each of these types of statement—or, more generally, that there are distinct kinds of fact for every distinct kind of statement? Wodeham's discussion in d. 1, q. 1 provides no answer to such questions, nor even any indication for how such questions should be answered. But this is not surprising. Such questions are among the most difficult to decide (indeed, they are at large even in contemporary discussions of facts), and are far beyond the scope of Wodeham's project in d. 1, q. 1. After all, his aim is not to develop or hand down a fully worked out ontology of facts, but merely to establish the need for such a theory.

BOOK REVIEWS

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS*

THERESE SCARPELLI AND STAFF

ALLARD, James W. *The Logical Foundations of Bradley's Metaphysics: Judgment, Inference, and Truth.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, 241 pp. Cloth, $75.00—*The Logical Foundations of Bradley's Metaphysics* is the latest offering from what may be called the "revisionist movement" within the tradition of Bradley scholarship. This movement began in 1983 with the publication of Anthony Manser's *Bradley's Logic*, and it continues today in the work of several notable writers. "Bradley revisionism" is often (though not always) characterized by the following claims: (i) the idealist movement in Great Britain was principally concerned with defending evangelical Christianity against Darwinism and the advance of the natural sciences; (ii) philosophical idealism as it developed in both Germany and Great Britain has as its distinguishing characteristic the identification of thought with reality; (iii) earlier commentators were mistaken in thinking that Bradley was committed to this doctrine and hence a proponent of idealism; and (iv) Bradley was himself confused when he endorsed the logical/metaphysical views of his idealist contemporary, Bernard Bosanquet. This book embraces each of these claims.

Although these theses occupy much of Allard's time, his main concern is to describe what he sees as Bradley's project in *The Principles of Logic* (1883). This Allard identifies as first "to defend the legitimacy and usefulness of deductive logic against Mill" and second "to determine the ontological status of the system of knowledge constructed by thought" (p. 47). Allard considers the second part of this project in chapters three, four, and five. There, through a reconstruction of the theory of judgment (the basic unit of thought), Allard portrays Bradley, not as an idealist, but as "an heir to the British empiricist tradition" (p. 80). Indeed, thought, for Allard's Bradley, is wholly ideal (abstract and general) while "what is individual [and thus real] is confronted directly without the mediation of ideas" (p. 75).

The heart of Allard's book rests, however, with the question of inference. Bradley's problem, we are told, is to explain how deductive inference can be "useful" (that is, go beyond what is stated in the premises) while at the same time remaining "legitimate" (that is, justified in a non-

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THERESE SCARPELLI AND STAFF

question-begging manner). Allard sees Bradley as confronting head-on Mill's claim that if our deductive inferences are valid they are not useful, since to know the truth of our premises (for example, "All men are mortal," "Socrates is a man") is already to have knowledge of our conclusion ("Socrates is mortal"). Allard follows Bradley's discussion of both syllogistic and nonsyllogistic inference in order to show that, while such inferences are justified by the larger system of knowledge, they are not, as Mill claims, a mere recounting of what we already know. But can the doctrine of judgment developed here achieve what is required of it in the sphere of inference? Many readers, I suspect, will remain doubtful. Yet there is, to my thinking, a more obvious difficulty in the book.

In the final chapter, Allard considers Bradley's understanding of truth as developed in *Appearance and Reality* (1893). Correspondence is rejected as the appropriate interpretive framework since Bradley by this time sees our primitive encounter with reality—"immediate experience"—as devoid of objects and events recognized as such. But if the correspondence theory is eliminated, the likely contender becomes coherence. (Bradley was dismissive of pragmatic accounts.) However, if Bradley is a coherence theorist (in the modern sense) his doctrine is, as Russell pointed out, plagued by difficulties. The most serious of these is what has been called the "alternative coherent systems problem." That is, if coherence constitutes the nature of truth, then incompatible systems of thought would—if equally coherent—be equally true.

To avoid these difficulties, and to accommodate the doctrine of "degrees of truth and reality," Allard attributes to Bradley the "identity" theory of truth. Yet given the book's prior account of judgment—an account Allard maintains to the end—readers might justifiably ask how this can be. In his fervor to distance Bradley from the idealist tradition, Allard ascribes to him a doctrine in which thought is wholly ideal. Thought remains, for Allard's Bradley, utterly distinct from its object (reality), and no combination of thoughts is capable of bridging the ontological divide. However, given this rigid division between thought and reality—a division that allows not even partial coincidence—the question arises, "In what sense can there exist an 'identity' between true judgments and reality?" One could argue, perhaps, that this "identity" is a kind of structural isomorphism. This, however, (despite disclaimers) would just be a variation on correspondence, and if correspondence is not a genuine option, it would seem that Allard's Bradley is a coherence theorist after all.

I would conclude by saying this is a serious work that Bradley scholars can ill afford to ignore. However, that Allard's reading of Bradley (or his historical account of idealism) can sustain itself against criticism remains to be seen.—Phillip Ferreira, *Kutztown University.*

ANTON, John P. *American Naturalism and Greek Philosophy.* Amherst: Humanity Books, 2005. 326 pp. Cloth, $32.00—In this fascinating study of the relationship between American naturalism and Greek philosophy,

John Anton explores one of the most significant but sadly neglected chapters in American intellectual history. Anton's theme is the role that the revival of Greek philosophy, chiefly Aristotle's, played in the development of American naturalism. He emphasizes the naturalist's creative use of the ancient Greeks and stresses the fact that what motivated Santayana, Dewey, Woodbridge, and other naturalists to revive Greek philosophy was the desire to free metaphysics from the sterility of the neo-Kantian and Hegelian modes of thought that dominated nineteenth century American philosophy. The American naturalists turned to the Greeks, Anton argues, not to resurrect Greek philosophy but to enrich their own modes of thought and to address the vital needs and problems of the present. They wanted to find a way out of the Cartesian dualisms and the "egocentric predicament" that had immobilized post-Kantian idealism. Moreover, Aristotle's philosophy held a special interest because of the naturalists' desire to forge novel theories of change, process, and history, and to discover new solutions to modern problems of ethics and education.

Anton does not attempt to present a comprehensive account of the naturalistic tradition in American philosophy. His focus is primarily on the development and subsequent fate of naturalism at Columbia University, where, he maintains, the dominant features of the tradition were formed. The book consists of ten interrelated essays that offer an historical account of the principal ideas and values advanced by some of the leading American naturalists. Anton's approach, however, is not only historical but critical as well. He explores and explains the reasons for both the success and ultimate demise of the naturalistic tradition. He argues that although the naturalists undoubtedly had much success in finding novel solutions to the problems that plagued modern philosophy, in the end, it was their excessive desire for novelty that proved to be their undoing. "Their projected philosophies of change and new relativisms," Anton writes, "were inescapably predicated of their own achievements, relegating them to the prospect of temporality" (p. 9).

The first two chapters of the book present an insightful analysis of the historical context that set the stage for the later development of American naturalism. This is followed by a chapter on Santayana, whose early work at Harvard provided much of the impetus for the revival of Greek philosophy, and six chapters on the subsequent development of naturalistic philosophy at Columbia. Two chapters devoted to Frederick Woodbridge and John Dewey are followed by four chapters on the "second generation" Columbia naturalists, John Herman Randall, Jr., Herbert Schneider, Ernest Nagel, and Justus Buchler. While the first nine chapters concentrate predominantly on the revival of Aristotelian naturalism, the concluding chapter is devoted to naturalistic interpretations of Plato and Plotinus. Of particular interest is Anton's discussion of the relationship between Dewey and Woodbridge and its effect on Dewey's increasing turn toward Aristotle in the later stages of his career.

Anton finds much to admire in the American naturalists' revival of Greek thought, but argues that their relativism undermined their various attempts to reconstruct Greek philosophy. Although his discussion of the vicissitudes of American naturalism is complex and multifaceted,

the underlying thread of his argument is found in his account of the point at which the naturalists broke with Greek metaphysics. Whereas the Greeks located the natural processes of change within the permanence of being, Anton argues, the naturalists placed the idea of permanence within the changing flux of experience. Permanence was thus to be found not within the structure of being but only within the experimental methods used to explore the constantly changing processes of nature and history. This shift from "a metaphysics of being" to "a metaphysics of experience" meant the end of the Greek search for permanent solutions and perennial values. When the problems of practical life and the changing currents of history became the measure of the adequacy of all theories, ideas, and values, the new naturalism inevitably became the victim of its own success. At Columbia, the creative period of enthusiasm for the recovery of Greek wisdom finally succumbed to the rising tide of analytic philosophy, or what Randall dubbed "the new scholasticism."

A graduate student at Columbia during the late forties and early fifties, Anton conveys a lively sense of the excitement he felt attending the lectures of Randall, Schneider, and other Columbia naturalists. While he expresses disappointment at the failure of the naturalists to sustain the movement's initial success, he also offers hope for renewal. Anton's probing analysis of the naturalist tradition will undoubtedly provide a stimulus for its rebirth. In the event of a second renaissance, John Anton's impressive study of the American naturalists will make an invaluable contribution.—Richard N. Stichler, *Alvernia College.*

AZZOUNI, Jody. *Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence, and Truth.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. vi + 248 pp. Cloth, $49.95—Azzouni's aim is to articulate philosophically adequate accounts of truth, proof, and logical consequence without falling into (what he perceives to be) the pitfalls of the following: Platonism, the truthmaker assumption (if a sentence, statement or belief is true then it is, at least in part, made true by how the world is), treating existential affirmations as entailing ontological commitments, and holding that normative rules or principles of reason are introspectively accessible. The reader is often referred to Azzouni's earlier work for more detailed explanations of why these are supposed to be pitfalls. The book divides into three parts: I. Truth, II. Mathematical Proof, and III. Semantics and the Notion of Consequence.

According to Azzouni, the truth predicate renders natural languages inconsistent. This is shown by the reasoning behind the liar paradox. (Fortunately common practices keep the inconsistency at bay.) Azzouni's approach to truth is to focus upon what he takes to be the essential functional role played by the truth predicate and to show how to regiment language so that it contains a device playing that role (presumably without introducing inconsistency). Azzouni accepts "the Quinean dicta that the functional role of the truth predicate is semantic ascent and descent—when coupled with an appropriate quantifier" (p. 109); this al-

lows one to make "blind truth-endorsements" [that is, "uses of the truth predicate where the sentences endorsed or denied don't themselves appear" (p. 14)], and ineliminable blind truth-endorsement "is the *raison d'être* for the presence of the truth idiom in the vernacular" (pp. 15–16). Azzouni argues that affirmation of a set of T-biconditionals of the form *"S" is true iff S* will not (contrary to what many think) license a full range of blind truth-endorsements—it will not enable one to endorse statements whose expression transcends one's own linguistic resources.

Azzouni develops a regimentation in terms of anaphorically unrestricted quantifiers. To give a rough idea of this notion, which is formalized in Chapter Three, think of a crude attempt to symbolize "Something Jones says is true" in first order logic as "∃x(Sx & x)," where "Sx" symbolizes "Jones says x." This would treat "x" as playing the role of an ordinary variable and the role of a wff. Though this violates the syntax of normal first order languages, Azzouni argues we can develop intelligible languages in which variables play such a dual role. Imagine someone saying, "For any blah-blah-blah, if Jones says blah-blah-blah then blah-blah-blah." Though this is not standard English, it seems to be intelligible, and we can think of it as saying that everything Jones says is true, or, alternatively, as making a blind truth endorsement of everything Jones says.

Part II deals with mathematical proof. How can mathematical proofs lead to results that, historically speaking, are so resilient? Euclid's proof that there is no greatest prime is as convincing today as it was in ancient times. Since Azzouni rejects mathematical Platonism his answer cannot appeal to the idea that proofs provide enduring insights into mathematical reality. On the other hand Azzouni does not think sociological explanation in terms of group conformity (which may nicely account for synchronic uniformity of opinion within a social group) can account for mathematical agreement across cultures and over long stretches of history. Azzouni's solution is that mathematical proofs are what he calls "derivation indicators." A derivation in a given system is mechanically checkable by algorithms, and ". . . the algorithmic systems that codify which rules may be applied to produce derivations in a given system" are at least implicitly recognized by mathematicians (p. 143). This (implicit or explicit) grasp of algorithms accounts for mathematical agreement. Strangely, as Azzouni recognizes, over the course of history mathematicians generally have not consciously realized that derivations could be formulated from their proofs. Typically mathematicians feel that they are dealing with mathematical objects (and imagining that they are doing so may be psychologically crucial to their mathematical productivity), but this should not be taken to show that they are actually describing mathematical reality. Azzouni compares mathematicians to novelists who think about their characters as if they actually exist, when of course they do not.

Part III concerns the notion of consequence. After critically discussing accounts of consequence that have descended from Tarski's work, Azzouni tries to show how insights gained from the Löweinheim-Skolem theorem and Henkin-style constructions of models can be used in

support of a Tarskian approach that avoids the pitfalls enumerated at
the beginning of this review. And just as psychological aspects of math-
ematical reasoning (with its apparent reference to mathematical ob-
jects) can be misleading, so too psychological aspects of drawing conse-
quences (with its apparent appeal to what is or is not imaginable) can be
misleading.—James Cain, *Oklahoma State University*.

BIELEFELDT, Heiner. *Symbolic Representation in Kant's Practical Philos-
ophy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. xiii + 202 pp.
Cloth, $60.00—Heiner Bielefeldt's aim is to demonstrate that Kant's
practical philosophy can help solve, what Bielefeldt calls, the "paradox
of liberalism" (p. 1). On the one hand, liberals subscribe to a "normative
commitment" on behalf of human rights and a democratic and a plural-
ist civil society (p. 2), on the other hand, they exercise a "deliberate self-
restraint," fearing that a public appeal to their own normative convic-
tions could be a hindrance to autonomy and ethical, political, and reli-
gious pluralism (p. 2). As a consequence, liberals and anti-liberals in-
creasingly view liberalism as lacking any fundamental norms.
According to Bielefeldt, Kant's use of symbolic representation in his
practical philosophy can help liberals find "careful ways to give voice to
their normative convictions," while at the same time protecting against
"ever-lurking tendencies of authoritarian objectification" (pp. 185, 3).
   Judging by the title of Bielefeldt's book, the reader may expect that
the book discusses Kant's indirect, analogical exhibition of transcen-
dent Ideas. But the author's notion of symbolic representation goes be-
yond Kant's in order to include some more general "as-if" attitudes.
Bielefeldt's broader understanding of Kant's "symbolic representation"
allows him to address many different areas of Kant's practical philoso-
phy.
   After a brief introductory chapter, in the second chapter the author
"characterizes" Kant's practical philosophy as a modern version of So-
cratic philosophy (p. 10). In this chapter, the reader can already discern
the author's realist interpretation of Kant's practical philosophy be-
cause, on his view, the aim of Kant's practical philosophy is "merely to
bring to light" the already existent true moral claims (p. 10). In the third
chapter, Bielefeldt rightly suggests that moral realism does not contra-
dict Kant's idea of "self-legislation," an insight contrary to the view of
many Anglophone Kant scholars. In his discussion of the "fact of rea-
son," Bielefeldt argues that for Kant reason and will are "inextricably
linked" (p. 44). Thus, practical reason does not operate as an external
force on the will; rather, "reason itself can become a practical motive of
action" (p. 44). In the remaining parts of the chapter Bielefeldt shows
how symbolic representations of nature's lawfulness and purposiveness
serve as a "guideline for moral judgment" as they help connect the moral
law with our understanding (p. 181). The author also shows how sym-

bolic representation (for example, the sublime in nature) "expresses the categorical force of the moral law" and helps connect the moral law with the motivational aspects of autonomy (p. 182).

Chapters four and five of the book are devoted to Kant's "applied ethics" (p. 11). By the latter, Bielefeldt understands that Kant's categorical imperative demands that the concrete moral ends be realized in the world. Central to the fourth chapter is the author's discussion of the highest good as a symbol of the "horizon of meaning" within which the concrete human practice takes place, and his discussion of the symbolic role of politeness in social duties (p. 78). In the fifth chapter Bielefeldt argues that for Kant a just political order is a symbolic representation of moral autonomy. Bielefeldt emphasizes Kant's clear distinction between a legal order of rights and moral autonomy. But unlike some commentators for whom this distinction amounts to an independence of a political order from morality, Bielefeldt shows their analogical interrelation according to which "societal institutions [are made] transparent toward their underlying normative functions" (p. 181).

Bielefeldt's aim in chapter six is to show how traces of teleology in nature and history help strengthen the hope in the actual success of moral commitments. Unfortunately, the author does not make a distinction between the effect of aesthetic and the effect of teleological judgment on the hope of a moral agent; these effects for Kant are clearly not the same: the former evokes hope by affecting our sensibility, while the latter evokes hope by affecting our understanding. With respect to Kant's conception of history, Bielefeldt rightly opposes some Hegelian interpretations of Kant's philosophy of history, emphasizing that, for Kant, we can never have insight into a necessary path of human history (p. 128). However, Bielefeldt elaborates that we can have hope for general historic progress given the inevitable antagonism among human beings, a driving force of progress and civilization that Kant calls "unsocial sociability" (p. 131).

Bielefeldt's discussion of Kant's philosophy of religion in chapter seven is consistent with his general approach to Kant as a "reformer, not a revolutionary," a critic but not a destroyer of metaphysics (p. 171). Kant criticizes traditional metaphysics and argues that religion can neither validate nor ground morality. But, for Kant, religion remains a significant component of one's moral life because it provides morality with its "comprehensive horizon of meaning" (p. 12). In reference to Kant's conception of the "visible church" as a symbolic representation of the "invisible church," or the ethical community, we can understand the highest good as a communal effort instead as an effort of an individual moral agent.

The book is valuable to the English-speaking audience because it includes a wide range of both Anglophone and German current literature on Kant; it discusses some non-salient and often neglected features of Kant's practical philosophy (for example, social duties). Also, contrary to current trends of highly specialized commentaries it systematically connects various topics in Kant's practical philosophy. Although the reader should not expect a detailed analysis of these topics, Bielefeldt's comprehensive discussion of Kant's practical philosophy can still

provide important insights to both specialists and non-specialists.—Lara
Ostaric, *St. Michael's College.*

BLANK, Andreas. *Leibniz: Metaphilosophy and Metaphysics 1666–1686.*
Analytica. Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 2005. 207 pp. Cloth, $78.00—
This volume consists of a set of eight distinct essays, with an appendix,
some of which have been previously published. The work derives its
unity from its subject, which is Leibniz's early metaphysics, together
with the author's reflections on the method Leibniz uses to produce that
metaphysics. Thus, we are far from considering Leibniz's thought as
completely represented in the *Monadology* or *Discourse on Metaphys-
ics*; the texts discussed in the work all predate these treatises. In fact,
as his subtitle indicates, Blank restricts himself to what Leibniz pro-
duced starting in 1666, the date of the *Dissertation on the Art of Combi-
nations*, and ending in 1686, that of the aforementioned *Discourse on
Metaphysics.* This is the time from Leibniz's graduate education in
Leipzig and Altdorf, through his first position with the Elector of Mainz
and his journey to Paris, concluding with his establishment in Hanover.
The philosophical highlights of this period are constituted by some
fairly obscure works, including the treatise "On Transubstantiation"
(1668), some dissertations on jurisprudence, together with *Elementa ju-
ris naturalis* (1666–69), the Preface to the edition of Nizolius (1670),
the two-part physics of 1671, *Theoria Motus Abstracti* and *Hypothesis
Physica Nova*, the Paris Period notes under the rubric *De Summa Re-
rum* (1675–76), some increasingly critical comments on Spinoza (1678
on), and "On the Method of Distinguishing Real from Imaginary Phe-
nomena" (circa 1683–86).

Blank's various chapters touch upon all of the above essays. In Chap-
ter 1, "Dalgarno, Wilkins, and Leibniz," Blank analyzes Leibniz's early
views on the nature of metaphysical concepts from the perspective of
Leibniz's responses to the artificial languages developed by George Dal-
garno and John Wilkins; he claims that those artificial languages, includ-
ing Leibniz's, are best understood as attempts to express structures of
thought and reality and not simply as formal representations of basic
definitions and axioms. In Chapter 2, "Definitions, Sorites–Arguments,
and Justice," he argues that Leibniz's analytic theory of justice is based
on definitions that are intended as explanations of our everyday con-
cepts. In Chapter 3, "Ether, Mind, and Pneuma," he rejects the assertion
that the ontology of *Hypothesis Physica Nova* construes material ob-
jects as collections of immaterial entities, emphasizing instead the role
of analysis for Leibniz's conception of mind and matter; he claims that
Leibniz achieves his notorious "momentary minds" by "searching for
epistemically basic concepts that provide the categories to describe
both the nature of mind and the nature of matter" (p. 80). In Chapter 4,
"Confused Perception and the Union of Soul and Body," Blank explores
the tensions in Leibniz's approach to corporeal substance. This is con-
tinued in Chapter 5, "Substance Monism and Substance Pluralism,"

where it is argued that there are two different concepts of substance at work in Leibniz's early metaphysics. Chapter 6, "The Response to Spinoza," contrasts the temporal structure of Leibniz's analysis of reflection with Spinoza's synchronic conception of ideas of ideas. The puzzling doctrine of "striving possible" substances is examined in Chapter 7, "Striving Possibles and the Cognitivist Theory of Volition." There Blank asserts that the doctrine "is closely connected with Leibniz's view that the laws of rational deliberation involve reasons that incline without necessitating" (p. 155), and that this governs both the Divine evaluation of possible worlds and the series of thoughts of human beings. Finally, in Chapter 8, "Rules as Instruments," Blank argues that the examination of rules as instruments of actions shows that there are two aspects to Leibniz's view of the nature of a calculus, namely, the usual formal one, but also a causal one that one starts with physical objects and everyday actions.

These chapters, in one way or another, all argue that Leibniz's philosophical method is best understood from the perspective of "descriptive" as opposed to "revisionary" metaphysics (using a dichotomy made famous by Peter Strawson). Why one would want to argue such a thesis is not made clear until the appendix, "The Emergence of the Logical Conception of Substance." There the target is the interpretation of complete concept, or logical conception, of substance by Louis Couturat (and by extension Bertrand Russell), which Blank concedes, "often is thought to provide strong evidence for the importance of a methodology that is both deductive and . . . revisionary" (p. 177). Against this interpretation, Blank argues that, from the point of view of the earlier metaphysics, "Leibniz developed the logical conception of substance only after he had formulated most ingredients for a theory of individual substances" (p. 177). The point should be well taken, though one would have thought that we had already overcome the image of Leibniz the logician deriving his metaphysics from self-evident premises; it should be quite evident that Leibniz has basic commitments deriving from language, physics, and especially theology. Though the overall thesis seems to be fighting old ghosts, the actual work being done in each chapter is quite valuable.—Roger Ariew, *University of South Florida*.

CAMP, Joseph L., Jr.: *Confusion: A Study in the Theory of Knowledge*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. x + 246 pp. Paper, $18.95—Confusion for Camp involves taking two distinct things ("thing" broadly understood) as one. To say that "X believes A is B," when A is not B, is not to ascribe a mental state of false belief to X but to take a "semantic position," specifically that X's reasoning about A and B should be evaluated by a special validity criterion. Where X uses "N" to refer to both A and B, the validity criterion regards N-inferences as about both A and B at once and certifies the inferences as valid basically when they would be valid if "N" did not have this special use. "N" is not equivocal. If X has

confused A with B, he cannot recognize that "N" refers sometimes to A, sometimes to B, and so cannot commit fallacies of equivocation.

Camp argues that one should not regard X's confused sentences as either true or false. If such sentences did have truth values, then the objective conditional probability of such a sentence being true and X's subjective probability that it is true would be meaningful concepts. Suppose that the objective probability that A is F is .8, if A has properties F_1, F_2, F_3. Suppose that X holds that the weight of evidence that "N is F_1, F_2, and F_3" constitutes for "N is F" is .8. If "N" referred just to A, X's subjective probability would be well calibrated with the objective probability. But if, for "N is F" to be true, both A and B must be F and B need not have the properties F_1, F_2, F_3 just because A does, the objective probability that N is F given N is F_1, F_2 and F_3 would be perhaps much lower. X might be poorly calibrated here, not a good judge of evidential weight. This is contrary, however, to our inferential charity in confusion attribution.

How then may we understand validity, classically explicated as truth preservation, for arguments involving confusion? Other properties might be preserved. In contexts of practical deliberation, X's believing S may contribute to achieving some goal of X. "Following from" can then be explicated as guaranteed practical effectiveness preservation. Camp fleshes this out by asking us to consider two "advisors" to X. AD1 uses "N" to name A, AD2 to name B. Let "N is F_A" be the sentence "N is F" where "N" denotes A; similarly for "N is F_B." AD1 asserts "N is F_A" with sufficient empirical confirmation. Hence, because of these confirming factors, if X accepts acting on "N is F" he will be more likely to achieve the goals of his action. Hence, some beliefs are profitable for X (and others costly). An argument may be regarded valid just in case if each premise involves profitability, so does the conclusion and if the conclusion involves costliness, so does some premise. A statement may be both profitable and costly.

We would regard X's confusion as cured if we had reason to withdraw our attitude of semantic charity. This would happen if, for example, when X discovers that A and B can be distinguished, X expresses bewilderment at the appearance of two N's, showing he can distinguish them at least in thought. Camp argues that X's bewilderment is basically semantic. Assume X apparently sees N in two places, L_1 and L_2. X's experience makes no sense and hence the use of language in the following argument makes no semantic sense:

N is in L_1

N is in L_2

N can be in L_1 and L_2 simultaneously.

The premises seem acceptable and the inference *prima facie* correct, but the conclusion paradoxical. X has become semantically self-aware in a way which includes recognizing that his previous arguments using "N" may be invalid. We are no longer willing to view X's previous reasoning with the semantic charity involved in confusion attribution. Rather, we would urge that X should not use such arguments until he can distinguish the valid from the invalid.

Camp believes that certain historic debates can be viewed as illustrating this pattern of critique, discussing Berkeley's attack on Newton's reasoning about infinitesimals. However, recognizing uncured confusion still permits a positive evaluation of certain philosophical arguments. To say that certain early modern philosophers chose to think of mental acts as their intentional objects is to attribute confusion, the identification not fully intelligible but the reasoning valid.

The foregoing presents the core of Camp's argumentation. I must add that this is a closely reasoned essay, with distinctions carefully drawn, opposing positions considered and argued against, Camp thoroughly backing his view with argument. For those concerned with argument evaluation, especially with arguments from other periods in the history of philosophy or even from other cultures, with having a rigorous way of distinguishing what is problematic in such arguments with appreciating their strong points, we commend Camp's *Confusion* as well repaying their study.—James B. Freeman, *Hunter College of The City University of New York.*

CHANG, Hasook. *Inventing Temperature: Measurement and Scientific Progress.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. xviii + 250 pp. Cloth, $65.00—There are two parts to this volume. One addresses how knowledge is constructed through experiments, then justified. The second emerges from this and argues for a new discipline, "complementary science." History and Philosophy of Science (HSP), the center of this new discipline, counteracts the loss of knowledge within the narrow focus of "specialist" science, to return science to its eighteenth-century meaning as natural philosophy.

Key developments in the history of thermometry in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries illustrate the broadening effect of HSP on the sciences. The first development examined is the use of fixed points on a scale. Even when shown they were not "fixed," this was too useful to abandon, and led to a deeper knowledge of the thermal behavior of matter. This iterative process, developed independent of any theoretical structure, demonstrates that knowledge can be generated outside of a theoretical structure. Confrontations over the fixity of temperature scales and their inter-comparisons continued until the work of Henri Victor Regnault in the 1840's who applied only the test of comparability, that is, self consistency to thermometers, introducing the principle of single-valuedness into thermometry. This example challenges philosophers who assume scientific progress springs from theory rather than the grubby practices of the laboratory.

When mercury, the liquid of choice for thermometers, froze in the Siberian winter experiments yielded a new phenomenon, super-cooling, and a deeper discussion of the properties necessary for thermometric liquids. At the other end of the scale, Josiah Wedgewood developed a

method to measure the temperatures in his pottery kilns. This example of the metrological extension of meaning leads into a critique of Percy Bridgman's operationalism.

The final narrative chapter outlines Sadi Carnot's description of the working of a perfect heat engine, and William Thomson's use of that heat cycle to develop three theoretical definitions of temperature, the first (1847) grounded in Caloric theory, the second (1851) in the mechanical theory of heat, and the last (1881) in thermodynamics. However, these theoretical differences are seen as irrelevant. Thomson's definition was grounded in the work done in completing part of this theoretical cycle. Why then did Thomson choose to redefine temperature as his theoretical allegiances shifted? Thermometry was not entirely independent of theory changes.

The philosophical focus of the text lies in developing a defensible form of operationalism. Beginning with Thomson's attempts to define and then measure absolute temperatures and an outline of the difficulties of operationalism, lead to a proposed modified, two step process, the development of a concrete image from the abstract system, then the matching of that image to concrete entities and operations. The next stage, validation, is incomplete, but the claim is that the solution lies in a "good correspondence between the abstract system and its concrete image," using the example of Thomson's third definition of absolute temperature. Thomson looked at the first, isothermal stroke of a Carnot engine. His real world system was the production of steam from water at constant pressure, corresponding to the second step in the author's vision of operationalism. This was a scheme that could not be completed as the data to build a steam-water thermometer were not available. He had to make do with air thermometers. The available alternative for Thomson was the kinetic theory of gases, but this was anathema to him. Thus history thwarts a neat solution to a philosophical problem.

The final chapter is directed to a process of justification in the absence of any self-justifying foundation. This requires coherentism to progress through a process of epistemic iteration, shifting the grounds of the argument from justification to progress. The continuity of this process is emphasized rather than the violent rejections and reconstitution of belief systems of Kuhn's image of scientific progress. The iterative process enriches a particular knowledge system and is self-correcting. However, the system may become so rickety that scientists feel compelled to reject it. Such was the reaction of Regnault and others to the abstract strait jacket of the Laplacian system. The direction for the next step in this process is not preordained. Progress is measured here as the enhancement of certain epistemic virtues, not in terms of progress towards a perfect understanding of the physical world.

In these processes, HSP keeps science open. Specialist science is esoteric, and limited in its ability to investigate all the promising lines of research or keep lines of research open indefinitely. HSP keeps these aspects of science available to the public and scientists even if the latter deem them incorrect, or unnecessary. Such HSP studies can recover lost knowledge encapsulated in repudiated theories and make scientists and the public aware of how we know what we know and the some-

times slender threads on which major claims are made.—Elizabeth Garber, *SUNY Stony Brook, Emerita.*

FERRY, Luc. *What Is the Good Life?* Translated by Lydia G. Cochrane. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005. x + 320 pp. Cloth, $45.00—Ferry notes that the question of the book is in danger today of tipping over too quickly into asking "what is the successful life?" He wants the older formulation to reconnect us to the original condition of philosophy as a way of life and to the variety of answers the question has received and which he will explore. To be sure, today's answer requires awareness of Nietzsche's destruction of everything transcendent to man, every criterion of the good outside of him, religious or metaphysical. So, what we want is a radically humanistic answer to the question.

Nietzsche is pressed, not just to give the conditions of an answer, but the answer itself. Ferry is aware that this will surprise, and his case is calmly presented and well argued. The answer itself is formulated in more classical categories, however, according to what we may look to by way of contemplation (*theoria*), action (*praxis*), and salvation (*soteria*). For Ferry also very much wants us to learn from classical and Christian answers to the question; indeed, part of what the good life is turns out to be is a sort of realization, at least in consciousness, of the experience of other cultures and the insights of conflicting philosophies.

Since Ferry takes Nietzsche's view on the inescapable perspectivalism of human thought to be true, the only kind of truth available for the good life is the truth of art, which means making a truth expressive of life. As to *praxis*, we are urged to cultivate the "grand style;" that is, we are to construct a life that includes all one's interests and forces, as varied as possible, where all are harmoniously balanced, and so each all the more powerful for the balance. Then there is salvation, which means overcoming, not death, but the fear of death. Here, Nietzsche equips us with the doctrine of the Eternal Return, whose function it is to make us ponder what is worth doing in the present moment, such that we would want it to return for ever. Thus does *amor fati* enable us to live in the present, without the pain of either nostalgia or hope, and therefore without fear of death. Ferry ends this section of the book by visualizing the sorts of lives possible on this basis, and visits daily life as presented by the Dutch artists of the 17th century, bohemianism as invented in the 19th, the life of the modern capitalist, where the will is most obviously its own object in a quest for ever greater consolidation of ways and means un-tethered to ends, and last, the life without illusions, where we achieve the lucidity of a depth-psychological knowledge of ourselves.

The next two sections are taken up with tracing answers to the book's question from ancient to Christian to modern times. There is much to learn and appreciate in Ferry's tale here, told with sympathy and insight, though of course not everyone will concur with his every judgment over

such a vast amount of material. What are we to retrieve from prior answers? Although we cannot embrace the ancient appreciation of the world as ordered and divine and laden with value, a world of which we are a subordinate part, and when knowledgeable of our status, a world of which we are a happy part, we nonetheless are to appropriate some version of Stoic *amor fati*. Ferry is nicely aware of the practical difficulties of materialism, ancient and modern, however, and he finds it impossible to love a world fate that includes Auschwitz. He notes as well the retreat from determinism to Kantianism of many materialists when faced with some momentous fork in the road, and himself affirms freedom.

Together with freedom of choice, we are also to keep from Christianity the objectivity or "transcendence" of values—the fact we do not invent but discover such things as justice, love, beauty, and truth. This is a very restrained transcendence, to be sure. It is not that of the Greeks, the transcendence of an objective intelligibility and value immanent in the world as a whole; and it is certainly not that of Christianity, where the source of value is beyond not only man but the world as well. It is a transcendence in immanence, one within the horizon of things human—in short, a humanism of the "man-god."

Readers will feel the urgency of Ferry's project according as they are persuaded with him of the truth that all claims to truth are but perspectival, revealing ourselves to us more than any "object" they are about, and of the probative force Ferry seems to impute to the depth-psychological destruction of all idealisms, where all our "higher" things turn out to be forms of "lower" things, and in the end, of the forces of nature as known by the empirical sciences. But if one is not persuaded at these places, then the ancient wisdom becomes once again a live possibility, as Alasdair MacIntyre thought twenty-five years ago, and it may be possible for us to recognize the integrity of natures, even human nature, and the finalities of natural kinds, even humankind.

One also wonders at the end of the day whether what Ferry gives us really and truly is Nietzsche. The ontology that is operative if not declared seems to be the old dualism of Descartes—as implied by the "humanism for us, science for what is not us" division of mental labor he settles for, but without calling it that because one must be nonmetaphysical. In the same way, his recognition of freedom cannot lead to the affirmation of an immaterial principle that enables us to anticipate the divine, nor can the objectivity of truth and justice and beauty and love serve as a clue to the ontology of the world. As to these last, discovered and not invented, are they not the standard Enlightenment list of values—freedom and justice and truth? Is that a Nietzschean thought?

As a satisfactory and coherent answer to its question, many will judge the book hardly to succeed. Yet as an extended "friendly debate," as Ferry puts it, with materialism and religion, and with the ancient world and contemporary deconstruction, the book succeeds admirably. Moreover, it would be ungenerous not to recognize Ferry as the wonderfully aware, marvelously learned, sensible, good philosophical company that he is. He writes so clearly that whatever disagreements one has are, as it were, also his gift.—Guy Mansini, OSB, *Saint Meinrad School of Theology*.

GRENBERG, Jeanine. *Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption and Virtue*. New York: Cambridge University Press. xi + 269 pp. Cloth, $75.00—In her book, *Kant and the Ethics of Humility*, Jeanine Grenberg argues convincingly that Kant's ethical theory not only can accommodate a virtue perspective whose central focus is humility, but needs to do so in order to provide a complete account of moral personhood. In making her case, Grenberg considers a broad range of issues surrounding the role of virtue in Kant, contrasting the function of virtuous character traits in Kant with Aristotelian and Stoic-style approaches. The uniqueness of her position comes out in the way she defends the notion of humility, in which she complements her sound knowledge of Kant and virtue theory with the use of numerous literary examples that help make concrete the experience of the humble agent.

The book begins by discussing how the virtue of humility has become marginalized, and what is needed to rehabilitate it as a central virtue. As Grenberg sees it, the crucial question for any adequate account of humility is ". . . whether, and the extent to which, human limitation has moral significance . . ." (p. 6). What makes Kant so appealing here is that his overall approach to personhood makes this very question of limits central to his account of morality. The argument of the book proceeds in four sections, with each one addressing a different aspect of humility in Kant. Part One (Chapters One to Three), provides the conceptual framework for Grenberg's interpretation by stipulating the "nature' of the Kantian moral agent. For Kant, human nature is marked by its dependency and corruptibility. The argument for dependency is based on the fact that all people desire to be happy, yet the goal of happiness is never completely within our reach. The argument for corruption is based on the fact that it is anxiety about the loss of happiness that creates self-conceit and fuels our self-love (p. 38). It is this tendency to love oneself over all other objects that is the root of radical evil. However, rather than seeing moral agents as simply hopelessly corrupt, Kant also argues that people have the capacity to rise above their own self-love and discover respect for moral principles, confirming their dignity in the process. Grenberg argues that the virtue of humility is essential here because it cultivates that moral disposition that enables agents to value the self in a realistic yet morally productive way. The advantage of approaching humility in this way is that it does not issue from a sense of moral worthlessness, one of the traditional starting points for humility, nor is it based on direct comparison with other moral agents, which inevitably leads to endless claims of inferiority or superiority. Rather Kantian humility starts from a broad conception of human nature that admits our "intractable human limits" while still recognizing the moral imperative to self-perfection and self-mastery: "And this confident valuing of self and exercise of one's agency in full awareness of one's moral limits is best described as humility" (p. 91).

Parts Two and Three of Grenberg's account (Chapters Four through Seven), reiterate the general account of humility outlined in Part One by contrasting it with other recent interpretations of virtue in Kant. As her discussion makes clear, humility is best seen as a meta-attitude that is expressed at the level of moral disposition in terms of an interest in the

transcendent authority of moral reasons. The feelings associated with this disposition, such as humiliation, awe and respect, are expressions of one single complex attitude, that arise from the way we evaluate the self in light of moral principles (p. 158). Grenberg argues that humility, when approached this way, has the benefit of relieving agents from endless psychological torment that can arise from the opacity of the self's underlying motives, for when properly understood humility is inseparable from "recognition self-respect," a term Grenberg takes up from Stephen Darwall (p. 163). Thus an attitude of humility does not result in a self-deprecatory stance towards oneself and others, but couples the epistemological reality of our own limitations with a practical disposition that continually strives to internalize these limits in a morally productive manner.

Part Four of the book (Chapters Eight and Nine) draws Grenberg's analysis to a close through showing how the virtue of humility is realized as a humble pursuit of self-knowledge and respect for persons. Viewing the book as a whole, Grenberg's work is original and timely, skillfully tackling the problem of how agents should live with the limitations of their own self-knowledge in light of the unremitting authority of moral principles. The result is an impressive work that makes a genuine contribution to both Kant and virtue scholarship.—Jason Howard, *Viterbo University.*

HEIDEGGER, Martin. *Introduction to Phenomenological Research.* Translated by Daniel Dahlstrom. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005. xiii + 252 pp. Cloth, $39.95—Heidegger's lecture course, *Introduction to Phenomenological Research,* delivered at Marburg in the winter semester of 1923–4, is an important piece of the puzzle in sorting out the genesis of *Being and Time.* Its contents divide into three broad themes: a restoration of phenomenology's proper focus by means of a return to Aristotle, a critical analysis of Husserl's initial breakthrough to phenomenological research in his *Logical Investigations,* and an assessment of the extent to which phenomenology lost its way under the influence of Descartes' obsession with certainty, science, and mathematics as a measure of philosophical rigor.

Generally speaking, the story Heidegger tells in these lectures is quite familiar: Greece (in this case, Aristotle) is a site of authentic discovery, the modern period (in this case Husserl) is a site of decline and devolution, and Descartes is the chief villain: his ontological categories act as an obstacle to gaining access "to the matters themselves." Only a historical method of phenomenological destruction can recover the lost treasures of the West and shift the focus of phenomenology from the essence of cognition to the structures of existence.

In Part One of the lecture course, Heidegger explains that his first step is to clarify the meaning of the word "phenomenology." If we compare the meanings that Aristotle ascribed to *phainomenon* and *logos* in *De Anima* B7 to the meanings given to both terms today, Heidegger

thinks we can better understand how Husserl's narrow meaning of "phenomenology" arose. What did Husserl miss? Heidegger argues that, for Aristotle, *phainomenon* refers to that which shows itself in the light of day, while *logos* refers to that capacity of language in virtue of which the world is made intelligible and accessible as such. On Aristotle's view, then, language is a precondition for perception and, more broadly, for having a world. Heidegger does not merely attribute this view to Aristotle. He develops it into his own idea that intentionality in general is founded in language and care.

The role care plays in world-disclosure turns out to be the primary focus of the lecture course. In the final pages of Part One and throughout Part Two and Part Three, Heidegger argues for three general theses. First, care has a peculiar kind of sight that "is given with existence . . . Existence as being in a world (being-in) is being that discloses" (p. 76). Second, the world-disclosing, pre-intentional features of existence are buried over by Descartes, who established science and mathematics as the standards against which philosophy measures its own success (p. 74). Third, Husserl's phenomenology inhabits this misguided tradition, as is evident in his concern to make phenomenology a rigorous science (pp. 191–213). Why is science-as-measure a problem? Heidegger's answer is that neither science nor the theory of knowledge can articulate its own foundations. As Heidegger argues, "concern for the idea of science shapes a specific ontology which is clung to as the sole possibility of interrogating existence. The tendency is toward burying existence itself" (p. 221), despite the fact that existence is the foundation we seek.

If traditional philosophy is off limits, how does Heidegger recommend we proceed? We must confront the philosophical tradition with a method of destruction (p. 85) capable of opening up existence and explicating it "in its being" (p. 213). However, we face a decisive obstacle: our categories and "care about already known knowledge" exclude existence from being encountered (p. 68), because we cannot help but take refuge from existence in the Cartesian comforts of certainty and rigor. "The care about already known knowledge is nothing other than anxiety in the face of existence" (p. 70). Heidegger's method of destruction aims to bring existence into view by showing the inadequacy of all previous concepts. But because this method fights against the inbuilt inertia of existence (p. 85), which is rooted in the eeriness of the nothing which is nowhere (p. 221), and because we are the history we must overcome (p. 82), Heidegger insists that traditional philosophy "has come to an end," that he and his students stand before "completely new tasks," and that what is required above all else is a "passion for questioning genuinely and rightly" (p. 1). Heidegger's lectures presumably are intended to embody such an interrogative, destructive, path-finding method.

Dahlstrom's book would have been a more useful research tool if it had included an index. Without a doubt, however, he has provided us with a masterful and lucid translation of the original manuscripts. Heidegger specialists and students will find plenty of food for thought about Heidegger's early development in these lectures. As with the other lecture courses from this time period, one can watch Heidegger

developing his own ideas out of his appropriation of Aristotle, distinguishing his project from Husserl's, developing his method of destruction, and generally tilling the soil for his magnum opus, *Being and Time.* Highly recommended.—Mark Ralkowski, *University of New Mexico.*

HEIDEGGER, Martin. *Introduction to Phenomenological Research,* translated by Daniel Dahlstrom. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005. xiv + 252 pp. Cloth, $39.95—This translation of Heidegger's first course given at Marburg University, during the winter semester of 1923–24, first appeared in 1994 as *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung,* Volume 17 of the Heidegger *Gesamtausgabe.* It is one of eight courses edited for publication so far by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, the leading figure, after Heidegger's son, in the dissemination of the Heidegger literary corpus. Working from a "handwritten revision" (p. 247) (also called "the typed and revised 'original transcript'" of the actual course manuscript, which Heidegger "destroyed" [p. 245]), Professor von Herrmann's "editorial work on the text of the lecture [course]" has included incorporating into the body of the transcript the notes from three auditors of the course: Helene Weiß, an unidentified student whose notes were passed on to Herbert Marcuse via Walter Bröcker, and Gerhard Nebel. The intercalation of students' notes with Heidegger's transcript is defended on the grounds that Heidegger often "deviated" from his script during class meetings, so that the inclusion of students' notes provides a more authentic protocol of what was actually said in class, which seems to be the editor's goal. The editor tells us that "all words that proved to be false readings were quietly corrected" and, in one case, a sentence deletion which had been made (p. 82; German editor's note) in Heidegger's "unevenly distributed, handwritten revision" of the typescript of the original manuscript was "not honored so that this critical [editorial] position would not be lost" (p. 247). Professor von Herrmann's editorial interventions are justified on the basis of "the freedom imparted by Heidegger to the editor" in conversations between the two men when, towards the end of his life, Heidegger was planning the Complete Edition, which was to be overseen by Professor von Herrmann. The purpose of including so many details from the brief "Editor's Afterword" is to raise a by now obvious question: Whose text is this? For now, only the editor and a small group of scholars close to Heidegger's son and his publisher know for sure.

Announced originally as "The Beginning of Modern Philosophy," the course aimed to be "nothing less than a proper preparation for the critical encounter with what is set forth as the thematic field in present-day phenomenology" (p. 198). The "beginning" referred to in the original title of the course may at first seem to refer to Descartes, but Heidegger shows that the French philosopher was at heart still knee-deep in and beholden to High Scholasticism.

"As a way of showing what we are up to," Heidegger writes, "we will fix on existence [*Dasein*] as our main theme; that is to say, world, dealings in it, temporality, language, one's own interpretation of existence, possibilities of interpreting existence" (p. 1). Heidegger reminds his students that "no foundation, no program or system, is given here; not even philosophy should be expected." But how can this be so in a university Philosophy Department? Heidegger asserts: "It is my conviction that philosophy is at an end" (p. 1). As to what students can expect from the course, namely, live performances of episodes of Heidegger's way of thinking, with a genuine modesty that can come only from someone who was throughout his life, without embarrassment, in awe of the great thinkers of the past, Heidegger adds: "You need not think that you have to think what is thought here" (p. 2).

In what is essentially a study of the ontology of consciousness and its relation to what Heidegger, here already in anticipation of *Being and Time* refers to as the implication of *Sorge* (translated as "care" and a "being bent on [*Aussein*] something encountered in the world" [p. 240]) in existence [*Dasein*], he takes as his task "to disclose positive phenomena from concrete considerations" (p. 150), that is, from the "facts of the matter" (p. 4) that concerned the seminal thinkers Heidegger admired—Husserl, Descartes, Thomas, Aristotle—and searchingly, often searingly subjected to critique.

For Heidegger, among the goods smuggled in and retained in Descartes' philosophy, in which a method of knowing was developed that claimed to have eliminated everything but the knowing act itself (p. 163), is God, and corresponding to the certainty of the existence of God claimed by Thomas is Descartes's "care about certainty" (p. 168) with respect to "already known knowledge." But this is emphatically not an epistemological issue, as we are usually led to believe. On Heidegger's reading, "through Descartes, the old reserve of Scholastic ontology is all of a sudden transformed, but not as though it were a matter of establishing an epistemology," since "epistemology does not matter to [Descartes] at all. His considerations are purely ontological" (p. 172): "The horizon for Descartes is the sort of horizon proper to the Catholic system of belief . . . noticeable in how Descartes lays the old ontology of High Scholasticism down as the basis for his fundamental considerations; . . . His aim is to provide, in a scientific manner, the necessary rational foundation for the Catholic system of belief" (pp. 203–4). Descartes's ontological commitment precludes the epistemological revolution he is said to have brought about.

In the final part of the course, the continuity between Thomas, Descartes and Husserl is reaffirmed (pp. 194, 198–9) in order to make way for Heidegger's presentation of his own, more radical phenomenology, which is to begin by bringing into question the problem of intentionality, which as inherited from Brentano, was insufficiently understood by Husserl (pp. 200-2). All the same, Heidegger is convinced that Husserl's "discovery of intentionality . . . [made it possible] for the first time in the entire history of philosophy [that] the way is explicitly given for a radical ontological research" (p. 200). Heidegger notes Husserl's admission

during a seminar he directed and that Heidegger attended that phenomenology might have originated with Descartes, had Descartes "stopped after the second meditation" (p. 206).

Heidegger's elucidations of texts of Aristotle (who "shaped the basic constants of philosophical research" [p. 32]), Descartes and Thomas are compelling and radical. By means of them we come to see the need for a new set of categories (what in Being and Time will be called the "existentials") that must be developed and how they must differ from those "determinations [the categories] that emerge in a completely different field" (p. 212). In the breathless last hour or two of the course (pp. 220–1, 240–3), Heidegger briefly outlines the program and sets the tone for his magnum opus. We see here the focus on existence and the background of Sorge (pp. 213–21, 241), time and historicity (p. 241–2), all of which are central to Being and Time.

Given the proximity of this course to the early drafts and final text of Being and Time, the present volume must stand as among the most important of the course texts published up to this point, especially for the perspective it gives on the background of Heidegger's way of thinking, not only his indebtedness to Aristotle, but also the place Heidegger's readings of High Scholasticism, Descartes and, of course, Husserl's idea of phenomenology had in shaping his way of thinking.—Miles Groth, *Wagner College.*

KEKES, John. *The Roots of Evil.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005. xiii + 261 pp. Cloth, $29.95.—Kekes's latest book is a perceptive, clear, and carefully considered illustration of the fable of "the six blind men and the elephant" (p. 181) to explanations of human evil: most of the usual explanations, which attribute evil variously to internal or external or active or passive causes, seize on an element of the truth but go wrong when they deny the relevance of the other elements. The first part of the book describes in fascinating detail six paradigm cases of evil, and the second, more theoretical, part considers leading metaphysical, biological, and psychological explanations as a context for his own view. This book can be understood quite independently of Kekes's earlier work, *Facing Evil* (Princeton, 1990); where there is overlap Kekes does not change his conclusions but does provide what he regards as better reasoning for them.

The evil that concerns Kekes here tends not to be the dreary but minor stuff that gets so much attention on the local newscasts. Defining evil as involving three components—"the malevolent motivation of evildoers; the serious, excessive harm caused by their actions; and the lack of morally acceptable excuse" (p. 2)—he focuses on six actual and horrible examples: the 13th century Albigensian Crusade against the Cathars, Robespierre's terror during the French revolution, the Nazi Franz Stangl's participation in the murder of almost one million victims at Treblinka, the murders by Charles Manson and his "family" in 1969, the "dirty war" of the Argentine military dictatorship in the late 1970s, and

the psychopath John Allen's crime spree earlier in the 1970s. In this array of different types of evil, passion was misguided by some sort of flaw and, given opportunity by external circumstances, did its worst. In the crusade, religious fanaticism caused violations of elementary decency because, due to their being perceived as a threat to authority, the Cathars were seen not as persons but as dangerous and self-condemned heretics. While the crusaders ignored reason, Robespierre relied on it while abusing it, due to his ideological fanaticism combined with some character peculiarities and unique historical contingencies. Stangl was an ordinary person whose high ambitions combined with circumstances in such a way that he deceived himself into thinking that he had no choice but to become a somewhat reluctant agent of mass murder. For Manson it was envy (the revenge of ruined pride), and for Allen it was boredom (restless apathy) that combined with other factors to produce malicious mayhem.

In his objections to those who think there is a moral order in the universe, Kekes seems to be a metaphysical naturalist and a determinist ("there are only impersonal, unmotivated, purposeless natural processes . . . including our own actions" [p. 5]) but he insists that explanations are (usually) not justifications or excuses. He says of Stangl both that his character was his destiny and that one does not choose one's character, but he claims in what seems to be a compatiblist vein (with its attendant advantages and problems) that evildoers should be held responsible even when they are acting reasonably on their sincerely held (but false and often self-deceived) beliefs. Intention is not the issue; none of the above was the sort of moral monster who does evil just because it is evil. However, even if the violation of elementary decency cannot be rationally condemned, it can and should be morally condemned, given that the purpose of morality is to protect human wellbeing.

By the time Kekes finishes his evaluation of all the explanations he regards as confused or one-sided, his own "mixed" explanation emerges as plausible, even obvious, given his metaphysics. Since his view is that evil is one of several natural propensities of human nature and that it is a permanent threat, the question is what we can to minimize it. For Kekes, the internal condition we should work on is moral imagination; it enables us to avoid the grotesque misperceptions of others that infect evildoers and it nurtures the sort of self-knowledge that stimulates self-criticism about our motives and beliefs. The external condition we should demand is the moral and legal condemnation of evildoers as well as their swift and certain punishment.

There's a lot to like about this book. Christians and other theists, however, will wonder whether Kekes's seeming antipathy affects his fairness: he tends to look poorly on Plato, Christianity, and the Enlightenment, and surprisingly, given his usual attention to important nuances, lumps them together as optimists about human nature. He also seems to interpret the doctrine of papal infallibility as implying that popes cannot do anything wrong (p. 17), and he seems to think that by definition faith ignores reason (whereas probably most Christians think that faith may go beyond but not against reason). In this and other

books, Kekes projects himself as a realist, if not a contrarian, out to expose liberal nonsense and misplaced sympathies. As a liberal, I usually find his criticisms challenging and worth taking seriously. But it is merely irritating when he simply announces that any sympathy for the perpetrator comes at the expense of sympathy for the victim (p. 122), or that a refusal to morally condemn someone entails the inability to respond appropriately (p. 127); even if a determinist sees evil as a disease, he need not blame a disease in order to fight it. His section on "Shibboleths" is rather slipshod in its treatment of moral equality, seeming to ignore the difference between what liberals call "recognition respect" and "appraisal respect." Moreover, he says that toleration involves a refusal to judge others, which is incorrect, given that toleration distinguishes itself from approval precisely by its enduring behavior judged to be disagreeable. These are, however, minor problems in a well-informed and wonderfully engaging book.—Edward Langerak, *St. Olaf College.*

LOCKWOOD, Michael. *The Labyrinth of Time: Introducing the Universe.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 405 pp. Cloth, $34.50—As if trying to absorb the Copernican view of astronomy, Prince Hamlet jots off in some verses to Ophelia: "Doubt that the stars are fire/ Doubt that the sun doth move/ Doubt truth to be a liar/ But never doubt I love." In the end, love confuses him too. The point is that human self-perception shapes physics and is shaped by it.

Later advances in physics—relativity and quantum mechanics— must also be integrated with human self-understanding. At least this is Lockwood's initial premise. In the light of physics, he says, there needs to be "a radical reassessment of the way we view our own lives," as well as the past and future, death, and personal responsibility. Such concepts must be revised in the light of scientific advance (p. vii).

He calls his book *The Labyrinth of Time*, and the book itself is labyrinthine as it follows many pathways: ideas lead to questions, options emerge, paths keeps forking, etc. Lockwood ends with a view found in Borges' fiction and others, but also among certain scientists, that time, too, is labyrinthine—a "garden of forking paths," as Borges puts it—because incompatible possibilities come to fruition in parallel worlds. For example, I might, at this moment, be sleeping, swimming, or visiting friends instead of writing, and in some sense I am—in worlds beyond measure.

Lockwood begins with McTaggart's celebrated argument (of 1908) to the effect that time does not pass. That is, our sense of its passing corresponds to no reality, since, if time passed, the same event would be past, present, and future—a contradiction, McTaggart suggests, which is only deferred and not resolved when we say of an event in the present that it was in the future and will be in the past, but is not in all three simultaneously (an explanation that presupposes time and cannot be used to validate it). Thus there are no passing events (no "A-series" in McTaggart's terminology), but there are co-present events in an unchanging

logical sequence (the so-called "B-series"); and we may say, for example, that preparing a meal is "immutably" earlier than eating it. McTaggart's arguments still have their partisans, but Lockwood does not join them. He thinks that a mere philosopher, relying only on "armchair reasoning," will not so easily free us from the trap of the myth of time's passage. A physicist will free us—namely Einstein.

Einstein shows that if I travel for years around the galaxy at a very rapid speed, the effect of time will slow, not, to be sure, insofar as I'm aware of it, but relative, let us say, to a twin who stays behind on earth. Thus I return in the prime of life, when my twin is old or long gone. In short, I arrive at the future faster than my twin does, which means, as Lockwood puts it, that "forward time travel is . . . allowed by the laws of physics" (p. 48)—because the very distant future is actually already there; only "slowness" keeps us separate from it. Einstein, therefore, gives us what the "armchair" McTaggart could not, namely, that every moment abides eternally. In a letter of condolence, Einstein writes: "He [the deceased friend] is now a little ahead of me in bidding this strange world farewell. That means nothing. For us devout physicists, the distinction between past, present and future has likewise no significance beyond that of an illusion, albeit a tenacious one" (p. 52). Thus physics impacts the human spirit.

In the subsequent chapters, Lockwood speaks of general relativity, curved space, the big bang, classical time travel, entropy, the dawn of life, the emergence of order, the past's (apparent) intractability, human freedom, quantum mechanics, and lived time. As his subtitle suggests, his book is designed to "introduce" the universe, and he wants to make himself intelligible, often relying on quaint and pleasing illustrations, with graphics by his talented son. There is scarcely any math in the book. Even so, Lockwood intends to contribute to physics, not merely to explicate it (p. vii). As for the laymen reading the book, they are in for quite a ride.

In Chapter 14, Lockwood turns his attention to Schrodinger's celebrated cat, who, as a result of the deliverances of quantum mechanics, cannot be consistently said to have died or not died. Lockwood favors the view that, in this peculiar and multiplex universe, the living cat can be superimposed on the dead one—each in its own "actuality." In similar ways, Lockwood would resolve those time-traveling dilemmas in which, going back before my birth, I angrily kill my own grandfather and thereby (it seems) prevent my own conception . . . and so, (presumably) resurrect my grandfather since I'm no longer there to take his life. But there is room in Lockwood's universe for multiple actualities. In some, I am born but don't die, in others I die but am not born, and in some perhaps I am friends with my grandfather, though in others we are enemies, and so on. These actualities are continuous, Lockwood says, and no signposts warn of the transition from one to the other. As for Schrodinger, whose mysterious cat provokes such controversy, he implicitly returns to an ancient conception of boundlessness (the "all dwelling in all" of Euthydemus and so many others) saying somewhat ruefully that it is as if "nature [were] prevented from rapid jellification only by our perceiving or observing it" (p. 306).

In his final pages, Lockwood turns his attention to the present moment, that is, to the specious present which in reality stretches a little between the past and future, since, if I snap my fingers three times in rapid succession, I can actually still hear the first snap when the last has begun to sound. The theme of the present moment (or specious present) introduces the writing of Brentano, teacher of Husserl— and the path of phenomenology. Here Lockwood's book abruptly ends.

To a book as ambitious and vital as this, there will doubtless be objections. Time will decide their weight; I shall limit myself to the comment that the perspective of phenomenology, to which the last page seems to be pointing, might have been elaborated further or, better yet, taken up at the start of the enterprise. In many of his best pages—as when he speaks (in Chapter 12) of how we live the future as "open" (as if we could change it but not know it) and live the past as "set" (as if we could know it but not change it)—Lockwood seems quite close to phenomenology. The phenomenological method, however, limits physics in certain respects since it seeks "lived time" as the ground of the time that physics measures; and it points back as well to a long tradition of time-meditation (Hegel, Kant, Descartes, Augustine, Aristotle, Plato, Parmenides, etc.), and, earlier still, to the most ancient of time-travelers: those mystics, east and west, who roam in time where they please, since they "transcend life and death, beginning and end" (Chuang Chou, The World, 3rd century BC).—Carl Levenson, *Idaho State University.*

LOWE, E. J. *The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. xiv + 222 pp. Cloth, $65.00—In this excellent and thought provoking book, Jonathan Lowe further develops and elaborates upon the ontological system that has been growing out of earlier works (*Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms* [Oxford: Blackwell, 1989] and *The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998]). According to Lowe, there are "two fundamental categorical distinctions which cut across each other to generate four fundamental ontological categories" (p. iii). The distinctions are, firstly, between the singular and the universal, and secondly, between the substantial and the nonsubstantial. Therefore, the four-category ontology recognizes (a) individual substances (objects), (b) substantial universals (natural kinds), (c) individual properties, relations, or "modes" as Lowe calls them (that is, those things that often go by the name of "tropes" in contemporary literature), and (d) nonsubstantial universals (attributes, properties or relations). Moreover, for Lowe, the relation between universals and particulars is one of instantiation, and the relation between substances and nonsubstances is one of characterization; thus, kinds are instantiated by objects, nonsubstantial universals (attributes or properties) are instantiated by modes, and kinds are characterized by attributes as objects are characterized by modes. While one might think that this ontology is not as parsimonious

as possible, Lowe presents strong arguments for his position that, in fact, it alone is best able to capture all that needs to be captured for a description of reality; that is, more reductive systems, systems that forgo one or more of Lowe's fundamental categories, are lacking in explanatory power. This system is particularly helpful in natural science, Lowe says, because physical laws can best be understood as depending upon the relations between and among properties and kinds.

Though Lowe's ontology has a long and distinguished history (which Lowe himself traces back to Aristotle's *Categories*), it is hardly a popular view now. As a result, Lowe spends a fair amount of time defending his four-category ontology against (and situating it with respect to) rival theories in contemporary analytic metaphysics. First, Lowe must counter the resistance to the universal/particular distinction which has arisen since Frank Ramsey's critique. He argues, firstly, that Ramsey conflates the distinction between universal and particular with the distinction between properties and property-bearers, and Lowe and contemporary trope theorists hold that there are, in fact, individual properties, and, secondly, he argues that Ramsey's critique takes place and can only succeed within a framework in which states of affairs or facts are the fundamental ontological elements, and we need not accept states of affairs as fundamental. Indeed, as should be clear, Lowe follows much of traditional western metaphysics in advocating a substance ontology, and he rejects such an ontology of states of affairs, holding instead that states of affairs are constituted by the entities of his four-category ontology. Moreover, as part of his substance ontology, he likewise rejects events as constituents of the fundamental ontology, seeing events merely as changes in the properties of particular objects. While Lowe disagrees sharply with David Armstrong about whether states of affairs or substances, modes, kinds, and properties should count as ontologically fundamental, his view is close to Armstrong's in one important respect: both admit universals and are scientific realists. But the devil is in the details, and Lowe again distinguishes his view from Armstrong's, proposing a "weak" version of immanent realism (according to which universal themselves need not be said really to exist "in" space and time, though their instantiations do) in contrast to what he terms Armstrong's "strong" immanent realism (according to which universals really do exist "in" space and time).

This account of how universals and properties are to work in scientific explanation is the most interesting and likely most controversial part of the book. According to Lowe, there is not a distinction to be drawn between occurrent and dispositional properties (as if these were two different types of properties) but between occurrent and dispositional predication. Lowe's claim is that "A sentence of the form '*a* is occurrently F' means '*a* possesses a mode of Fness,' whereas a sentence of form '*a* is dispositionally F' means '*a* instantiates a kind K which possesses Fness'" (p. 125). In other words, any dispositional predication of an individual is bound up with that individual's membership in a natural kind. With respect to the laws of nature, Lowe believes that substantial universals or kinds are characterized by nonsubstantial universals: for example, benzene is characterized by burning; and thus, "benzene

burns" or "benzene is flammable" are expressions of natural law. Now, Armstrong claims that there is a second-order relation of necessitation between universals. Lowe argues, however, that Armstrong is forced to this second-order relation because of a failure to distinguish between substantial and nonsubstantial universals, and, thus, Lowe "can say that what 'links' the universals involved in a law is not some mysterious second-order relation, but simply the familiar characterizing of predicative tie, which 'links' any property to its 'bearer.'" (p. 132) With this view of the relation between substantial and nonsubstantial universals in hand, Lowe is able to move on to another controversial claim, namely, that the Kripke and Putnam are wrong to believe in the metaphysical necessity of laws of nature.

I believe that there is much to Lowe's view. At the same time, I remain skeptical with regard to a few points. Lowe has relatively little to say in this book about how exactly we are to determine whether individual *a* is a member of kind K. Thus, even if his account of the natural law were to prove most fruitful, we still have the problem of ascribing the correct sortal terms to individuals. Also, one contemporary philosopher who is rarely confronted in this book is David Lewis, and I am not convinced that the Lewisian account of properties is not superior. (Of course, accepting Lewis's view would ultimately mean undermining much of Lowe's view.) Nevertheless, I hope that this brief synopsis makes clear that this is an excellent book which deserves to be read by everyone working in analytic metaphysics today.—Brandon C. Look, *University of Kentucky*.

MACDONALD, Cynthia. *Varieties of Things: Foundations of Contemporary Metaphysics*. Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2005. x + 278 pp. Cloth, $64.95; paper, $29.95—*Varieties of Things* is an exceptionally good introduction and tour through central topics in contemporary metaphysics. The book could easily be used alone for an upper level course in metaphysics or as a commentary alongside original articles. The book is divided into three parts.

Part I is called "Metaphysics and its Tools." It offers an account of metaphysics as an ontological investigation into what exists and the nature of fundamental reality. The tools that are presented include criteria for ontological commitment, principles of individuation, and principles of identity, such as Leibniz's Law. Macdonald discusses in good detail the competing conceptions of metaphysics outlined by Aristotle and Kant, Strawson's distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics, and Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions. The working conception of metaphysics Macdonald offers is called "real metaphysics," which is a revisionary metaphysical project where one identifies conceptual frameworks as sets of sentences and adopts a criterion of ontological commitment in order to determine what kinds of things exist, as well as what their fundamental nature is.

In Part II, "Particulars," Macdonald discusses are material substances, persons, and events. Part II is by far the longest section of the book. In the chapter on material substances Macdonald rejects two reductive accounts of substances: the Bundle Theory of substances, which attempts to capture substances as bundles of properties, and the Bare Substratum Theory, which attempts to capture substances as bundles of properties plus a nonrepeatable constituent that is necessarily without properties and bare. Some of the reasons the Bundle Theory is rejected is because it cannot explain how a substance is a unified thing and how substances persist and survive change. If a substance is just a bundle of properties how does the bundle get unified in a way that is present in a substance? If a substance survives change, then what is the part of the substance that survives change when it undergoes a change? The Bare Substratum Theory is supposedly an improvement over the Bundle Theory, because by positing an essentially bare nonrepeatable constituent for every particular it can account for how material substances survive change. After considering various glosses, however, Macdonald argues that the Bare Substratum Theory is incoherent. If a bare substratum is just a property-less constituent of a substance, how can we make sense of the idea that it is the part of a particular material substance wherein the properties inhere? How can a property-less thing be that in which properties inhere?

Macdonald's own view is called the property exemplification account of substances. It is a nonreductive account of substances that countenances a partition of the properties that a substance has into individuating properties and identity characterizing properties. Some properties of an apple are essential and kind individuating, but not identity characterizing. For example, the property of being an apple is a kind individuating property of any given apple, two red apples and a green apple share the essential property of being an apple, the red apples and green apple differ in their color, an accidental property of each of the particular apples, which are further distinguished by their spatiotemporal location. On Macdonald's account, material substances are exemplifications of substance-kind properties in places at times, and where a and b are substances, $a = b$ if and only if a and b are exemplifications of the same atomic substance-kind properties in the same place at the same time.

In Chapter 4, Macdonald discusses our ontological commitment to persons and various accounts of what it is to be a person. Her discussion includes psychological accounts, pure physical accounts, the closest continuer theory, and the multiple occupancy thesis. She defends a continuity account of persons, whereby persons are psychological things that are constituted by physical things much in the same way that a statue is constituted by clay.

In Chapter 5, Macdonald discusses events, beginning with Donald Davidson's classical work. Three important criteria for the identity of events are discussed: spatiotemporal coincidence, necessary spatiotemporal coincidence, and sameness of cause and effect. Macdonald eventually defends a property exemplification account of events by exploring the work of Jaegwon Kim and Lawrence Lombard.

Macdonald's discussion of particulars reveals a realist bias: little attention is given to antirealism, such as social constructivist views of particulars. Only in Part III, "Universals," is discussion given to serious antirealist theories. Here the extreme nominalism of Nelson Goodman, and moderate nominalist positions, such as resemblance nominalism and trope nominalism, are discussed at length. Macdonald closes with a good discussion of how a Platonic account of universals might answer the notorious "Third Man Argument."

Varieties of Things is also a good book for anyone interested in getting back up to speed on contemporary metaphysics, it is written clearly, with illuminating examples and engaging discussion.—Anand Vaidya, *San Jose State University.*

MACINTYRE, Alasdair. *Edith Stein. A Philosophical Prologue 1913–1922.* Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, Inc., 2006. ix + 195 pp. Cloth, $25.95—For those familiar with the important philosophical work of Alasdair MacIntyre, his new book on Edith Stein will undoubtedly bring to mind themes present in his previous writings such as unity of life and conversion. The account that MacIntyre gives of the relationship of Stein's philosophy to her life and to her conversion is unlike the modern and contemporary compartmentalization whereby philosophical thinking is one thing and the practices of everyday life another. The Kantian distinction between the private and public uses of reason stands in sharp contrast with a life in which private reflection and public action are not at odds with one another. In presenting us with the stages and context of Stein's philosophical formation and development as a prologue to her conversion, MacIntyre shows us, as did Diogenes Laertius in his books written in the third century A.D. on the lives of famous philosophers, that the practice of philosophy does indeed make a difference to the lives of those engaged in it.

While it is the case that a conversion such as that of Edith Stein requires divine intervention, it is also true that because grace builds on nature the person can be more or less disposed to the reception of grace. Stein recognized that for a change to be effected in the soul, some external power or intervention would be necessary; she in fact says that change in the inner life cannot be brought about by personal efforts but rather by an "otherworldly power" outside of the person (p. 141). Yet, there can be a sort of preparation or disposition—even if this too is said to be the work of divine grace—for turning toward God. This is justified when we consider not only the stages of Stein's life before her conversion but also the differences which MacIntyre clearly points out between Stein and her contemporary Martin Heidegger. Both Heidegger and Stein studied with Husserl, knew that they needed to move beyond Husserl, but they embarked on very different courses. Initially a Catholic and a Thomist, Heidegger moves to a radical rejection of theology and of traditional ontology. Stein, on the other hand, is born into a devout Jewish family and as an adolescent stops practicing her faith. Her

philosophical studies bring her in contact with fellow students, also working under Husserl, for whom belief in God is important; she is influenced by them and becomes open-minded to questions of religion. This openness and her "remarkable character" (p. 107) prepare the way for her conversion to belief in God and more specifically to Catholicism.

Friendships play a significant role in Stein's life; she learns from them, whereas Heidegger has no real use for friendships other than those that will attest to his superiority. As MacIntyre says, "Heidegger deprived himself of just those philosophical and moral resources that would have enabled him to recognize the unqualified evil of National Socialism, while Stein at an early stage had identified signs and precursors of that evil" (p. 185). Throughout the book MacIntyre gives us indications of virtues which formed part of Stein's character: her gratitude for all she had learned from Husserl; her patience amid the difficulties and rejections she encountered in pursuit of the *habilitation*—a patience which enabled her not to give up on what she treasured most, her philosophical work, for want of an academic appointment; the capacity she had for a certain intransigence where the truth was concerned; what MacIntyre calls her "unusual realism about herself" (p. 139), which is comparable to the virtue of humility, so indispensable for forming friendships and for being magnanimous, both of which Edith Stein cultivated. Her pursuit of the truth permeated her life, brought unity to it, and gave it that "singleness of purpose" of a "unitary life," of which MacIntyre speaks in *After Virtue*. It is this conception of a human life, of Stein's life, that offers such a sharp contrast with that of Heidegger's life.

In MacIntyre's narrative of Stein's formation as a philosopher, he also provides an excellent account of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology as a response to what Husserl took to be the errors of Hume and Kant. For Hume the idea of substance, for example, is not derived from any impression of sensation or reflection; it is rather a collection of simple ideas united by the imagination. The same can be said of the notion of "self." We only have one or another particular perception of the "self." There is no substantial self but only a series of perceptions that are united by association. For Kant, on the other hand, the order in the phenomena, in the appearances of natural things, is introduced by the mind, and so the mind imposes order and form on objects of perception. Husserl's phenomenological enquiry was an alternative to both Kant and Neo-Kantianism, since for Husserl perception yields not just knowledge of particular sensible appearances, of what Kant called phenomena, but also of things themselves. The phenomenological method enables us to arrive at an intuition of essences and so to grasp the essential from the accidental properties of the objects presented in experience. Nature manifests itself to us as a whole, and knowledge, as Stein herself explained, "again appeared as reception, deriving its laws from objects not, as criticism has it, from determination which imposes its laws on the objects" (p. 66). The realism of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, so different from critical idealism, attracted Stein as well as her fellow students. She in fact called it "a new scholasticism" (ibid.).

Husserl's thought, however, took a turn toward idealism in *Ideas*, where he states that reality has no "absolute essence," but rather is "only intentional, only known" (p. 65). Despite this new direction in Husserl's thought and the disagreements that ensued between Husserl and some of his students, Stein wrote her doctoral dissertation under his direction on empathy, an experience which he had referred to in the first volume of *Ideas* but which he had scarcely developed. MacIntyre thoroughly shows that while Stein does rely heavily on Husserl's thought, her dissertation reveals that her own thought not only departs from his but that she is also influenced by a brilliant student of Husserl, a young professor by the name of Adolf Reinach. The latter's work on the social conditions of knowledge emphasized that mental acts require the intentionality of an embodied consciousness, and that other human beings would have to be more than simply objects of our experience if we were to have a shared understanding of a particular act—the act which occupies Reinach's special attention is that of promising.

Given Husserl's direction in *Ideas*, embodied consciousness and the question of intersubjectivity become problematic areas for his philosophy. And these are in fact the areas which are developed in Stein's work on empathy, for communication and the experience of empathy are possible for us precisely as embodied persons. In the experience of empathy we are both subjects and objects: subjects who are aware of ourselves as objects of the awareness of other subjects. Not only can our account of objects of perception be corrected by the account of others, but our own understanding of ourselves can be made more adequate from what we learn from others about ourselves (see pp. 77–83). Stein was particularly interested in the possibility of communication between human beings and in the insertion and development of individuals in communities. As Roman Ingarden, a colleague of Stein, put it: "[B]elonging to a community was a personal necessity, something that vitally affected her identity" (p. 98). So for Stein there are two questions that are inextricably linked: "What kind of person should I become?" and "Of what kinds of community should I be a member?" (p. 122). For this reason it is not surprising that, as MacIntyre points out, "her decision was from the outset both to become a Catholic and to become a Carmelite" (p. 168).

MacIntyre's study of Stein's conversion, as well as those of her contemporaries Adolf Reinach, Franz Rosenzweig, and Georg Lukács, helps us to understand that conversion need not be viewed as a Kierkegaardian "leap of faith." According to MacIntyre, many of those who have undergone a conversion understand what has happened to them "not as taking them beyond reason, but rather as enhancing their rational powers" (pp. 143–4). Belief in God brings them to a new understanding about themselves and the world. In addition, the truths made known by faith can aid the philosopher in the pursuit of truth. Edith Stein saw this clearly for as she says, "If faith makes accessible truths unattainable by any other means, philosophy cannot forego them without renouncing its universal claim to truth" (p. 180). Thus her belief in God, along with her later study of Thomas Aquinas and of the ontology characteristic of his thought, would enable her to move beyond what she perceived to be the limitations of the phenomenological project.

Stein's conversion is interestingly presented as linked with that of Reinach. While reading his notes on philosophy of religion, Stein thought of them as "very beautiful things" (p. 163), which needed to be put in print and for which she would seek the opinion of his wife, at that time grieving the death of her husband. From Frau Reinach, a convert to Catholicism, there emanated a remarkable interior peace, an "otherworldly power," which Stein was able to see and to feel and to understand. As MacIntyre puts it, "[H]er experience . . . certainly involved the kind of empathetic perception and understanding to which she had devoted so much philosophical attention" (p. 164). Stein's soul was receptive to the divine power she saw at work in Anna Reinach. From her conversations with Anna and with Hedwig Conrad-Martius, another student of Husserl, and especially from her reading of the New Testament and of the autobiography of Teresa of Avila, she came to the conclusion that she had to become a Catholic. In her reading of Teresa she recognized the truth and also the demands—even if loving ones—made on the person who experiences God's presence. To come to a realization of truth then requires a transforming of the self.

MacIntyre certainly does a singular job in his intellectual biography of Edith Stein. As he points out, the questions raised by Stein in her philosophical work prior to 1922, the year of her conversion, are more important than the conclusions themselves, for they are questions which would help to shape her life. As the "master" philosopher that he is, MacIntyre also points out further areas for study in Stein's work. His book is not only an introduction to Stein's early writings but also a prologue to the philosophical work which she would later undertake as a Catholic and as a student of Thomas Aquinas. *Edith Stein. A Philosophical Prologue, 1913–1922*, is a splendid book from which both philosophers and non-philosophers can learn about how seeing things in their true light will also require a remaking of the self.—Alice Ramos, *St. John's University*.

MANSUETO, Anthony E., Jr. *Knowing God: Restoring Reason in an Age of Doubt*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2002. v + 237 pp. Cloth, $99.95—Mother Theresa of Calcutta regularly implored Christians to work with and for the poor, for their salvation. "Touch the poor and you touch Christ; touch Christ and you will be saved." Reading the text of Mansueto's *Knowing God* reminds one of this oft quoted claim of Mother Theresa.

In this engaging, erudite, and tightly argued text, Mansueto addresses himself to a peculiar bi-polar problem facing the person of faith today. The first pole is subjective idealism, which claims that all knowledge is radically immanent, with no real connection to the "real" world. The second pole is postmodernist perspectivalism, which "regards knowledge as largely a function of social location and claims about truth and value as instruments in an ultimately unresolvable struggle for power"

(p. 2). Mansueto's resolution of this bi-polar critique of knowledge is a full fledged cognitional theory and epistemology which will provide the rational basis for a metaphysics, ethics, and theology.

The principal thesis of this text is straightforward: "[T]hat the intellect knows intelligibles by an act of abstraction from the images formed by the brain in response to the data of the external senses, and that this act of abstraction depends on a preconceptual connaturality with the object known which derives not principally from our biological, but rather from our social nature" (p. 37). The first part of this thesis is a traditional Aristotelian-Thomist claim. To demonstrate this claim, Mansueto works through the act of sensation (Chapter 1), the act of intellect (Chapter 2), and the various kinds of abstraction (Chapter 3) that he identifies [these are: totalization (Chapter 4), formalization (Chapter 5), and transcendental (Chapter 6)].

The second part of the thesis is what makes this work most remarkable. Mansueto presents an argument that a necessary condition for the act of intellection is the socialization of the individual human being. He alerts the reader to the medieval debate over the Agent Intellect in which some claimed that the Agent Intellect is the same for all human beings. He suggests that this claim, though rejected by many, can be mined for important insights about human knowing (pp. 41–3). Calling on Hegel, Marx, Durkheim and Piaget, Mansueto builds upon this medieval suggestion about the Agent Intellect to build a case for the necessarily social conditioning of all acts of the intellect. Mansueto provides this argument at the same time, in many ways, as he builds the more traditional argument about cognitional theory and epistemology. The social conditioning of both becomes clear in the course of the text. It becomes increasingly clear, as well, that attention must be paid to the kinds of structures that are in place to support intellectual development. He argues for the necessity of a tradition, or magisterium, that functions to enable the development of the various, and ever more complex, modes of abstraction that are realizations of human intellectual potential. Far from being merely an abstract philosophical argument, Mansueto looks at the historical evidence to support his claims about the necessity of social conditioning.

The entire impetus behind this work, however, is not a more adequate account of human knowing. The purpose of providing a more adequate account is to lay the groundwork for human knowledge of God. Mansueto argues on this point in the tradition of Maritain. Mansueto maintains "that the highest degree of abstraction involves not only judgment but also apprehension, and thus a real vision of being" (p. 138). In every act of judgment there is at the same time a vision of Being, that is, of God. Through a careful analysis of the act of judgment, Mansueto uncovers an implicit apprehension of Being Itself, which becomes explicit in the transcendental abstraction.

As the text concludes with a discussion of theological method, Mansueto, building on his claims about the social conditioning of acts of knowing and the preconceptual connaturality with the object to be known, presents an argument for the necessity of works of justice. In order to know the God revealed in the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, one must be engaged in social interaction sufficient to make possible

the knowledge of God that is available. Again, Mother Theresa comes to mind: "Touch the poor, and you touch God; touch God and you will be saved."

This text is worth the time and energy it will demand of the reader. It is an invigorating return to a traditional Thomism, but with respect for the development of human knowing in the natural and the social sciences. The author has provided a rich source of insights, and an even richer methodology for understanding future developments in human knowing. It is a methodology that escapes the traps of subjective idealism and postmodernist perspectivalism, while at the same time opening the human knower to the transcendent in a way that does not require the sacrifice of reason.—Mark Doorley, *Villanova University*.

MURPHY, James Bernard. *The Philosophy of Positive Law: Foundations of Jurisprudence*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 2005. xiii + 240 pp. Cloth, $40.00—This meticulously researched book addresses a central question of analytical and philosophical jurisprudence: What is positive law? Throughout his analysis, James Bernard Murphy, author of *The Moral Economy of Labor: Aristotelian Themes in Economic Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), contrasts positive law with the other two kinds of law that constitute the triad of legal concepts—natural law and customary law. Although they are treated at length in this work, Murphy states in the preface that he intends to write a companion volume on natural law and customary law, "thus completing the foundation of philosophical jurisprudence" (p. x). It is an ambitious project, but Murphy is up to the task. Murphy displays a vast knowledge of analytical jurisprudence, of the history, sociology, and anthropology of law, as well as of linguistics (study of language is the fundamental analytical tool employed by Murphy). *The Philosophy of Positive Law* is a searching examination of the concept of positive law—apparently the first such book length study—in the works of four seminal legal philosophers, Plato, St. Thomas Aquinas, Thomas Hobbes, and John Austin (along with "eminent" and contemporary scholars thereof), allowing Murphy to draw magisterial conclusions about the jurisprudence of positive law.

In the introduction, Murphy accepts the definition of positive law as "the law that human courts enforce" (p. 2). Positive law is thus distinguished from "legal positivism," which is succinctly defined as the claim that "law can be identified and distinguished from other norms by a set of empirical criteria and that the content of law has no necessary connection to moral truth" (p. 22). Yet the perennial question remains: "What distinguishes law enforced by courts from all the other kinds of law, which are not so enforced?" (p. 1). Chapter 1 seeks the roots of an answer in a philosophical debate over language among the ancient Greeks. In Plato's *Cratylus*, Socrates asserts against Cratylus that a law-giver names things as natural images of what they are; and against

Hermogenes, Socrates asserts that names do not thereby emerge by na-
ture but from social agreement. In this debate over social convention
and natural necessity, we can trace the origins of the philosophical defi-
nition of positive law, as law that "finds its source in some authoritative
enactment (in contrast to custom) or that . . . lacks intrinsic force (in
contrast to natural law)" (p. 18).

Through this prism, St. Thomas Aquinas is significantly identified in
Chapter 2 as the "first major theorist of positive law" (p. 55) because of
his paradigm of law as an authoritative imposition by a legislator.
Aquinas recognizes both divine positive law and human positive law,
which derive binding force from a complex interplay of morally neces-
sary content and the sovereignty of the promulgator. As to divine law,
Aquinas distinguishes the parts of the Mosaic law which possess generic
moral force and hence are immutable, with those that have merely legal
force and are applicable only to Israel. Likewise, enacted human laws
acquire moral force from both a rational connection to a principle of
morality and from the rational requirement to obey the law-giver. In
Chapter 3, Murphy finds that Hobbes's account of positive law, although
linguistically rich, is not able to achieve a clear distinction between law
which is positive because it is imposed and law which is positive be-
cause determinate and not vague or uncertain in content. Many of the
same ambiguities pervade John Austin's jurisprudence of positive law.
In chapter four, Austin is shown to have been greatly concerned with
questions of moral truth and divine law, in the pattern of Aquinas and
Hobbes, rather than the utilitarian jurisprudence of the Benthamites to
which he is usually linked. In his conclusion, Murphy suggests that
much of the confusion over the discourse of legal positivity stems from
a misplaced emphasis on statutory law as the supreme, and perhaps the
only, form of positive law. The insights of contemporary legal anthro-
pologists, historians, sociologists, and philosophers indicate that norm-
applying institutions—courts—are a more important source of positive
law than legislatures. This conclusion would seem to indicate that the
search of analytical philosophers such as Hans Kelsen and H. L. A. Hart
for a single enacted norm that underlies a legal system is misplaced.

The Philosophy of Positive Law reviews with great erudition the con-
tribution of leading legal thinkers to concepts of positive law, while clar-
ifying the pervasive confusion over the descriptive claim that law is pos-
itive because it has been duly enacted and the normative claim that law
is positive because it lacks intrinsic connection to moral principles.
This analysis allows for a persuasive and even striking rethinking of his-
torical jurisprudence: for example, recognizing Aquinas not only for his
natural law philosophy but for presenting "a full-blown ideology of legal
positivism" (p. 57) and Hobbes and Austin for their overlooked efforts to
connect divine and moral law with positive law.—Howard Bromberg,
Ave Maria School of Law.

ODDIE, Graham. *Value, Reality, and Desire.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. xvi + 252 pp. Cloth, $65.00—In this long, technical, and closely argued book, furnished with some seventy-five tables and figures, and three logical appendices, Oddie presents and defends what he calls "robust realism" with respect to value, the highly unfashionable thesis that value is independent of the mind, irreducible to natural facts, causally efficacious, and knowable by means of experience. Oddie has consciously set himself an audacious project, inasmuch as many contemporary theorists in meta-ethics and the metaphysics of value would surely refuse to recognize robust realism as even a live option to explain our experiences of value, much less a plausible and serious candidate for that rôle.

Oddie attempts to answer many of the vexing metaphysical and epistemological questions that stand in the way of a wide acceptance of robust realism, or any other realist theory of value, including the following: (1) What is the ontological status of these objective values? (2) Is it even meaningful to postulate values independent of valuers? (3) How do these objective values causally interact with the natural world and with material beings such as ourselves? (4) How can we come to have reliable knowledge of these values? (5) How can the realist reconcile his claim that value judgments are beliefs with the principle that value judgments motivate action and with Hume's principle that beliefs do not motivate action? (6) How can these real values be fitted into the scientific, naturalistic framework of reality? And (7) In what ways does robust realism offer better explanations of our experiences of value than the numerous non-realist alternatives? It is a testament to the seriousness and comprehensiveness of Oddie's work that all of these issues are addressed.

Robust realism is the theory that our experiences of value are caused by, and bring us into epistemic contact with, an objective reality of mind-independent values. These are not the transcendent Platonic Forms of old, whose interaction with the natural world Plato could explain only by means of metaphors. Instead, Oddie proposes that while values have a reality independent of our perceptions of them, they are completely determined by, and dependent upon, their material bases. Values supervene on nature. However, Oddie denies that this supervenience of values on the natural entails their reducibility to natural facts. In arguing for supervenience without reduction, a parting of the conceptual waters that many theorists regard as incoherent, Oddie develops at length his own version of the familiar "natural kinds" argument against reduction. According to this argument, upper-level entities or properties, such as values, can not be reduced to the natural properties on which they supervene, because, unlike values, the disjunctive set of reducing properties constitutes neither a natural kind nor a genuine property. Thus, in order to reduce values to natural facts, we would have to map a homogeneous upper-level property onto a heterogeneous set of lower-level properties, in violation, Oddie argues, of the requirements of reduction.

The greatest success of the book is Oddie's proposal of his "experience conjecture," according to which our "desires are experiences of value" (p. 47). This hypothesis performs several important explanatory offices. First, if desires are in fact experiences of goodness, then the hypothesis would explain the common view that our desires are somehow related to the experience of goodness. Second, since desires are familiar experiences, we can explain our epistemic access to the realm of values without positing a mysterious faculty of intuition. And third, the experience conjecture would allow us to retain Hume's principle that beliefs about the world are separate from, and do not entail, desires, without denying that our beliefs about values do influence our desires.

There is much in this sophisticated book from which philosophers can profit. In the course of his wide-ranging argument that robust realism "is as coherent, attractive, and every bit as believable as any of its antirealist rivals" (p. 2), Oddie introduces a bounty of thoughtful and provocative insights into our understanding of noncognitivism, idealism, naturalism, properties, supervenience, reduction, and causation. One source of concern, however, is whether Oddie has perhaps understated the violence to the contemporary scientific understanding of reality that a realist theory of values would occasion. Although he tries to minimize the collateral metaphysical damage by attaching values superveniently to natural facts, and by adopting a minimally disruptive account of value causation, it seems unlikely that Oddie's welter of arguments, distinctions, and illustrations will ultimately succeed in dislodging some form of antirealism as the preeminent explanation of value. Robust realism awaits the construction of a metaphysical theory that can accommodate it.—Carl Miller, *Fort Hays State Universty*.

OSBORNE. Thomas M., Jr. *Love of Self and Love of God in Thirteenth-Century Ethics*. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005. ix + 325 pp. Cloth. $60.00, paper, $30.00—The theme of this book is the medieval discussion of the question whether one can naturally love God more than one can love oneself. While this topic is certainly more appropriate to moral theology than to ethics, Thomas Osborne widens the scope of the question to consider the moral problem of the psychology of altruistic behavior in relation to self-oriented behavior. The point of departure for his discussion is the work of the theologians, Augustine and Bernard of Clairvaux, who argue that by loving God more than oneself, a human being may overcome the natural inclination of egoism. In the thirteenth century the question becomes more complicated by the introduction of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* into the curriculum of the Arts Faculty of European universities. Aristotle's discussion on friendship redirects the discussion toward a consideration of the problems of self-love and altruistic actions.

Osborne shows how "Augustine's battle with the Pelagians" (p. 22) and Bernard's notion of bent nature (*natura curva*) provide the background against which the medieval discussion on love of self and love of

God developed. The early scholastic discussion concentrated upon the problem of the natural tendency of human beings to pursue their own goodness, and how choosing to love God more than oneself contributed to this end.

With the translation of Aristotle's *Ethics* into Latin at the beginning of the thirteenth century, the question of natural love encompassed philosophical themes, such as contemplation as the *finis hominis*, the proper object of contemplation, the dilemma of choosing the communal good over the individual good, and the primacy of the will or intellect. Although Osborne's main interest is the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, he examines many lesser-known figures, who participated in the medieval deliberations concerning moral issues. Theologians, such as Philip the Chancellor, William of Auxerre, Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, and Bonaventure, contributed to the formulation of the Thomistic resolution of the question. For Thomas, the principle that the part naturally loves the whole more than itself provides the foundation for his doctrine of natural love. Thomas can thereby argue that the human good exists "more perfectly in God than in ourselves, since God is the perfect and first universal cause of goods, including our own" (p. 77). Osborne then considers the relevance of this principle to the question of human moral goodness. After discussing various modern interpretations of Thomas's doctrine of the "natural" desire for goodness, Osborne concludes that "any desire for the good is an implicit desire for God" (p. 107). Osborne has some difficulty understanding how God can be both the universal good and the good for every individual human being. Thomas, however, resolved the problem by adapting a distinction from Aristotle's *Physics* concerning the end: the end of which (*finis cuius*) and the end by which (*finis quo*). God as the *finis cuius* is the same for all, but as the *finis quo* He is the object of every individual's distinct contemplative activity. In this way Thomas can maintain there can be the same moral end for all human beings, but their happiness is individualized by their unique intellectual actions.

An important and illuminating chapter of the book concerns the transition from the study of Aristotle in the thirteenth century to the more critical view of the philosopher in the fourteenth century. Osborne analyzes the contributions to the problem of self love of Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome, Godfrey of Fontaines, and James of Viterbo. While these figures are less prominent than Thomas and Duns Scotus, their contributions to medieval philosophy and theology were significant. Osborne shows how they reacted to the doctrines of Thomas and paved the way for Scotus's resolution to the questions of the primacy of natural love of God over self, and the compatibility of Aristotleian moral psychology with such a love. Osborne argues convincingly that Scotus "resembles his predecessors in the Aristotelian scholastic tradition more strongly than scholars have recognized" (p. 205). Osborne argues that the "voluntarism" of Scotus's theory does not lead to a general dismissal of a morality based on human nature. Human nature directs the will to choose objects that are deemed to be morally good.

While many may argue that medieval moral theory is so greatly affected by theological concerns that it can never be considered an autonomous ethical philosophy, Osborne shows that many modern moral issues have equivalents in medieval thought. Osborne perhaps extends the concept of ethics too far when he consider, the natural love for God to be an ethical question, but he is correct in viewing this problem as essential to medieval moral theory. The goal of moral thinking in this period was not to construct a science of ethical deliberation but, as Aristotle claimed, to make us good (*ut boni fiamus*). For the medieval masters discussed in this book, the primary way in which a human being could become good was to love the first being. The manner in which one loved God and how this activity affected subsequent moral choices were topics of much dispute in this period. Osborne is successful in his treatment of these issues.

The book is generally clearly written and well researched. Some minor errors, however, remain. Some are rather insignificant, such as typographical errors and grammatical flaws. The author twice cites Kilwardby as Richard Kiwlardby, when, in fact, he is Robert Kilwardby. The most serious criticism concerns the translations of the Latin texts. Although the author clearly understands the texts, he does, at times, render the Medieval Latin into English that is awkward, and perhaps misleading to the reader, who cannot comprehend the original texts. Two examples are sufficient here:

1) "... *studiosum quantumcumque diligat se et suum bonum proprium et intrinsecum, magis tamen eligit bene et virtuose mori et non esse quam bonum commune perire.*

Osborne's Translation: "... the eager citizen (*studiosus*) as much as soever he loves his own and intrinsic good, however more he chooses to die well and virtuously and not to exist rather than for the common good to perish" (p. 146).

Alternative translation: "... the learned (or educated) citizen however much he loves his own and intrinsic good, would still choose to die well and virtuously and cease to exist rather than to have the common good be lost."

2) "*Dilectio enim naturalis prius et magis tendit in se quam in Deum.* . . .

Osborne's translation: "For natural love tends first and more to itself than to God" (p. 158).

Alternative: Natural love has a prior and greater tendency to itself than to God."

There are several other problematic renderings of the Latin into English, but the subsequent analyses explain the ideas contained therein clearly and well. Those who have an interest in medieval moral theory will gain from this book a greater knowledge of important themes in the writings of medieval thinkers in the thirteenth century.—Anthony J. Celano, *Stonehill College.*

PANGLE, Thomas L. *Political Philosophy and the God of Abraham*. Balti-
    more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003. 285 pp. Cloth, $39.95—
    This wise book is of considerable merit and importance. It inquires into
    the intelligible relationship, if any, between that revelation found in the
    Hebrew Bible and the tradition of political philosophy rooted in So-
    crates. Thomas Pangle, now at the University of Texas at Austin, is a
    well-known and careful scholar in the tradition of Leo Strauss. His eru-
    dition is impressive. Seventy-eight pages of useful footnotes go with
    one hundred and eighty-four pages of text. Pangle ranges freely and fa-
    miliarly through scriptural, rabbinic, philosophical, Christian, and Mus-
    lim commentaries and sources on central issues found in and rising out
    of the Hebrew tradition.

    The supposition of the book stems from political philosophy; namely,
    a systematic and coherent account of political things is found in the phi-
    losophers, beginning with Plato and Aristotle in particular, but carried
    on in the moderns from Hobbes to Hegel and Kierkegaard. Familiarity
    with this tradition is taken for granted. Pangle next follows the implica-
    tions of Strauss's well-known observations about Jerusalem and Athens,
    with Tertullian's acid remark about whether they have anything to do
    with each other. Pangle is acutely aware of the implications both of the
    answer that they do have something to do with each other and the one
    that denies any. In this book, Pangle seeks to show that some coherent
    relationship is possible. How this coherence is understood is what this
    book is about.

    Pangle, I think, is not an Averroist, that is, someone who might be
    tempted to deny any relationship between the Bible and philosophy but
    who, for political reasons, keeps the news quiet. He takes political phi-
    losophy seriously, but no less seriously than the intelligible content of
    the Hebrew Bible, even when it leaves us with some mystery, the great-
    est of which, as he shows in last chapter on Kierkegaard, is the call of
    Abraham to dutifully sacrifice his son Isaac, something that also seemed
    to contradict Yahweh's promise to Abraham of a progeny as numerous
    as the sands of the seas. This issue of Yahweh's command to Abraham
    and his response has long been recognized as a test question between
    the tradition of reason and the tradition of obedience to God.

    The crucial question of political philosophy has to do with how we are
    to live in this world and why this living requires ethics, economics, and
    politics, plus their relation to the philosophic life. In this sense, politics
    has its own proper sphere of reasoned life, the life of prudence. Politics
    is limited to what it is. On the other hand, the prophetic tradition, the
    life of revelation in the Hebrew Bible, sees the life of wisdom not to be
    the philosophic life, but the life of obedience, especially obedience to
    law, to the very detailed Mosaic Law, that includes, to be sure, the Ten
    Commandments, the ethical life. But the Old Law does not seem to be,
    as in the Greek classics, a self-governing system of politics of the best
    regime.

    What Pangle does in this book is to carry through a sustained argu-
    ment about the content of the Hebrew Bible from Genesis through the
    Fall, to the family of Adam, to Noah, to Abraham, and the founding of
    the Chosen People. Pangle rightly wants to know whether this account,

particularly the account of Creation, is simply a hodge-podge, or whether some intelligibility exists in it that would be worthy of philosophic curiosity if not ponderings. I recall reading somewhere a remark of Pangle wherein he told a class that the odd thing about sitting down and reading the Hebrew Bible, no mean task, is the impression that the whole thing was written by one author, even though we know that different books come from different individuals and periods. That is to say, as this book suggests, something innately coherent exists in this Book of Books.

Pangle examines, often with the aid of Augustine and Aquinas, each issue in the Old Testament that might contradict what are the obvious positions of the political philosophers—say, why the preference for monarchy and not democracy, or what is the relation between natural law universalism and Hebrew particularism? In one sense, his essential task is to establish a sensible reason why this Hebrew tradition, with its living political representatives, might be said to maintain something that is essential to political philosophy, something not so clearly seen by these especially modern philosophers themselves. Following a passage in Deuteronomy 4, one often used by Strauss, Pangle suggests that the Hebrew Bible, with its faith and obedience, is intended for the nations as the example and understanding of how best to live in this world, how to be wise. This content can be grasped in a sensible way by representatives of the Socratic tradition.—James V. Schall, S.J., *Georgetown University*.

PLATO, *The Republic*. Translated with an Introduction by R. E. Allen. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006. xxvii + 369 pp. Cloth,$35.00.—This new translation of what many regard as Plato's greatest dialogue is the first major translation in English since the publication of F. M. Cornford's and G. M. A. Grube's renditions more than a generation ago. R. E. Allen, an accomplished philosopher in his own right, is recognized as a distinguished translator of Plato's dialogues. Yale University Press has previously published his translations of the *Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Gorgias, Menexenus*; the *Symposium, Ion, Hippias Minor, Laches, Protagoras* and *Parmenides*. Intended for the student and general reader, this edition is accompanied by Allen's notes and an introduction. In his introduction, Allen shows that moral and political issues raised in the *Republic* remain important still. The *Republic* was read by the Framers of the U.S. Constituion and later by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, whom Allen identifies as "beyond question a Throsymachean." The *Republic* is many things: metaphysics and epistemology, social theory, moral psychology, and ethics; "But the threshold question is political," writes Allen, "*Politeia*, the word which we translate as 'republic,' is consistently used to mean 'Constitution,' and we may legitimately read the *Republic* as an essay in constitutional law."

The Introduction alone is worth the price of the volume. Students who are assigned the translation will find not only a lucid text but

Allen's guiding hand in showing its contemporary relevance.—Jude P. Dougherty, *The Catholic University of America*.

PROCLUS. *On the Existence of Evils.* | Translated by Jan Opsomer and Carlos Steel. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003. 159 pp. Cloth, $73.50—It seems to be of little importance whether one speaks of evil or of evils, but for the Neoplatonic philosopher Proclus it made all the difference. In his treatise *On the Existence of Evils (De malorum subsistentia* = DMS), Proclus argued that Plotinus, who had famously concluded that prime matter is absolute evil and the cause of all evils in the physical, as well as in the psychical realm (Enn. 1.8), was wrong, and that, in fact, there existed no absolute evil at all, but only individual evils. With Plotinus and against some Middle Platonists like Atticus and Plutarch, Proclus rejected the possibility of the existence of two independent principles of good and evil, since there can be only one first principle, namely the One. However, if this first principle is good, as Plato affirms in *Republic* VI and as follows from its very nature as the source of being, how can there be evil?

Plotinus and Proclus do not follow the Stoic solution which denies the existence of evil as contradicting divine providence; after all, evil is a reality, and according to Plato's *Theaetetus* (176a), it is a necessary opposite to goodness, even though not to the Good itself. Yet evil has a specific place in the hierarchy of being; it is limited to the physical world. Universal substances, which transcend the corporeal realm, are changeless and therefore incapable of any deterioration; as real beings they are good. Therefore, it is only individual souls and individual bodies that are susceptible to defects, that is, to vicious states and to unnatural conditions. Incarnated souls and physical bodies are inferior to the intelligible because they are in touch, as it were, with matter, that last and lowest level of reality which in and of itself is nothing, real nonbeing. Devoid of any form of its own, matter is the necessary substrate for all the forms that the World-Soul imparts; however, unlike all entities superior to it, it is unproductive due to its absolute lack of being. This is where Plotinus and Proclus depart. Whereas Plotinus ascribes to matter a specific efficacy—as absolute lack of measure it can cause lack of measure in bodies and souls—Proclus denies it. If matter is immaterial, formless, unproductive and devoid of being, it cannot be a cause at all, not even of evil. Moreover, if matter is not an independent principle, it must be caused ultimately by the first principle, the Good; but nothing deriving from the Good can be evil.

How does Proclus account for the existence of evil if it is caused neither by the first principle, the Good, nor by matter? Interpreting a passage in *Republic* II (379c) that vindicates the goodness of the gods and assigns the existence of evil to "some other causes," he argues that there is no single cause of evil, no hypostasis; there are rather individual evils that emerge in and coexist with individual bodies and souls in some sort

of parhypostasis, "parasitic existence" (the translators' rendering of the term; compare to p. 24 with note 81; DMS 49 and following.). Evils are contrary to individual goods, for example, a disease is contrary to the health of a specific body, but not to the health of bodies universally; therefore, they are partial. Moreover, like parasites, evils depend for their power on the strength of their hosts, as, for example, a disease depends on the strength of the body or a vice on the strength of the soul (the more intelligent an agent the more effective the vice). Evils can only exist as long as their hosts exist; consequently, they have a share in being and hence in goodness. Therefore, Proclus concludes that evils *qua* beings are caused by the Good insofar as they reside in beings caused by the Good; *qua* evils, however, they are not caused by the Good, but originate from an incapacity of ontologically inferior levels of reality to receive fully the goodness of the first principle.

DMS belongs to a trilogy of treatises concerning providence, free will and evil, the so-called *Tria Opuscula* (ed. H. Boese. Berlin, 1960). The original Greek text is mostly lost, but a literal Latin translation by William of Moerbeke survives, on which the translation by Opsomer and Steel is based. The translation (pp. 55–104) of the often difficult, sometimes almost unintelligible Latin version of Moerbeke is accurate and clear. The translators supply basic explanations and references to primary sources in the Notes (pp. 105–31), as well as information on textual problems in a Philological Appendix (pp. 133–45). The history of the text, the philosophical (Neoplatonic) context of the problem of evil, and a structural analysis of the treatise are provided in a concise Introduction (pp. 1–53). The volume is completed by a Select Bibliography (pp. 147–53) and indices (pp. 154–160). All those interested in the problem of evil, and in particular Neoplatonic approaches to it, will welcome this first English translation of DMS since 1833 and look forward to more volumes to come.—Matthias Vorwerk, *The Catholic University of America.*

RESCHER, Nicholas. *Scholastic Meditations. Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy*, vol. 44. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005. x + 169 pp. Cloth, $49.95—In the last essay of this collection, Rescher sums up the general thrust of this collection of essays when he says, "what we owe to the great tradition of Catholic philosophy is a matter of acknowledging it as the source not only of a substantial problem agenda for philosophical inquiry but also as a role model for us in our efforts to grapple with the problems it poses." The collection in this volume include five previously published essays and five new ones organized around the tradition of Catholic philosophical inquiry with particular attention to recurring themes in epistemology and metaphysics. Medieval scholastics are used as guides, sources, and foils for Rescher's own arguments which cast new light on traditional questions.

Chapter One, on "Choice Without Preference: The Problem of Buridan's Ass," considers how it is possible to make a rational choice with symmetric desires. Rescher takes the reader on a historical *tour de force* of the arguments from Averroes and Aquinas to Leibnitz and Kant. Rescher contends that in cases of symmetric knowledge between two alternatives, a random choice is a reasonable choice. This follows from the pragmatic concern that not making a choice is less desirable than making a choice without preference. The solution is that one may choose a policy of randomness (for example, "Choose the first one that comes into view") that can be employed in situations of choice without preference.

Chapter Two examines Nicholas of Cusa's interpretation of Islam as a Christian heresy—since the Muslims denied the divinity of Christ. Yet, Nicholas is able to see the true elements of religion in the Koran while rejecting those inconsistent with his own Christian faith, which may serve as a helpful model for contemporary interfaith dialogue. Consistent with the later essays in this collection, Rescher is quick to point out the noetic constraints upon Nicholas's treatment of Islamic thought.

The third, fourth, and fifth essays focus upon epistemological limits on our knowledge as well as limits upon our understanding of God's knowledge. While much of analytic philosophy is written in a stultifying fashion, Resher's rhetorical flair illuminates the issues with refreshing clarity that should engage readers with varying degrees of familiarity with the issues. These chapters elaborate on the ideas that (1) I can know what I know, (2) I can know that there are facts that I don't know, and (3) I can never know what it is precisely that I do not know. Rescher applies this basic epistemological sequence to our knowledge of ourselves, our possible knowledge, and how we must think about how God knows what God knows. On this last point Rescher concludes that we can know that God knows more than we do but we cannot say how it is that God knows more than we since we lack omniscience.

Chapters Six and Seven focus on the ideas of infinite regress and the nature of ontology. In these two chapters we see Rescher's distinct brand of pragmatism at work most clearly. Chapter Six, on "Issues of Infinite Regress," address the problems raised by Aquinas in his famous "Five Ways." Rescher's critical appraisal is that "An unending regress of causes is conceivable, an unending regress of causal explanations is not—as long as those explanations are intelligible to us." Chapter Seven on "Being Qua Being" argues that even if we cannot define "existence"— since its meaning cannot be clarified by definite terms—ontology is still possible because real beings have characteristics that we are able to describe and define. Thus, ontology has a pragmatic function—to describe those characteristics of real beings we address in philosophical discourse.

Chapter Nine confronts the problem of "non-existents" and whether or not they are "knowable." Rescher argues that problems of "transworld identity" dissolve since there is no conceivable "pre-identity" for them in the first place, that is, there is no way for us to identify them as having any reification in the first place.

The last two chapters, "Thomism: Past, Present, and Future" and "Respect for Tradition and the Catholic Philosopher Today" have the feel of in-house advice to Catholic philosophers as to how they should go about their professional work, how to use their sources judiciously, and in what way respect for the authority of the Church as well as authority for past philosophers should be given.

Rescher's knowledge of the history of philosophy—especially the medieval and modern eras—is impressive. Drawing upon Aquinas and other great scholastics, he is able to formulate questions and propose solutions to contemporary metaphysics and epistemology that are informed by the great medieval scholastics in a way that critically employs these authors without slavishly following them wherever they lead. Yet, one wonders why Rescher ignores the most important interpreter of Aquinas, and an outstanding scholastic metaphysician in his own right, Francisco Suarez.—Craig A. Boyd, *Azusa Pacific University*.

ROCKMORE, Tom. *Hegel, Idealism, and Analytic Philosophy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005. 284 pp. Cloth, $40.00—Rockmore argues that recent attempts by analytic philosophers such as Robert Brandom and John McDowell to make use of Hegel's ideas represent an encroachment on continental philosophy that cannot be allowed to pass unchallenged. This encroachment rests on a basic confusion over the differences between analytic and continental philosophy, and in particular between the analytic semantic concern to establish reference and the continental concern with epistemology. Philosophers like Brandom and McDowell only think that their positions are Hegelian because they completely ignore Hegel's idealism, and so think that Hegel's views could be consistent with their own metaphysical realism. In this way they are still influenced by G. E. Moore's uninformed rejection of idealism as denying the existence of the external world.

The book is split into three long chapters. Chapter 1 surveys idealism, British idealism and the early analytic reaction against it. Rockmore argues that there is no single point of doctrine that unites all idealists, or even British idealists. In particular, Rockmore argues that no idealist denies the existence of the external world, and thus that Moore's rejection of idealism is off the mark. If this is so, then there is no reason for contemporary (analytic) philosophers to be wary of idealism, or to avoid looking to idealism as a solution to epistemological problems.

Chapter 2 surveys the various forms of pragmatism and neopragmatism. As in Chapter 1, Rockmore denies that there is a single doctrine linking all pragmatists; furthermore he adds that, as currently used, the term "pragmatism" is close to losing all meaning. Rockmore argues that pragmatism does not understand knowledge as historical in the same way that Hegel does, and thus that Hegel cannot be said to be a pragmatist. The chapter culminates in a discussion of Brandom, McDowell, and Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer. In arguing against the Hegel interpretations of these three authors, Rockmore claims that each of the three is com-

mitted to a project that is fundamentally at odds with Hegel's own project. Brandom and Stekeler-Weithofer are fundamentally interested in a semantic theory of reference that, as usually understood, is fundamentally different from the interest in epistemology that Hegel has. The semantic theory of reference is only one topic in epistemology, which concerns the broader issue of knowledge. In addition, each of the three is a metaphysical realist, whereas Hegel (as a good post-Kantian) rejects metaphysical realism (the doctrine that we can know a mind-independent world as it is) in favor of empirical realism (the doctrine that we can know the real within consciousness in such a way that it represents an empirical constraint on knowledge). The two themes are connected because the Fregean focus on semantics involves reference to the mind-independent real world, and thus entails metaphysical realism. This chapter is predominantly negative in character: the main point is that there is not currently an interesting conversation across the analytic-continental divide because these analytic thinkers have not squarely addressed the vast differences in project and approach that separate the two kinds of philosophy.

In Chapter 3, Rockmore provides the picture of Hegel on which his criticisms in Chapter 2 are based. There are three basic elements to this picture. First, Hegel is an empirical, not metaphysical realist. This discussion left me with a number of questions. A consideration of Kenneth Westphal's realist interpretation of Hegel (which is summarily dismissed in a footnote) would have been useful. Also, though I doubt that Hegel is a metaphysical realist, he is not an antirealist such as Rorty, nor is it clear that there is any restriction on objects of knowledge of Hegel's view (since he thinks the transcendental thing in itself is unintelligible). Since Brandom and McDowell's professions of realism come in response to Rortean antirealism, a real conversation between the two and Hegel still seems possible.

Second, Hegel does not advance a doctrine of absolute knowledge, but of absolute knowing (that is, our understanding of the epistemic process). Hegel distinguishes between first order knowledge claims and second-order conceptual schemes. Hegel's "spirit" is the "practical negotiation of unstable, mutable conceptual frameworks in real time" (p. 191). My concern here is that this characterization applies more obviously to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* than it does to Hegel's mature system, and Rockmore provides no argument to link it to Hegel's mature thought.

Third, Hegel's contextualism is fundamentally historical (unlike the [neo]pragmatists). Knowledge claims are historically relative, but still objective. They are historical in the sense that they involve reference to a world-view or conceptual schemes that change through time for reasons that are not directly related to the first-order judgments those schemes support. I was left wanting to know more about the nature of Hegel's historicism, and particularly why it would be at odds with pragmatist contextualism.—Chris Yeomans, *Kenyon College.*

RUSSELL, Daniel C. *Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life.* Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 2005. 340 pp. Cloth, $74.00—Russell finds a consistent and
unified account of happiness and virtue in the Platonic corpus. He
traces its development through the *Euthydemus, Gorgias, Phaedo, Re-
public,* and *Philebus.* In this account, virtue is happiness, in part, be-
cause of the way it incorporates pleasure. In rough outline, the account
has the following important aspects.

First of all, Russell distinguishes between the additive conception of
happiness and the directive conception. The former is "the view that
happiness depends on the 'ingredients' added into one's life. . . ." He
does not say, but clearly means, ingredients other than virtue. The di-
rective conception is "the view that happiness depends on the intelligent
agency that gives one's life the direction it needs to be healthy and flour-
ishing. . . ." (p. 17). Intelligent agency is, as one might expect, virtue.
Thus, in the *Euthydemus,* the virtue of wisdom makes one's assets, for
example, wealth and health, good not by changing the assets or achiev-
ing something with them but by changing the agent's attitude towards
them (p. 29). Wisdom illustrates the directive conception of happiness.
It is the intelligent agency that gives the direction that one's assets need
for health and flourishing; in turn, happiness depends on wisdom. It
does not depend on the assets in any important way. If one thinks hap-
piness does depend on these assets, he has an additive conception of
happiness. In the latter conception, the virtuous person would be hap-
pier with the addition of, for example, wealth, even if the nonvirtuous
one would not.

Russell can now put pleasure into the picture. He holds that, while
Plato thinks pleasure is an important aspect of happiness, it cannot be
something like an ingredient to be added to one's life—like a conse-
quence or reward of virtue. Pleasure must be rationally incorporated in
one's life (p. 46). In order to explicate this notion, Russell uses the dis-
tinction between pleasure as a sensation and pleasure as a propositional
attitude—the latter being "a way of registering the value we attach to
the objects of our pleasure" (p. 89). Pleasure is rationally incorporated
in one's life if these propositional attitudes are shaped by intelligent
agency, that is, by virtue. With pleasure so incorporated, one would be
pleased, for example, by doing a brave deed. First of all, pleasures of
this sort are not sensations, like that of eating a doughnut; they are atti-
tudes that register the value one attaches to acting bravely. Second,
these pleasures are not added to virtue—like some reward. They are in-
tegral to virtue since they are its affective aspect.

It would be a fair conclusion to draw from this book that in these dia-
logues Socrates articulated a lot of what would later be Stoic ethical
teaching—a conclusion Russell invites. Space forbids trying to assess
this claim in much detail, although the informed reader will find some of
the author's interpretations of particular passages unconvincing—even
if others are well-argued. An instance of the former is found in the *Eu-
thydemus,* where Socrates famously claims that if one has wisdom, he
does not need good fortune. Socrates backs up this puzzling claim with
a clearly invalid argument that uses the *technê* analogy (279d–280b).
Russell would save Socrates from implausibility by claiming that in this
passage good fortune amounts to the exercise of wisdom, not its accom-

plishments. Thus, the very exercise of wisdom is the whole of good fortune—an interpretation that fits with Russell's thesis about the directive conception of happiness (pp. 30–1). While this move would save Socrates, it is hardly clear that it is one he makes in the context of the argument he actually gives.

One can level a somewhat larger criticism against this interpretation. To make his case, Russell puts aside the Platonic doctrines no Stoic would accept, thus assuming that the moral theory can be separated from the metaphysical. In the last chapter, however, the author admits that his interpretation of virtue is in tension with another strain in Plato's account—one in which pleasures must be externally controlled rather than rationally incorporated into virtue. This strain is seen in those passages where, for example, the bodily appetites are treated like dumb animals that need to be tamed or plants that need to be trimmed back. Although Russell does not explore this possibility, it is surely the case that this second strain is related to Plato's dualism of mind and body and that the latter is of a piece with his metaphysical doctrines. This observation raises the issue of the delicacy of trying to separate Plato's ethical theory from the metaphysical.

Still, it can hardly be denied that Socrates sounded themes that the Stoics developed. Russell does a credible job of giving a well-argued interpretation of these dialogues that shows how—and to what extent— they can be read in a Stoic light. The effort is well worth making and will be of interest both to the specialist and to a general philosophical audience.—Richard D. Parry, *Agnes Scott College.*

SCHUMACHER, Bernard. *A Philosophy of Hope: Josef Pieper and the Contemporary Debate on Hope.* Translated by David C. Schindler. Moral Philosophy and Moral Theology Series, No. 5. New York: Fordham University Press, 2003. xii + 317 pp. Cloth, $60.00—Josef Pieper's philosophical work has received negligible critical attention in the English-speaking academy, yet translations of many of his works have appeared regularly since the mid 1950s. Few philosophers are as widely read by the thoughtful general public as is Pieper. As with Socrates in Hellenic times, Pieper's philosophy materializes in an engagement with questions of the day that preoccupy society, and like Socrates, Pieper deftly draws his reader into a consideration of basic philosophical ideas. For example, in his well-known book on leisure as the basis of culture, he insists on the rightful place of *theoria*—speculative thought that begins and ends in wonder—in any culture worthy of human dignity. His refashioning of this perennial insight, however, is tailored to the demands of reestablishing society in the face of the spiritual ravages of two world wars and the toll taken on several generations by totalitarian systems of government. In his approach to philosophical argument, Pieper does not set out to fashion his own special terminology or system, rather, he works within a philosophical tradition. Inquiry begins by giving an ear

to Plato, Aristotle, and especially Thomas Aquinas. The subsequent appropriation or application of principles and arguments enriches contemporary discussions with a philosophical aptness and clarity that challenges the inclinations of a culture skittish of wisdom based on truths of Absolute Being. Bernard Schumacher's treatment of the philosophy of hope shows Pieper at his philosophical and dialectical best. It becomes clear how the issue of hope pervades Pieper's thought. More importantly, the book persuades us that the challenge to hope is a vital contemporary issue.

By nature men project themselves into future possibilities with a foresight that anticipates difficulties in the way of achieving their goals and especially the ultimate end of beatitude. Two questions arise: How much confidence should one allow one's self? And, what basis is there for acting with assurance of achieving one's goals? Schumacher shows Pieper confronting both nihilism's pessimism, represented in Sartre's existentialist atheism, and the rationalist optimism in historical progress through human *praxis*, represented in Ernst Bloch's Marxism. The argument ranges across fundamental issues in anthropology, ontology, and the philosophy of history.

An adequate philosophy of hope has to face the contingency of existence and in particular the reality of death. In a fundamental sense, one's own death presents itself as a barrier to any achievable ideal of final personal fulfillment, especially if that fulfillment is conceived as an historical event. In a more universal or communal sense, when the life of humanity is projected into a future that can be imagined realistically as terminating in either planetary catastrophe or the kind of suicide of humanity made imaginable by 20th century horrors such as Auschwitz and Hiroshima, then the meaning of human life with respect to history is made questionable, especially if one believes that man's end is worked out in *praxis* that remains immanent to its history. It is in virtue of hope, then, that man, the "not-yet-being" follows his natural inclination "from *minimal-being* to *being-complete*" (p. 123) and presses forward his projects into a future of difficult, realistic possibilities.

Schumacher explains Pieper's concept of hope as a passion of the irascible appetite that moves one through substantial difficulties toward an achievable end. The passion needs to be moderated by the virtue of humility and reinforced by the virtue of magnanimity. Magnanimity, a form of courage, "urges the subject on toward a natural ideal of greatness, toward a *being-more* through an effort of conquering the arduous good" (p. 107). Humility, rising from temperance, perfects the irascible appetite and enables hope to act in conformity with the dictates of right reason. In the final analysis, as Pieper argues it, hope anticipates an ultimate good that transcends both nature and history. Also, its achievement, from the points of view of both natural reason and *praxis*, requires a saving intervention from a transcendent agent. What this means is that a person of hope must exist in the world on the basis of a primary act of trust in the goodness of being, which in turn, rests on the creative love of the Absolute Being. What is perhaps most illuminating and surprising is Pieper's insistence on trust and its corresponding metaphysics of creation. "The certainty of the reason felt by the terminally ill person, by the prisoner condemned to death, by the martyr, that

they will not sink into nothingness once they have crossed the threshold of death is thus, according to Pieper, ultimately rooted in a trust in being that is more fundamental than nothingness" (p. 161). Behind it all is trust in a Creator God—not reasoned to but grasped in an *a priori* intuition. None of these claims is given without its emerging through the process of an extensive dialectical encounter with major twentieth-century European thinkers.

Although this review has emphasized the significance of the book's subtitle, *Josef Pieper and the Contemporary Debate on Hope*, Schumacher presents us with the elements of a critical essay on the philosophy of hope in its own right. The book is filled with instructive and interesting detailed analyses of the many facets of hope. It is curious how in Europe there is a debate over hope that cuts to the marrow of culture, whereas in North America the topic seems more distant, even academic. Perhaps Americans are a more hopeful people who have resisted contemporary challenges to its trust in transcendent reality. Or alternatively, it may be that the New World has yet to face the despair that lies behind its culture increasingly powered by pragmatism and ordered to the enjoyment of material prosperity. The original French edition, *Une philosophie de l'espérance: La pensée de Josef Pieper dans le contexte du débat contemporain sur l'espérance*, was published by Cerf/Éditions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse in 2000.—William A. Frank, *University of Dallas.*

TANCREDI, Laurence. *Hardwired Behavior; What Neuroscience Reveals about Morality.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 240 pp. Cloth, $28.99—Tancredi sets out in his own words to "examine the history of our general idea about morality, and its development through childhood; show how modern neuroscience research is shifting the focus to the brain as a physical organ shaping moral responses; and illustrate the outcome of defective brain wiring in the development of undesirable moral traits." In a final chapter, he paints a fantastic picture of a society one hundred years from now in which, based on a change in paradigm from "mentalism" (that is, the mind as something invisible and intangible) to "physicalism" (that is, the brain as the source of moral behavior), the potential for political control to create a homogenized moral society will once again, he fears, rear its Orwellian head.

Many neuroscientists who started out with the brain as the target of their curiosity, interest, research, and practice now see colleagues in psychology and psychiatry add the prefix "neuro-" to their areas of specialty and subspecialties.

Indeed, the modern neurosciences, particularly those of chemistry, genetics, neurotransmission, and neuroimaging, have contributed massively to our understanding of brain formation, maturation, function, injury and to a lesser extent, recovery after injury. Tancredi finds a recent adaptation of MRI imaging—the functional MRI (fMRI)—of particular

interest and, apparently, of particular credibility. Autoregulation is the process by which the brain not only commands (demands and gets) a constant flow of blood, in both volume and velocity, across a wide spectrum of systemic blood pressures but also that within that constant supply to the entire organ, when measured within the brain, there is enough surplus to permit the shifting of blood from less active areas to areas where more metabolic substrate is required to sustain the demand created by more active regions. The brain actually regulates its own supply of nutrients in response to its own needs. The fMRI is a technique whereby minute increases in blood flow to tiny areas of the brain, corresponding to the known general locations of specific nuclei, may be interpreted as increased neuronal activity of those nuclei. Similarly, with decreased flow, the reverse is thought to be true.

It has long since been established, however, that in pathological conditions, such as partial seizures in which one part of the brain is actually convulsing and in strokes in which part of the brain is actually "dead," the mechanism of autoregulation itself is often suspended or dysfunctional.

Most studies using fMRI are based on anecdotal case reports and/or small-sample-sized case series reports. Nonetheless, this technique and the numerous references made to published studies are a real asset to empiricists who are not concerned with the classical methods of neuron-epistemology, and to non-scientists who are only marginally exposed to them. And so far, so good. There have not been any newly imaged centers of function that had not been known by classical neuro-investigative methods.

Tancredi also briefly describes two other processes of abiding interest to the neurobiologist, namely, selective myelinization and dendritic sprouting, both anatomical indicators of primary or recuperative learning. In contrast to the sequence in which the subjects are taught in medical school—that is, anatomy first, then physiology—in most biological and engineering systems, function determines structure. Most who studied a generation ago were taught that the nerve fibers with the thickest myelin sheaths conduct the fastest. During the period of rapid brain growth and development, the increase in brain size from that of a small fist at birth to ninety-five percent of adult size when a person starts school in first grade is due to the deposition of the fatty substance myelin around the fibers connecting nerve cells already present at birth. If myelin were distributed first to the most frequently stimulated fibers, then the most frequently used pathways would become facilitated, (a pretty scary notion when you realize that most myelin is deployed before we even start formal education.) Those fibers that we avoid stimulating throughout a lifetime—pain pathways, for example—have the thinnest myelin coats and conduct very slowly. It has been found that myelinization does continue into adult life, especially in higher brain centers.

Dendritic sprouting is a process where by the dendrites, the receiving fibers of nerve cells, attempt and often succeed at growing new connections with previously unconnected or recently disconnected nearby stimulator fibers (axons). These are two of the mechanisms invoked to account for learning and the limited but definite improvement often

seen in brain function after injury. But so are all of the scientific pro-
cesses cited in this well-referenced book; they reveal purported mecha-
nisms by which human behavior may occur or indeed be monitored.
They ignore the possibility that there may be a mind, a spiritual compo-
nent, or an immaterial soul. To the contrary, they are only helpful in ex-
plaining how the concrete brain works in support of the "abstract" but
neither prove nor disprove the existence of the mind.

For most of the major issues he outlines, Tancredi seems nonjudg-
mental. He does speculate, however, that perhaps social order and mo-
rality exist only because of how the human brain is wired (the product
of both nature and nurture). It must be said that the use of modern sci-
entific tools to explain the various phenomena of brain function hardly
justifies such a conclusion.

Even in a prophetic and horrific last chapter, Tancredi presents both
sides of the issue of legislation to regulate the treatment of criminals,
who presumably are compelled to their antisocial behavior because of
how their brains are wired, but this reader cannot tell which outcome of
the proposed legislation he supports. Tancredi is a forensic psychia-
trist, a physician-attorney, and a clinical professor of psychiatry at New
York University, and has been consulted in dozens of cases involving a
wide variety of psychiatric issues.

This book may be recommended to the readers of this journal, philos-
ophers who are interested in what some neuroscientists view as the pos-
sible outcome of their research.—Gaeton Molinari, M.D., *George Wash-
ington University School of Medicine and Health Care Sciences,
Emeritus.*

THOMSON, Keith. *Before Darwin. Reconciling God and Nature.* Yale Uni-
versity Press, New Haven, 2005. xiv + 314 pp. Cloth, $ 25.00—The focus
of Thomson's book is to trace out for the reader the dialectical debate in
England on the question of our knowledge of nature and its relationship
to our possible knowledge of God and/or the historicity of the Bible—
with an emphasis on the creation accounts in Genesis. The primary
time frame of the book is the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries with an em-
phasis on the years leading up to Charles Darwin's publication of his
evolutionary theory on November 24, 1859, *On The Origin of the Spe-
cies*, advocating the principle of natural selection.

In the above timeframe in England, there emerged five viewpoints in
regard to the above debate, and some of these viewpoints can be traced
back to the ancient Greeks. The first viewpoint is that of the deists, who
claimed that there is evidence that there is a God who created the uni-
verse but God left the world to function on its own without God's fur-
ther involvement. The second viewpoint is that of the theists who were
trying to defend a literal interpretation of the Bible and biblical history.
The third viewpoint is that of those theists who thought that one could
discover the existence of God and many of His attributes from the study

of nature without any reference to the Scriptures *per se*. Thus they hoped to develop a purely rational natural theology. The fourth viewpoint was that of the atheist who held that there was insufficient or no evidence for the existence God. The fifth viewpoint was that of the agnostic who claimed the question of God remains unanswerable. The agnostic position was reported to be that held by Charles Darwin, whose crisis in faith was the result of the devastating loss of his ten year old daughter, which he could not reconcile with Christian religious beliefs.

The general framework for the debate, according to the author, was the mechanistic notion of the world *a la* Descartes and Newton, in conjunction with an understanding of rationality in terms of the philosophy of David Hume. Thus, in this context much of the debate seems to have been whether one can answer the question of reconciling God with 18th century philosophy/science of nature within the confines of reason alone as defined by Hume. The question became whether the developing discipline of geology, and its understanding of the age of the earth and the various views of the changes in the formation of the earth over time, are compatible with religion and the existence of God. This seemed to create a great difficulty for those who wanted to hold to a literal interpretation of, for example, the flood, and how some understood this in regard to the stability of the species of living things and geological formations. According the author, the deists and the agnostics were not really at the center of the debate. The center of the debate is between the atheists and those who believe that one can develop a natural theology.

Thus we have, for example, William Paley's argument that if one discovers a watch with all its integral parts and intricacies involved in correctly reporting the time, one should rightly and reasonably conclude that, while the parts separate from one another do not indicate an intelligent designer, the intrinsic order of the parts in a watch directing them to the telling of the time does require an intelligent designer to account for their unity of function and purpose. In contrast, we have the various atheistic views of a natural history and their presuppositions: (1) that the world as we know it originated out of chaos by a chance event which produced matter and all its forces, (2) that all life forms originated out of non-life by chance without any external agent being involved, (3) that second causes or secondary causes do not require a primary cause to explain any of the events or the existence of living or non-living things in the world, (4) that through the super-fecundity of living things, mutation, and natural selection, we can explain the existence of all the variations of life as we know it, and finally, (5) that a rational God would create a world without evil or suffering. In my view, this seems to be a position that has made the assumptions of scientism and Darwinism objects of something akin to a religious faith, rather than a matter of that which is more or less probable as a final explanation.

Thus, in dissent to the above, we have many who are well aware of these positions and see an irreducible complexity in the simplest of living creatures (Michael Behe, for example) that can only be explained by the existence of an external designing intelligence. Thus, it would appear that the dialectical debate is far from over.—Joseph J. Califano, *St. John's University*.

WALTON, Douglas. *Abductive Reasoning.* Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2004. xv + 303. Cloth, $40.00—Since Protagoras at least, rationality has been portrayed as ineliminably subjective and, therefore, one argument as good as any other. As Douglas Walton notes, however, it is not all that long a leap to the further conclusion "that there is no such thing as rationality at all." The "sharp challenge" posed here to logic is to identify new resources for defending rationality (p. 121). Walton dedicates his new book to providing an exhaustive account of the foundations of a kind of rationality that is not confined to the things we can know and prove beyond doubt, but rather is "broad enough to include rational opinions that can be supported by good reasons that are, nonetheless, inconclusive" (p. 102).

Abductive inference is a relative newcomer in discussions of logic, Walton says. Indeed, most logic textbooks ignore it. For whereas logic is expected to be exact, abduction is decidedly inexact and, as such, suspect. It is an "uncertain and tentative" brand of reasoning, "fallible and conjectural," "variable and presumptive" (pp. 1, 4, 33). If deductive inference abstracts directly from data, while inductive inference is based on but extrapolates partially beyond data, abductive inference extrapolates still further (p. 13). Just as we speak of deductive necessity and inductive probability, so we speak of abductive expectability (p. 14). We associate with abduction what Walton calls "the judgment of likelihood" (p. 20).

C. S. Peirce conveys what is at once most precarious and compelling about abduction when he likens it to "the instincts of animals" (p. 9). Abduction draws its conclusions from an incomplete body of evidence, and to that extent, Walton confirms, counts as a guess. But it is an "intelligent guess," he insists (pp. 3, 215). The word "abduction," he proceeds to remind us, derives from *ab* and *duco*, meaning, leading back (p. 34). Accordingly, abduction amounts to reasoning from observed data to some hypothesis that would explain them. The aim of abduction, then, is, first, to generate plausible hypotheses and, second, to evaluate those hypotheses by inference to the best explanation, where the best explanation is understood to be that which "covers more of the given facts and contradicts fewer of them" (pp. 22, 174). On several occasions, Walton contrasts abduction with prediction (pp. 29, 33, 129, 193), since abduction "begins with observation and then moves to explanation of what was observed" (p. 18). This link with explanation is crucial, since we aim to explain, rather than engage in argument, in cases where there is no disagreement concerning the truth of designated propositions, but rather an urge to account most convincingly for why they are true (pp. 79–80).

What prompts an explanation is a request, not so much for information, as for understanding (pp. 80, 216). The prospects for understanding are made possible by our shared capacity for practical reasoning and heightened by our active engagement in dialogue. According to Walton, in fact, abduction is best understood as a "dialogue sequence," involving a series of questions and answers, but also the eliciting, and ultimate evaluation, of competing explanations (p. 32). He proceeds to contrast this "dialogue theory of explanation" with Hempel's deductive-

nomological, or covering law, model (pp. 52, 56, 78). Construing explanation as a sequence of reasoning from a system's knowledge base together with a set of laws is, as recent research in artificial intelligence has shown, inadequate. Instead, we ought to regard it as a "transaction" or "conversational exchange," an "interactive process between two agents or parties in a dialogue" (pp. 60, 69).

Walton's concern for the dialectic, or pragmatic, aspects of explanation is reflected in his repeated efforts to establish that the caliber of our reasoning is a matter as much of use or purpose as of form (pp. 100, 111, 120, 155–6, 165, 202). For instance, in the dialogue model, "an explanation is seen as a kind of inference, or at least as based on an inference or chain of reasoning" (p. 78). In such an inference, however, "the conditional . . . goes from an antecedent finding of fact (observation, indicator, sign) to a consequent that postulates a best explanation of the observed fact" (p. 147). And yet, the implied *modus ponens* form, here, is defeasible rather than deductive, since the conditional premise functions not as a universal quanitifier, but as "the hedged quantifier of ordinary life" (p. 151).

The distinction has long been drawn in logic between efforts to assess arguments in light of standards of formal, or structural, correctness, on the one hand, and the use of logical reasoning to invent arguments, on the other. The dynamic, even creative, aspects of abduction conform to this latter *ars inveniedi*, or art of finding (p. 225). Abductive inference, after all, is always open to "new evidence and future developments" (p. 234). At each step in an account, new statements are added, and, through a process of "colligation," new accounts successively produced, impelling the dialogue forward (pp. 213, 228). Walton's *Abductive Reasoning* is an informed and tenacious effort to offer an account that reconciles this "feature of openness" with an "overarching structure representing discovery" (p. 231).—John E. MacKinnon, *Saint Mary's University*.

WILLIAMS, Bernard. *The Sense of the Past: Essays in the History of Philosophy*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006. xxii + 393 pp. Cloth, $39.50—In *The Sense of the Past: Essays on the History of Philosophy*, Bernard Williams offers a set of important essays on philosophers that span the field, from Plato to Wittgenstein. This collection is a most unique history of philosophy. In his introduction, Miles Burnyeat notes that Williams disliked the fact that philosophy had become so specialized (p. xvii). Specialization, Williams thought, allows philosophers to be comfortable only knowing their own debates, and therefore, to only really address a small audience. Williams did not hope to be a specialist in Plato, Nietzsche, or Collingwood, nor did he pretend to be. In most of these essays, rather, Williams addresses specific problems that certain philosophers engendered, and shows how they can illuminate our issues. Williams does not offer a survey of philosophy, but uses history "to make strange what is familiar in our assumptions" (p. 263).

Williams begins with the ancient Greeks. In "Plato against the Immoralist" and again, in his article on "Intrinsic Goodness," Williams notes that Plato insists that we pursue justice "for its own sake." If we do not do this, we only have our desires to guide our ethical behavior (p. 105). But this argument, he admits, would not be convincing to those with different views of justice. In "Pagan Justice and Christian Love," Williams argues that Plato, and later Christian philosophers, changed our conception of justice, and consequently, raised our standards for it. Yet Plato and the Christians struggle because, to justify their position, they appeal to an otherworldly order of value that governs this world. This leads to a problem, for "it leaves it mysterious why what happens in this world matters at all" (p. 79). Williams hints at a solution here: the individual and the city, he says, support each other and are mutually justified, here and now (p. 134).

In "Acting as a Virtuous Person Acts," Williams turns to Aristotle. He notes that, according to Aristotle, acts are only virtuous if they are done from the best positive and negative reasons. The practically wise person is "structurally and materially peculiar" (p. 195). Yet Aristotle is not a moral realist, since for him, ethics is matter of biological human flourishing and for realists, it is not. This difference can be seen from the way Aristotle and realists categorize ethical concepts differently. In "Hylomorphism," Williams suggests that Aristotle offers a doctrine that seems to be either a kind of materialism, or entirely mysterious (p. 222). Yet hylomorphism, he says, is coherent, and has benefits; in particular, hylomorphism, at least, yields the concept of the human being, which has been of value in ethics. Williams concludes that Greek ethics, regardless of its faults, is different from and superior to ours (p. 44).

In his articles on Descartes, Williams turns away from away from ethics, and to issues of method and epistemology. In "Introduction to the *Meditations*," he points out that Descartes requires of us "to meditate with him," and even to object to his positions. In fact, his method is meant to be "purely a search for truth . . . unconstrained by any other objectives" (p. 250). In "Descartes' use of Scepticism," Williams insists that Descartes uses doubt, not as a skeptic, but rather, to build foundations. Yet plainly, Descartes does not succeed. Descartes argues from "irresistible" truths, to a benevolent God, and then to the world. Williams notes that, although Descartes does not argue in a circle, his truths may be false, his proofs of God fail, and so nothing about the world follows (p. 243). Thus, ironically, this simple and general method that Descartes develops ends up showing his own conclusions to be implausible.

Williams next addresses Nietzsche, and this is the most interesting part of *The Sense of the Past*. To begin his discussion, he criticizes the supposed distinction between analytic and Continental philosophy, as a "bizarre conflation of the methodological and topographical" (p. 300). Williams treats Nietzsche with respect, for the latter offers insights into our moral psychology. In particular, Nietzsche shows that morality must be purged of the notion of the unified self, as well as the notion of a single will. Williams insists that abandoning these myths can help us: "The process by which we come to see this may be complex and painful enough for us to feel, not just that we have learned a truth, but that we

have been relieved of a burden (p. 309)." Williams also notes that, according to Nietzsche, although we should hope to purge our myths of our moral psychology, we cannot ever get entirely free of them. Nonetheless, we should at least strive to be truthful with ourselves. Williams suggests that Nietzsche cannot so easily say this, given his positions on our creative abilities, and on perspectivism (p. 327). Even so, social change still comes about through strife because of heroic individuals who suffer. Williams insists that Nietzsche has no real vision of our future, but still tells us what is required of us for change.

In summary, in *The Sense of the Past*, Williams attempts to make strange what is familiar in our assumptions, and he admirably succeeds in this task. In other words, he uses the history of philosophy to awaken in us a sense of urgency about our problems, be they about ethics, epistemology, or metaphysics. Williams succeeds in his task, for, in his presentation, the problems he addresses from the history of philosophy come alive. This is not to say that any of his articles are easy, as they are all quite complex, and therefore reward detailed study. In this book, Williams also lives up to his reputation as being a negative philosopher, for although the problems he addresses are compelling, his solutions to them are understated. It has not been possible here to address all his arguments, but fortunately, many of them can also be found in more detail in his earlier works. In conclusion, *The Sense the of the Past* is an excellent contribution to the field, and deserves a wide audience.—Basil Smith, *John Tyler Community College.*

WOOD, Kelsey. *Troubling Play: Meaning and Entity in Plato's Parmenides.* Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. 205 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $19.95—Wood argues that there is a deep affinity between the fundamental themes of the *Parmenides* and those of the *Republic* (p. 11 and throughout Chapter 1). Dialectical philosophical education aiming at the reform of the *psyche* is central to the *Republic* (VII.518c ff.), and in the *Parmenides* we see a paradigmatic instance of this kind of education: the young and overconfident Socrates is on the receiving end of the great Parmenides' dialectical attack (what Wood calls "the troubling game") on Socrates' claim that Zeno's paradoxes can be avoided if we only invoke a distinction between forms and entities that instantiate them (p. 2). This lesson is intended to lead Socrates (and the reader) to a "transformative moment of insight" (p. 11). This insight is the ground for the central analogies of the *Republic*— the sun, the line and the cave—(and perhaps for Parmenides' own use of the analogy of the chariot ride in his own poem) which signify that "the language of philosophy must be figurative" (p. 52), and all attempts to eliminate this figurative aspect by eliminating the ambiguity and analogy of language fall into contradiction (p. 34). That is, "every moment of disclosure [*aletheia*] is irreducibly ambiguous and aporetic" (pp. 28–9). By what paths does Parmenides' dialectic arrive at this insight? Wood seems to emphasize two: *choris* and *chronos*.

Choris ("otherwise than;" from which *chorismos*, "separation") is at the center of Wood's interpretative web. To escape Zeno's paradoxes Socrates invoked forms, each of which, unlike particulars in the world, exists in itself (*kath'hauto*) and even in "itself, according to itself" (*auto kath'hauto*; p. 2). But, as Parmenides demonstrates, apart from relations to others even a form such as "the one" (Parmenides' favorite, presumably) is utterly unintelligible (pp. 80–4). The fundamental *archai* (which Wood translates as "origins" or "beginnings," p. 50), such as unity/plurality or part/whole (p. 94), are indefinable; they mark out many irreducibly analogous meanings that come in pairs of opposites, the intelligibility of which are mutually dependent (p. 136). In addition, should the forms be purely "in themselves" and so utterly unrelated to the world, they would be irrelevant to our world rather than basic to our knowledge of it (p. 61). That is, there would be the same unbridgeable gulf that one discerns between the "Way of Truth" and "The Way of Opinion" in Parmenides' own poem. Everything, whether form or sensible entity, can only be understood in reference to what it is not. Thus, whatever is understood is present in the foreground while everything else, that is, all that is "otherwise than" (*choris*) it, provides the context for its intelligibility, although these others are not-present but exist in the penumbra that hovers at the edges of *logos* (pp. 99–103). This underscores the fact that the conditions of intelligibility to which Parmenides constantly alludes are shown by his arguments to be themselves not intelligible (p. 32); *logos* points to that which always transcends it because (contra Heidegger) for Plato being is more fundamental than knowing (pp. 1, 22, 48–9, 136).

Chronos (time) is also central to Wood's argument. Things become intelligible to us in time, but the intelligibility of time itself depends on "the instant," which Parmenides shows to be unintelligible (pp. 130–4). Indeed, the mysterious "third beginning" (155e; pp. 122–5), which breaks the pattern of Parmenides' eight-fold argument schema, is an analogue for the *kosmos* that goes beyond any of our systematic representations of it (p. 124). Once again, Parmenides is directing us to the insight that the conditions of intelligibility transcend the conceptualization of logos, and point beyond *logos* to being.

What are we to make of Wood's arguments? I am not sure. A formidable barrier to evaluation is terminology and phrasing that I find hard to grasp (I have tried to emulate his language in order to give the reader a sampling of it). I confess that this may be a matter of mere taste: I am more familiar with the perhaps bland flavors of Anglo-American philosophy, while Wood approaches his work using exotic spices (to me at least) imported from the continent. In addition, there are certain crucial ideas that are underdeveloped: for example, he claims teleology underpins all understanding (pp. 22–7, 53), but never explains precisely why this is so. Despite these misgivings, the claims and arguments of this book are well worth pondering because they address fundamental questions of metaphysics, epistemology, and language.

I end on a practical note. So far about eighteen pages have fallen out from the cloth edition I received only three months ago. Readers interested in purchasing the book might want to heed my experience and buy the paperback edition.—Timothy A. Mahoney, *Providence College*.

PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS

Principles of Composition and Criteria of Identity, KATHERINE HAWLEY

I argue that, despite van Inwagen's pessimism about the task, it is worth looking for answers to his General Composition Question. Such answers or "principles of composition" tell us about the relationship between an object and its parts. I compare principles of composition with criteria of identity, arguing that, just as different sorts of thing satisfy different criteria of identity, they may satisfy different principles of composition. Variety in criteria of identity is not taken to reflect ontological variety in the identity relation; I discuss whether variety in principles of composition should be taken to reflect ontological variety in the composition relation.

Reliabilism and Deflationism, JAMES R. BEEBE

In this article I examine several issues concerning reliabilism and deflationism. I critique Alvin Goldman's account of the key differences between correspondence and deflationary theories and his claim that reliabilism can be combined only with those truth theories that maintain a commitment to truthmakers. I then consider how reliability could be analysed from a deflationary perspective and show that deflationism is compatible with reliabilism. I close with a discussion of whether a deflationary theory of knowledge is possible.

Presentism and Fatalism, MICHAEL C. REA

It is widely believed that presentism is compatible with both a libertarian view of human freedom and an unrestricted principle of bivalence. I argue that, in fact, presentists must choose between bivalence and libertarianism: if presentism is true, then either the future is open or no one is free in the way that libertarians understand freedom.

G. E. Moore on Goodness and Reasons, JONAS OLSON

Several proponents of the "buck-passing" account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing account over its Moorean rivals. The final section of the paper is a survey of what can be said for and against the buck-passing account and Moore's views about goodness and reasons.

Can the Physicalist Explain Colour Structure in Terms of Colour Experience? ADAM PAUTZ

Physicalism about colour is the thesis that colours are identical with response-independent, physical properties of objects. I endorse the *Argument from Structure* against Physicalism about colour. The argument states that Physicalism cannot accommodate certain obvious facts about colour structure: for instance, that red is a unitary colour while purple is a binary colour, and that blue resembles purple more than green. I provide a detailed formulation of the argument. According to the most popular response to the argument, the Physicalist can accommodate colour structure by explaining it in terms of colour experience. I argue that this response fails. Along the way, I examine other interesting issues in the philosophy of colour and colour perception, for instance the relational structure of colour experience and the description theory of how colour names refer.

A Realistic Colour Realism, JOSHUA GERT

Whether or not one endorses realism about colour, it is very tempting to regard realism about determinable colours such as green and yellow as standing or falling together with realism about determinate colours such as unique green or green$_{31}$. Indeed some of the most prominent representatives of both sides of the colour realism debate explicitly endorse the idea that these two kinds of realism are so linked. Against such theorists, the present paper argues that one can be a realist about the determinable colours of objects, and thus hold that most of the colour ascriptions made by competent speakers are literally true, while denying that there are any positive facts of the matter as to the determinate colours of objects. The result is a realistic colour realism that can certify most of our everyday colour ascriptions as literally correct, while acknowledging the data regarding individual variation.

Negative Truths from Positive Facts?, JOSH PARSONS

I argue that Colin Cheyne and Charles Pigden's recent attempt to find truthmakers for negative truths fails. Though Cheyne and Pigden are correct in their treatment of some of the truths they set out to find truthmakers for (such as "There is no hippopotamus in S223" and "Theatetus is not flying") they over-generalize when they apply the same treatment to "There are no

unicorns." In my view, this difficulty is ineliminable: not every truth has a truthmaker.

Number Words and Ontological Commitment, BERIT BROGAARD

With the aid of some results from current linguistic theory, I examine a recent anti-Fregean line with respect to hybrid talk of numbers and ordinary things, such as "The number of moons of Jupiter is four." I conclude that the anti-Fregean line with respect to these sentences is indefensible.

About Stage Universalism, YURI BALASHOV

Most four-dimensionalists, including both worm and stage theorists, endorse mereological universalism, the thesis that any class of objects has a fusion. But the marriage of four-dimensionalism and universalism is unfortunate and unprofitable: it creates a recalcitrant problem for stage theory's account of lingering properties, such as writing "War and Peace" or travelling across the tennis court, which take time to be instantiated. This makes it necessary to impose a natural restriction on diachronic composition.

The Importance of 'Being Earnest', BENJAMIN SCHNIEDER

Reference to properties is normally achieved by the use of nominalizations of predicative expressions. I examine the relation between different kinds of these: while, traditionally, the terms "wisdom" and "the property of being wise" were thought to be co-referential, in certain contexts they do not seem to be interchangeable *salva veritate*. Observing this, Friederike Moltmann claims that abstract nouns such as "wisdom" do not refer to properties. I argue that her theory is flawed and that the existence of the problematic contexts should be explained in non-referential terms.

Moral Responsibility and Omissions, JEREMY BYRD

Frankfurt-type examples seem to show that agents can be morally responsible for their actions and omissions even if they could not have done otherwise. Fischer and Ravizza's influential account of moral responsibility is largely based on such examples. I examine a problem with their account of responsibility in cases where we fail to act. The solution to this problem has a surprising and far-reaching implication concerning the construction of successful Frankfurt-type examples. I argue that the role of the counterfactual intervener in such examples can only be filled by a rational agent.

A Gradable Approach to Dispositions, DAVID MANLEY; RYAN
    WASSERMAN

Previous theories of the relationship between dispositions and condi-
tionals are unable to account for the fact that dispositions come in degrees.
We propose a fix for this problem which has the added benefit of avoiding the
familiar problems of finks and masks.

The Impertinence of Frankfurt-Style Argument, DANIEL SPEAK

Discussions of the principle of alternative possibilities have largely ig-
nored the limits of what Frankfurt-style counter-examples can show. Rather
than challenging the coherence of the cases, I argue that even if they are
taken to demonstrate the falsity of the principle, they cannot advance the
compatibilist cause. For a forceful incompatibilist argument can be con-
structed from the Frankfurtian premise that agents in Frankfurtian circum-
stances would have done what they did even if they could have done some-
thing else. This "counterfactual stability" meets the same fate under
determinism as does the ability to do otherwise. Thus the cases are irrele-
vant to the compatibility debate.

Triangulating with Davidson, CLAUDINE VERHEGGEN

According to Davidson, "triangulation" is necessary both to fix the
meanings of one's thoughts and utterances and to have the concept of objec-
tivity, both of which are necessary for thinking and talking at all. Against
these claims, it has been objected that neither meaning-determination nor
possession of the concept of objectivity requires triangulation; nor does the
ability to think and talk require possession of the concept of objectivity. But
this overlooks the important connection between the tasks that triangulation
is meant to perform. One cannot fix concepts or meanings, which one must
do for there to be any concepts or meanings at all, without having the con-
cept of objectivity.

Anti-Nominalism Reconsidered, DAVID LIGGINS

Many philosophers of mathematics are attracted by nominalism, the
doctrine that there are no sets, numbers, functions or other mathematical ob-
jects. John Burgess and Gideon Rosen have put forward an intriguing argu-
ment against nominalism, based on the thought that philosophy cannot over-
rule internal mathematical and scientific standards of acceptability. I argue
that Burgess and Rosen's argument fails because it relies on a mistaken view
of what the standards of mathematics require.

Reasons, Resultance and Moral Particularism, OMAR EDWARD
    MOAD

According to Jonathan Dancy's moral particularism, the way in which a
given moral reason functions as a reason for or against an action can vary

from case to case. Dancy also asserts that reasons are resultance bases. But a reason why something ought to be done is that in virtue of which it is something that ought to be done. If the function of a reason can vary, then resultance bases cannot be reasons. Perhaps the particularist might conceive a reason not as a resultance base, but as a specific type of which a resultance base is a token. But this picture of reasons cannot be correct.

Potentiality and the Matter of Composite Substances, JONATHAN BEERE

The paper examines the connection between Aristotle's theory of generated substance and his notion of potentiality in Metaphysics Θ.7. Aristotle insists that the matter of a substance is not what that substance is, against a competing view that was widely held both in his day and now. He coined the term thaten (ἐκείνινον) in order to make this point. The term highlights a systematic correspondence between the metaphysics of matter and of quality: the relationship between a thing and its matter is like the relationship between a qualified thing and the relevant quality. It is argued that Aristotle's view about the matter of particular substances is connected with his view about ultimate matter. His conception of the matter of particular substances allows him to block an argument, from Plato's Timaeus, that ultimate matter must be something imperceptible and lacking all perceptible qualities. Aristotle uses the term thaten to introduce an alternative conception of ultimate matter on which ultimate matter might well be an ordinary perceptible kind of thing.

Aristotle Physics I 8, SEAN KELSEY

Aristotle's thesis in Physics I 8 is that a certain old and familiar problem about coming to be can only be solved with the help of the new account of the "principles" he has developed in Physics I 7. This is a strong thesis and the literature on the chapter does not quite do it justice; specifically, as things now stand we are left wondering why Aristotle should have found this problem so compelling in the first place. In this paper I develop an interpretation which (I hope) will help to remedy this.

I believe that Aristotle's problem about coming to be depends on a certain principle to the effect that "nothing can become what it already is" (it is this that is supposed to explain why τὸ ὄν cannot come to be ἐξ ὄντος - cf. 191a30). The main innovation of the interpretation developed here is its suggestion that we understand this principle as a principle about kinds. So understood, the principle does not make the comparatively trivial point that nothing can become any individual it already is, but rather the more powerful

and substantive point that nothing can become any kind of thing it already is. I argue that this is a point which Aristotle himself accepts and that this is why the problem about coming to be raises serious difficulties for him. I also discuss Aristotle's proposed solutions to this problem, explaining how each draws on his new account of the principles and why each is required for any full resolution of the difficulties the problem raises. In this way I hope to show how the interpretation developed here does justice to the very strong thesis with which Aristotle begins Physics I 8. I conclude briefly and somewhat speculatively with a suggestion as to why Aristotle might accept the principle on which I have suggested the problem turns.

Epicureans and the Present Past, JAMES WARREN

This essay offers a reading of a difficult passage in the first book of Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura* in which the poet first explains the Epicurean account of time and then responds to a worry about the status of the past (1.459-82). It identifies two possible readings of the passage, one of which is compatible with the claim that the Epicureans were presentists about the past. Other evidence, particularly from Cicero's *De Fato*, suggests that the Epicureans maintained that all true assertions must have a contemporaneous truth-maker and that no contingent future-tensed assertions are true. It appears, however, that they did not assert a symmetrical view of past-tensed assertions. There is no compelling reason, therefore, to think that the Epicureans were presentists about the past.

Socrates' Therapeutic Use of Inconstancy in the Axiochus, TIM O'KEEFE

The pseudo-Platonic dialogue *Axiochus* seems irremediably confused. Its author tosses together Platonic, Epicurean and Cynic arguments against the fear of death, apparently with no regard for their consistency. Whereas in the *Apology* Socrates argues that death is either annihilation or a relocation of the soul, and is a blessing either way, in the *Axiochus* Socrates seems to assert that death is both annihilation and a release of the soul from the body into a better realm.

I argue that we can acquit the *Axiochus* from the charge of confusion if we pay attention to its genre, a consolation letter cast in dialogue form. The dialogue dramatizes a distinctive type of consolatory argumentative practice. Socrates' use of arguments with inconsistent premises, presented in propria persona, is only one of many ways in which he is willing to sacrifice argumentative hygiene for the sake of therapeutic effectiveness. These include appealing to emotion, tailoring arguments to the audience, and presenting invalid arguments so as to induce unjustified but comforting beliefs. In these respects, I think that Socrates' argumentative practice is best compared to PH III 280-1, where Sextus Empiricus says that the skeptic will deliberately use logically weak arguments as long as they work.

Why There Are No Tropes, JEROLD LEVINSON

This paper effectively inverts the argument of an earlier paper of mine, "The Particularisation of Attributes," to argue that there are no necessarily particularised and unshareable attributes of the sort that contemporary metaphysics calls tropes. In that earlier paper I distinguished two kinds of attributes, namely, properties and qualities, and argued that if there were tropes they could only be particularised qualities, i.e. particularisations of, say, redness, rather than particularisations of, say, being red. While continuing to hold that there cannot be particularised properties—that the very notion is oxymoronic—I now hold, further, that the supposition of qualities (that is, abstract stuffs) in addition to properties (that is, conditions or ways of being) is both ontologically extravagant and conceptually outlandish. Hence there are no qualities, and thus no tropes either.

Family Matters, JOHN HALDANE

Governments and international bodies continue to praise the family for its service to the good of individuals and of society. Among its important contributions are the rearing of children and the care of the elderly. So far as the former is concerned, however, the family is subject to increasing criticism and suggestions are made for further state intervention, particularly in the area of education. In response to this challenge I consider the natural operation of the family in relation to the development of children, and examine the implications of this for the role of the state in promoting, protecting or interfering with family life. Relating this to the issue of autonomy I argue that the sort of liberalism that lies behind the increasing criticism of parental authority is unable to find a place for the common good of family because of its commitment to neutrality between life-shaping values. I conclude that the best advice that philosophers might offer to policy makers is to make it possible for families to flourish in the ways they themselves recognise to be best.

The Self-Centredness Objection to Virtue Ethics, CHRISTOPHER TONER

Aristotelian virtue ethics is often charged with counseling a self-centred approach to the moral life. Reviewing some influential responses made by defenders of virtue ethics, I argue that none of them goes far enough. I begin my own response by evaluating two common targets of the objection, Aristotle and Aquinas, and based on my findings sketch the outlines of a clearly non-self-centred version of virtue ethics, according to which the "center" is

instead located in the agent's right relation to others and ultimately to the Good. I conclude that while some species of virtue ethics may be self-centred, the objection cannot be used to indict the whole genus.

Goodness And Truth, WILLIAM CHARLTON

The paper presents goodness and truth as analogous formal concepts. I first argue that saying something is true of something and saying it is false of it are basic ways of speaking truly or falsely. I then consider thinking a property a good one for something to acquire and thinking it a bad, equate this with having something as a positive or negative objective, an object of desire or aversion, and argue that these are basic ways of thinking rightly or wrongly. Finally I discuss the notions of a way of speaking or thinking, making special reference to Frege's "Negation" and "The Thought."

Scepticism About Intuition, DAVID SOSA

Contemporary philosophy's antipathy to intuition can come to seem baffling. There is inadequate reason to move away from the intuitively attractive view that we have a faculty of intuition, in many ways akin to our faculties of perception and memory and introspection, that gives us reason for belief, and with it, often enough, gives us knowledge. The purpose here is to consider whether scepticism about intuition is more reasonable than a corresponding scepticism about other epistemic faculties. I am sceptical that it is.

Wittgenstein and Musical Formalism, BÉLA SZABADOS

I argue that Wittgenstein was no lifelong musical formalist. I further contend that the attribution of musical formalism obscures, while the break with it I propose explains, the role that music played in the development of his philosophy of language. What is more, I sketch a perspective on the later Wittgenstein's remarks on the music and musical understanding that supports my claims. Throughout my discussion, rather than assimilating Hanslick's and Wittgenstein's views on music, I point to similarities and differences between them, suggesting that taking snapshots and putting them side by side sheds more light on how they are related to each other.

The Continuum: Russell's Moment of Candour, CHRISTOPHER ORMELL

A quotation from Russell concedes that the immensity of real numbers (unending decimals) implied by the usual account of the continuum cannot mainly consist of "those whose digits procede according to some rule." Russell concludes that the main body of real numbers 'must be' of the 'lawless' variety. The author scrutinises these so-called 'lawless decimals' and concludes that they are mythical. It follows that the totality of well-defined real numbers (existing and future) cannot be more than a countable whole. It is however clearly uncountable. An explanation is offered using the "greater lexicographic sequence" (GLS).

What's God Got to Do with It? Atheism and Religious Practice,
    DAVID BENATAR

It is commonly thought that theism entails full religious observance and that atheism entails either the abandonment of religious practice or, at least, its reform. Focusing on Judaism, I argue against both of these entailment claims. Both theistic departure from religious observance and atheistic adherence to religious practice are coherent. I outline the features of those religions that make them more conducive to atheistic observance. Finally, I consider various objections to full observance by atheists.

*What Difference Does It Make? The Nature and Significance of
    Theistic Belief,* JOHN COTTINGHAM

Theism is often supposed to be distinguished from atheism by the heavy weight of metaphysical belief that it carries. This paper argues that this is not as illuminating a way of distinguishing the theist's from the atheist's outlook as is often supposed. The key divergence consists not so much in matters of theoretical belief or philosophical argument as in practical differences in affective response and in the adoption of certain models for living. Two characteristically religious virtues, humility and hope, and two distinctively religious responses, awe and thanksgiving, are discussed in order to illustrate this. The paper's conclusion, while not denying a cognitive core to theism, argues that warranted assent to the metaphysical truth of God's existence cannot be a precondition for theistic hermeneusis and praxis.

Philosophy, the Restless Heart and the Meaning of Theism, JOHN
    HALDANE

There is a common philosophical challenge that asks how things would be different if some supposed reality did not exist. Conceived in one way, this can amount to trial by sensory verification. Even if that challenge is dismissible, however, the question of the relation of the purported reality to experience remains. Writing here in connection with the central claims, and human significance, of theism; and drawing on ideas suggested by C. S. Pierce, C. S. Lewis, Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas, I aim to turn the tables and argue that the broad structure and basic features of human cognitive and affective experience indicate their fulfilment in God.

Worshipping an Unknown God, ANTHONY KENNY

This paper examines the religious tradition of "negative theology," and argues that it is doubtful whether it leaves room for belief in God at all. Three theologians belonging in different degrees to this tradition are discussed, namely John Scotus Eriugena, Anselm of Canterbury and Nicolas of Cusa, and it is argued that all three, in maintaining the ineffability of God, reach positions that are in effect forms of agnosticism. There is a paradox here: if God is inconceivable, is it not self-refuting to talk about him at all, even to state his inconceivability? The final part of the paper examines the work of the nineteenth-century poet Arthur Hugh Clough, two of whose poems, Hymnos Aumnos, and Qui Laborat Orat, explore the paradox of talking about the inconceivable Godhead. Clough gives eloquent expression to the idea that leaving God unnamed is not equivalent to disowning him. There is room for a devout agnosticism.

"Seeke True Religion. Oh, Where?" MICHAEL MCGHEE

We precipitately express opinions about religion without reflecting critically on our conception of it, and may blame it for conduct that the religious traditions themselves judge unbecoming. A distinction can be drawn between the raw, natural self of the untrained person and the well-tempered demeanour of a spiritually developed person. Such a distinction drives the appropriation of religious beliefs and can survive their demise. "Religious belief" is not to be conflated with Abrahamic notions of "belief in God" and "faith." There are other versions of transcendence and other psycho-dramas. One possible form of transcendence is available within the moral life of human beings.

The Varieties of Non-Religious Experience, RICHARD NORMAN

I want to consider the suggestion that certain essential components of human experience are by their nature distinctively religious, and thus that the atheist is either debarred from participating fully in such experiences, or fails to understand their real nature. I am going to look at five kinds of experience:

- the experience of the moral "ought";

- the experience of beauty;

- the experience of meaning conferred by stories;

- the experience of otherness and transcendence;

- the experience of vulnerability and fragility.

These seem to me to be integral features of any meaningful human life. They are aspects of what it is to be human. Some theists would simply agree with that statement. Others, however, would say that though essentially human they are also essentially religious, and that the secular humanist's participation in such experiences is in some way defective. That is the claim which I want to consider and contest.

Divine Action in the World (Synopsis), ALVIN PLANTINGA

The following is a synopsis of the paper presented by Alvin Plantinga at the Ratio conference on The Meaning of Theism held in April 2005 at the University of Reading. The synopsis has been prepared by the Editor, with the author's approval, from a handout provided by the author at the conference. The paper reflects on whether religious belief of a traditional Christian kind can be maintained consistently with accepting our modern scientific worldview. Many theologians, and also many scientists, maintain that the idea of divine intervention is at odds with the framework of natural laws disclosed by science. The paper argues that this notion of a "religion/science problem" is misguided. When properly understood, neither the classical (Newtonian) picture of natural laws, nor the more recent quantum mechanical picture, rules out divine intervention. There is nothing in science, under either the old or the new picture, that conflicts with, or even calls in to question, special divine action, including miracles.

A Defense of the Ramsey Test, RICHARD BRADLEY

According to the Ramsey Test hypothesis the conditional claim that if A then B is credible just in case it is credible that B, on the supposition that A. If true the hypothesis helps explain the way in which we evaluate and use ordinary language conditionals. But impossibility results for the Ramsey Test hypothesis in its various forms suggest that it is untenable. In this paper, I argue that these results do not in fact have this implication, on the grounds that similar results can be proved without recourse to the Ramsey test hypothesis. Instead they show that a number of well entrenched principles of rational belief and belief revision do not apply to conditionals.

Existence, Freedom, Identity, and the Logic of Abstractionist Realism, PETER MILNE

From the point of view of proof-theoretic semantics, we examine the logical background invoked by Neil Tennant's abstractionist realist account of mathematical existence. To prepare the way, we must first look closely at the rule of existential elimination familiar from classical and intuitionist logics and at rules governing identity. We then examine how well free logics meet the harmony and uniqueness constraints familiar from the proof-theoretic semantics project. Tennant assigns a special role to atomic formulas containing singular terms. This, we find, secures harmony and uniqueness but militates against the putative realism.

Agnosticism as a Third Stance, SVEN ROSENKRANZ

Within certain philosophical debates, most notably those concerning the limits of our knowledge, agnosticism seems a plausible, and potentially the right, stance to take. Yet, in order to qualify as a proper stance, and not just the refusal to adopt any, agnosticism must be shown to be in opposition to both endorsement and denial and to be answerable to future evidence. This paper explicates and defends the thesis that agnosticism may indeed define such a third stance that is weaker than scepticism and hence offers a genuine alternative to realism and anti-realism about our cognitive limits.

Vagueness and Arbitrariness: Merricks on Composition, ELIZABETH BARNES

In this paper I respond to Trenton Merricks's (2005) paper "Composition and Vagueness." I argue that Merricks's paper faces the following difficulty: he claims to provide independent motivation for denying one of the premisses of the Lewis-Sider vagueness argument for unrestricted composition, but the alleged motivation he provides begs the question.

Remarks on Vagueness and Arbitrariness, TRENTON MERRICKS

In "Composition and Vagueness," I argued, among other things, that the Vagueness Argument for unrestricted composition fails. In "Vagueness and Arbitrariness: Merricks on Composition," Elizabeth Barnes objects to my argument. This paper replies to Barnes, and also offers further support for the views defended in my original paper.

Theories of Meaning and Logical Truth: Edwards versus Davidson, MIGUEL HOELTJE

Donald Davidson has claimed that for every logical truth S of a language L, a theory of meaning for L will entail that S is a logical truth of L. Jim Edwards has argued (2002) that this claim is *false* if we take "entails" to mean "has as a *logical consequence*." In this paper, I first show that, *pace* Edwards, Davidson's claim is correct even under this strong reading. I then discuss the argument given by Edwards and offer a diagnosis of where he went wrong.

Response to Hoeltje: Davidson Vindicated? JIM EDWARDS

In response to Hoeltje I concede the main point of his first section: for each logical truth S of the object language, it is a logical consequence of the Davidsonian theory of meaning I offered in my paper that S is logically true, contrary to what I asserted in the paper. However, I now argue that a Davidsonian theory of meaning may be formulated equally well in such a way that it not a logical consequence of the theory that S is a logical truth. Nonetheless, the revised theory of meaning will still "entail" in a wider sense that S is a logical truth, for we can prove by induction on the consequence class of the revised theory that S is a logical truth. So far, my disagreement with Hoeltje

is over the more charitable interpretation of a passage from Davidson. I close by arguing that Davidson was mistaken on one point, a theory of meaning will entail a threefold distinction among the sentences of the object language, not a twofold distinction as he claimed.

Scottish Philosophy, JOHN HALDANE

James McCosh, the Scots born eleventh President of Princeton characterized Scottish Philosophy as proceeding on the method of observation, employing self-consciousness, and reaching principles prior to and independent of experience. The philosophy he had in mind was that of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In this introduction to an issue on Scottish philosophy that discusses figures from later periods I also consider earlier anticipations of key themes and ideas by figures from the mediaeval period. My suggestion is that if a principle of continuity is to be sought for that links much of the the philosophy in Scotland from the late middle ages to the mid-twentieth century it is a broad Aristotelianism.

The Rise and Fall of James Beattie's Common Sense Theory of Truth, JAMES FIESER

In a 1766 letter, Beattie states his intention to write a book on the nature of truth with this central thesis: "that as we know nothing of the eternal relations of things, that to us is and must be truth, which we feel that we must believe; and that to us is falsehood, which we feel that we must disbelieve." In more contemporary wording, his bold point is that we must reject the correspondence theory of truth (i.e., that true statements are those that correspond with reality) since we do not have access to the world of facts. Instead, we must adopt a common sense standard of truth, which bases truth upon an instinctive conviction of foundational concepts. He states this thesis very prominently in the first edition of his Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth (1770)—in wording very similar to that in the letter. However, in his final revision of the Essay in 1776, he deleted the relevant sentences, thereby diluting—if not destroying—the book's most innovative point. Why did he do this? He was apparently swayed by harsh criticisms of his thesis, particularly by Joseph Priestley. I discuss Beattie's claim, the attacks, and suggest ways in which a common sense standard of truth might be viable.

The Scottish Enlightenment and the American Founding, DANIEL ROBINSON

This essay traces the various influences of Scottish thought on the intellectual and political life of the American colonies and their emergence as a Republic. Noted in particular is the expression of these influences in education, political theory and constitutional jurisprudence.

Natural Philosophy and its Limits in the Scottish Enlightenment, RYAN NICHOLS

Where does natural philosophy end and metaphysics begin? Despite the fact that figures in the Scottish Enlightenment are univocal in their commitment to Newtonian natural philosophy, these thinkers offer quite different answers to this question. The goal of this paper is to explore the way in which the Scottish Common Sense School answers this question by way of an analysis of Thomas Reid's work. After briefly stating the key tenets of Reid's Newtonianism, I will examine his remarks about the limits of Newtonian natural philosophy as they appear in his major and minor works, and his unpublished writings. I conclude that Reid unsuccessfully demarcates his Newtonianism from his metaphysics. This finding has implications for our assessment of Scottish Enlightenment thought about the scientific method, materialism, natural theology and common sense. It also runs counter to recent judgments that Reid is not a mysterian about the mind: he is. I conclude the paper by highlighting the implications of this tension in Reid for the legacy of the Common Sense School and for philosophy in Scotland in the nineteenth century, and with a Humean analysis of Reid's skeptical inclinations.

Marcel at Harvard, MICHAEL NOVAK

This article originally appeared in *The Commonweal* (October 5, 1962): 31–3. Michael Novak, a graduate student at the time, met Marcel while he was at Harvard University to deliver the William James lectures in the fall of 1961. Those lectures were subsequently printed in the volume, *The Existential Background of Human Dignity* (1963). The article is reprinted here with the kind permission of Michael Novak and the Commonweal magazine.

Gabriel Marcel and the Recovery of Philosophy in Our Time, PETER A. REDPATH

In this paper, I take for granted that, today, something is radically wrong metaphysically with Western culture. I maintain that this problem arises, as Marcel says, from the very depths of our being. This paper's purpose is to

consider some aspects of Marcel's metaphysical teaching, especially about our need to start philosophizing in the concrete, not the abstract, situation, to battle against the spirit of abstraction, and use these reflections for the practical purpose of considering what sorts of steps we need to take at the present moment to recover philosophical practice in the postmodern age. Within the context of this paper, I argue that Marcel is a realist humanist in the tradition of Plato and Aquinas whose battle against the spirit of abstraction is fundamentally a fight against nominalism and sophistry.

Toward the Concrete: Marcel as Existentialist, THOMAS R. FLYNN

After reviewing how Jean Wahl interprets the early Marcel, specifically his Metaphysical Journal, in a seminal work whose title captured the philosophical spirit of the 1930s, Vers le concret ("Toward the Concrete"), I discuss the existentialist style of philosophizing, offer five criteria for judging a philosopher to be an existentialist and submit Marcel's work to each. I turn to the appropriateness of calling him a neo-Socratic philosopher, an appellation he seemed to prefer, and conclude with some observations of how this mixture of the Socratic and the existentialist places Marcel in the lineage of those like Michel Foucault and Pierre Hadot who speak of philosophy less as a doctrine and more as a way of life.

Constellations: Gabriel Marcel's Philosophy of Relative Otherness, BRIAN TREANOR

This paper examines the postmodern question of the otherness of the other from the perspective of Gabriel Marcel's philosophy. Postmodernity—typified by philosophical movements like deconstruction—has framed the question of otherness in all-or-nothing terms; either the other is absolutely, wholly other or the other is not other at all. On the deconstructive account, the latter position amounts to a kind of "violence" against the other. Marcel's philosophy offers an alternative to this all-or-nothing model of otherness. His thought can satisfy the fundamental (and legitimate) ethical and philosophical concerns of postmodern thinkers without resorting to the paroxysmal hyperbole that characterizes philosophies of absolute otherness. Moreover, Marcel's critique of the "spirit of abstraction" offers a unique perspective on what might motivate such paroxysmal hyperbole.

And when the Creator of the universe had compounded the whole, He divided it up into as many souls as there are stars. And allotted each Soul to a Star.

Plato, Timaeus, 41e

Gabriel Marcel on Personal Immortality, THOMAS ANDERSON

The question of personal immortality is a central one for Gabriel Marcel. Early in his life he took part in parapsychological experiments which convinced him that one could, rarely and with great difficulty, communicate with the dead. In a philosophical vein he argued that each self has an eternal dimension which is of eternal worth. This dimension is particularly manifest in

self-sacrifice, where I find it meaningful to give my life for another and when I unconditionally commitment myself in love to another self. Marcel also cites the experience of trust or hope, and the experience that life is not an absurd freak accident of nature destined for eternal extinction but rather possesses absolute meaning and value. Yet, none of the above experiences involves certitude; one remains free to accept or reject them and what they claim to involve.

Marcel on God and Religious Experience, and the Critique of Alston and Hick, BRENDAN SWEETMAN

This article examines Gabriel Marcel's unique approach to the existence of God, and its implications for traditional philosophy of religion. After some preliminary remarks about the realm of "problems" (which would include the "rational"), and about the question of whether Marcel thinks God's existence admits of a rational argument, Part I explains his account of how the individual subject can arrive at an affirmation of God through experiences of fidelity and promise-making. Part II proposes a way in which Marcel's own philosophical and phenomenological approach could be regarded as a type of argument for the existence of God. The last section suggests that Marcel's approach offers an advance upon the views of William Alston and John Hick concerning the analysis of religious experience.

Marcel and Ricœur: Mystery and Hope at the Boundary of Reason in the Postmodern Situation, PATRICK L. BOURGEOIS

This article on mystery and hope at the boundary of reason in the postmodern situation responds to the challenge of postmodern thinking to philosophy by a recourse to the works of Gabriel Marcel and his best disciple, Paul Ricœur. It develops along the lines of their interpretation of hope as a central phenomenon in human experience and existence, thus shedding light on the philosophical enterprise for the future. It is our purpose to dwell briefly on this postmodern challenge and then, incorporating its positive contribution, to present theirs as an alternative philosophy at the boundary of reason.

Gabriel Marcel's Politics: Theory and Practice, THOMAS A. MICHAUD

Gabriel Marcel is not typically read as a political theorist and social commentator. He never wrote a treatise devoted specifically to a systematic treatment of politics. His writings, nevertheless, abound in political theorizing and social analysis. This study articulates Marcel's socio-political thought, explicating its coherence with his overall concrete philosophy and with his personal engagement in political events of his time. It develops through three themes. The first details Marcel's particular approach to socio-political thought as a "watchman." The second shows why Marcel offers a "hopeful communitarianism" which overcomes the problems of collectivism and individualism. The third delineates Marcel's views on the concrete, socio-political and ethical issues of peace and population control. A brief clos-

ing section explains the importance of politics in Marcelian scholarship and the "prophetic" quality of his thought.

A Journey to Consciousness: Gabriel Marcel's Relevance for the Twenty-First-Century Classroom, KATHERINE ROSE HANLEY

In the post-September 11, 2001 world in which we live, French existentialist playwright and philosopher Gabriel Marcel's works are especially relevant. His increased popularity reflects both student and faculty interest in questions he raises about issues that remain vital concerns in our lives. Plays focusing on questions about life's meaning, connected with insights from his philosophic essays, illustrate how Marcel engages personal reflection to clarify challenging situations. He uses dramatic imagination to investigate conflicting viewpoints, inviting the viewers to examine their unique experience of the issues portrayed. Thus his individual journey to consciousness welcomes others to develop their own. Today's classrooms also benefit from a greater availability of Marcel's translated works in the form of books, scripts, videos, CDs, and Readers' Theatre performances.

Evil in Later Medieval Philosophy, BONNIE KENT

This essay presents a critical review of recent literature on evil in medieval philosophy, as understood by thinkers from Anselm of Canterbury onward. "Evil" is taken to include not only serious, deliberate wrongdoing, but also everyday sins done from ignorance or passion. Special attention is paid to Aquinas's De Malo, Giles of Rome and the aftermath of the 1277 Condemnation, scholarly disputes about Scotus's teachings, and commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics by Walter Burley, Gerald Odonis, and John Buridan.

Is Natural Slavery Beneficial? THORTON C. LOCKWOOD, JR.

Aristotle's account of natural slavery appears to be internally inconsistent concerning whether slavery is advantageous to the natural slave. Whereas the Politics asserts that slavery is beneficial to the slave, the ethical treatises deny such a claim. Examination of Aristotle's arguments suggests a distinction which resolves the apparent contradiction. Aristotle distinguishes between the common benefit between two people who join together in an association and the same benefit which exists between a whole and its parts. Master and slave share no common benefit, but instead the slave receives the same benefit a master does, albeit only through participation in the master as a part within a whole. Although Aristotle's distinction hardly justifies his doctrine of slavery, it saves Aristotle from one alleged internal

inconsistency and sheds light on what Aristotle means by association and the common good.

Aristotelian Influences in Gassendi's Moral Philosophy, VERONICA
    GVENTSADZE

The accepted view that Gassendi's ethics is a Christianized form of Epicureanism is incomplete: there is extensive and direct influence of Aristotle's works on the key concepts of Gassendi's ethics, while Epicurean ethics is itself largely informed by Aristotle's views. In the first part of this paper, the notion of freedom as choice informed by rational judgment is examined, and the foundation of Gassendi's intellectualist view of freedom is established in Aristotle's notion of prohairesis. In the second part, the nature of happiness is examined, as well as the relationship between happiness and pleasure, and the contemplative as well as active components of happiness. The third part examines the significance of ethics as an ongoing activity of discernment and regulation of desires: the development of a "second nature" through habitual practice of virtues. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of Aristotle's influence on Gassendi's (and through him, on Locke's) political philosophy.

Francis Hutcheson and the Origin of Animal Rights, AARON
    GARRETT

"Animal right" is an important political and philosophical concept that has its roots in the work of Francis Hutcheson. Developing ideas derived from his natural-law predecessors, Hutcheson stressed the category of acquired or adventitious right to explain how animals might gain rights through becoming members of a community guided by a moral sense. This theoretical innovation had consequences not just for animals, but for making sense of how all of the formerly rightless might gain rights. Examining Hutcheson's development of an important, if problematic, concept allows us to think of rights not through the natural right tradition of Locke, but rather in connection with Bentham—as granted to those who become useful to the community and grounded in feeling and utility, not reason or language.

Promises, Social Acts, and Reid's First Argument for Moral Liberty,
    GIDEON YAFFE

This paper is concerned to bring out the philosophical contribution that Thomas Reid makes in his discussions of promising. Reid discusses promising in two contexts: he argues that the practice of promising presupposes the belief that the promisor is endowed with what he calls "active power" (EAP, IV.6), and he argues against Hume's claim that the very act of promising—and the obligation to do as one promised—are "artificial," or the products of human convention (EAP, V.6). In addition to explaining what Reid says in each of these two contexts, the paper demonstrates that the two discussions are linked. It is, in part, because he thinks that promises are a special kind of act (they are what he calls "social acts," which he contrasts with "solitary

acts")—performable solely through the exercise of our native, natural capacities—that he thinks that the practice of promising presupposes active power. Towards this end, the paper explains how Reid conceives of active power and explains his concept of a social act. The paper argues that, when considered as part of a single, unitary conception of the nature of promises, Reid's two discussions provide important insights into the nature of promising, particularly with regard to the sense in which promisory obligations are conditional: they are conditional upon a rather short list of circumstances that are not within our power—a shorter list than those on which other obligations are conditional.

Kant's Conception of Humanity, JOSHUA GLASGOW

Contemporary Kant scholarship generally takes "humanity" in Kant's ethical writings to refer to beings with rational capacities. However, his claims that only the good will has unqualified goodness and that humanity is unconditionally valuable suggests that humanity might be the good will. This problem seems to have infiltrated some prominent scholarship, and Richard Dean has recently argued that, in fact, humanity is indeed the good will. This paper defends, and tries to make sense of, the more conventional view that humanity and the good will are distinct.

Husserl's Critique of Kant's Ethics, HENNING PEUCKER

This paper introduces Husserl's ethics by examining his critique of Kant's ethics. It presents Husserl's lectures on ethics in which he offers his own ethical theory in a historical context. The phenomenological ethics seeks to combine the advantages of both the traditional empiricism and rationalism. Husserl's ethics takes into account that emotions play an essential role in the constitution of values and morals. Contrariwise, Husserl fights against relativism in ethics and praises Kant for the discovery of an absolute moral imperative. He considers Kant's ethics as a rationalistic position that is too formal and that does not take into account that every will must be motivated by some concrete material good that is evaluated in our feelings or emotions.

Recent Work on Epistemic Value, DUNCAN PRITCHARD

Recent discussion in epistemology has seen a huge growth in interest in the topic of epistemic value. In this paper I describe the background to this new movement in epistemology and critically survey the contemporary literature on this topic.

Source Incompatibilism and its Alternatives, KEVIN TIMPE

In current debates about moral responsibility, it is commonplace to differentiate two fundamentally different incompatibilist positions: Leeway Incompatibilism and Source Incompatibilism. In the present paper, I argue that this is a bad dichotomy. Those forms of Leeway Incompatibilism that have no appeal to 'origination' or 'ultimacy' are problematic, which suggests that incompatibilists should prefer Source Incompatibilism. I then differentiate two sub-classifications of Source Incompatibilism. Narrow Source Incompatibilism holds that alternative possibilities are outside the scope of what is required for moral responsibility. Wide Source Incompatibilism maintains that while ultimacy is most fundamental to moral responsibility, an agent meeting the ultimacy condition will also have alternative possibilities, thereby also satisfying an alternative possibilities condition. I give reasons to think that a version of Wide Source Incompatibilism is the most promising incompatibilist position

A More Palatable Epicurianism, DAVID B. HERSHENOV

It has often been thought that the Epicurean account of the impossibility of death being a harm plays havoc with our commonsense moral claims about the wrongness of killing and the prudence of avoiding death. To preserve such commonsense notions, some philosophers have found more attractive than they might otherwise some very non-commonsensical accounts of existence, reality and time. I argue that we can preserve both the truth of the Epicurean account of death and our commonsense moral and prudential norms needs without adopting a controversial metaphysics.

The Argument from Ignorance against Truth-Conditional Semantics, PAUL SAKA

According to orthodox semantics, to know the meaning of a sentence is to know its truth-conditions. Against this view I observe that we typically do not know the truth-conditions of the sentences we understand. We do not know the truth-conditions, for instance, of empty definite descriptions, non-declaratives, subjunctive conditionals, causal ascriptions, belief ascriptions, probability statements, figurative language, category mistakes, normative judgments, or vague statements. Appealing to tacit knowledge does not help, for the problem goes beyond our inability to articulate complete truth-conditions: even full knowledge of the world's condition would leave us unable to say whether an arbitrary sentence was true or false.

Realism and the Problem of Infimae Species, CRAWFORD L. ELDER

Modal conventionalists hold that sameness in kind rests on our conventions for individuating nature's kinds, and that numerical sameness across time rests on our conventions for individuating members of the kinds. Realist opponents have for thirty years argued forcefully against the first claim, but only weakly and rarely against the second. This paper identifies a reason for the reticence, and undertakes to dispel it. The reason: if there are mind-

independent persistence conditions for the objects of nature, they derive largely from the membership-conditions for natural kinds to which those objects belong—but a particular object can, it seems, belong to two natural kinds, one more specific and one more general. If so, then incompatible persistence-conditions will attach to that object. This paper argues that the hardest such challenges come from recognizing kinds that are too specific to qualify as natural kinds at all, by the realist's own lights.

The Liberationists' Attack on Moral Institutions, ZACHARY ERNST

An influential argument—developed mainly by Peter Singer and Peter Unger—aims to discredit the reliability of our moral intuitions. This argument, which I call the "debunking argument," has attracted much attention because so-called "liberationists" like Singer and Unger aim to use the argument in order to support very strong normative claims. In this paper, I examine the debunking argument, and offer a charitable reconstruction of it that is significantly different from the approach advocated by liberationists, but which retains their fundamental insight. I also argue for a thesis of wider importance—namely, that this reconstruction of the debunking argument provides the right way of understanding the significance of so-called "empirical philosophy."

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
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
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THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE ULTIMATE WHY QUESTION: WHY IS THERE ANYTHING AT ALL RATHER THAN NOTHING WHATSOEVER?*

JOHN F. WIPPEL

LET ME BEGIN BY ACKNOWLEDGING that I have not found Aquinas rais-
ing this question in these exact words. But it is interesting to note that
a contemporary of his who was teaching in the Faculty of Arts at the
University of Paris, the so-called Latin Averroist, Siger of Brabant, did
address the question in these terms. He did so either during or imme-
diately after Thomas's second teaching period at the University of
Paris, which ended in 1272. Siger considers this question in two of the
four surviving versions of his *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* (ca.
1272–5), which in fact are *reportationes*, that is, student reports of his
lectures on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. While commenting on Aristotle's
Metaphysics, book 4, chapters 1–2, Siger recalls Aristotle's claim that
there is a science that studies being as being and the properties that
pertain to it *per se*. Moreover, Siger notes that, according to Aristotle,
it belongs to this science to inquire after the first principles and causes
of being insofar as it is being.[1]

Siger is aware that this remark might seem to contradict a posi-
tion he himself had defended earlier in the "Introduction" to his Com-
mentary on book 1. There, at question 2, he had stated that there can
be no principle and cause of being as being, for such a principle would
then be a cause and principle of itself. This also implies that for Siger
the First Principle or Cause—God—falls under being as being, the

subject of metaphysics.[2] Yet, as Siger now notes, in *Metaphysics* 4.1, Aristotle himself clearly does refer to the need to inquire after the principles and causes of being as being in this science.[3]

Siger proposes to resolve this apparent conflict in the following way. When Aristotle refers to principles and causes of being as being, he does not intend to speak of being in the absolute or unqualified sense, for this would imply that every being has a cause. That, in turn, Siger comments, would imply that no being would have a cause, presumably because if there were no uncaused cause, there would be no caused causes, and hence no effects whatsoever. Siger continues, however, by saying that Aristotle really intends to speak of causes of every *caused* being when he refers to the need to search for the principles and causes of being as being.[4]

Moreover, Siger comments, not every being has a cause of its existence, nor does every question about existence admit of an answer in terms of a causal explanation. Thus, he continues: "If it is asked why there is something rather than nothing," we may take this question in either of two ways. If we restrict the question to things that are themselves caused, we may respond that this is ultimately because there is some immobile *Primum Movens* and some immutable First (that is, Uncaused) cause for every caused being. But if we take the question as applying to the totality of beings and ask why there is something rather than nothing, a causal answer cannot be given. For this would be to ask why God himself exists rather than not, and this question cannot be answered by citing some cause. Siger therefore obviously does not admit the possibility that God could be the efficient cause of his own existence. Rather, he concludes, not every question and not every being admits of a causal explanation.[5]

Lying behind Siger's consideration of and answer to this issue is Avicenna's discussion of the subject of metaphysics in the Latin

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[2] *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* (Munich version), 37.

[3] Ibid., 169.

[4] Ibid. See especially: "Et est hic intelligendum quod non intendit Philosophus per principia et causas entis secundum quod ens, quod ens absolute dictum habeat causas et principia, ita quod causam habeat eius in eo quod ens, quia tunc omne ens habdret causam; quod enim convenit enti in eo quod ens, cuilibet enti convenit quia inest per se et universaliter; si autem omne ens haberet causas, tunc nullum ens haberet causas; non enim esset aliqua causa prima et si non esset prima, nec aliqua aliarum."

translation of his *Liber de prima philosophia* 1, chapters 1–2. In chapter 1, Avicenna considers at some length and rejects the view that God (or God's existence, according to the Marmura translation) is the subject of metaphysics ("first philosophy" or "divine science"). God's existence must be examined in this science, whereas a science must grant the existence of its own subject and investigate the properties of that subject. Since no science can establish the existence of its own subject, God cannot be the subject of metaphysics.[6] In chapter 2, Avicenna concludes that its subject is being as being (or the "existent" insofar as it is existent, according to a more literal translation from the Arabic). He comments that there is no cause or principle for all beings because such an entity would then be a principle (or cause) of itself. Here, too, the implication is that for Avicenna, God falls under being as being, the subject of metaphysics, just as Siger was later to hold. According to Avicenna, therefore, being taken absolutely does not have a cause or principle, but particular beings do. So this science will seek after the principles (and causes) of some beings, but not of being taken absolutely.[7]

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[5] *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* (Munich version), 169:60–170:71: "Sed intendit Philosophus per causas et principia entis inquantum ens, causas simpliciter et per se entis causati, non causas secundum accidens, sed causas per se entitatis eorum quae causam habent illius. Non enim omne ens entitatis suae causam habet nec omnis quaestio quaerens de esse habet causam. Si enim quaeratur quare magis est aliquid in rerum natura quam nihil, in rebus causatis loquendo, contingit respondere quia est aliquod Primum Movens immobile et Prima Causa intransmutabilis. Si vero quaeratur de tota universitate entium quare magis est in eis aliquid quam nihil, non contingit dare causam, quia idem est quaerere hoc et quaerere quare magis est Deus quam non est, et hoc non habet causam. Unde non omnis quaestio habet causam nec etiam omne ens." For essentially the same position see the Cambridge ms. in *Siger de Brabant. Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, ed. Armand Maurer (Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1983), 135–6. Note that there Siger asks specifically: "Utrum entis secundum quod ens sint causae et principia" (135).

[6] Avicenna, *Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia divina I–IV*, ed. Simone Van Riet (Leiden: Brill, 1977), 4–5. For an English translation, see *The Metaphysics of the Healing*, trans. Michael Marmura (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 2005), 3–4.

[7] Ibid., ch. 2 (Van Riet ed., 12–14, especially 14:58–63; Marmura translation, 9–10, 10–11, par. 15).

I

With this in mind, we turn to Thomas Aquinas. Before Siger's consideration of this question in his *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*, Thomas had already addressed the issue of the subject of metaphysics and the closely related question about the relationship between being as being, on the one hand, and divine being, on the other, first in his Commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius (ca. 1258–1259), and then again in the Prooemium to his own Commentary on the *Metaphysics* (ca. 1272–1273). For Thomas, as for Avicenna and Siger, the subject of metaphysics is certainly not God or divine being. Its subject is being as being.[8] Moreover, at least on my reading, metaphysics does not presuppose prior knowledge of God's existence, as it would have to do if God were its subject, and as Averroes had maintained.[9] Rather, it pertains to a science to arrive at knowledge of the causes and principles of its subject. This, says Thomas, is the end or goal of its investigation. In this case, therefore, it pertains to metaphysics to arrive at knowledge of the cause or principle of being as being (its subject), that is to say, at knowledge of God. Consideration of God enters into metaphysics only indirectly, in one's search for the cause or principle of what falls under its subject.[10] This, then, is how

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[8] See Thomas Aquinas, *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 4 (ed. Leonina, vol. 50, pp. 153–4, especially p. 153, ll. 82–7. The Leonine edition will be cited by volume number, page number, and line numbers as applicable, as follows: Leon. 50.153:82–7): "[U]nde et huiusmodi res divinae non tractantur a philosophis nisi prout sunt rerum omnium principia, et ideo pertractantur in illa doctrina in qua ponuntur ea quae sunt communia omnibus entibus, quae habet subiectum ens in quantum est ens." See also Leon. 50.154:157–62; and Aquinas, *In duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristoteles Expositio* (Rome: Marietti, 1950), Prooemium, 1–2, where he refers to the subject of metaphysics as *ens commune*, or being as taken universally.

[9] For more on this, see my *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 14–22.

[10] See *In De Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 4 (Leon. 50.153:82–7): "Sciendum si quidem est quod quaecumque scientia considerat aliquod genus subiectum, oportet quod consideret principia illius generis, cum scientia non perficiatur nisi per cognitionem principiorum, ut patet per Philosophum in principio Physicorum." Also see *In Met.*, Prooemium, 1–2: "Eiusdem autem scientiae est considerare causas proprias alicuius generis et genus ipsum: sicut naturalis considerat principia corporis naturalis. Unde oportet quod ad eamdem scientiam pertineat considerare substantias separatas, et ens commune, quod est genus, cuius sunt praedictae substantiae communes et universales causae." Also see the text cited in note 11.

Aquinas manages to unite into one science Aristotle's science of being as being as presented in *Metaphysics* 4.1–2 and his "divine science" in *Metaphysics* 6.1, which might otherwise seem to be directed only to a particular kind of being, divine being, rather than to being taken universally or as being.[11]

More importantly for our immediate purpose, however, unlike Avicenna, unlike Siger, and unlike practically all of his contemporaries, Aquinas denies that God or divine being is even included under the subject of metaphysics, that is to say, under being as being or under what he sometimes refers to as being in general *(ens commune)*.[12] This, I would speculate, is closely connected with another of Aquinas's distinctive and controverted positions, his denial that in this life human beings can arrive at quidditative knowledge of God.[13]

In any event, Aquinas's denial that God falls under the notion of being that serves as the subject of metaphysics makes it fairly easy for us to see how he would overcome the difficulty addressed by Siger with respect to the ultimate why question. If we ask Thomas why there is something rather than nothing whatsoever, he would distinguish different meanings for the term "something" before replying. If by "something" we mean whatever falls under the subject of metaphysics (being as being), Thomas would argue that any such entity must ultimately consist of an essence and a distinct act of existing. Therefore it must depend upon something else for its existence, or be efficiently caused. Therefore, if, as he claims, recourse to an infinite regress of caused causes of existence adequately explains nothing, any such being must ultimately depend upon an uncaused cause of

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[11] See *In Met.*, Prooemium, 2: "Ex quo apparet, quod quamvis ista scientia praedicta tria consideret (first causes, being taken universally, separate substances), non tamen consideret quodlibet eorum ut subiectum, sed ipsum solum ens commune. Hoc enim est subiectum in scientia, cuius causas et passiones quaerimus, non autem ipsae causae alicuius generis quaesiti. Nam cognitio causarum alicuius generis, est finis ad quem consideratio scientiae pertingit."

[12] *Super Librum Boetii De Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 4 (Leon. 50.154). *In Met.*, Prooemium, 2; *In Librum B. Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus Expositio*, ch. 5, lect. 2, ed. Ceslaus Pera (Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1950), p. 245, n. 660, where Thomas compares God and *esse commune*.

[13] Unaided reason can successfully demonstrate that God exists, and indicate what God is not; but unaided reason cannot deliver any kind of quidditative knowledge of God to us in this life. See, for instance, *Summa contra Gentiles*, bk. 1 [hereafter, CG 1], ch. 30. For other passages and for discussion see my *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, ch. 13, sect. 1.

existence. As will be seen below, this reasoning appears most explic-
itly in what is, in my judgment, his most metaphysical argument for
God's existence, that found in his *De ente et essentia*, ch. 4.[14]

On the other hand, if we take the term "something" as it appears
in the ultimate why question more broadly, so as to include not only
all that falls under being as being but even the cause or principle of
the same, Aquinas would agree with Siger of Brabant's response. No
causal explanation can be given for this, since God himself has no
cause. He is the uncaused cause. Aquinas would never entertain the
thought that God could be regarded as an (efficient) cause of his own
existence. He explicitly rejects the suggestion that anything might ef-
ficiently cause its own existence as self-contradictory, for instance in
De ente, ch. 4.[15]

Nonetheless, there are other aspects to Aquinas's consideration
of our question. Suppose that for the sake of this discussion, we grant
him that he and others have succeeded in demonstrating philosophi-
cally that an uncaused cause of existence does exist, and that it is the
ultimate causal explanation for the existence of all caused being.
Having established this philosophically to his own satisfaction,
Aquinas finds it necessary to determine why God has created anything
at all, rather than nothing whatsoever. He also asks why God has cre-
ated this universe, rather than some other possible universe. Since
his discussion of the second issue presupposes his answer to the first
and more fundamental question, I will concentrate on the latter and
raise three questions: (1) According to Aquinas, why did God create
anything at all? (2) In addressing this, does he offer a causal explana-
tion for God's decision to create, or perhaps something else? (3)
What would Aquinas say if we raise the ultimate why question about
God himself and ask Thomas why God exists rather than not?

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[14] For his *De ente et essentia*, ch. 4 see Leon. 43.376 and following. For
discussion, see my *The Metaphysical Thought*, ch. 5, pp. 137–50.

[15] Leon. 43.377:131–5: "Non autem potest esse quod ipsum esse sit cau-
satum ab ipsa forma vel quidditate rei, dico sicut a causa efficiente, quia sic
aliqua res esset sui ipsius causa et aliqua res se ipsam in esse produceret:
quod est impossibile."

II

In taking up the first question (Why did God create rather than not create anything at all?), I would like to begin by briefly considering Aquinas's understanding of the term "nothing" (*nihil*). It is well known that he defends the view that God is a creative principle and that he produces the world "from nothing" (*ex nihilo*). Thomas explains that by "nothing" we should not understand any kind of preexisting subject or substratum from which things might be produced. By using the expression "from nothing," Thomas simply means that what is created is not produced from something, that is, from any kind of preexisting subject. For instance, in *Summa theologiae* [=ST] I, q. 45, a. 1, he explicitly asks whether to create is to make something from nothing (*Utrum creare sit ex nihilo aliquid facere*). In contrast with any kind of production by generation, he argues that in the case of the emanation of the whole of [created] being from the First Principle, it is impossible for any kind of being to be presupposed. "Nothing" simply means *nullum ens*, no being whatsoever. To create is to produce something from no preexisting subject, hence from nothing.[16]

In the following article 2, he argues that it is necessary to hold that all things are created by God from nothing, that is, not from something. For if God could not create without presupposing some preexisting subject, that subject would not be caused by him. Yet Thomas notes that in q. 44, aa. 1–2, he has already shown that there is no particular being which is not caused by God, who is the universal cause of the whole of being (*totius esse*), meaning, of course, the whole of finite or caused being.[17]

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[16] In addition to this meaning of being produced "from nothing," Thomas had also identified a second meaning in his Commentary on II *Sentences*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2. Nonexistence is prior to existence in a created thing in the sense that if the creature were simply left to itself without being caused by God, it would not exist. The priority involved in this usage is a priority of nature, but not necessarily one of time. See *Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum*, ed. P. Mandonnet, vol. 2 (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929), 18.

[17] Here in q. 44, a.1, Thomas bases his argument on his earlier proof in q. 3, a. 4 that God is *esse subsistens* and that there can only be one instance of this (see q. 7, a. 1, ad 3). This is because subsisting *esse* is not received in any subject and is thereby distinguished from all other instances of *esse* which are multiplied in accord with distinct principles or subjects that receive it. Therefore all things other than God are not identical with their *esse*, but only participate in it. Hence things that are diversified according to their different degrees of participation in *esse* are caused by one first being which exists most perfectly. Also see q. 44, a. 1, ad 1, where he writes: "[Q]uia ex hoc quod aliquid per participationem est ens, sequitur quod sit causatum ab alio" (Leon. 4.455).

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In other contexts, Thomas also asks whether God could reduce something to nothing, that is to say, whether God could annihilate something. In ST I, q. 104, a. 3, for instance, he observes that some held that God produced things necessarily by reason of his nature. If this were true, counters Thomas, God could not reduce something to nothing. But he maintains that the fact that God communicates existence to creatures depends upon the divine will. Moreover, God conserves things in existence by continuously communicating existence to them. Therefore, just as before things existed, God was able not to communicate existence to them, so too, after they have been made, he could cease giving them existence. They would then simply cease to exist; and this would be for God to reduce them to nothing, or to annihilate them. Nonetheless, in the immediately following article, he also argues that in fact, God will not do this because the divine power and goodness are better manifested by the fact that he keeps things in existence. In *De potentia*, q. 5, a. 4, he argues that no intrinsic contradiction is involved in holding that it is possible for creatures not to exist. This is because a creature's essence is not identical with its *esse* (act of existing).[18]

At the same time, Thomas's appeal to the goodness of God as an explanation for the fact that he willed to produce created beings has led some authors to criticize his argumentation either as insufficient or inconsistent. Norman Kretzmann, for instance, acknowledges that Aquinas successfully establishes the presence of intellect and will in God, and grants that he is consistent in maintaining that, just as the divine essence is the only adequate object of the divine intellect, so too the divine goodness is the only adequate object of God's willing. Kretzmann insists, however, that this is not enough to justify Aquinas's claim that God freely decided to create the universe rather than not create it. Kretzmann does grant that, given the divine decision to create, Thomas has successfully shown that God is free to create this universe or any other possible universe.[19]

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[18] See *Quaestiones disputatae De potentia*, q. 5, a. 4, ed. Paul M. Pession (Turin-Rome, 1965), 136: "Creaturas autem simpliciter non esse, non est in se impossibile quasi contradictionem implicans. . . . Et hoc ideo est, quia non sunt suum esse . . . ."

[19] Norman Kretzmann, *The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas's Natural Theology in Summa contra Gentiles I* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), chs. 6–7.

As evidence for his claim that Aquinas should not have main-
tained that God is free to create or not to create, Kretzmann notes that
Thomas often cites with approval a Neoplatonic philosophical axiom
to the effect that the good is diffusive of itself (*bonum est diffusivum
sui*). Since God is all good and therefore naturally and necessarily
wills his own goodness, he naturally and necessarily must will the
goodness of things other than himself. Therefore, Thomas should
have concluded that God had to create.[20]

In his *Great Chain of Being*, written more than 60 years before
Kretzmann's *Metaphysics of Theism*, Arthur Lovejoy had argued that
inconsistency on this issue is present not only in Aquinas and in other
medieval Christian theologians, but that it can be traced back to the
classical period of Greek Philosophy. Thus Lovejoy finds in Plato two
conflicting views of the supreme ontological principle for all of reality.
On the one side, there is the otherworldly view best captured by
Plato's description of the Good in *Republic* 6 and 7, which is so tran-
scendent, so beyond being and essence, that it would seem that our
physical world is not needed, and which Lovejoy identifies as the
equivalent of Plato's God. On the other side, there is the Demiurge of
the *Timaeus* who was responsible for forming the sensible universe
as it actually is because "he was good, and in one that is good no envy
of any kind ever arises. Being devoid of envy, then he desired that ev-
erything should be so far as possible like himself."[21] While recognizing
that this next step is open to considerable dispute, Lovejoy judged it
more likely that Plato did identify the Good of the *Republic* with the
Demiurge of the *Timaeus*. Consequently, he finds Plato attributing to
one and the same entity the self-sufficiency and transcendence of the
Good of the *Republic* and the desire to communicate its goodness of
the Demiurge of the *Timaeus*. And thus, Lovejoy maintains, the view
that the good is diffusive of itself, if not in so many words, in fact ap-
pears for the first time in the history of philosophy, thereby giving rise
to an internal conflict that would trouble Western philosophy for

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[20] Kretzmann, *The Metaphysics of Theism*, 217–25. Also see his "Good-
ness, Knowledge, and Indeterminacy in the Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas,"
The Journal of Philosophy, Supplement 80, n. 10 (1983): 631–49; *The Meta-
physics of Creation: Aquinas's Natural Theology in Summa contra Gen-
tiles II* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 120–6 and 132–6.

[21] Arthur Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1936, repr. 1964), 47. See *Timaeus* 29E–30A.

much of its subsequent history. Moreover, on Lovejoy's account, the fecundity on the part of the Good does not result from free choice, but is necessary. It must produce things like itself insofar as it can.[22]

As for the medieval period, Lovejoy quotes a key text from the *Divine Names* of Pseudo-Dionysius:

> The Good by being extends its goodness to all things. For as our sun, not by choosing or taking thought but by merely being, enlightens all things, so the Good . . . by its mere existence sends forth upon all things the beams of its goodness.[23]

One can easily understand why Lovejoy (and others) might take this text as implying necessary creation on the part of God.[24] Such a reading is strengthened by the analogy the author draws with the sun. Just as the sun, without choosing or thinking but simply by existing illuminates all things, so the Good, by merely existing, sends forth "the beams of its goodness."

In his Commentary on the *Divine Names*, however, Aquinas himself does not read the text this way. He notes that the point of the analogy with the sun is to show that, just as it extends its beams to all visible things, God extends goodness to all other things that share in goodness. In other words, according to Aquinas, the analogy holds only for one side—the universal communication by God of his goodness to all good things. It does not hold for the other side, the necessary and automatic diffusion of the rays of the sun to visible things.[25]

As we turn to Aquinas's texts themselves, I will assume for the sake of this discussion a number of items which he accepts as already established on philosophical grounds before he takes up this question. He himself follows this order in his synthetic treatments of this issue in *Summa contra Gentiles* [=CG] 1 and 2, and in ST I. Thus he claims to have already demonstrated the existence of God in CG 1, chs. 13 and 15, and in ST I, q. 2, a. 3. Moreover, he has also argued on philosophical grounds that God is all-perfect (CG 1.28; ST I, q. 4), that he is perfectly good (CG 1.37 and 30; ST I, q. 6), that he is infinite (CG

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[22] Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being*, 50–4.

[23] Ibid., 68, translating from *De divinis nominibus*, ch. 4, 1 (*Patrologiae cursus completus, Series Graeca*, ed. J.P. Migne, vol. 3 [Paris, 1857], col. 693). See *Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works* (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), for Colm Luibheid's translation of this text, 71–2.

[24] See Fran O'Rourke, *Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas* (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 242; John D. Jones, "An Absolutely Simple God? Reading Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite," *The Thomist* 69 (2005): 403–4.

[25] *In De divinis nominibus* ch. 4, 1 (lect. 1, nn. 270–1). Also see *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 15, obj. 1 and ad 1.

1.43; ST I, q. 7, a. 1), and subsequently that intellect and will are present in him. If I may fill this in briefly, Aquinas holds that we can by reasoning from effect to cause know that God is, and that by denying of him anything that implies imperfection, we can also discover what God is not. But, as noted above, we cannot know what God is.[26] Thus, by following the way of negation, in CG 1.15–27, Aquinas develops a number of appropriate names for God which are negative in content and then, by also using the way of negation, applies them, concluding for instance that God is simple (that is, not composed in any way) and immutable (that is, not subject to change of any kind), and so forth. Subsequently, however, (and this point should not be overlooked), he also applies certain other names to God which appear to be positive in content, for instance, good, intelligent, etc., even though such names can be predicated of him only analogically. So true is this that in later discussion he argues that such names can be predicated of God substantially (*substantialiter*).[27]

The turning point in this development in CG 1 occurs in Aquinas's discussion of divine perfection in chapter 28. He begins his effort to prove that God is perfect, still using the way of negation. A being is perfect in every respect if no excellence of any kind is lacking to it. But this is true of God. For instance, in his first argument, Thomas reasons that the excellence of a thing pertains to that thing in accord with the mode whereby it enjoys *esse*, that is, the act of existing. Insofar as a thing's act of existing is limited to a greater or lesser mode of excellence, that thing is more or less perfect. If there is something to which the total power of existing (*virtus essendi*) pertains, no excellence that can belong to any thing (*res*) is lacking to it. God possesses the act of existing according to the total power of existing because his essence is identical with his act of existing. Therefore no excellence that can pertain to any being is lacking to him; therefore, he is all perfect. What is striking about this argument is the fact that, by negating any kind of limitation or imperfection of God—in other words, by negating any such negation—Aquinas ends with a very important positive conclusion: God is all perfect.[28]

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[26] See CG 1.30, for instance, and my *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, 502–43.

[27] See *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 5; ST I, q. 13, a. 2. See my *The Metaphysical Thought*, 523–7 and 537–9 for discussion.

[28] See also the second argument in which Thomas establishes divine perfection by eliminating any *non esse* from God.

Pursuant to this, in ch. 29 Thomas argues that because every effect must in some way be like its cause, the form of an effect must in some way be present in the cause that produces it (formally or at least virtually, I would add), even though the cause may greatly surpass the effect in excellence and perfection. Thus, in ch. 30 Aquinas maintains that names such as goodness, wisdom, and being (*esse*), which signify perfection without any limit whatsoever, may be applied to creatures and to God as their cause, but only with certain restrictions. The creaturely way in which they signify (*modus significandi*) must be denied of them when they are applied to God, and what they signify (*res significata*) can be said of God only analogically.

Most important for our discussion is Aquinas's account of divine goodness. For Thomas, the good is a transcendental, that is to say, a property or characteristic of being that is as general or universal in extension as being itself (*ens*). Here I have in mind ontological goodness, not moral goodness. As a transcendental, the good is really identical and convertible with being, but differs from it conceptually. Being is known as good when it is explicitly recognized as an object of will or of appetite, as something that is desirable in itself.[29] Thomas also insists that the good is perfective with respect to something else insofar as it serves as an end for that which is perfected by it. Thus, he observes, those who correctly define the good include in its meaning a relationship to an end.[30]

Thomas's response to an objection in this same *De veritate*, q. 21, a. 1 is interesting. Objection 4 argues from Pseudo-Dionysius that the good is diffusive of itself and of being, and therefore that something is good by reason of the fact that it is diffusive. But to diffuse implies action. Aquinas acknowledges that if taken strictly, the word "diffuse" seems to imply the action of an efficient cause. Yet when taken broadly, it can refer to any kind of causality. Thus, as used by Dionysius in this context, it does not imply efficient causality but final causality.[31] As we shall see, this is an important part of Thomas's defense

[29] See *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 1; q. 21, aa. 1–2; ST I, q. 5.

[30] See *De veritate*, q. 21, a. 1, Leon. 22.3.594:201–9, especially: ". . . et inde est quod omnes recte diffinientes bonum ponunt in ratione eius aliquid quod pertinet ad habitudinem finis." For a fuller presentation and discussion of much of what follows in the remainder of this section and which I summarize here, see my "Thomas Aquinas on God's Freedom to Create or Not," ch. 9 in my *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 224–37.

of God's freedom to create or not. As for the point that God is good, in CG 1.37, Aquinas maintains that this follows from the fact that God is all perfect, which he has established in ch. 28. He argues in similar fashion in ST I, q. 6, a. 3, in order to conclude that God alone is good of his essence.

Following this, in both CG 1 and in ST I, Thomas offers philosophical argumentation to show that intellect is present in God. For instance, in CG 1.44, he offers a series of arguments for this, one of which is based on divine perfection. Among all perfections, the most powerful (*potissima*) is for something to be intellective. By means of intellection, it is, in a certain sense, all things, since by knowing all things, it possesses their perfection in some way (that is, cognitively). After discussing various aspects of divine knowledge in the following chapters, in ch. 72 Thomas takes up the issue of the divine will. In the first of a series of arguments for will in God, he reasons from the fact that God is intelligent to the conclusion that he wills. Aquinas assumes that the proper object of will is an object understood as good by intellect. Insofar as something is understood as good (or desirable), it is something that is willed. Therefore, one who understands a being as good is one who wills. Because God is perfectly intelligent, he understands being as good. Therefore he wills. What is an object of divine appetite or divine will is loved, not as something that God lacks and wants, but as something in which he takes delight.[32]

In ch. 73, Aquinas maintains that God's will is identical with his essence. He reasons to this conclusion because of God's perfection and simplicity. For instance, just as the divine act of understanding (*intelligere*) must be identical with the divine being (*esse*), so too, the divine willing (*velle*) must be identical with the divine being. Hence the divine will itself is also identical with the divine being or, as he puts it in his second argument, with the divine essence itself. There can be no real composition in God of being or essence and operation as, according to Thomas, there is in created agents.

In ch. 74, Thomas argues that the principal object of the divine will is the divine essence itself. For instance, he recalls from ch. 72 that a good that is understood by intellect is an object of will. But the

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[31] *De veritate*, q. 21, a. 4, Leon. 22.3.594:251–69.
[32] As Thomas sometimes puts it, as something which he loves. See the conclusion of Thomas's third argument. On this point, see Kretzmann, *The Metaphysics of Theism*, 203–6.

primary object of God's understanding is the divine essence itself. Therefore, the divine essence is also the primary object of the divine will. Moreover, if God were to will something other than himself as the primary object of his willing, such a thing would cause God's act of willing. But his willing is identical with his being (*esse*). Thus something else would cause his *esse* (see the third argument: "*Praeterea*").

Next, in ch. 75, Thomas reasons that by willing himself, God also wills other things. For instance, he first argues, it belongs to one who wills an end in primary fashion to will those things which are ordered to that end by reason of that end. But God himself is the ultimate end for all things. Therefore, since he wills his own being (literally, wills himself to be), he also wills other things which are ordered to himself as to their end.

Again ("*Item*"), Thomas reasons that everyone desires the perfection of that which he wills and loves for its own sake, and wills for it always to be improved and multiplied insofar as this is possible. God wills and loves his essence for its own sake. But his essence cannot be increased or multiplied, but can only be multiplied by reason of his likeness which is participated in by many things. Therefore, God wills a multitude of things by reason of the fact that he wills and loves his own essence and perfection.[33]

Still again ("*Item* 2"), Aquinas reasons that to the extent that something possesses more perfect power, to that extent does its causality extend to more things. The causality of an end consists in the fact that other things are desired on account of it. Therefore, the more perfect an end is and the more intensively it is willed, the more things are willed by reason of that end. Since the divine essence is most perfect both in goodness and as an end, it will extend (*diffundet*) its causality to many things to the maximum degree. Hence a multiplicity of things are perfectly willed by God in accord with the fullness of his power.[34]

In light of these and similar arguments in ch. 75, Aquinas does present a very strong case to prove that God wills to diffuse his perfection to other things since he is the ultimate final cause of every-

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[33] See Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being*, 73–4. As Thomas puts this in another context (CG 2.35, ad 7), it was fitting for the divine will to produce creatures as participating in his goodness so that by likeness they may represent the divine goodness. "Sic igitur divinae voluntati conveniens fuit in suae bonitatis participationem creaturam producere, ut sua similitudine divinam bonitatem repraesentaret" (Editio Leonina manualis [Rome, 1939], 125).

thing else. But, one may ask, does it not follow from this that he is thereby falling into a necessitarian position, as both Lovejoy and Kretzmann maintain? Before responding to this criticism, Thomas adds another point in ch. 76: it is by one act of willing that God wills himself and other things. This should cause little surprise since, as we have seen, Thomas cannot admit any real distinction between God's essence, his will, and his act of willing; yet it does seem to make his effort to defend God's freedom to create more difficult.

Seemingly causing still more difficulty for Thomas is his view in ch. 80 that God necessarily wills his own being (*esse*) and his own goodness. As he explains, this follows from his earlier proof in ch. 74 that God wills his own *esse* and goodness as the primary object of his willing, and as he now notes in ch. 80, this willing in turn is the reason for his willing other things.[35] In addition, Thomas now reasons that it is not possible for God not to will something actually, for otherwise he would do so only potentially. This must be rejected because his act of willing is identical with his being. Hence he necessarily wills his own *esse* and his own goodness.[36]

Thus, in ch. 81, Aquinas realizes that the conclusion he had reached in ch. 80—that God necessarily wills his own goodness— might seem to some to imply, as in fact it does for Kretzmann, that God creates other things necessarily. For Thomas has maintained in ch. 75 that by willing his own goodness, God wills other things. He has also maintained that God necessarily wills his own goodness. Therefore, it might seem, he necessarily wills other things.[37]

Thomas replies that the divine will is directed to other things insofar as they are ordered to his own goodness as their end. But a will is not ordered necessarily to things which are directed to an end if that end can be perfectly realized without them. Because the divine goodness is fully realized without the existence of anything else and receives no increase in perfection from the fact that other things exist, it

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[34] See Norman Kretzmann, "A General Problem of Creation: Why Would God Create Anything at All?," in *Being and Goodness*, ed. Scott MacDonald (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 222. He views this passage in particular as implying a Platonic-necessitarian tendency in Thomas. See also his *The Metaphysics of Theism*, 217–20.

[35] CG 1.80: "Ostensum est enim supra quod Deus vult suum esse et suam bonitatem ut principale obiectum, quod est sibi ratio volendi alia" (Ed. Leonina manualis, 74). For ch. 74 see ibid., 70–1.

[36] CG 1.80, Ed. Leon. manualis, 74.

[37] CG 1.80, Ed. Leon. manualis, 75.

is not necessary for the divine will to create anything else even though God necessarily wills himself.[38]

Thomas's third argument in this chapter is very different, but is worth mentioning. By willing his own goodness God wills other things to exist insofar as they participate in his goodness. Because the divine goodness is infinite, it can be participated in in an infinity of ways, and in ways which have not yet been actually realized. If it were true that, because God necessarily wills his own goodness, he necessarily wills those things that participate in it, he would have to will an infinity of creatures, which would participate in his goodness in an infinity of ways. But, says Thomas, this is clearly false, presumably because he finds it contrary to the *de facto* situation.[39]

Thomas had already made this point in *De veritate*, q. 23, a. 4. There, too, he observes that the fact that God necessarily wills his own goodness does not imply that he necessarily wills things other than himself. If that which is ordered to an end is perfectly proportioned to that end in such fashion that the end cannot be attained without it, then if the end is necessarily willed, so are the means. But since no effect can be equal to the divine power, nothing that is ordered to God is adequately proportioned to or equal to the divine end. This is so because no creature is perfectly like God. No matter how excellent the manner in which some creature is ordered to God and in some way is like him, it is possible for another creature to be ordered to him and to represent his goodness in equally excellent fashion or, I would add to Thomas's reasoning, even in more excellent fashion. For no matter how perfect any creature may be, it will always be finite and therefore never equal to the intensively infinite divine perfection.[40]

If this argument seems to show that there is no necessity for God to produce any given creature rather than some other, what about God's freedom not to create anything at all? In the text from the *De veritate*, Thomas now explicitly addresses this issue: There is no necessity for God to produce the whole of creation, that is, to create at all. The divine goodness is so perfect in itself that, even if no creature whatsoever existed, God's goodness would still be completely perfect in itself. As Thomas succinctly puts it, the divine goodness is not the kind of end that is produced by or results *from* those things that are

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[38] Ibid. Also see CG 2.31, as part of Thomas's argumentation to show that it is not necessary for creatures to have always existed.

[39] CG 1.81, Ed. Leonina manualis, 75.

[40] *De veritate*, q. 23, a. 4, Leon. 22.3.662:197–663:221.

ordered to it. Rather it is the kind of end *by which* those things which are ordered to it are themselves produced and perfected.[41]

Underlying Thomas's defense of God's freedom (1) to create or not to create, and (2) to create this creature rather than that, is the lack of proportion, the lack of any kind of equality between the goodness and perfection of any creature or any number of creatures whether actual or possible, on the one side, and God's infinite goodness and perfection, on the other. Here Aquinas has in mind what we may call intensive infinity, as distinguished from any kind of extensive infinity based on quantity, such as numerical multiplication to infinity of finite goods or finitely perfect beings. According to Thomas, no addition can be made to that which is intensively infinite in goodness and perfection. Therefore, even if no creature whatsoever existed, the divine goodness would still be completely and infinitely perfect in itself.

III

Now in light of Thomas's discussion, we may turn to the second main question raised above: Does anything cause God to will to create other beings? In CG 1.86, Thomas replies that a *ratio* (a reason or explanation) can be given for God's willing other things. Again Thomas points out that God wills his own goodness as an end and all other things as ordered to it. Therefore his goodness is the reason (*ratio*) why he wills such things. Indeed, in ch. 80 he had already referred to God's *esse* and his goodness as the primary object of his will and hence as his reason for willing other things.[42] Moreover, in *De veritate*, q. 23, a. 4, he had also made this point and had observed that just as the divine essence is the reason (*ratio*) for God's knowledge of other things, so is the divine goodness the reason for his will's willing all things.[43] Yet now, in ch. 87, he argues that while there is a reason for God's willing of things other than himself, it does not follow from this that something must be a cause of this, thereby introducing an

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[41] *De veritate*, q. 23, a. 4, Leon. 22.3.663:229–32.

[42] CG 1.80, Ed. Leon. manualis, 74. See n. 35 above.

[43] See *De veritate*, q. 23, a. 4, Leon. 22.3.662:184–8: "Unde ea quae circa creaturas vult sunt quasi eius volita secundaria quae propter suam bonitatem vult, ut divina bonitas ita sit eius voluntati ratio volendi omnia, sicut sua essentia est ei ratio omnia cognoscendi." Compare ST I, q. 19, a. 2, ad 2: "Et sic, sicut alia a se intelligit intelligendo essentiam suam, ita alia a se vult, volendo bonitatem suam" (Leon. 4.233).

interesting distinction between a *ratio* and a cause.[44] Moreover, by identifying a reason though not a cause for God's willing things other than himself, Thomas avoids falling into any kind of blind divine voluntarism in his account.

At this point, it may be helpful to see how Thomas develops this distinction between a reason and a cause within this context. In ch. 86, he writes that an end is the reason (*ratio*) for willing those things which are ordered to that end. But God wills his goodness as an end, and wills other things insofar as they are ordered to that end. Thus his goodness is the reason (note that he does not say the "cause") why he wills other things that differ from him. In a second argument ("*Rursus*"), Thomas argues that a particular good is ordered to the good of a whole as to its end, just as the imperfect is ordered to the perfect. Certain things fall under the divine will insofar as they are ordered to the good. Therefore, the good of the universe is the reason (*ratio*) why God wills each particular good in the universe.[45]

A third argument ("*Item*") brings out more explicitly Thomas's understanding of the term "reason" within this context. He recalls from ch. 83 that if God wills something, it follows necessarily that he wills what is required for it. But what imposes necessity upon another thing is the reason why that thing exists. Therefore the reason why God wills the things that are required for each thing is so that every such thing may exist. Then Thomas spells out different ways in which reasons may be assigned for God's willing. God wills man to have reason in order for man to exist. He wills man to exist in order for the universe to be complete. And he wills the good of the universe because this befits his own goodness. But these three kinds of reasons involve different relationships. Thus the divine goodness does not depend upon the perfection or completeness of the universe, nor does the perfection of the universe add anything to God's goodness. The perfection of the universe depends necessarily upon certain particular goods which are its essential parts, and depends in nonnecessary fashion upon others which are not essential to the universe, but which may add some goodness or beauty to it. A particular good depends necessarily upon those things which are absolutely presupposed for it, although it may also contain others which only serve to embellish it. Therefore, the reason or *ratio* for the divine will in some cases includes only what is fitting, namely, what befits the divine

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[44] CG 1.87, Ed. Leon. manualis, 79.
[45] CG 1.87, Ed. Leon. manualis, 79.

goodness. Presumably Thomas here has in mind God's reason for creating a universe. In some cases it includes usefulness, presumably of one particular good for another to be realized. In some cases it includes necessity *ex suppositione*, presumably for the realization of another good under the supposition that that good is willed. But a reason for the divine will includes absolute necessity only when it wills itself. In other words, Thomas continues to hold that while God freely wills all other things, he necessarily wills himself.[46]

In ch. 87, he maintains that while a reason can be assigned for the divine will, this does not imply that something actually causes it to will. Because of some difficulty in interpreting this text, however, I will number the sentences as I quote it here in translation:

> (1) Although some reason (*ratio*) can be assigned for the divine will, it does not follow that something is the cause of this will. (2) For a will the end is the cause of its willing. (3) But the end of the divine will is its goodness. (4) Therefore, for God it (the divine goodness) is the cause of his willing, which is identical with his willing. (5) But of other things willed by God, none is a cause of willing for God.[47]

Proposition 1 simply asserts Thomas's purpose—to show that while some reason can be assigned for God's willing, this does not imply that something causes it. One wonders whether here Thomas is speaking only of God's willing other things, or also of his willing himself. Proposition 2 states that the end is the cause of a will's willing. One wonders whether this applies only to finite agents accessible to us, that is, to human beings, or also to God. Proposition 3 simply recalls that the end of God's willing is his own goodness. But proposition 4 concludes from this that the divine goodness is therefore a cause for God's willing, and also adds that it is in fact identical with his very act of willing. The latter part of this proposition follows from God's simplicity, but the first part, while it is consistent with propositions 2 and 3, seems to clash with proposition 1, which warned the reader that while there is a reason for God's willing, it does not follow from this that something is a cause of it.

One way of interpreting this is to conclude that Thomas intends to show that there is indeed a reason (or reasons) for God's willing

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[46] CG 1.87, Ed. Leon. manualis, 79.
[47] CG, 1.87, Ed. Leon. manualis, 79. "(1) Quamvis autem aliqua ratio divinae voluntati assignari possit, non tamen sequitur quod voluntatis eius sit aliquid causa. (2) Voluntati enim causa volendi est finis. (3) Finis autem divinae volutatis est sua bonitas. (4) Ipsa igitur est Deo causa volendi, quae est etiam ipsum velle. (5) Aliorum autem a Deo volitorum nullum est Deo causa volendi."

things other than himself, and that none of these is a cause for God's willing them. According to proposition 4, however, there is a cause for God's willing himself, namely his own goodness, which, we are reminded, is identical with his act of willing. Yet since it is difficult to understand how anything in God, including his willing, can be caused, especially since it is identical with his being, Sylvester of Ferrara suggests that after proposition 4, we should insert the following: "Therefore neither is (divine) goodness itself really the cause of the act of willing, since nothing is a cause of itself." He also suggests that in proposition 4, when Thomas refers to the divine goodness as causing God's willing, he is speaking according to our human mode of understanding, but that in reality there can be no cause of God's willing.[48] Whether one prefers such an explanation, or thinks that Thomas really did regard the divine goodness as a (final) cause of God's will when God wills himself, he has proposed a number of examples of *rationes* or reasons in ch. 86 which are not causes of God's willing other things. This suffices to bring out the point that a reason for God's willing does not have to be a cause of the same, and this distinction will serve us well in the final section of this paper.

Before turning to that, however, I should note that in ch. 88, Thomas wants to show that free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) is present in God. He observes that free choice is said of someone who wills not out of necessity but of one's own accord (*sua sponte*), and he refers back to his proof in ch. 81 that God does not will other things of necessity to support his claim that God enjoys free choice. In ST I, q. 19, a. 10, he again attempts to prove that God possesses free choice. There he refers back to article 3 of this same question, where he reasons in the same way as he had in *De veritate*, q. 23, a. 4, and in CG 1.81. In brief, one who necessarily wills an end does not necessarily will things that are ordered to that end, unless they are such that the end cannot be achieved without them. Because God's goodness is perfect and fully realized without the existence of other things, and because other things add nothing to the divine perfection, God is free to will or not to will anything other than himself.[49]

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[48] In his Commentary on this text, Sylvester of Ferrara noticed this difficulty and proposed to resolve it by supplying the following after the troublesome proposition 4: "Ergo neque ipsa bonitas est realiter causa ipsius actus volendi: cum nihil sit sui ipsius causa" (Leon 13.238). A little farther on, Sylvester adds: "Ideo, cum dixisset quod bonitas est causa volendi, subiunxit statim, *quae est etiam ipsum suum velle*, quasi diceret: Cum dico ipsam esse causam, non intelligo secundum realem causalitatem, cum sit idem cum ipso velle, sed tantum secundum nostrum modum intelligendi" (ibid.).

As for the Dionysian axiom that the good is diffusive of itself, Aquinas refrains from giving this a necessitarian application to God's creative activity by insisting that it should be interpreted in terms of final causality rather than efficient causality. The divine goodness exercises its causality by serving as an end, a final cause, for other things. In other words, God produces things other than himself so that they may participate in and reflect that goodness; but since no created good is proportionate to the divine perfection and goodness, the production of other good things is not required for and does not add to the divine perfection and goodness. Thus God is perfectly free to produce or not produce things other than himself, and to produce this rather than any other creature or set of creatures. While this interpretation of the Dionysian principle may be both novel and counterintuitive, as Kretzmann charges, it is the reading Aquinas gives it, thereby enabling him to offer a benign interpretation of this supposedly Apostolic authority in the Christian world, in accord with the medieval custom of offering "a reverential interpretation" of an accepted authority.[50]

IV

Finally, in light of the distinction Thomas makes between there being a reason (*ratio*) but not a cause for God's willing to produce other things, I will conclude by returning to our third main question: What would Aquinas say if we were to raise the ultimate why question

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[49] See ST I, q. 19, a. 10 (Leon. 4.248) for the backward reference to a. 3 (Leon. 4.235).

[50] For Kretzmann, see "A General Problem of Creation," 220. Fran O'Rourke, for instance, acknowledges that Dionysius likely interpreted this principle in terms of efficient causality. See his *Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas* (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 242. Also see John D. Jones, "An Absolutely Simple God? Reading Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite," *The Thomist* 69 (2005): 403–4, who cites two texts, including the one we have quoted above in the body of our text, as seeming "to argue against the view that for Dionysius God creates beings in the sense that he need not have willed them." The second text is taken from *De divinis nominibus* 1.5.593D. For other discussions of God's freedom to create or not in Aquinas see W. Norris Clarke, *Explorations in Metaphysics: Being, God, Person* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 222–6; O'Rourke, ch. 9; B. T. Blankenhorn, "The Good as Self-Diffusive in Thomas Aquinas," *Angelicum* 79 (2002): 803–7. For an important earlier study on Aquinas's interpretation of the Dionysian axiom in terms of final causality see J. Peghaire, "L'Axiome 'Bonum est diffusivum sui' dans le néo-platonisme et le thomisme," *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa* 2 (1932): 5*–30*.

about God himself and ask Thomas why does God exist? Aquinas is convinced on philosophical grounds that in all beings, with one possible exception, there is a distinction and composition of an essence principle, and an intrinsic *actus essendi*, an act of existing, which actualizes the essence, serves as the ultimate source of perfection in that being, and also accounts for the fact that it exists.[51] Indeed, in one of his best known arguments for such distinction (*De ente*, ch. 4), he maintains that it is impossible for there to be more than one being in which essence and *esse* are identical, and he often repeats this reasoning elsewhere.[52] Far from assuming that such a being exists, however, he concludes that in every other being, with this one possible exception, essence and act of existing differ. Then, on the strength of this, he concludes that any being in which essence and act of existing differ must receive its existence from something else; in other words, it must be efficiently caused. After considering but rejecting a regress to infinity of caused causes of existence as an adequate explanation of this, he concludes to the existence of an uncaused cause of existence, which is in fact identical with its act of existing, that is, which is subsisting *esse*.[53]

If one asks, therefore, why does this being exist, or why does God exist, Aquinas will, of course, deny that it is caused by anything, that is to say, it is not caused by itself, and it is not caused by anything else. God is not a *causa sui*. No efficient cause can be proposed to account for his existence. Yet he would also say that such a being exists because its essence is identical with its act of existing. Its very nature is to exist. Given this, it is not possible for God not to exist; consequently, he exists necessarily. While this is not to appeal to a cause to account for God's existence, it is, I would suggest, to offer an explanation or reason (*ratio*) for this. Here I am adopting and adapt-

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[51] See, for instance, the often cited text from *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9: ". . . hoc quod dico *esse* est inter omnia perfectissimum: quod ex hoc patet quod actus est semper perfectio<r> potentia. Quaelibet autem forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi per hoc quod esse ponitur. Nam humanitas vel igneitas potest considerari ut in potentia materiae existens, vel ut in virtute agentis, aut etiam ut in intellectu: sed hoc quod habet *esse*, efficitur actu existens. Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum et, propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum" (*De potentia*, p. 192).

[52] *De ente et essentia*, ch. 4, Leon. 43.376–7. See my *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, 137–57.

[53] See *De ente et essentia*, ch. 4, Leon. 43.377.

ing the distinction Thomas developed in CG 1.86–7 between a *ratio* and a cause, in order to address the ultimate why question: Why does God exist? My suggested answer is that it is in accord with Aquinas's thought to respond that while no causal explanation can be given for God's existence, a reason or explanation may be offered, namely that God's essence is identical with his *actus essendi.*

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JUSTICE AND THE BANNING OF THE POETS: THE WAY OF HERMENEUTICS IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC

TODD S. MEI

> What is unthought in a thinker's thought is not a lack inherent in his thought. . . . The more original a thinking is, the richer will be what is unthought in it. The unthought is the most precious gift that a thinking has to convey.[1]

SOCRATES AT ONE POINT IN THE *REPUBLIC* remarks that the matter of accusing the poets of lying is "a point that we will agree upon when we have discovered the nature of justice."[2] This suggests that in order to understand what is at stake with poetry, one must come to understand in some way the nature of justice. But this seems to be an impossible suggestion within the context of the *Republic* since the question of the nature of poetry occurs before any thorough exploration of justice is completed. To be sure, Plato's return to the critique of the poets in book 10 is often interpreted to be his final conclusion on the matter[3]; nevertheless, the above passage, which occurs in book 3,

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[1] Martin Heidegger, *What Is Called Thinking*, trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 76.

[2] Plato, *Republic* 3.392c. All excerpts from the *Republic* are from the Loeb Classical Library, trans. Paul Shorey, vol. 5 and 6 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999 and 2000). Unless otherwise noted, translations of Plato's other dialogues are from *Plato's Dialogues*, vols 1 and 2, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York: Random House, 1937).

[3] For example, as said outright by Eric Havelock, *Preface to Plato* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), 4–5; or implicitly by Margaret Pabst Battin, "Plato on True and False Poetry," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 36, no. 2 (1977), 163–5; Elizabeth Belfiore, "Plato's Greatest Accusation against Poetry," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, suppl. vol. 9 (1983): 39–62; and Alexander Nehamas, "Plato on Imitation and Poetry in *Republic* 10," in *Plato on Beauty, Wisdom and the Arts* (hereafter *PB*), ed. Julius Moravcsik and Philip Temko (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1982), 47–53. Martha Craven Nussbaum sees the *Republic* as an intermediate statement on poetry that is subsequently revised in *Phaedrus*; "'This Story Isn't True:' Poetry, Goodness, and Understanding in Plato's *Phaedrus*," in *PB*, 81. For a contrary view see James O. Urmson, "Plato and the Poets," in *PB*, 127–8.

places the reader in a precarious interpretive situation that asks that one consider poetry and justice together, that is, as being mutually disclosive of one another. While this irony can be conceived along stylistic and formal lines,[4] I see it more in terms of how such commentators as Hans-Georg Gadamer understand it to convey a decisive philosophical statement: namely, that the path of understanding the Good is not akin to science or *techne* and requires its own unique unfoldment through dialogue.[5] I shall look at this claim in more detail, but for now let it suffice to say that this essay intends to show that the themes of justice and the banning of the poets, which are often seen to be separate concerns in the *Republic*, are not only interrelated thematically but integral to one another in the philosophical process of understanding them. My argument assumes the momentum of earlier studies that emphasize the Platonic dialogues as initiations or movements into philosophy.[6]

The relation between poetry and justice entails the following: as Plato repudiates the legalistic formulations of justice, wherein relationships between citizens are defined by specific modes of acting, he similarly rejects a legalistic, or literal (by the letter), understanding of poetic *logos*. Yet this also has a positive correlation: the legalistic misconceptions of poetry and justice find their remedy at the hermeneutical level. Here the kind of interpretation required by poetry in order

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[4] For example, Charles L. Griswold, Jr., "Irony in the Platonic Dialogues," *Philosophy and Literature* 26 (2002): 84–106; and C. Jan Swearingen, *Rhetoric and Irony: Western Literacy and Western Lies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 55–94.

[5] Compare to Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Plato and the Poets," in *Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato* (hereafter *DD*), trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 68; and *The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy* (hereafter *IG*), trans. Paul Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 140. See also John Sallis on *dianoia*, *Being and Logos: Reading the Platonic Dialogues*, 3ᵈ ed. (hereafter *BL*) (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), 424–43.

[6] For example, Gadamer, "Plato and the Poets," 39–72; Paul Friedländer, *Plato: An Introduction*, trans. Hans Meyerhoff (New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1958), 121 and 189–90; David Roochnik, *Of Art and Wisdom: Plato's Understanding of Techne* (hereafter *AW*) (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1996), 105–6, and Sallis, *BL*, 1–22 and 533–4. Sallis refers to others in this same line of interpretation (21, n. 12), including Allan Bloom, *The Republic of Plato* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), xvii; and Hermann L. Sinaiko, *Love, Knowledge, and Discourse in Plato* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 12. Nussbaum refers to the tendency to ignore the literary style of the dialogues in relation to its philosophical argument; "'This Story Isn't True'," *PB*, 91.

to grasp nonliteral meaning becomes the means by which a nonlegalistic and nonvulgar notion of justice is disclosed. My use of the term "legalistic" requires some flexibility since, on the one hand, I refer to what David Sachs famously noted as the "vulgar conception of justice"[7]—for example, that justice is speaking the truth and paying one's debts (Cephalus, 1.331c), owing friends good and enemies harm (Polemarchus, 1.332a), and the advantage of the stronger (Thrasymachus, 1.338c). On the other hand, legalism designates the equally vulgar (or literal) interpretation of the metaphorical and symbolic elements of poetry—that is, what Socrates refers to as allegorical meaning.[8] I take allegory to denote, in its fullest sense, a bearing of meaning that is unfamiliar, novel, and in the end transformative of reality[9]; hence, if this aspect of poetry is missed or misunderstood (as for example by the young and the uneducated), it must appear that poetry teaches lies and thus falsely portrays reality (*pseudeis*).

In view of the above, I can now give more detail to my thesis. The banning of the poets acts as a self-reflexive episode that proves central to the inquiry on the nature of justice. First, it articulates the question of justice with respect to a specific instance that shall recur throughout the dialogue: should the poets be banned? Second, the resolution of this instance indicates how the question of justice should be approached. That is to say, as Plato identifies the manner in which one should relate to poetry, this in turn suggests *how* the nature of justice is to be understood. In short, I am arguing that the philosophical inquiry into justice requires a poeticization, and by this I mean that the nature of justice is something which can be disclosed only in the appropriation (*periagōgē*)[10] of the inquirer according to the poetic nature of existence—that is, the *poiēsis* that informs *phūsis*, and not by recourse to an explanatory science or *technē*.[11] This refers to a

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[7] David Sachs, "A Fallacy in Plato's *Republic*," in *Plato*, vol. 2, *Ethics, Politics and Philosophy of Art and Religion*, ed. Gregory Vlastos (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), 37. Compare to Roochnik's treatment of Socrates's critique of justice as a technical knowledge; *AW*, 131–8 and Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 2d ed. (hereafter *AV*) (Notre Dame: University of Notre Press, 1984), 131.

[8] *Republic* 2.378d.

[9] See, for instance, Paul Ricoeur, "Mimesis and Representation," in *A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection and Imagination*, ed. Mario J. Valdés (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 137–55; and Willem J. Verdenius, "Plato's Doctrine of Artistic Imitation," in *Plato*, ed. Vlastos, 2:262–3.

[10] *Republic* 7.521c; compare to Roochnik, *AW*, 202.

[11] See Richard Rojcewicz on Heidegger and *phūsis*: *The Gods and Technology: A Reading of Heidegger* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2006), 38–40.

metanoia of understanding in which the question of justice is understood through a narrative-based (poetic) apprehension. To support this claim, I shall rely upon the thesis, presented by such philosophers as Alasdair MacIntyre and Paul Ricoeur, that human understanding is always set within a narrative context by which it actualizes and affirms meaning. Thus, I argue that in the *Republic*, the question of the nature of poetry offers a hermeneutical way through which the inquirer can be made appropriate to the nature of justice vis-à-vis the narrative nature of being itself. This fundamental bond reinterprets the ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy, conceiving their relationship as a productive, even if antagonistic, dialectic.

This essay is divided into three parts: (1) a discussion of the context of the *Republic* and its significance for *paideia*, (2) an interpretation of the episode of the banning of the poets, and (3) the implications of how justice is to be understood when reading it through this episode.

I

What is the context of the question of justice for Plato? Gadamer was keen to point to a remark of Goethe's: "He who philosophizes is not at one with the previous and contemporary world's ways of thinking of things. Thus Plato's discussions are often not only directed *to* something but also directed *against* it."[12] Perhaps this point seems rather facile, but it nonetheless requires of us to understand to what exactly Plato was reacting. In this section, I shall argue that, as is well known, Plato's philosophical milieu is one dominated by sophism and the reduction of justice to what MacIntyre refers to as "the goods of effectiveness."[13] This brought Plato to challenge and reformulate the process by which learning was to be reconceived. According to Gadamer, "Plato's *paideia* is thus meant as a counterweight to the centrifugal pull of those forces of the sophist enlightenment being exerted upon the state."[14] By setting forth the clarity of this line of argumenta-

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[12] Gadamer, "Plato and the Poets," 39 (italics in original). The reference to Goethe's work is not given by Gadamer.

[13] Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (hereafter *WW*) (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), ch. 5. Havelock was one of the first to speak of this context; *Preface to Plato*, 12–13.

[14] Gadamer, "Plato and the Poets," 58.

tion, we will then be able in the next section to see how the critique of poetry plays a positive role in poetry's reformulation, not through its banishment, but through its safekeeping.

Justice (*dikaiosunē*), as Socrates explains, is one of the four virtues—the others being courage (*andreia*), temperance (*sōphrosunē*), and practical reason (*phronēsis*). That justice should be the central question of the dialogue is no accident, for we find Socrates saying:

> I think that this [justice] is the remaining virtue in the state after our consideration of temperance, courage, and practical reason, a quality which made it possible for them all to grow up in the body politic and which when they have sprung up preserves them as long as it is present.[15]

Justice is given a preeminent status among the virtues since it is required by the others for their maturation and flourishing. According to MacIntyre, justice is inseparable from the inherent ordering of the cosmos for the ancient Greeks, and within the Homeric tradition the sense of justice plays out in terms of roles and responsibilities within the social hierarchy:

> The characterization of action and of the prologues to action make ineliminable reference to the cosmic order of *dikē*. The cosmic order can be transgressed, but the consequences of transgression are themselves signs of that same order.[16]

Within its Platonic inception, the question of justice, MacIntyre argues, is set against the Periclean "goods of effectiveness" that elevate external "good reasons" for actions over that of "good reasons as such," namely, reasons that are antecedent to the performance of any one action. Here, the antecedent is the *archē*, or that which sustains the practical reasonableness of an action as it moves towards its end. The *archē* is the Good[17] by which human action as such can be ordered: "If man always encounters the good in the form of the particular situation in which he finds himself," writes Gadamer, "the task of

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[15] *Republic* 4.433b–c. I have altered Shorey's translation of the virtues according to mine in order to retain consistency.

[16] MacIntyre, *WW*, 23; compare his *A Short History of Ethics: A History of Moral Philosophy from the Homeric Age to the Twentieth Century* (London: Routledge, 1967), 5–13.

[17] Roochnik, *WA*, 248. I refer to "the Good" when speaking of Plato and "the good" when speaking of Aristotle. The difference in capitalization acknowledges Aristotle's turn towards the more practical application of the good, though as I shall argue it is not discontinuous with Plato.

moral knowledge is to determine what the concrete situation asks of him."[18] In contrast, the "goods of effectiveness," in subordinating this ideality to its immediate external aims, are therefore the ancestor of utilitarianism and emotivism, which hold to a plurality of reasons in order to achieve what appears to be most beneficial or preferential.

This difference between the ideal Good and immediate practicability is, of course, the point over which Plato and Aristotle have been interpreted to diverge. Martha Nussbaum notes in this respect that for Plato, "All things are *epistēmē*," while for Aristotle, ethics cannot be a science.[19] Indeed, for Aristotle, the conditions of contingency are essential in the actualization of *eudaimonia*, while Plato centers all discussion on the relevance of the Good in terms of Form. Nussbaum has, in this regard, shown how the notion of goodness in ancient Greek tragedy and philosophy is set against, or in dialogue with, the temporal contingencies that challenge the enacting of the virtuous life, a life which is *praxis*.[20] Aristotle's thinking appears to be a critical modification of Plato's reflections on the relation between *phronēsis* as the knowledge of the statesman, and the ability to apply this knowledge in action. Plato thus speaks not of *praxis*, but of the relation between *phronēsis* and *technē*.[21] Similarly, John Milbank sees Plato as more or less arguing for a theoretical model that one can imitate, therefore ascribing to wisdom a mimetic role that can be carried out through *technē*. This, in fact, is more or less the agreed-upon position.[22] *Phronēsis* is a technique to be learned, administered, and taught. But is this what Plato is really saying?

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[18] Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, rev. 2d ed. (hereafter *TM*), trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 2003), 313.

[19] Referring to *Protagoras* 361c; Martha Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy*, updated ed. (hereafter *FG*) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 94–120. See also Gadamer, *TM*, 312.

[20] Nussbaum, *FG*, 318–42.

[21] See Robert Hall, "*Technē* and Morality in the *Gorgias*," in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, ed. John P. Anton and George L. Kustas (Albany: SUNY Press, 1971), 203–5.

[22] John Milbank, *The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 124. Compare Nussbaum, *FG*, 309; and Stanley Rosen, *The Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 27. Roochnik refers to this as SAT (the Standard Account of *Technē*) which is divided into the "continuist" and "discontinuist" interpretations. The former see the dialogues as consistently advocating *technē* for moral knowledge while the latter sees a shift in the middle and later dialogues to a nontechnical based knowledge. Roochnik's thesis opposes these two positions, arguing that Plato was well aware of the insufficiency of *technē* from the start; Roochnik, *AW*, 1–15.

Going against the grain of interpretation, it seems to me that what is overlooked in Plato's dialogues is that matters concerning virtue are never clear. Is virtue comprised of a technique that is learnable and teachable, or is it a gift of the gods?

There appears to be no clear position. In the *Meno*, Socrates concludes that "virtue is neither natural nor acquired, but an instinct given by God to the virtuous."[23] In the *Protagoras*, Socrates assumes the contrary position, concluding that virtue can be taught.[24] At one point in his earlier lectures, Heidegger remarks, "Plato would never determine philosophy as *technē* [technique]!"[25] Similarly, Gadamer notes that Plato's intent is to oppose the *technē* of the sophists to a new *paideia* whose only technique would appear to be a "doctrine" of Socratic ignorance.[26] The inconsistency between the dialogues suggests that the question of virtue is a mixture of both: that is, as a divine gift, it requires human nurturing through contemplation and action.[27] In other words, on the one hand, the learning of virtue is possible only because it has been given to human beings, while on the other hand, its divine bestowal is no guarantee of its flourishing, so that it must be thought out in relation to "the whole and the parts."[28] The latter is a position that Aristotle himself seems to take when considering one of his main objections in *Nicomachean Ethics* 2, namely, that the Platonic Good is not practicable.[29] In this sense, perception (*aisthēsis*) is pivotal for Aristotle in defining the human being over-against the animal. The human being is directed in a specific way by a concern for the good[30]: perception in Aristotle is, according to Nussbaum, "a faculty of discrimination that is concerned with the apprehending of concrete particulars, rather than universals."[31]

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[23] *Meno* 99d–100a, trans. Benjamin Jowett; compare to *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.7.1177a13–17, trans. Christopher Rowe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), henceforward *NE*.

[24] See Roochnik's account of this ending in *Protagoras*, where he argues Socrates's reference to measurement and hedonism cannot be taken to be serious: Roochnik, *AW*, 227–31.

[25] Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 38; the bracketed word is in original. I have transliterated the Greek.

[26] Gadamer, *IG*, 139–40.

[27] Ibid., 46–50.

[28] Sallis, *BL*, 101–2.

[29] Nussbaum, *FG*, 255–8 and Gadamer, *IG*, 126–58.

[30] *NE* 6.2.1139a18–21.

[31] Nussbaum, *FG*, 300.

Nussbaum's point has Plato in mind, and it is undeniable that Plato was indeed concerned with the universal and the One (*hen*). Nonetheless, we make a great interpretive jump if we are therefore to conceal Plato's philosophy within the realm of transcendence. As Gadamer points out, and as David Roochnik has shown more systematically, Plato was distrustful of *technē* as a science of the Good; furthermore, the transcendence of the Good (*epekeina tēs ousias*)—that is, its separation from the physical world (*chōrismos*)—seems to be entirely questionable within Plato's dialogues.[32]   Gail Fine, for example, has argued persuasively that there is continuity between human knowledge and the Good.[33]   According to MacIntyre, Plato's philosophy was deliberately incomplete in terms of formulating an *epistēmē* and *technē*, because at the heart of the matter, for Plato, was a discernment of the *archē* of philosophy, which, at least in the *Republic*, could not adequately be disclosed.[34]

One can ask in this respect, do the dialogues in general ever declare a final position, or do they exist as a manner of questioning that opens up the very pertinence of the subject? In view of this openness or indeterminacy (which perhaps is located in the Socratic ignorance), MacIntyre argues that Aristotle inherits Plato's project of disclosing the *archē* in terms of particular instances of justice. This is precisely Aristotle's development of *phronēsis* that seeks to articulate a practicable relation to the good, that is, *praxis* whose end and beginning is within the activity itself and not external to it.[35]   In other words, its *tēlos* and *archē* are the same, that is, the good. Otherwise, *praxical* action would seek an end outside itself.[36]   Indeed, as Gada-

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[32] Gadamer, *IG*, 137–40. Among other points, Gadamer also remarks that Aristotle takes Plato's metaphors when explaining the Good in relation to being to be literal. Certainly, a reading of "the Good beyond Being" can be construed metaphorically, and if so, its meaning becomes much more productive and less dualistic. Gadamer bases this appeal to metaphor on the dramatic and poetic quality of the dialogues noted by many commentators, as mentioned above. Roochnik, *AW*, 1–15.

[33] Gail Fine, "Knowledge and Belief in *Republic* 5–7," in *Plato*, vol. 1, *Metaphysics and Epistemology*, ed. Gail Fine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 215–46.

[34] MacIntyre, *WW*, ch. 5–6.

[35] MacIntyre, *WW*, 88–102; compare to Gadamer, *IG*, 126–58.

[36] *Hou heneka* [the for-the-sake-of-which] and the *archē* are the same. See Martin Heidegger on Aristotle, *Plato's Sophist*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 85 and 101; compare to Gadamer, *IG*, 145–6.

mer has shown, while this notion is explicitly developed by Aristotle in the term he coined, *entelecheia*, it has its roots in Plato.[37]

When viewing Aristotle within the direct lineage of Plato, one can get a sense of the compelling necessity around which Plato gathers his dialogues, namely, that beyond a reduction of the Good to ends of effectiveness (in this case, sophism), philosophical knowledge requires the harmonization of the human being (and the *polis*) with the Good itself. Plato's concern, in other words, was to provide a reflective milieu in which the question of justice as such could be renewed and reinvigorated against the misunderstandings he attributed to the sophist and Periclean developments.[38] The definitions of justice offered by Cephalus (who, MacIntyre points out, was a friend of Pericles),[39] Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus appear wholly inadequate within this milieu. This is not only because the definitions themselves do not hold up to logical and rational scrutiny, but more importantly, their untenability derives from what I referred to earlier as their legalism. That is to say, they insufficiently maintain an open reflection on justice itself, and it is dialogical openness that appears to be requisite for Plato's reformulation of *paideia*.[40]

The lack of openness in the *Republic* often means that a legalistic definition of justice replaces a mode of understanding that participates in the constant necessity for justice to be rethought, that is, meditated upon as a manner of dwelling (habituation) which constitutes an *ethos*.[41] In the last analysis, legalism presupposes a meaning of the subject without actually inquiring into it: the letter, as it were, replaces the question that opens one to the subject. MacIntyre thus remarks, in view of the sophist goods of effectiveness, that "Plato's view is that not to understand what virtue is precludes one from being virtuous."[42] This is why, in part, the Socratic ignorance remains so

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[37] Gadamer, *IG*, 176–7.

[38] MacIntyre, *WW*, 84.

[39] Ibid., 72.

[40] The radicality of Plato's conception of *paideia* is often noted in relation to the highly individualized pursuit of knowledge. See, for example, Raphael Demos, "A Fallacy in Plato's *Republic*?," in *Plato*, ed. Vlastos, 2:53.

[41] Gadamer, *IG*, 167. Compare to Belfiore on Plato and *ethos*, who sees Plato's critique of poetry as one that attacks the inadequacy of its medium (*mimēsis*) to convey ethical teaching: Elizabeth Belfiore, *Tragic Pleasures: Aristotle on Plot and Emotion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 86. Suffice it to say, I rest my analysis of *ethos* not on the medium, but on the way one comes to interpret it.

[42] MacIntyre, *WW*, 69.

resourceful. Its ignorance springs from an openness that can reorient itself to the Good according to the necessity of the situation, that is, its *kairos*.[43] This hermeneutic relation, according to Gadamer, is what lies at the heart of Plato's dialectic where the specificity or limitation of a situation (*to peras*) is opened up by the appropriate question.[44] Similarly, it is related to the event of Reason (*nous*) persuading Necessity (*ananke*) in *Timaeus*.[45] The necessary constitution of the cosmos is what abides according to *nous* and can so be "marked out" by *dike*.[46] This, so I am arguing, provides us with the extent to which justice in Plato mediates the ongoings within the cosmos and provides order so that both *polis* and *psuche* can function properly.[47]

The legalistic reliance on definitions to provide an *arche* for action runs parallel to the denigration of dialogue. Thus if Plato espouses a *techne* in any respect, it is, as MacIntyre notes, not a *techne* that one can merely adopt and conform to. Rather, it is a radically new kind of *techne* that constantly recalls an understanding of its *arche* in its enacting.[48] The *techne* is subsequent to the comprehension of its *arche*, whereas with sophism it is the opposite: *techne* allows one to perfect as much as possible a means towards an end. As mentioned before, Gadamer, in fact, holds this repudiation of nondialogical *techne* to be an underlying theme in Plato's critique of poetry, a critique that is especially open to "dogmatic abuse."[49]

> [Plato's] position is the quite conscious expression of a decision—a decision made as a result of having been taken with Socrates and philosophy, made in opposition to the entire political and intellectual culture of his time, and made in the conviction that philosophy alone has the capacity to save the state. . . . For the pedagogical significance of Plato's new and different philosophy becomes evident precisely insofar as that philosophy breaks with the poetic foundations of the Attic education and asserts itself against the whole tradition.[50]

Does this elevation of "philosophy first," however, require the banishment of the poets? Or is there a subtler relation operating within the *Republic* whereby the elevation of philosophy frees poetry by way of opening up a new way of relating to it? If the answer to this latter

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[43] Roochnik, *AW*, 233.
[44] Gadamer, *TM*, 362–9; compare MacIntyre, *WW*, 78.
[45] Gadamer, "Idea and Reality in Plato's *Timaeus*," *DD*, 171–2.
[46] MacIntyre, *WW*, 14.
[47] Ibid., 74.
[48] Ibid., 70. Compare to Roochnik, *AW*, 192.
[49] Gadamer, *TM*, 369.
[50] Gadamer, "Plato and the Poets," 47–8 and 58.

question is positive, the manner of seeing this is roundabout, for Plato's criticisms seem to be uncompromising.[51] Indeed, as I shall argue, the implication of Plato's critique requires a hermeneutic detour by regrounding his analysis in the movement of the narrative of the dialogue itself. That is to say, Plato's analysis turns from a critique of poetry to its restoration—albeit, no longer understood in its traditional, uncritical reception.[52]

II

The critique of book 2 designates poetry as representations that teach lies (2.377b–8a), while the critique of book 10 takes on a more complete accusation. It abjures the poets because they do not have knowledge of their subject and compose by inspiration (10.600e–601b). Therefore, poetry by nature is imitative of reality and, more importantly, leads to Socrates' final rebuke that as such, poetry corrupts the soul (10.604a–605c). In this section, I argue that Plato's critiques perform a different function: namely, they negatively characterize poetry, because Plato assumes that its nature is likely to be misunderstood: in other words, its meanings are likely to be taken to be literal descriptions of reality, the gods and heroes, and their conduct.[53] In this sense, poetry needs to be coupled with deliberate philosophical inquiry in order to see secondary, figurative meanings, that is, the truth of that which informs the appearance (*eidolon*). Poetry therefore

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[51] Partee remarks, "The *Republic* does not attack simply a way of interpreting poetry"; Moriss H. Partee, "Plato's Banishment of Poetry," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 28 (1970): 216. Partee, however, thinks more generally than I intend. He sees "a way of interpreting poetry" to mean literary criticism, whereas I refer to the ontological transformation of understanding involved in interpretation as expressed, for example, in the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer and Ricoeur.

[52] Julius A. Elias, *Plato's Defence of Poetry* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1984), 78.

[53] Belfiore marks the different kinds of *mimēsis* in the *Republic* according to one that imitates willy-nilly and without knowledge of its subject (*mimētikos*) and the other which does so with this knowledge (*mimēsis*). She argues that it is the latter which is acceptable to some degree by Plato: see Elizabeth Belfiore, "A Theory of Imitation in Plato's *Republic*," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 114 (1984): 121–46. These distinctions, nonetheless, tend to focus on the medium itself while leaving out the role of the audience who must learn to exercise discrimination through philosophical reflection, as I am arguing here.

requires a transformation of the listener in order for it to be appre-
hended. In this respect, debates over whether or not Plato admits of a
purer kind of poetry are beside the point, because the emphasis is on
how one appropriately comes to interpret poetry, rather than on de-
termining the aesthetic nature of the medium itself.[54] Yet if this is in
fact the case, why doesn't Plato simply say so? Why does his dis-
missal of the poets seem so total?

This lacuna can obviously be construed as a fatal flaw to my argu-
ment. Yet, it can also be conceived as an interpretive *kairos*, to be
filled in, as it were, by the person reading the dialogues.[55] In other
words, Plato leaves the resolution open in order to provoke thinking.
The pedagogical event that is emergent here is one where what is left
unanswered produces the greater reflective response.[56] This herme-
neutic license makes sense, insofar as one bears in mind that Plato's
reluctance towards the written word is mitigated to a great extent by
the written medium of the dialogues themselves, a medium which
most commentators are keen to point out assumes the form of *mimē-
sis*. This paradox has formed the core of various interpretations of
Plato's philosophy as a whole.[57] Gadamer argues that in relying on
myth, Plato initiates a new kind of *muthos* that breaks with the older
tradition through irony, ultimately provoking the need for philosophy:
"Insofar as his dialogues portray philosophizing in order to compel us

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[54] Gadamer adamantly opposes the idea that Plato's critique in book 10
is a platform for aesthetic consciousness. In fact, he states that book 10 is "a
critique of the moral consequences of 'aesthetic consciousness'"; Gadamer,
"Plato and the Poets," 65. By this he means that Plato was against the reduc-
tion of an understanding of art to the subjective experience contra ontologi-
cal self-knowledge. Gadamer's translator, Paul Christopher Smith, points
this out (65, n. 10) in reference to *TM*, 42–64. Francis M. Cornford also op-
poses the aesthetical interpretation of book 10: see *The Republic of Plato*
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 322; as noted in Partee, "Plato's
Banishment of Poetry," 216. See also Giovanni R. F. Ferrari, "Plato and Po-
etry," in *The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism*, vol. 1, *Classical
Criticism*, ed. George A. Kennedy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989), 98; and Urmson, "Plato and the Poets," 132.

[55] Elias therefore speaks of two defenses of poetry in Plato (*Plato's De-
fence of Poetry*). The former is the "weak defense," in which poetry embod-
ies an understanding of something for those whose intellectual capacity is
not commensurate to the task and therefore must rely on emotion (here
emotion is not meant pejoratively [76–7]). The latter is the "strong defense,"
in which philosophy is seen to be lacking, and only poetry can convey the
highest truths (81). I do not take the separation between poetry and philoso-
phy to be so radical as I argue for a dialectical relation between them.

[56] Compare to what Roochnik alights upon in *Euthydemus* 275a, as re-
ferred to in *AW*, 156.

to philosophize, they shroud all of what they say in the ambiguous twilight of irony."[58] The point of poetic *mimēsis*, according to Gadamer, is to initiate a recollection of knowledge through the distance one must travel between contemplating the copy and the original.[59] MacIntyre remarks that this paradox, epitomized in the concluding *Myth of Er*, which violates two principles Socrates mentions earlier in the *Republic* (that is, imitating characters through direct speech and depicting the underworld in an unacceptable way), shows to us that Socrates himself has not "achieved *epistēmē*" and thus suggests, in turn, that the *Republic* is neither a science nor a model of the Good.[60] Despite differences which themselves are inherent to the quality of Plato's mimetic dialogues (which deny any kind of doctrinal stance), this paradox appears to be indicative of the greater project which is operative in Plato's thinking. For my part, I wish to concentrate on two moments in books 2 and 10. When taken together, they provide an indication as to how one is to understand justice.

Sacrifice in Book 2. In book 2, Socrates remarks of Hesiod's descriptions of the gods in song:

> [A]nd if there were some necessity for relating them, a chosen few might hear them in a mystery after sacrificing, not a pig, but some huge and unprocurable victim.[61]

This passage is often overlooked in an analysis of Plato's critique,[62] perhaps because it refers to religious or mythic meanings interpreted to be surplus to that of Plato's philosophical criticism. Nonetheless,

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[57] Here, the paradox can be construed in different ways: formal irony, philosophical provocation, and logical inconsistency. I referred to the first two in notes 4, 5, and 6 above. For an account of this paradox in terms of rational consistency, see Belfiore, "A Theory of Imitation in Plato's *Republic*," 121–2.

[58] Gadamer, "Plato and the Poets," 70.

[59] Gadamer, *TM*, 115.

[60] MacIntyre, *WW*, 82.

[61] *Republic* 378a. I have retained Jowett's rendering of the Greek ἀπορρήτων as "mystery" rather than Shorey's "pledge of secrecy," to coincide with Plato's subsequent reference to Eleusinian mystery sacrifice.

[62] Battin is one of the few who does, but she does not dwell on the sacrificial part and only on the fact that herein Socrates says such stories should not be told while in other instances noble lies should be told (for example, *Republic* 389b and *Laws* 663d–664a); see "Plato on True and False Poetry," 164. Similarly, Belfiore dedicates an examination to this passage in relation to Hesiod but never mentions the role of sacrifice; Belfiore, "'Lies Unlike the Truth:' Plato on Hesiod, *Theogony* 27," *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, 115 (1985), 47–57.

one cannot simply bracket out the religious and mythic references, thereby importing a modern, secular division of philosophy and theology into a reading of the dialogues. In this respect, Friedländer remarks on the essential tie between philosophy and religion: "Plato's theory of the eternal forms appears not as an individual experience, but as a sublimation in the truly Hellenic spirit of the noblest form of piety of a people."[63] And although Gadamer points out that Plato wished to oppose his radicalization of *paideia* to the poetic and mythic tradition, and that even when Plato alludes to myth in his dialogues it is in an altogether different way than the tradition would have it,[64] there is a level of meaning in the passage above that requires an interpretation more sensitive to narrative. Despite whatever new meaning Plato's myths may attain through their subversive and "ironic counterimages,"[65] his use of *muthos* still remains trustful to some degree of narrative pedagogy. In the last analysis, irony, as Ricoeur notes, relies on an affirmation of a secondary meaning that can only arise through the initial gainsay that places two things in opposition.[66] In this respect, *muthos* in the dialogues are not a repudiation of poetry as such, but a revivification of it.

The sacrifice (*thusia*) in book 2 carries the mythic-ritualistic significance of initiation; and if Gadamer is correct, then this initiation is one that arises through philosophy: "The critique of the poets can be understood only within the setting of this total refounding of a new state in words of philosophy."[67] Here, the *logos* of poetry is juxtaposed to the *logos* of philosophy. The misrepresentative and seductive nature of poetic *logos*, discussed by Socrates not only in the *Republic* but also in *Gorgias* 501d–503b, where poetry is associated with the rhetoric of sophists,[68] complicates the phronetic process of deliberation. Whatever pedagogic function poetry serves, it is liable to be misinterpreted, and from this perspective, Socrates can assert that the imitative tribe of poets teaches lies. But here is where the remedy of philosophy arises: philosophy allows one to see for oneself how poetic *mimēsis* works. It does not necessitate the dismissal of poetic *mimēsis* as such but only when philosophical reflection is not sufficient, that is, not appropriate to poetic *logos*. The inadequacy of po-

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[63] Friedländer, *Plato: An Introduction*, 72.
[64] Gadamer, "Plato and the Poets," 67–8.
[65] Ibid., 68.
[66] Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor*, trans. Robert Czerny, Kathleen McLaughlin, and John Costello (London: Routledge, 1977), 110.
[67] Gadamer, "Plato and the Poets," 48.

etry, in other words, is not in the language or medium itself, but in the human relation to it.[69] Failings of the *logos* cannot reside within language itself, even poetic language; otherwise reflection, even if a *dianoia*, would exist within a continual perpetuation of simulacrum. Because the *logos* is co-emergent with human being, it requires something in addition to its power of disclosure. That is to say, "it is not the *word* (*onomata*) that opens up the way to truth,"[70] but one's being within language itself.

The above consideration suggests that the nature of the sacrifice involved in the reception of poetry is a metanoia. In this respect, the recognition of the imitative quality of poetry constitutes only half of the entire process of understanding. What is imitative in poetry is figurative at another level, the very paradoxical basis upon which figurative meaning can attain to different levels of ontological significance. Without being able to set itself against a 'lower' order of meaning, the figurative cannot unveil itself. The metanoia would, on these grounds, involve an appropriate hermeneutic orientation towards the poetic medium of the *logos* that functioned in this way. This orientation is not unrelated to the kind of piety required of ritual, since the act of seeing (*theōrein*) is for Plato (and Aristotle) an apprehension of the divine.[71] Yet if this is in fact the case, then how is the final pronouncement in book 10 to be understood?

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[68] The identification of the imitative nature of poetry with the sophist is a problematic one. Iris Murdoch concludes that because both poetry and sophistry are in fact imitation, they can be placed in the same category; Iris Murdoch, *The Fire and the Sun: Why Plato Banished the Artists* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 31–2. Many commentators point to the contradiction in the *Republic* where Socrates cites the sophists (Protagoras and Prodicus) in order to support his attack on poetry (10.600c–e); see Partee, "Plato's Banishment of Poetry," 215–16. Belfiore notes that the words describing the nature of imitation differ in each instance. For poetry, their representations are in ignorance and therefore *eidola* while for the sophist, their constructions are *phantastike*, that is, semblances that give the impression of being fine when they are not; Belfiore, "A Theory of Imitation in Plato's *Republic*," 131–2.

[69] Nussbaum argues that in Plato's later thinking the conflict between the rational and irrational is not a metaphysical dualism by a psychological one; Nussbaum, "'This Story Isn't True'," 107. Here I apply her argument to Plato's thinking on the whole.

[70] Gadamer, *TM*, 407.

[71] Cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 47a–b; *Republic* 7.514a–17a; and *NE* 10.7.1177a12–24. For a detailed study of the different meanings and transformations of *theōria*, see Andrea Wilson Nightingale, *Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in Its Cultural Context* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Antidote in Book 10. First one must ask, in what sense is book 10's critique final? Its critique can in part be explained by its narrative context in relation to book 2. The critique of book 2 admits a certain kind of poetry, while book 10 bans poetry altogether. As mentioned earlier, book 10 has often been taken to be the concluding argument on the matter of poetry; but this is to assume that book 10 itself is a concluding argument to the dialogue. I disagree with this assumption.

Parallel to the allusion to sacrifice in book 2, one finds an allusion to antidote (*pharmakon*) in book 10:

> That kind of art [poetry] seems to be a corruption of the mind of all listeners who do not possess, as an antidote, a knowledge of its *real* nature.[72]

One should also take into account that the beginning of book 10 returns to the question of poetry in such a way that Glaucon is given the opportunity to recapitulate the preceding discussion on justice and the soul in relation to poetry.[73] Book 10, as Sallis notes in projecting the whole of the dialogue onto the structure of the allegory of the cave, occurs within the philosopher's descent back into the cave.[74] This context is vital, for it necessitates that those who have undergone the ascent of the soul be able to communicate what has been learned to those in need of teaching. Yet Glaucon cannot recapitulate the discussion, and consequently, I suggest, the reconsideration given over to poetry in book 10 is now set within a different pedagogical context, one which is nonetheless anticipated by Socrates before it actually unfolds. It is Glaucon's inability to proceed according to Socrates's suggestion that determines the manner in which the nature of poetry will be discussed. Because Glaucon has not yet come to understand fully in the same way Socrates has, the discussion takes the course of a preventative, or antidote.[75] In other words, the level at which this second discussion on poetry resides is administered precisely to the level of Glaucon's understanding, and the discussion of poetry's "real" nature is "protreptic"—that is, it is a pedagogical instrument to provoke deeper reflection.[76]

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[72] *Republic* 10.595b, my emphasis.
[73] *Republic* 10.595a–d.
[74] Sallis, *BL*, 455.
[75] Sallis points out that Glaucon represents a transitionary mode of understanding, between opinion and knowledge; Sallis, *BL*, 389. The dialogical course of the *Republic* is, in this sense, an instantiation of *paideia*.
[76] Roochnik, *AW*, 150.

The antidote to poetry is to know its true nature, and within the context of the discussion in book 10, this refers to knowing its limitations. I suggest here that "real" is not a univocal pronouncement, but a true description of poetry according to its limitations. These limitations, which in the grossest sense refer to poetry's inability to represent *immediately* the very subject it speaks of, is at another level the expression of a necessity: namely, that human understanding is required to traverse the distance between the literal image represented in poetry in order to arrive at its secondary meaning—that is, genuinely poetic meaning. Human understanding is hermeneutical. Hence, Plato's renewed critique encompasses all forms of *mimēsis*, because it is the metaphorical and symbolic nature of mimetic production as such that requires a metanoia in order for one to understand what it may be showing. Belfiore therefore argues that the comparison in book 10 between poetry and painting is used to show that the imitation involved in poetry is not concerned with the relation between original and copy, so much as it is intended to point out that the imitative process is insufficient at disclosing truth; that is, poetry results in confusing virtues because it speaks of them in ways one is apt to take literally. She refers to this as "veridical" falsehood.[77] Thus, one can see how hermeneutics proves central since it allows for one to discern that poetry requires a metaphorical reading. This necessity is itself a principle of hermeneutics, formulated by Ricoeur:

> If it is true that literal sense and metaphorical sense are distinguished and articulated within an interpretation, so too it is within an interpretation that a second-level reference, which is properly metaphorical reference, is set free by means of the suspension of the first-level reference.[78]

And elsewhere: "It is by living in the first meaning that I am led by it beyond itself; the symbolic meaning is constituted in and by the literal meaning."[79]

In this sense, Ferrari remarks that *pharmakon* is not like a medical inoculation; rather, it is a mode of being in which one is able to remain "aloof" from the imitative seduction.[80] And here I would go beyond Ferrari's point and note that the imitative seduction, like being beholden to the shadows in the cave, is not a moral licentiousness but

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[77] Belfiore, "Plato's Greatest Accusation against Poetry," 40–4.

[78] Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor*, 261.

[79] Paul Ricoeur, *The Symbolism of Evil*, trans. Emerson Buchanan (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), 15–16.

[80] Ferrari, "Plato and Poetry," 142; compare Belfiore, "Plato's Greatest Accusation against Poetry," 62.

an intellectual shortcoming wherein the intellect allows the senses to act as the main faculty of *aisthēsis*. That is to say, the banning of poetry rests upon an intellectual offense that in turn affects the political and ethical conditions of the *polis*.[81]

If the antidote is knowledge of poetry's real nature, then it is not the final point at which one can then turn away from poetry. Rather, it marks the hermeneutical moment in which one is provoked into being-with the poetic *logos*. Derrida has famously pointed to the dual nature of *pharmakon* in Plato as both "good (*agatha*) and painful (*ainaral*)"; "it is a mixture (*summeikton*)."[82] I interpret this double sense to mean that the remedy is not a simple cure for a problem; rather, it prepares one to make the transition to a "healthier" manner of being, through a transformation that involves illumination as well as sacrifice. The metaphor of health shows that philosophical knowledge is not simply something that can be attained by simply knowing a system or remedy.

Hence, the question of what constitutes true or false poetry matters less in this regard, since the hermeneutical encounter with poetry opens a wider vista in which a rubric does not guide the rules of interpretation. Indeed, for Plato to offer such a legalistic rubric would eliminate the necessity of interpretation itself, since poetic metaphors would merely be swapped for the sign of the Good that one should know in advance.[83] Poetry would create a lifeless regurgitation of the same themes, and the gods and heroes, to paraphrase Heidegger's apt remark, would be those before which no mortal could play music and dance.[84] Even in the case of educating the young, poetry would have a minor role that one therefore outgrows when one has attained to dia-

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[81] I attempt here to mediate between Havelock, *Preface to Plato*, 7, and Rosen, *The Quarrel Between Philosophy and Poetry*, 2. Even in Rosen's insistence that the moral offence is essential to Plato's critique, it is superseded in the end by the intellectual. Rosen himself ends up speaking mostly on the role of dianoia in the reception of poetry (14–19).

[82] Jacques Derrida, "Plato's Pharmacy," in *Dissemination*, trans. Barbara Johnson (London: Continuum, 1981), 101–2.

[83] Julius Moravcsik, "On Correcting the Poets," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 4 (1986): 44; Gerald F. Else, *Plato and Aristotle on Poetry* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 46; and Ferrari, "Plato and Poetry," 143, all take antithetical positions to mine.

[84] Martin Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 72. Plato, nonetheless, seems to be the central thinker Heidegger accuses in this sense. I argue against this in my "Heidegger and the Appropriation of Metaphysics," *The Heythrop Journal*, forthcoming.

lectic (as Hegel suggests).[85] On the other hand, the notion that there is no *technē* to interpretation seems to parallel the argument that for Plato, there is no *technē* of the Good. Moreover the coupling of the two, poetry and justice, would appear to reside in a mode of understanding that places philosophical reflection side-by-side with poetical interpretation. In short, if the philosophical attempts to apprehend the Good, it is the poetical that regrounds this understanding in life itself. This is because all things understood in human being are set within a narrative context, and it is this narrative context that provokes a reinterpretation of its changing situations according to the Good.

III

My attempt to correlate philosophy and poetry assumes that life, for human beings, is necessarily poetic. Hence in *phūsis*, in which human *bios* participates, there is a kind of *poiēsis*. Of course, the same can be said of philosophy: that life is necessarily philosophic insofar as any one human life presupposes a for-sake-of-which (*hou heneka*) according to which one attempts to live. The difference, however, is the fore-structure of existence itself. In Heidegger's words, human being is *thrown* into the world,[86] a world that is already coherent to a large degree and is therefore that by which we understand our manner of being. A narrative understanding of existence, in this sense, is the pregiven context, and we arrive, as it were, *in medias res*. It is this narrative pregivenness that gives rise to difference, marking out the fragility of existence against a pregiven world. If (ontological) difference provokes reflection, then this difference is apprehensible because of the pregiven narrative structure of the world. Narrative—that is, poetic *logos*—precedes reflection.[87] Ricoeur refers to this as "the pre-narrative quality of human experience," which bestows,

> ... the right to speak of life as of an incipient story, and thus of life as *an activity and a desire in search of a narrative*. Comprehension of an

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[85] Elias, *Plato's Defence of Poetry*, 242, n. 6.
[86] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 150–1 (161). Regular page citations refer to Joan Stambaugh's translation while the pages in parentheses refer to the original 7th edition of the German text.
[87] Louis Dupré, *Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 16–20.

> action is not limited to familiarity with its symbolic mediations. It extends even to recognition, in the action, of temporal structures that evoke narration.[88]

Ricoeur refers to temporal structures, which can have the everyday sense of a schedule, and more profoundly, a cosmological orientation by which we anticipate how time comes to mean something. In the ancient Greek sense, this pregiven narrative quality, as mentioned earlier, is represented in terms of the everlasting cosmos and the *dikē* that marks it out. The Greek gods do not exist prior to or outside this cosmos; rather, they exist already within the *muthos* of chaos and order: "And wise men tell us, Callicles, that heaven and earth and gods and men are held together by communion and friendship, by orderliness, temperance, and justice; and that is the reason, my friend, why they call the whole of this world by the name of order (*kosmos*), not of disorder or dissoluteness."[89]

The implications of the above consideration locate an understanding of justice within the poetic. The question of justice is itself set within a narrative, and this seems to say that given the various discussions on justice and the Good, the context of these discussions is bound to the existential situation in which they arise. This does not negate the authority and preeminence of the Good, but attests to the necessity of always having to approach it anew and thus reinterpret it according to what presents itself as most dire. It is perhaps in this light that Plato's *politeia* can be spoken of ideally and only as a city contemplated in heaven. The line separating the heavenly from the earthly is not a physical or metaphysical gap (*chōrismos*) but a hermeneutical one that itself is evident in a reading of the *Republic*: namely, given the Good, how is justification of it to be shown, and in turn, how should it relate to practical action?[90]

This gap, however, is precisely that which cannot be overcome by a simple technique or teaching, a code of conduct, or simple upright adherence to the letter of the law. It is an ongoing encounter and attempts to correlate the eternal and constant nature of the Good

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[88] Paul Ricoeur, "Life: A Story in Search of a Narrator," *A Ricoeur Reader*, 434, italics in original.

[89] Plato, *Gorgias* 507e–508a, in *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, vol. 3, trans. Walter R. M. Lamb (London: William Heinemann, 1967); compare to Dupré, *Passage to Modernity*, 20.

[90] Gail Fine, "Knowledge and Belief in *Republic* 5–7," 244; Stanley Rosen, *The Quarrel Between Philosophy and Poetry*, 15, and Gadamer, *IG*, 138–40, note this discrepancy.

with the fragility of human being. In other words, as the nature of poetry cannot be confused with simple imitation, the nature of justice cannot be understood by imitation—whether this be imitating the actions of another or acting in view of an ethical code. In short, there is no *techne* to poetic interpretation, as there is no exact science of the Good.[91] This correlation, furthermore, is not accidental. Because *poiesis* is constitutive of *phusis*, the poetic nature of things as such becomes the standard by which human life is understood. There is no exact science to human life; it is, as Roochnik notes, "stochastic."[92] Here, I am suggesting that the domain of philosophy that contemplates the Good is continually placed in crisis by virtue of the poetic *logos* that recounts life to us as that upon which is to be reflected. MacIntyre likens this process to that of a quest in the medieval sense where one does not

> . . . search for something already adequately characterized, as miners search for gold or geologists for oil. It is in the course of the quest with its episodes and incidents that the goal of the quest is finally to be understood. A quest is always an education both as to the character of that which is sought and in self-knowledge.[93]

The narrative counterpart of MacIntyre's reformulation of ethics and virtues is central to his thesis that repudiates the contemporary and interminable discourse on the Good as "heterogeneous and incommensurable."[94] This is because much of the debate he centers on characterizes human action without regard to a thorough and conscious consideration of narrative: "An action is a moment in a possible or actual history or in a number of such histories. The notion of a history is as fundamental a notion as a notion of an action. Each requires the other."[95] And it is in this setting that the preeminence that Plato gives to the Good strikes one as being foreign to the modern requirement of proof and justification of a conceptual scheme before it will admit it. Perhaps the metaphor of the "Good beyond Being," if we can read it as a metaphorical statement, means that the Good is prior to all justification; justification itself, if one relates the word to justice,

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[91] Here, I am juxtaposing Roochnik's thesis on Plato and *techne* (*AW*) and Gadamer's argument that scientific method is not adequate to the task of interpretation (*TM*).

[92] Roochnik, *AW*, 42–57. Compare MacIntyre, *AV*, 88–108.

[93] MacIntyre, *AV*, 219.

[94] Ibid., 226. Ch. 2–3 are the main sections wherein this critique occurs.

[95] Ibid., 214.

requires the Good. Ricoeur expresses this in another way when say-
ing: "The unity of the world is too prior to be possessed, too lived to
be known. It vanishes as soon as it is recognized."[96] Heidegger, too,
makes this point clear for his ontology when asserting, "We do not
presuppose truth, but *truth* makes it ontologically possible that we
can *be* in such a way that we "presuppose" something."[97]

This, of course, affirms a circular structure of understanding jus-
tice in which the Good is that which is presupposed by the for-sake-
of-which (*hou heneka*) of every action. This by no means marginalizes
or makes less meaningful the contingent nature of existence that is
set against virtuous constancy; rather, it affirms the need to correlate
the two. In other words, it is through the hermeneutical gap between
human action and the preeminence of the Good that an understanding
of the Good stands to be potentially gained. Without this gap, there is
no need for the Good, since human action would be identical to it, or
at the very least, would be subject to some kind of doctrinal declara-
tion of its validity across history and cultures. This gap consequently
removes the illusion of needing a definition of the Good to which one
can conform all things. For Plato, this necessary tension is metaphor-
ically inscribed in the body, on which Sallis writes:

> [T]he body is the locus of negativity that adheres to the human condi-
> tion—which, however, is *not* to say that the body is identical with the
> negativity or is the cause of it. It is to say only that the body gives that
> negativity a place. . . . It is because the body remains in the city that the
> return of the philosopher to the cave is, as Socrates says, not a fine
> thing but one that is necessary: it is necessary because he has never en-
> tirely left the cave.[98]

The hermeneutical gap can therefore be said to open the circular
structure of understanding justice: through interpretation and reflec-
tion, the Good is evermore brought into clarification; yet as Heidegger
notes, any such disclosure (*alētheia*) is also a concealing at the same
time, and so the process of hermeneutical interpretation produces the
grounds for the impetus to see more.[99] Though referring to Aquinas,

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[96] Paul Ricoeur, "Notes on the Wish and Endeavor for Unity," *History
and Truth*, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1965), 194.

[97] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 209 (227–8); italics in original.

[98] Sallis, *BL*, 450.

[99] For example, see Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in
Basic Writings, rev. 2d ed., ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper,
1993), 175–81.

John Bowlin makes a similar conclusion: "When practical reason and the good are defined together the circularity is virtuous, not vicious."[100] The circularity, in other words, is not one closed off, because one cannot find a valid starting point for reflection. Rather, the circularity attests to the unity and order of things in which one finds oneself, and by virtue of one's existential disproportion within it, finds an ever-present provocation to understand it more fully.

Returning to the passage from the *Republic* I quoted at the beginning—"we will agree upon [the nature of poetry] when we have discovered the nature of justice"—one can see that the decision to judge the poets is one that not only presupposes some grasp of justice, but more holistically, it is one that requires placing the poets within the larger movement of the human quest of this understanding. And this act is itself to correlate justice to the poetic nature of *phüsis*; it is to make justice poetic rather than legalistic or juridical. In this way it is articulated as the coherent reasoning that informs intelligent choice (*prohairesis*), and therefore it cannot be contained or adequately represented as a *technē* since it calls for a deliberate participation addressed to the uniqueness of a situation. Gadamer notes, "The right thing to do—which one decides on the basis of reasonable, practical deliberation—is not simply a case or instance of a rule." Therefore, "Practical philosophy by itself can give us no assurance that we know how to 'hit' what is right. Such knowledge remains the end of practice itself and the virtue of a practical reasonableness."[101] In addition, it should not be forgotten that the uniqueness of a situation exists not only because no one situation in existence can be identical to another, but also because the basis of deliberation is itself founded within a narrative understanding that informs one's unique self-identity. Ricoeur summarizes this: "It is in unending work of interpretation applied to action and to oneself that we pursue the search for adequation between what seems to us to be best with regard to our life as a whole and the preferential choices that govern our practices."[102] The way towards the Good is, in this respect, not a task for reason alone in attempting to clarify a rational, mediating structure by which we can institute justice; rather, it requires a hermeneutical understanding of

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[100] John Bowlin, *Contingency and Fortune in Aquinas's Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 118.

[101] Gadamer, *IG*, 163 and 166, respectively.

[102] Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 179.

the poetic by which we grasp the sense of existence and by which we come to regard excellence as it stands in relation to all things. The hermeneutic way therefore places philosophy and poetry together, and this constitutes a dialectical tension that I might suggest is metaphorically expressed as "the ancient quarrel." This is to say that the Good and the True of philosophy, to use Neoplatonic expressions, cannot be without the Beautiful of poetry, and that human existence is therefore a potentiality of bringing them together (*dunamis koinonias*).[103]

What this belonging-together implies or is in actualization is an inquiry that moves beyond our conventional expectations of scientific and systematic clarity. It does not negate them but suggests that an order of knowing beyond them would mean a different relationship to them, something which Gadamer has attempted to articulate in his formulation of hermeneutics as practical philosophy.[104] This, as I have suggested, is contained in the weight that the interrelating themes of poetry and justice place on a metanoia of understanding. That a *technē* and *epistēmē* of justice should be repudiated, by what I argue to be the self-reflexive meditation invoked by poetry, suggests that the dialogues are a movement into philosophy; and it would follow that the actual heart of philosophizing has yet to be disclosed. On this matter, it would appear that Plato was silent.[105]

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[103] Heidegger, *Plato's Sophist*, 336.

[104] See, for example, Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Reason in the Age of Science*, trans. Fredrick G. Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984), 69–87.

THE WOUND AND SALVE OF TIME: AUGUSTINE'S POLITICS OF HUMAN HAPPINESS

RICHARD AVRAMENKO

I. Introduction: The Happy Life

IN 386, A FEW MONTHS AFTER HIS CONVERSION, while enjoying his *Christianae vitae otium* at Cassiciacum, St. Augustine of Hippo wrote *The Happy Life* (*De Beata Vita*). In this masterful little dialogue he asks a question that resonates through the rest of his life's work: "We desire to be happy, do we not?"[1] Although the question here is somewhat rhetorical, by asking it Augustine makes clear a goal for human life—happiness. This goal is certainly not unique to Augustine. Happiness, no matter how understood, has been a burning topic since people first began speculating on both divine and political order. More specific to Augustine and other theo-political thinkers, however, is the question of whether happiness is a practical possibility. This question is of paramount importance for political thought, for if one thinks human happiness is possible in this world, one will most certainly regard politics and the task of political life differently than if one thinks that no matter how well we organize our political world, it still will not yield true happiness. Simply put, if one does not regard true happiness as possible in this world, the end of politics will perforce be different. Instead of associating politics with happiness, or as others might say, with flourishing, one might be inclined to associate the end of politics with mere order, or piety, or honor, or duty, and so forth. To be sure, such categories might lend themselves to a type of happiness, but they are not happiness in and of themselves. With this view,

[1] Augustine, *The Happy Life* 2.10, trans. Ludwig Schopp (New York: CIMA Publishing, 1939).

one might be inclined to think, "If we cannot be happy, let us at least be honorable." Or safe. Or pious. Whatever the case may be, the project of politics from this vantage will be quite different than from a vantage which regards happiness as a clear and present human possibility.

In *The Happy Life*, Augustine's position on this seems clear: happiness in this life is indeed a clear and present possibility. The happy life is possible, he claims, and is achieved by recognizing "piously and completely the One through whom you are led into the truth, the nature of the truth you enjoy, and the bond that connects you with the supreme measure."[2] Humans can be happy when the incompleteness of the soul is remedied through contemplative recognition of the Christian God. Happiness is derived from one's connection to the divine. It is, of course, easy to sympathize with Augustine's early position on happiness. One need only imagine oneself thirty-two years old, excused permanently from one's teaching duties, retired to a pastoral estate in the north of Italy, living under the aegis and financial sponsorship of a wealthy patron, settling in to enjoy life in *otium liberale*, in "cultured retirement." Happiness appears to be a real possibility, if not an actuality, at Cassiciacum.

Much can be said regarding the correlation of happiness and the cloistered life—that is, happiness and a life bereft of the political affairs of the world. The point, however, is that in his early thought, Augustine considers happiness to be a worldly possibility. Much later in his life the issue reappears in *City of God*, where Augustine asks, "Can man have genuine felicity though mortal?"[3] The question, he says at this point, is vexed and controversial. Some hold, as he did in the year 386, that one can be happy in being possessed of wisdom despite one's mortality. Others argue the opposite. Augustine's view, however, is very different from the garden days of *The Happy Life*. The change is striking: "The more credible and probable position," he writes, "is that all men, as long as they are mortals, must needs also be

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[2] *The Happy Life* 35.16. Augustine is clearly referring to John 14:6: "I am the way, the truth, and the life." For more, see Peter Brown's account of Augustine's *Christianae vitae otium* in *Augustine of Hippo* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 115–27. For an excellent account of the idea of happiness in Augustine's thought, and for the evolution of his thought in general, see Eugene TeSelle, *Augustine the Theologian* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), esp. 59–73.

[3] Augustine, *City of God* 9.14, trans. John O'Meara (New York: Penguin Books, 1972).

wretched."[4]   Whereas he once thought that through philosophical reflection one might be able to establish the requisite connection to the divine and arrive at happiness, he now decides that "true happiness . . . is unattainable in our present life."[5] This is a rather perplexing departure from his earlier opinion.

What precipitated this turn? How is it that Augustine can depart so sharply from his earlier, more optimistic position? It is my contention that this turn is closely related to Augustine's reflections on time, especially as they appear in book 11 of the *Confessions* (c. 401 AD).[6] Augustine himself points to the reflections on time as a decisive turning point. In 427, in his *Retractationes*, when endeavoring to evaluate his life's work, he considers the thirteen books of his *Confessions*.[7] About these, he states "the first to the tenth books were written about me; the remaining three are about the holy scriptures from the words, 'In the beginning God made heaven and earth' up to the rest on the Sabbath."[8] The turning point in his *Confessions*, then, is book 11,

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[4] *City of God* 9.15.

[5] *City of God* 14.25.

[6] This is not a typical interpretation of Augustine's reflections on time. Closest to this are perhaps James Wetzel who holds Augustine's general intention in *Confessions* 11 is to try "to see through love's greatest deception, the masquerading of time as eternity" ("Time After Augustine," *Religious Studies* 31 [1995]: 351); James J. O'Donnell who holds that Augustine "sees traces of God the creator in Bk. 11 in the juxtaposition of time with eternity and understands himself as separated from God by his own position in time" (*Augustine: Confessions*, vol. 1, *Introduction and Text* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992], xl); and Stanislas Boros, "Les Catégories de la temporalité chez Saint Augustin," *Archives de Philosophie* 21 (1958): 323–85. Other commentators, such as Katherin A. Rogers, take seriously that with his reflections on time, Augustine is actually trying to reconcile an immutable God with the creation of the world *ex nihilo*; see her "St. Augustine on Time and Eternity," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 70 (1996): 207–23; but see also N. Joseph Torchia, *Creatio* ex nihilo *and the Theology of St. Augustine: the Anti-Manichean Polemic and Beyond* [New York: Peter Lang, 1999]). According to others, such as Robert Jordan, Augustine's investigations of time pertain not to problems of cosmology or physics, but to moral philosophy ("Time and Contingency in St. Augustine," *Review of Metaphysics* 8 (1955): 394–417).

[7] His goal in this work was not necessarily to retract what he had previously written, but to defend, explain and caution readers against various misunderstandings. This, of course, is not to say that Augustine was not critical of his own work. For instance, with regard to his *On the Immortality of the Soul*, he says that it is "so obscure that even my attention flags when I read it and I, myself, can scarcely understand it" (*Retractationes* 1.5, in *The Fathers of the Church Series*, trans. Sister Mary Inez Bogan [Washington, DC: Catholic University of American Press, 1968]).

[8] *Retractationes* 2.6.

which concerns time and eternity. Prior to this, his thoughts concern himself—he reflects on the particular events of his life. There is, however, an intermediate discussion. After the autobiographical reflections, but before the reflections on time get underway, Augustine finds himself once again ruminating on the problem of happiness. Specifically, in the preceding book, from 10.20 to 10.27, Augustine discusses his "quest for the happy life"[9] and how the "authentic happy life . . . is to set one's joy on [God], is grounded in [God], and caused by [God]. Those who think that the happy life is found elsewhere, pursue another joy and not the true one."[10] His argument here is simple: everyone wants to be happy, and everyone prefers not to be deceived—that is, they prefer the truth. Since God is Truth, the happy life lies in knowing Truth, in knowing God. Augustine's central claim is that happiness is possible only through a particular relationship, or perhaps a particular understanding of the relationship, between man and God. The way to this special understanding, it can be argued, reflects the narrative structure of the *Confessions*: to be happy, we must know ourselves (hence the first ten books); but knowing ourselves is wholly contingent on knowing God and His creation (hence the last two books). Consequently, what lies between man and God is a book on time. Time, therefore, separates man from God, yet paradoxically it is also the nexus between man and God. To know God, one must know time.

I would like to argue that in these reflections on time, Augustine is doing precisely this in the context of happiness: through the question of time, he is necessarily contemplating the nature of man and his relation to God. Time is not merely a philosophical problem. Considerations of time do present certain philosophical paradoxes, but perhaps more important than these philosophical paradoxes is that time emerges at the center of a series of experienced paradoxes.[11] Paul Ricoeur, for example, regards Augustine's thesis on time in this way, arguing that it is fundamentally aporetic and, at bottom, should be regarded as a "psychological thesis."[12] Thus to inquire into time is to inquire into man's place in the cosmos; it is to inquire into the heart of

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[9] Augustine, *Confessions* 10.20.29, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
[10] *Confessions* 10.22.32.

what it means to exist as a human being vis-à-vis other human beings. James Wetzel puts it eloquently when he writes that "in Augustine's hands, metaphysical questions turn back upon their owners. [Thus] what I ask of time I ask of myself."[13]

But there is more: in Augustine's ontology, one cannot inquire into the nature of time without inquiring into eternity; time makes no sense unless it stands in contradistinction to eternity. A close examination of these reflections therefore reveals that for Augustine the human political condition is that of temporality—human beings exist in time. Contrary to this is atemporality, or, as Augustine is more likely to put it, eternity. Eternity is inextricably bound up with God, who exists outside of time and politics, and it is the awareness of the gulf between time and eternity that moves Augustine to reconsider his position on the possibility of human happiness. Insofar as man is determined by his temporality, he is forcibly separated—he is dirempted—from eternity. Theologically speaking, insofar as (temporal) man has fallen, he has fallen utterly away from (eternal) God, and therefore the human-divine unity required for true happiness becomes all but impossible. For the mature Augustine, this position becomes the basic experience of human existence and serves as the

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[11] I am here referring elliptically to Roland J. Teske's insightful book, *Paradoxes of Time in St. Augustine* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1996). I am not alone in my desire to reexamine the existential importance, which is also to say the political importance, of Augustine's thought. The last decade and a half has seen a good number of books with this orientation: Peter Iver Kaufman, *Redeeming Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); William Connolly, *The Augustinian Imperative: A Reflection on the Politics of Morality* (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1993); Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Augustine and the Limits of Politics* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995); Eugene TeSelle, *Living in Two Cities: Augustinian Trajectories in Political Thought* (Scranton: University of Scranton Press, 1998); Donald X. Burt, *Friendship and Society: An Introduction to Augustine's Practical Philosophy* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999); John von Heyking, *Augustine and Politics as Longing in the World* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2001); Robert Dodaro, *Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Saint Augustine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Also worth noting is a recent publication of Hannah Arendt's dissertation, *Love and Saint Augustine* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

[12] Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 6.

[13] Wetzel, "Time after Augustine," 34.

cornerstone for much of his political philosophy. This theological and philosophical problem must be dealt with in order to arrive at a coherent theory of politics.

The following discussion of time in the thought of St. Augustine differs from most in that it neither seeks to resolve nor contribute to debates surrounding the philosophical problem of time. If it does, it is only by serendipitous collateral coincidence. Instead, the effort here is to reinterpret the various philosophical paradoxes as they must be lived and endured in the political affairs of human beings. In other words, in what follows, Augustine's considerations of time, no matter if or how the philosophical problems are resolved, will be presented as two sides of the same coin. On one side, time pulls man, in his average everyday political existence, away from God and therefore away from happiness; and on the other side, time provides the basis for reconciling the temporal diremption inherent in man's relation to the divine order. The paradox of time can therefore also be understood as an eminently practical problem because careful consideration brings to light the human-divine diremption and the unhappy condition of man on the one hand, yet on the other it reveals that without this temporality, reconciliation of the fall from eternity is also impossible. In short, Augustine's reckoning of time has both a negative and positive aspect. Time stands as both the wound of existence and as the salve necessary for healing this wound. His reflections on time are, in Paul Ricoeur's words, "a 'lamentation' full of hope."[14]

This bifurcation of time also brings to light just how different Augustine's understanding of time and eternity—of the finite and the infinite—is from that of the ancients. Whereas thinkers such as Plato and Plotinus hold fast to a dualistic view of the cosmos, Augustine presents a differentiated vision. While Plato draws a sharp distinction between the radically other world of the infinite (*apeiron*) and the utter finitude (*peras*) of the immanent world, Augustine's understanding of time provides an intermediate world of possibility in between. The ability to regard time as both wound and salve presents human beings with a middle way—it provides them with the possibility to live without sinking into dark despair for their mortal condition, yet it prevents them from the error of pride, from mistaking themselves for gods.

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[14] Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, 6.

Thus when time is analyzed in Augustine's work, it does not have a uniform character. Unlike the dichotomy one finds in pagan thought, time and eternity are not mere opposites. They are not two nodes standing in direct contradistinction to each other. Instead, time takes on various characters in Augustine's thought. Some of these characters of time are dark and lend themselves to his later, more pessimistic view of human life as a wound; others provide hope that the wound of mortal life can be healed.

In what follows I provide a sketch of seven different characters of time in Augustine's thought. They are: (1) time as death, (2) time as *logos*, (3) time as difference, (4) time as extension, (5) time as distension, (6) time as a series of calamities, and (7) time as process. Of these, in (1), (3), (5), and (6), time has the character of a wound. In the others, time appears as a salve for the pessimism engendered by the others. These characters each contribute to the claim that Augustine's reckoning of time functions as both separation and nexus between man and God. They illustrate that time is necessary for human happiness, yet at the same time renders it impossible. They illustrate that man's awareness of time—the source of unhappiness—when fully differentiated, can be transformed into, if not a source, then a sign post on the way to a politics that throws itself neither into frivolous optimism regarding man's place in the cosmos, nor into a dark pessimism regarding practical human affairs.

II

Time as Death. The first character of time is dark and falls under the category of time as a wound. It emerges from Augustine's most philosophical ruminations on time when he himself admits that questions concerning time are difficult. In fact, in one of his better known quips, he says, "Provided no one asks me [about time], I know."[16]

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[16] *Confessions* 11.14.17. In the third *Ennead*, Plotinus says the same thing: time and eternity are easily defined as process and everlastingness unless "we make the effort to clarify our ideas and close into the heart of the matter we are at once unsettled." *Enneads* III.7.1.9–11, trans. Stephen MacKenna (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1969).

Thinking about time, it appears, robs Augustine of speech.[16] Despite this, Augustine does provide several definitions that shed light on the issue. First, in *City of God*, he differentiates between time and eternity. He claims that we are "right in finding the distinction between eternity and time in the fact that without motion and change there is no time, while in eternity there is no change."[17] From this preliminary definition, two points need to be emphasized: first, time is something different from eternity, and second, the distinction between the two is located in the concepts of change and motion.

Although the first point seems simplistic, it is nevertheless important because from it a basic understanding of time emerges. Time is time insofar as it contains change and motion; eternity is eternity only insofar as it contains no change and no motion.[18] One must keep in

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[16] A strong parallel can be drawn here with Heidegger's considerations of anxiety in "What is Metaphysics?" in *Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper, 1993). Anxiety, Heidegger says, attunes us with "nothing," and in so doing, "robs us of speech." This parallel between time and eternity in Augustine's thought and "nothing" (*das Nicht*) in Heidegger's can be made recurrently. Some commentators dismiss out of hand any comparison between Augustine and Heidegger on this matter. John M. Quinn, for instance, claims that such comparisons are usually merely a "running paraphrase that often tends to obscure and lose the leading strings and the pivotal turns in the discourse" ("The Concept of Time in St. Augustine," *Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy* 4 [1969]: 78, but see also 114–7). While Quinn may be correct that Augustine and Heidegger are certainly not in agreement concerning the specifics of time, it does not mean that Augustine has not had a strong influence. Heidegger's teacher, Edmund Husserl, for instance, begins his *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* with the claim that "Chapters 13–18 of Book 11 of the *Confessions* must be thoroughly studied by everyone concerned with the problem of time" (trans. James S. Churchill [Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1966], 21). Heidegger, in the closing pages of his *Being and Time*, invokes book 11 of the *Confessions* as well, as if the final punctuation of his thought embodies one final refutation of Augustine's account of time; see *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper, 1962), 489–90. See also Richard James Severson, *Time, Death, and Eternity: Reflecting on Augustine's Confessions in Light of Heidegger's* Being and Time (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1995), and Paul Ricoeur, who claims that Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty will follow in the wake of "the stroke of genius of Book 11 of Augustine's Confessions" (*Time and Narrative*, 16).

[17] *City of God* 9.6.

[18] Similarly, Aristotle posits the Unmoved Mover. See *Metaphysics* 12.6.1071b1–1072a20.

mind that the discussion of time in *Confessions* 11 is, among other things, a response to the Manichean question of what God was doing before He created heaven and earth. This question was formulated to reject the Christian claim of omnipotence and omniscience for their God because, if God was doing nothing before this moment, then He must have changed his mind; He must have realized that what was before was not as good as what he could create, that he was formerly mistaken and therefore not perfect, and so on. The Manichean argument aimed at reducing the stature of the Christian God by imputing change, that is, imperfection, into this new god. Augustine recognizes that the establishment of an absolute Truth in God depended on an acceptable refutation of these objections—he is well aware of the fact that to be perfect, God must not have been mistaken; He must not have changed his mind; nor must He have been moved to another opinion on the order of things. Augustine refutes all of this by showing that the pagan argument necessarily relies on the notion of temporal precedence. The argument requires that the very notions of "before" and "after" exist in God. For Augustine, this is unacceptable, because these can only exist when time exists. If there is to be before and after—which is to say time—then they cannot be in God himself, for this would imply that God is mutable and temporal. It would mean that time exists coequally with eternity. This is an error because God, who is eternal, created time—in the creative act of Genesis 1:1, he created precedence, which is to say, he created change. The instant he created heaven and earth, he set in motion time. "There can be no doubt," Augustine writes, "that the world was not created *in* time but *with* time."[19] Eternity can therefore be regarded as the father of time. The first point is now clear: time and eternity are fundamentally distinct. Moreover, they are not merely opposites: eternity is ontologically and logically prior to time. In short, eternity can exist without time, but time cannot exist without eternity.

For the second point, we can restate it in plain language. The distinction between movable and immovable, change and immutability, is akin to the distinction between man and God. God is eternal, unmoving; man changes and is movable—and specifically, man moves between life and death. Man is born, he grows, then he dies; and all of

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[19] *City of God* 11.6.

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this happens in the world created by God "in the beginning."[20] This movement toward immanent death, which we shall refer to as the timeliness of human existence, lies at the core of not just Augustine's philosophical reflections in book 11 of the *Confessions*, but it is also, one can argue, the fundamental point of departure for his thought in general. However, having made this claim—that human existence is fully temporal—we must address the question: whither time? We already know that in Augustine's interpretation of the scriptures, time was created "in the beginning." It was created when God made heaven and earth. Before this, there was no time—there was no change—and therefore, there was only God. The absence of time leaves only eternity. In the *City of God*, Augustine claims that with the creation of heaven and earth, change and motion were initiated particularly with the changing days and the alternation between morning and evening.[21] In the *Confessions*, however, the creation of time is afforded much more detail but becomes a little more complex. In a prayer to God for understanding,[22] Augustine says that Moses wrote the passage at Genesis 1:1 and then "went his way, passing out of this world from you to you."[23] The first passage in this famous discussion of time therefore brings us immediately back to the notion of death: namely, Moses wrote, then died. Although this does not directly answer the question we are presently pursuing, the relationship between the beginning and human timeliness gets us on our way.

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[20] See also Ecclesiastes 3:1–8: "There is an appointed time for everything. And there is a time for every event under heaven./ A time to give birth, and a time to die; A time to plant, and a time to uproot what is planted./ A time to kill, and a time to heal; A time to tear down, and a time to build up./ A time to weep, and a time to laugh; A time to mourn, and a time to dance./ A time to throw stones, and a time to gather stones; A time to embrace, and a time to shun embracing./ A time to search, and a time to give up as lost; A time to keep, and a time to throw away./ A time to tear apart, and a time to sew together; A time to be silent, and a time to speak./ A time to love, and a time to hate; A time for war, and a time for peace" (New American Standard Bible).

[21] *City of God* 11.7.

[22] It is important to note that Augustine's prayers are almost always for understanding–which indicates that understanding maintains its place as the fundamental cause of human happiness, be it happiness in this world or happiness in the next. This is not to say that understanding is an end in itself, but instead a path to happiness. That is, happiness requires understanding, but understanding alone will not guarantee happiness. It is a necessary but not sufficient cause.

[23] *Confessions* 11.3.5.

As an intermediate question, let us ask whether Augustine intends for the passage to be understood as one establishing a relationship between time and death. Is it his intention to begin the exegesis with a reference to death? It is my contention that he does indeed. Augustine is well aware that the "In the beginning" verse is soon followed by God creating man. As to the relationship between this creation and time, Augustine is unambiguous:

> [F]rom the moment a man begins to exist in this body which is destined to die, he is involved all the time in a process whose end is death. For this is the end to which the life of continual change is all the time directed, if indeed we can give the name of life to this passage towards death. There is no one, it goes without saying, who is not nearer to death this year than he was last year, nearer tomorrow than today, today than yesterday, who will not by and by be nearer than he is at the moment, or is not nearer at the present time than he was a little while ago. Any space of time that we live through leaves us with so much less time to live, and the remainder decreases with every passing day; so that the whole of our lifetime is nothing but a race towards death, in which no one is allowed the slightest pause or any slackening of the pace. All are driven on at the same speed, and hurried along the same road to the same goal.[24]

For Augustine, there is a certain relationship between death and time. In fact, from this we can see that this relationship manifests itself in the categories of process, continual change, a "passage toward," a race, and a goal. Each of these categories evoke a specific characteristic of time—a directional characteristic—that will be elaborated in Section 7 below. For now, it is important to note that life, that is, temporal life and death, are nearly synonymous for Augustine. To use his words: "Everyone is in death from the moment that he begins his bodily existence."[25] Time, in this understanding, indicates the first wound of existence.

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[24] *City of God* 13.10. Again, a strong parallel between Heidegger and Augustine can be made. Whereas Augustine gives the name life to this passage toward death, Heidegger simply refers to the process as being-toward-death. See *Being and Time*, div. 2, ch. 1, sect. 51.

[25] *City of God* 13.10. In *The Magnitude of the Soul* 25.47, Augustine states the same unambiguously: "Man is a rational animal subject to death so every rational animal subject to death is a man." In *The Fathers of the Church Series*, vol. 2, trans. Ludwig Schopp (New York: CIMA, 1947).

III

Time as Logos. With this first character of time, the existential paradox begins to emerge. When Augustine begins ruminating on time, he finds himself chewing on a bitter existential pill—to be human means to be timely, and to be timely means to be hurrying along the road to death. If this is so, then why not put an end to the absurdity and expedite the process? To paraphrase a modern existentialist, Why not Suicide?[26] In this sense, time does indeed appear to be difficult to reconcile with human happiness. However, as is the nature of a paradox, there must also be a conflicting opinion, a counterpoint. This counterpoint emerges from the same metaphor that begot the first character. After his first reference to Moses, Augustine does not subsequently refer to Moses' act as writing. Instead, he changes from reading the words of the prophet to imploring him to speak so that he might hear the word of the prophet. He wishes he could "clasp [Moses] and ask him and through [God] beg him to explain to [him] the creation."[27] Since, however, the word of the prophet is actually the word of God, and the prophet is the mouthpiece of the divinity, Augustine is actually yearning to hear the word of God. This word "would speak a truth which is neither Hebrew nor Greek nor Latin nor any barbarian tongue."[28] The truth spoken in Genesis 1:1 is therefore a truth that "uses neither mouth nor tongue as instruments."[29] And what is this truth? The truth revealed in Genesis 1:1 is the wisdom, the *Logos* of God.

The second character of time that comes from these considerations is therefore *logos*.[30] The term *logos* is often accompanied by confusion and variegated meanings, but this is not necessarily so for Augustine. From him we can take it literally; when God created heaven and earth, His creation is thought to "cry aloud that they are made, for they suffer change and variation."[31] In pointing this out, however, it is certain that Augustine does not mean that God's words are themselves not temporal. Instead, as he writes in his *City of God*,

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[26] Cf. Albert Camus: "There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide." In *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), 3.

[27] *Confessions* 11.3.7.

[28] *Confessions* 11.3.5.

[29] *Confessions* 11.3.5.

"We believe, hold, and faithfully proclaim that the Father has begotten the Word, that is, the Wisdom by which all things have been made."[32] Simply, God's Word is the tool of creation and, as Augustine says, "you spoke and they were made, and by your word you made them."[33] With the Word, with his Wisdom, God creates heaven and earth and, a few days later, man.

But in addition to creating heaven and earth, the Word also created time. How this happened is both interesting and important. According to Augustine, that the Word created time does not mean that some voice sounded out of the clouds, because such an understanding of *logos* would necessarily entail time. Words spoken in this way occur in succession—one is uttered and it necessarily passes away before the next is sounded, and when the second is sounded it too becomes past before the next, and so on. This cannot be so, because words with successive syllables presuppose the existence of things. Thus for Augustine, it is "clear and evident that the utterance [that created heaven and earth] came through the movement of some created thing, serving your eternal will but itself temporal."[34] Since, however, nothing created existed before there was heaven and earth, there was only eternity and "the word is spoken eternally and by it all things are uttered eternally."[35] The Word is coeternal with God, and all things that exist, exist only because of God's Word.

The problem with this formulation is that no created thing is made in the simultaneity of eternity. Once something is created, it becomes the fellow of time. It takes on the same nature as Moses—it passes away. If all things created by God's Word reside in the

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[30] This nexus between time and wisdom (*logos*) is not unusual. Calvin L. Troup, for example, goes so far as to say that "discourse, speech in particular, dominates Augustine's consideration of time and eternity" (*Temporality, Eternity, and Wisdom: the Rhetoric of Augustine's* Confessions [Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1999], 94; and see especially chapter 3, "The Significance of Incarnational Wisdom in Time"). Compare Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, especially 9 and 23; Paul Archambault, "Augustine, Time, and Autobiography as Language," *Augustinian Studies* 15 (1984): 7–14; and M. B. Pranger, "Time and Narrative in Augustine's *Confessions*," *Journal of Religion* 81 (2001): 377–93.

[31] *Confessions* 11.4.6.
[32] *City of God* 11.24.
[33] *Confessions* 11.6.7.
[34] *Confessions* 11.6.8.
[35] *Confessions* 11.7.9.

simultaneity of eternity, nothing would ever pass from existence. This, we know, is patently false, and Augustine has already demonstrated his acute awareness of the timeliness of things existing in the world. In Augustine's words, "if the present were always present, it would not pass into the past: it would not be time but eternity."[36] But through the Word of God, things are inserted into timely existence; therefore, "we cannot say that time exists except in the sense that it tends towards nonexistence."[37]

So, on the one hand, there is the *Logos* of God, which is eternal; but on the other, there is a *logos* that belongs to man. In other words, there is a human wisdom to which we can aspire, the same wisdom by which Augustine thinks we might find happiness. It is this *logos* (that is, the *logos* of the *Confessions*) that one commentator argues might remedy the diremption of the Fall. As Emmett Flood puts it, the *narratio* of the Confessions, especially the first nine books, is "Augustine's successful attempt, in cooperation with the Incarnate Word, to convert his experience of temporality from one of greater and greater diffusion to one of deeper and fuller unity."[38] Put otherwise, it is through the correlation of time and *logos*, albeit temporal *logos*, that Augustine attempts to imitate the eternal *Logos* of God. Through his narrative discourse, through his own words which are essentially a temporal copy of the Eternal *Logos*, Augustine is attempting to reconcile the original diremption. As Ricoeur puts it, Augustine's confessional "bridges the abyss that opens up between the eternal *Verbum* and the temporal *vox*. It elevates time, moving it in the direction of eternity."[39] By recasting the Eternal *Logos* into temporal *logos*, he is pointing to the divine spark within, and the confessional narrative becomes an active effort for reconciliation between man and God, between time and eternity.[40] It is through an intermingling of eternal *Logos* and temporal *logos* that Augustine finds the first salve for the wound we suffer when experiencing time as death. Thus, while on the one hand God creates time and subjects the whole of creation, including man, to it, on the other hand, the pain and pessimism stem-

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[36] *Confessions* 11.14.17.
[37] *Confessions* 11.14.17.
[38] Emmett Flood, "The Narrative Structure of Augustine's *Confessions*: Time's Quest For Eternity," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (1988): 144.
[39] Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, 29.

ming from this subjection finds respite in the fact that human temporality is intimately bound up with *Logos*.

IV

Time as Difference. In recognizing that man is inserted into time, which is to say, always moving and changing toward nonexistence, Augustine is not only demonstrating a particular relationship between man and time, but also between man and God. This relationship appears most fundamentally as a division between time and eternity. The problem is that by imputing a sort of synonymy between human existence and time, Augustine must also recognize that there is something utterly different between man and eternity. This difference is precisely what Augustine cannot utter. It is the ineffable. The divine origin is nothing that can be expressed in terms of human rationality. It cannot be put into words. It is recognized, but "who can comprehend it? Who will give account of it in words?"[41] The Word, it is clear, cannot be encapsulated; it cannot endure the boundaries of human *logos* or rationality. It can only be experienced at a distance, or through glass darkly.

In this vein, two important questions need to be asked: first, insofar as time is experience of ineffable difference, does this experience depend on a prior experience of eternity (eternal-being)? In other words, can we understand our human condition as temporal and radically other than eternity, without already having experienced eternity? The second question pertains to the experience itself. If we answer

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[40] See ibid., 147. O'Donnell makes a similar claim: "'Confession' in Augustine's way of understanding it—a special divinely authorized speech that establishes authentic identity for the speaker—is the true and proper end of mortal life. He had struggled to find voice for this speech all his life" (*Augustine: Confessions* 1:xlii). For more on time as both radical difference from eternity and imitation of eternity, see Gerard O'Daly, who claims that "Augustine does not attempt to understand time with reference to its supposed *paradeigma* or model, eternity. Elsewhere, indeed, he will refer to time as a 'trace (*vestigum*)' or 'copy (*imitatio*)' of eternity [Gn. Litt. Imp. 13.38, en. Ps. 9.7, mus. 6.11.29] but in *Confessions* 11 it is rather the total contrast between God's transcendence of time and our anguished sense of dispersion and fragmentation in time that he wishes to emphasize" (*Augustine's Philosophy of Mind* [London: Duckworth Press, 1987], 152).

[41] *Confessions* 11.9.11.

the first question in the affirmative—that experiencing time as difference depends on a prior experience of eternity—does the experience of eternity necessarily reveal a negative? What would such an experience look like? The first question is not new. Plato put it this way: "Is it a god or some human being who is given credit for laying down your laws?"[42] Good reasons can be offered to argue either way, and whatever the answer is, more might be revealed about who answers than about the question itself. It can be argued that one needs a garden conversion, a Vision at Ostia, or a burning bush to recognize time as difference. Likewise, it can be argued that watching a friend or family member die, suffering grievous injury or sickness, or simply experiencing hunger every day will lead to the same experience. Practically speaking, time can be experienced as difference from either starting point, but in either case (both philosophically and theologically speaking), eternity is prior to time. Knowledge of our mortality is consequently something that comes to us in the course of our lived experience.

But what can be said of this experience of time as difference? Is the experience necessarily negative? Does the experience of difference between time and eternity necessarily illuminate a deficiency in human beings? According to Ricoeur, this is precisely how the experience ought to be regarded. In fact, all speculation about the difference between time and eternity should be placed "within the horizon of a limiting idea."[43] This limiting idea is twofold—it is both experiential and ontological. As Ricoeur puts it, the "experience of eternity has the function of a limiting idea, when the intelligence 'compares' time with eternity. It is the recoil effect of this 'comparison' on the living experience of the *distentio animi* that makes the thought of eternity the limiting idea against the horizon of which the experience of *distentio animi* receives, on the ontological level, the negative mark of a lack or a defect in being."[44] In other words, as Ricoeur understands these meditations, the experience of time as difference is a double wound, one that causes man to "recoil" from eternity because of the inherent limitations of his being (impending death) in the face of eternal Being, as it were.[45]

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[42] Plato, *Laws* 624a, trans. Thomas L. Pangle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
[43] Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, 22.
[44] Ibid., 26.

The experience of time as difference, however, runs much deeper than an average everyday experience—it is an experience that is suffered. The prospect of human happiness must therefore contend with an unavoidable experience of time. | It must contend with the fact that all living is suffering. Moreover, it must contend with the fact that it is a passionate suffering because passion *is* suffering. Obviously, this experience is not physically suffered as one would suffer a spike through the hand or a spear in the ribs, but suffered inwardly. In this inward suffering of the experience of time, it is clear that Augustine has in mind a specific and fundamental Christian experience. The passion at Golgotha contains the ultimate experience of timeliness and humanness. There is, however, an element of ambiguity in this experience of time; in this ambiguity there resides possibility, which is to say, the alternative to complete timeliness and unhappiness. In this passion, eternity suffers timeliness, but at the same time the resurrection reveals a possibility other than timeliness. In revealing the terrors of timeliness, passion enkindles an awareness, and thus a relationship, with the radical otherness of eternity. As Augustine writes, this impassioned experience of time ignites a spark within: "What is the light which shines right through me and strikes my heart without hurting? *It fills me with terror and burning love: with terror inasmuch as I am utterly other than it, with burning love in that I am akin to it.*"[46] The experience fills him with terror and unhappiness because in it he experiences the radical otherness of eternity; he senses the radical unknowability of Wisdom. It fills him with terror because it brings to light the fundamental difference between man and God—the separation, the disunity of time and eternity.

It is for just this reason that Augustine elsewhere expresses a certain suffering—a suffering that is at the same time a terror and burning love—when confronted with the difference between time and eternity. Early in the *Confessions*, Augustine describes his miserable state of mind when a dear, yet unnamed, friend dies. His friend's death brings to the fore dreadful thoughts of time and mortality that prompt him to write, "Time is not inert. It does not roll on through our senses without affecting us. It has remarkable effects on the mind."[47]

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[45] Ricoeur goes even farther and says that for Augustine this experience is "raised to the level of lamentation" (ibid.).

[46] *Confessions* 11.9.11. Emphasis added.

[47] *Confessions* 4.8.13.

The effect that it has on the mind is twofold: first, it makes the soul "aware of the misery which is its actual condition even before it loses [friends]."[48] It brings home the unhappy truth that all timely existence moves toward nonexistence; that all earthly existence is necessarily different from Wisdom. Secondly, it reminds man that it is God who created time and consequently that time must also be good. It is for these two reasons that Augustine suffers when the harsh reality of time is brought to the fore: "the drops of time are precious,"[49] he says, and it is necessary to "take advantage of time."[50] But on the other hand, since it is God who created time, he also experiences the "splendor of time,"[51] and, with regard to his dead friend, that "with time [his] wound is less painful."[52] In short, the Word imbues man with a sense of timeliness that makes him acutely aware (and therefore unhappy) of his radical difference from God/eternity, yet, because of the relationship between time and eternity, it is a salve that alerts him to the restorative character of time—a character that sparks a burning love or desire of God. Thus, to consider time is not only to consider oneself: one can only consider time in contradistinction to eternity, in its difference from eternity. By regarding time as difference, a unique space for human existence and political life is created, a space between absolute finitude and wretchedness on the one hand, and Absolute Eternity and true (yet unattainable) happiness on the other. In Augustine's parlance, this space is a "region of dissimilarity" (*regio dissimilitudinis*).[53]

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[48] *Confessions* 4.6.11.
[49] *Confessions* 11.2.2.
[50] *City of God* 11.17.
[51] *Confessions* 10.6.8.
[52] *Confessions* 4.5.10.
[53] *Confessions* 7.10.16. For more, see Margaret Ferguson, "Saint Augustine's Region of Unlikeness: The Crossing of Exile and Language," *Georgia Review* 29 (1975). Katherin A. Rogers invokes the language of angelic time to describe this image. According to Rogers, in Augustine's understanding, the difference between man and God is illuminated in an intermediary way through the angels. Angelic time, she argues, is "the light which marks the border between time and eternity" ("St. Augustine on Time and Eternity," 219).

V

Time as Extension. In putting together time and the notion of a region of dissimilarity, the fourth character obtrudes time as extension. Two points bear restatement before we proceed: first, man is well aware of his separation from God and, second, if he asks the same questions Augustine is asking, he is apt to become both aware and distraught that time only exists insofar as it is moving toward non-existence.[54] From this unhappy awareness, man necessarily has a propensity for asking questions concerning lengths of time. In realizing that he is apart from God and that existence is constantly moving toward nonexistence, man perforce wonders how much time he has for his existence; that is, how long he will be extended in time. For this reason, Augustine says "we speak of 'a long time' and 'a short time', and it is only of the past or the future that we say this."[55] To speak in terms like this, however, is to speak in contradictions because there can be no such thing as a time past that is long or short—something can only be long or short when it exists. For Augustine, and likewise for the Platonists, the Aristotelians, and the Stoics, once something is past, it ceases to exist. Once a time passes, it ceases to exist and "therefore it could not be long if it had entirely ceased to exist. Therefore let us not say 'The past was long'. For we cannot discover anything to be long when, after it has become past, it has ceased to be."[56]

Philosophically speaking, Augustine's point is not so difficult. The past cannot be long because it does not exist as such and, for precisely the same reasons, neither can the present or future. The present, he says, cannot be long, because if we try to think in terms of extended time, that is, our present year, this extended present can be divided into our present month, then our present day, then our present hour, until we realize that every conceivable length of time is but a fugitive moment. As he writes:

> If we think of some bit of time which cannot be divided into even the smallest instantaneous moments, that alone is what we can call 'present'. And this time flies so quickly from future into past that it is an interval with no duration. If it has duration, it is divisible into past and future. But the present occupies no space.[57]

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[54] *Confessions* 11.14.17.
[55] *Confessions* 11.15.18.
[56] *Confessions* 11.15.18.
[57] *Confessions* 11.15.20.

As a result, we seem to have a dilemma, for on the one hand there are intervals of time that can be compared to each other, yet on the other hand, these cannot rightly be said to exist. One can only claim to measure these lengths of time if one dares to assert that one can have knowledge of something that does not exist.

This mystery of time as extension is resolved in a way that has important theological and political ramifications. Augustine claims that, just as we were taught as children, past and future events exist because without it, "those who narrate past history would surely not be telling a true story if they did not discern events by their soul's insight."[58] Although he does not mention it, without past and future events existing, the entire narrative in the Scriptures could not be taken as truth. Likewise, the songs of prophets, which concern future events, must also be lies. Without past, one cannot speak of the Incarnation; without future, one cannot speak of the Eschaton. Without past and future, one cannot be a Christian. As Augustine puts it, "if the past were non-existent, it could not be discerned at all."[59] The past, however, and likewise the future, can be discerned. Therefore, he continues, "both future and past events exist."[60] To argue that they do not would be to claim to be able to see what has no existence; it would be to assert a belief and an understanding of that which does not exist. For Augustine and the Christian tradition, this has substantial implications, because knowledge and understanding of God requires a seeing, a knowing, and an understanding similar to that which he describes for time.

If we grant Augustine this position and agree that past and future events exist, where are they?[61] Augustine's solution is that whatever and wherever they are, they must exist in the present. In fact, he claims that they exist as images in human memory. Human memory is therefore the storehouse for images of things past and presentiments of things to come.[62] As Augustine calls it, it is the home of

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[58] *Confessions* 11.17.22.
[59] *Confessions* 11.17.22.
[60] *Confessions* 11.17.22.
[61] It might well be that modern quantum physics offers a solution to this problem in the relationship between time and space. Because light travels at a certain speed, we know that light from certain stars takes thousands of years to reach us. Therefore, if someone 2000 light years from earth is watching us through a telescope, would they not *now* just be witnessing the events at Golgotha? If so, then all of our events are present somewhere.

"three times, a present of things past, a present of things present, a present of things to come. In the soul there are these three aspects of time, and I do not see them anywhere else."[63] This means that time gives body, so to speak, to the narratives or, perhaps more precisely, the trinity of time gives the soul a magnitude and a kind of unity in its relation to all God's creation. Because time—events of the past and the future—reside in the soul of man, the soul of man, like time itself, is given extent. Augustine envisions man's soul, in the present, to be extended so as to encompass the events of the Scriptures as past (memory), present (awareness), and future (expectation). Put otherwise, mirroring the genealogical interconnectivity in Genesis, time resides within man's soul and creates therein an innate connection with the past, the present, and the future of not just the entire Christian community, but with political communities and nations in general.[64] In fact, as the argument goes, by being extended by time, the soul is provided the wherewithal to participate in this relationship between time and eternity. It is given a temporal space (*spatio*).

This relationship between the soul and time is important. In this regard Augustine goes to great lengths to demonstrate that although impossible to measure time as one would more tangible things, this is no argument against the existence of time. The same thing can be said about the soul: the inability to measure the soul like other bodies does not mean that the soul does not exist. In *The Magnitude of the Soul*,

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[62] See also *The Magnitude of the Soul* 14.24.

[63] *Confessions* 11.10.26. Eva Brann refers to this conception of time as "the pivotal present": see *What, then, is Time?* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 120. For more on memory, see *On the Trinity* 10.11.17–18, and *Confessions* 10.8–26. Compare Donald L. Ross, "Time, the Heaven of Heavens, and Memory in Augustine's *Confessions*," *Augustinian Studies* 22 (1991): 191–205; James Olney, "Memory and the Narrative Imperative: Augustine and Samuel Beckett," *New Literary History* 24 (1993): 857–80; Paul Plass, "Augustine and Proust on Time and Memory," *Soundings* 73 (1990): 343–60; Dean Hammer, "Freedom and Fatefulness: Augustine, Arendt and the Journey of Memory," *Theory, Culture & Society* 17, no. 2 (2000): 83–104.

[64] The relationship between time, memory, and national identity has recently surfaced in political science. See for example, Eric Langenbacher, "Changing Memory Regimes in Contemporary Germany?" *German Politics and Society* 21, no. 2 (2003): 46–68, and "Memory Regimes and Support for Democracy in Contemporary Germany," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, 2003; and Jan-Werner Mueller, *Memory and Power in Postwar Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

Augustine describes the soul in terms similar to those he uses for time in *Confessions* 11. When asked how great the soul is, that is, what its extent is, he says that it is "not long, or wide, or strong, or any of those things that one usually looks for in measuring bodies."[65] Instead, it is a certain kind of substance, "sharing in reason, fitted to rule the body."[66] It is incorporeal, and this incorporeality is the very thing that gives the soul its qualitative superiority over the body. The qualitative superiority of the soul, it can be argued, is directly the result of time. As we have said, time gives the soul extent. It does this, not because the soul "increases its size with age as the body does," but instead because "by growing, the soul comes to virtue, which, we admit, derives all its beauty and perfection not from any greatness of space, but from the power of consistency."[67] In other words, the greatness of the soul refers to a power and force within it, not its magnitude *per se*. As the soul expands incorporeally, it gains a certain power: "it despises material things."[68] Being extended by time, the soul gains wisdom and becomes impassioned. It becomes "long-suffering," as Augustine translates the Greek *makrothumian*. This is particularly important because, in Augustine's understanding, whereas corporeal things (eyes) see corporeal things, incorporeal things are needed to see incorporeal things. The incorporeal magnitude which the soul acquires from being extended by time makes it more adept at seeing the incorporeal, like justice. Because of time, the soul is endowed with a capacity for reconciliation—it is moved in the direction of that which can otherwise not be put into words: eternity. Thus because of the experience of time as extension, happiness remains a possibility, even it if is on the theoretical horizon.

In this sense, time is imbued with a salubrious character. As one commentator puts it, "Time is soteriological. To the individual, the Abiding tempering the transient imposes the possibility that one be 'not distracted, but attracted'; that is, that the *distensio* of the soul becomes transformed into an *intentio*."[69] Through time, humans transcend the mere corporeality of the body and can become more than their temporality. One could even say that in some ways, humans

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[65] *The Magnitude of the Soul* 3.4.
[66] *The Magnitude of the Soul* 13.22.
[67] *The Magnitude of the Soul* 16.28.
[68] *The Magnitude of the Soul* 17.30.
[69] Marilyn Ekdahl Ravicz, "St. Augustine: Time and Eternity," *The Thomist* 22 (1959): 551.

transcend themselves. This transcendence, however, remains in the fold of finitude. It is finite transcendence. Moreover, extension is a character that applies to temporal existence only. As one commentator rightly puts it, extension is a characteristic of what it means to be human: "There is no extension in God because extension or duration would limit the perfect divine simplicity."[70] Eternity has no use for extension: extension pertains to time only. Unlike man, eternity need not be extended, for either its happiness or reconciliation with itself. Man, however, through the extension begotten by time, finds another salve for ameliorating the wound of time and is endowed with the most elemental tools of good political life.

VI

Time as Distension. Two curiosities arise from the notion of time as extension. First, at the same time that Augustine uses the metaphor of the soul being extended, he also invokes the metaphor of being stretched. It must therefore be asked what it means to have the soul not just extended, but also stretched. Second, insofar as the soul is stretched by time to be connected with the larger Christian community and, we might say, with any community with a shared history, precisely what events of the Christian narrative does the extension envelop? Concerning the first, when Augustine says that he sees "time as some kind of extension"[71] he has in mind more than just the ability to measure lengths. This point has already been made clear. However, according to Augustine, in some ways it is indeed possible to measure time. Through words, for example, it is possible to measure time.[72] Augustine explains:

> Nevertheless, even so we have not reached a reliable measure of time. It may happen that a short line, if pronounced slowly, takes longer to read aloud than a longer line taken faster. The same principle applies to a poem or a foot or a syllable. That is why I have come to think that time is simply a distension.[73]

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[70] Rogers, "St. Augustine on Time and Eternity," 211.
[71] *Confessions* 11.23.30.
[72] That human words are the measure of time should bring to mind that God's word is akin to the measure of eternity. The relationship between time and eternity, man and God, plays constantly in this discussion.
[73] *Confessions* 11.26.33.

Plainly, words can be used to measure time, but when being measured thusly, time is no longer referred to as an extension. Instead, Augustine says that insofar as time can be measured this way, it is called distension (*distentionem*). For the fifth character, let us consider time as distension.[74]

To begin, "dis-tension" is markedly different from "ex-tension." Both terms, however, would seem to indicate a spreading out. However, when Augustine uses the term "distension," he has something negative in mind. For example, with regard to his pre-Christian life, Augustine describes his life as distension (*distentus*). He prays that he may "[leave] behind the old days" and be "gathered to follow the One 'forgetting the past' and moving not towards those future things which are transitory but to 'the things which are before me' not stretched out (*non distentus*) in distraction but extended in reach (*sed extentus*)."[75] Whereas with extension Augustine means to indicate an outward enveloping or encompassing, distension has clear pathological connotations. To be distended is to be stretched away from, it is to be forcibly separated, it is to be dirempted. In broad terms, to regard time as distension and human life as temporal, human existence itself must be a distension. This is just what Augustine has in mind in his famous configuration: "it would not be surprising if [time] is not [*distensio*] of the mind (*animi*) itself."[76]

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[74] Much of the interpretive body of book 11 of the *Confessions* begins with this character. For example, in his study, John M. Quinn concludes that for Augustine time is a distension of the soul. However, in his attempt to get at the meaning of *distensio*, Quinn repeatedly vacillates between extension and distension. The terms simply have no great metaphorical difference and he fails to distinguish between the salubriousness of extension and the pathology and distension. Roland J. Teske also uses the terms interchangeably, but to his credit does differentiate between *extentio* and *distentio*. Moreover, Teske's account of time is more akin to what is being argued here in that he does suggest, however obliquely, that time is not merely a philosophical problem for Augustine but that it also has political ramifications. Ricoeur's analysis of book 11 also misses this distinction; although he recognizes that the mind "suffers *distentio*" (*Time and Narrative*, 21) he repeatedly interchanges "extension" and "distention." For more on *distensio* see Rogers, "St. Augustine on Time and Eternity"; John Protevi, "*Inventio* and the Unsurpassable Metaphor: Ricoeur's Treatment of Augustine's Time Meditation," *Philosophy Today* 43, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 86–94; Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, 16–30.
[75] *Confessions* 11.29.39.
[76] *Confessions* 11.26.30.

In his *Paradoxes of Time in Saint Augustine*, Roland J. Teske points out that the Latin *distentio* can be construed as a term pertaining to a medical condition of the human body. As such, it connotes "access of tension, spasm, distortion."[77] As an adjective (*distentus*) it can be translated to "swollen" or even "distended," and this sort of negative meaning is surely what Augustine has in mind. In book 8 of the *Confessions*, for instance, he poses the question as to whether "divergent wills pull apart (*distendunt*) the human heart while we are deliberating which is the most attractive option to take."[78] Augustine, it appears, has taken this word from Plotinus, who, in his *Enneads*, says that time is an uncoiling outward, a *diastasis*.[79] Augustine renders the Greek *diastasis* as *distensio*. *Diastasis* is also a term rife with negative connotations: it indicates a "standing aloof," or, in terms we have been using thus far, a disunity. When Thucydides uses the word, for instance, it indicates a separation of one part of the army from another.[80] Liddell and Scott give as its primary definition various medical conditions such as the separation of bones, swollen veins, a splitting headache, and, interestingly, vomiting. It has the sense of illness just as in English we speak of a distended belly. Howsoever rendered, if time is regarded as distension it must be regarded as a coming-apart, a disunification, a disintegration, a diremption. It must be regarded as something suffered, and as a wound.

Since the human condition is that of timeliness, Augustine must also consider life—literally, temporal existence—to be a pathological state of disunity, disintegration, or even uncontrolled swelling. This parallel between time as distension and the idea of pathological swelling, or perhaps more accurately the swelling of the soul, is not unknown to Augustine: in *On Genesis against the Manichaeans*, he goes so far as to describe pride as the swelling of the soul into material things.[81] As such, distension and tumescence become nearly synonymous. The soul is given breadth by being extended in time, but at the same time, this stretching of the soul in various directions is a

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[77] Teske, *Paradoxes of Time in Saint Augustine*, 28. See the *Oxford Latin Dictionary* for a more complete description.

[78] *Confessions* 8.10.24.

[79] Plotinus, *Enneads* 3.7.11.

[80] See Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War* 6.18.6, trans. Steven Lattimore (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998).

[81] Augustine, *On Genesis against the Manicheans* 2.5.6, trans. Roland J. Teske (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1991).

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painful experience. The pain, of course, can be understood to be just as much psychical as physical pain, because not only does it distort, the distortion is something beyond one's control. The distortion is something that ranges beyond the rational capacity of human beings. Just as with a tumor, and as is often the case with tumescence, the swelling cannot be controlled. It defies the rational control of one's life that Augustine would otherwise prefer. It defies the self-control required for reconciliation with the divine. So whereas on the one hand time is extension, an unrolling of the soul creating common bonds, creating a shared sense of identity and giving magnitude to the soul, it is on the other hand an uncoiling outward, a dangerous swelling, a tumor, and an illness. This pathological construction of time forces Augustine to conclude that "life is a distension in several directions."[82]

VII

Time as a Series of Calamaties. From this understanding of time as a distension in several directions, another metaphor of time emerges: direction. This metaphor is bound up with the Eden account which, as will soon be shown, is where Augustine originally derives this notion of direction; in Genesis, when man falls into sin, something is started, something gets under way. The event in the garden, he says, was not man's first *use* of free will, but the first *misuse* of free will:

> [And] from the misuse of free will there started a chain of disasters (*series calamitatus*): mankind is led from that original perversion, a kind of corruption at the root, right up to the disaster of the second death, which has no end. Only those who are set free through God's grace escape from this calamitous sequence.[83]

Whereas before the bad use of free will, man was in a happy state, after the misuse of free will, he finds that he has fallen into a different

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[82] *Confessions* 11.28.39. Elsewhere, Augustine describes the process of the soul reflecting upon itself as an "unrolling" (*evolvere*) (*On the Trinity* 9.4.5). This imagery fits nicely to the distinction being made here: *evolvere* seems to imply a salubrious extension of the soul that lends itself well to a reconciliation of the existential disunity bound up with temporal existence.
[83] *City of God* 13.14.

sort of time—into a series of calamities between the first and second death. Time is now called a *series*, or as many interpreters render it, a chain. But how are we to understand this notion of a chain? A chain is, in the most obvious sense, a series of links passing through one another. They form an interconnectedness that is strong, yet even in this strength, highly flexible. This flexibility allows for movement, that is, free will, but not so free as to escape the interconnectedness with the previous link. As such, the symbol carries with it the sense of a bond, a fetter, a confinement, a thing that restricts freedom (*vinculo*).[84] The chain as a whole has direction, but the parts are restricted by the whole. Moreover, the parts, should they become independent of the whole, would no longer have anything in common with the whole. A single link, for example, extracted from a chain is no longer a chain. It is merely a ring. It must participate in the confines of the interconnected chain to have either direction or the characteristics of a chain. According to this metaphor, it appears that man, in pursuit of the happy life, has many choices available within the confines of time, yet whatever choices he makes and whatever way the chain is twisted and bent, he not only depends on what comes before and what comes after, but he also ends up in the same place. One always concludes at the end of the chain, and at that point one will be in the same unhappy state that was characteristic of the entire movement toward death (life). At the end of the chain, one will either be released into the happy life through God's grace, or one will suffer eternal unhappiness, for which Augustine invokes St. John's symbol of the second death.[85] With this character of time, the practical possibility for happiness is obvious—the happy life is not to be had while man exists in time; it exists at either end of the chain, but it is not to be had while man is living in time. It is not to be had while man is separated from eternity. Despite this, because each human existence is a link in the chain of human existence, it is impossible to live outside the political affairs of the community. Just as we are bound together in the chain of time, so too is our political destiny bound up with our fellows.

The chain of disasters is therefore the fetter with which man lives unhappily as he moves directionally. It is the inescapable link between man's root corruption—the original sin—and the final calamity.

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[84] *City of God* 13.14.
[85] See Rev. 20:14.

How, then, should this corruption be understood? If we think in visceral terms, say, of meat corrupting, we are again forced to think of disintegration. We think of putrefaction, which is a coming-apart. The corruption at the one end of the chain of disasters is therefore departure from an original wholeness. It is a perversion of integrity. In his timely existence, man lives in a fundamental separation from his original unity with God. The misuse of free will, which is called sin, is therefore the beginning of a process of separation, that is, the separation of the soul from the body (in death) and the soul from God (in both life and death).[86] In this sense, the fall can be regarded as a fall into a different sort of time. Clearly one cannot claim that the fall is a fall into time, because humans are temporal by nature. They are never eternal, either before the fall or after. One can, however, claim that although man lived in time before the fall, the experience of time—which is to say, the experience of himself and his world— changed fundamentally after the fall. Before the fall, humans lived in undifferentiated Edenic time. It is only after the fall from this Edenic time that man experiences these different characters of time—that he finds himself vacillating between the experience of time as a wound and time as healing all wounds. The vacillation itself marks a sort of disruption and interruption of what was once a peaceful time. Whereas man lived in a worldly unity with the divine, with original sin man's garden days end, and he must contend with time as death, time as difference, and time as distension. The healthiness of the soul is lost, and man falls into a time of soul sickness that Augustine calls a "process of death," or a "process of diminution."[87]

VIII

Time as Process. Speaking of time as a process of death or a process of diminution brings the notion of process to the fore. While Augustine himself does not use this precise language, he does use *intentio*. We will recall that Augustine deliberately differentiates between distension and extention. He prays his life is "no longer stretched out (*non distentus*) but now pulled together again (*sed extentus*)." Imme-

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[86] *City of God* 13.6.
[87] *City of God* 13.10.

diately after this, he continues: "Not distractedly now, but intently (*non secundum distentionem, sed secundum intentionem*)."[88] As such, there appears to be some kinship between *extensio* and *intentio*—Augustine does not want his soul distended, but extended. He does not want it distended, but intended. Not only does the final character of time therefore embody the aforementioned understanding of time as movement, but it also connotes consideration, thinking, perhaps even wisdom. This understanding of time, by definition, therefore encompasses process. Process is progressive movement from a beginning point to a *contemplated end*. Insofar as time can be understood as intentional or as a process, time is going *somewhere*, and this *somewhere* is known. For the purpose of this discussion, it is not particularly important how this somewhere comes to be known—that is, through reason or revelation—but that it is known. Knowing this end (*eschaton*) and participating in this process are, however, little consolation for man because if to exist in time merely means movement towards nonexistence, and if man is aware of this end, then surely he is going to be unhappy in this life. However, since time as process is somehow akin to the salubriousness of *extentio*, there must be some salve for this suffering of time.

One way to escape this inevitable worldly wretchedness is, as Augustine points out, through a repudiation of time as process. The unhappiness caused by the awareness of existence as a process toward diminution can be resolved by supposing "an infinite series of dissolutions and restorations at fixed periods in the course of ages."[89] In other words, one can propose a cyclical theory of time. With this theory, one can say that although time may be a process toward death, there is consolation in the fact that one will return to the world in precisely the same manner, an infinite number of times. This alternative theory is therefore one in which time has neither beginning nor end. According to Augustine, this is how Plato and others in the ancient world understood time.[90] Augustine calls them the Physicists and says that in their postulates of periodic cycles,

> ... they asserted that by those cycles all things in the universe have been continually renewed and repeated, in the same form, and thus there will

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[88] *Confessions* 11.29.39.
[89] *City of God* 12.12.
[90] Augustine most likely has in mind *Timaeus* 39d; *Laws* 677a–680b.

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be hereafter an unceasing sequence of ages, passing away and coming
again in revolution. These cycles may take place in one continuing
world, or it may be that at certain periods the world disappears and re-
appears, showing the same features, which appear as new, but which in
fact have been in the past and will return in the future.[91]

For Augustine, this position is cause for even more unhappiness than
what is supposed to arise from process-time. If the goal is happiness
and this goal is achieved through wisdom, assuming wisdom cannot
be had within time, the cyclical theory of time would mean that one
can be happy neither in this life nor the next.

If we keep in mind that happiness is found with the reconciliation
with the divine, then the reason for this rejection will be evident. The
desire of the soul is satisfied with Truth. Therefore the happy soul
will be the soul with wisdom, but one can never be truly happy if one
lives in fear of losing that which satisfies one's desires. One cannot
live in fear, Augustine argues repeatedly, and be happy at the same
time. The wisdom that satisfies the soul must be eternal and eternally
one's own. The problem with cyclical theories of time is therefore
that

> they are utterly unable to rescue the immortal soul from this merry-go-
> round, even when it has attained wisdom; it must proceed on an unre-
> mitting alternation between false bliss and genuine misery. For how
> can there be true bliss, without any certainty of its eternal continuance,
> when the soul in its ignorance does not know of the misery to come or
> else unhappily fears its coming in the midst of its blessedness?[92]

Put otherwise, happiness is not true happiness if it is temporary hap-
piness. This is either false bliss or deception, and, as Augustine is
fond of saying, no man wants to be deceived. To be truly happy, man
requires wisdom that does not change and cannot be taken from him;
he requires an eternal unification with eternal Wisdom.

The problem with cyclical theories of time is that they "allow no
room for the eternal liberation and felicity of the soul."[93] Since libera-
tion from the original corruption begins with the Incarnation, the in-
termingling of time and eternity and its concomitant promise of eter-
nal felicity (life), cyclical theories of time must be refuted lest one
also accept that Christ will die again and again—that Christ himself is

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[91] *City of God* 12.14.
[92] *City of God* 12.14.
[93] *City of God* 12.15.

subject to eternal suffering. Thus Augustine argues that we must "escape from these false circuitous courses, whatever they may be, which have been devised by these misled and misleading sages, by keeping to (1) the straight path in the right direction under the guidance of (2) sound teaching."[94] (1) The straight path is, of course, the process-time of which we have been speaking. We must maintain ourselves in a progressive movement from a beginning point to a contemplated end, regardless of one's happiness *en route*. (2) For "sound teaching," Augustine paraphrases Romans 6:9: "'Christ died once for all for our sins'; and 'in rising from the dead he is never to die again: he is no longer under the sway of death.' After the resurrection 'we shall be with the Lord forever.'"[95] At the end of the process toward death, happiness becomes a possibility.

IX

Conclusion. Having elaborated on these various characters of time, we can now return to the question with which we began. Whither the turn? Why did Augustine change his mind regarding the possibility of human happiness? Whereas he began his writings with the position that through inquisition into certain philosophical and theological questions, man could attain a degree of wisdom commensurate with happiness in this life, he later came to the position that this is insufficient. Instead, it is only "after all the heavy and fearful ills of life have been endured . . . [that] we can arrive at the sight of God and reach our bliss in the contemplation of immaterial light through participation in his changeless immortality."[96] The former position is held by a young Augustine living in *otium liberale*, the latter by a mature Bishop of Hippo immersed in political and lived realities. The farther he moves from the cloistered world of his philosophical youth, the more he is forced to inquire not just into his own condition as a human being, but into the temporality and transitory nature of hu-

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[94] *City of God* 12.14.
[95] *City of God* 12.14. A bit later Augustine reiterates this point: "So let us keep to our straight way, which is Christ, let us take him as our guide and saviour, and turn our minds from the absurd futility of this circular route of the impious, and keep instead to the way of faith" (12.21).
[96] *City of God* 12.21.

mans in general. It is from this line of questioning that he arrives at the position that happiness in this life is neither fully possible nor completely impossible—that the possibility of human happiness is somewhere in between. As he writes, when he asks these more profound questions about the political and practical affairs of man, he finds himself "scattered in times whose order [he] does not understand."[97] He finds that serious questioning concerning happiness inevitably leads to questions of time; that these questions perforce raise "the storms of incoherent events [that] tear to pieces [his] thoughts, the inmost entrails of [his] soul"[98] and, in so doing, force upon him a sense of the radical difference between time and eternity.

Yet it is in these careful and circumspect considerations that the possibility of reconciling the chasm between time and eternity is disclosed. The disclosure of the different characters of time provides the Bishop of Hippo with a theoretical ground (both philosophical and theological) for a politics that is neither hubristically optimistic, nor darkly pessimistic. By interpolating the idea of time as a salve between time as death on the one hand and the radical otherness of eternity on the other, Augustine creates a space for the practical and immanent commingling of the human and the divine—a commingling of the possible and the impossible. Through this differentiated experience of time, Augustine discovers a place for politics between two extremes. The world is mortal and bound up with time, and therefore politics cannot simply aim at other worldly goals. The experience of time as a wound therefore yields, as von Heyking puts it, an "approach" to politics that cannot end up in a "lashing out and putting faith in easy answers such as triumphalist religiosity, technological dreams, revolutionary ideology, or some other idol."[99] Because the wounding character of time constantly reminds us of our mortal condition, we cannot hubristically mistake ourselves for gods and try to create heaven on earth. But because time is also experienced as a salve, there is recourse from the lingering fear that mortal life is meaningless: we are mortal, but we are neither without hope nor are we alone. This twofold experience of time therefore shapes the mind such that political life becomes a hospitable *regio dissimilitudinis*

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[97] *Confessions* 11.29.39.
[98] *Confessions* 11.29.39.
[99] von Heyking, *Augustine and Politics as Longing in the World*, 4–5.

between the darkness of the city of Man and the saintly city of God.[100]
Political life can become the vehicle for a happiness appropriate to the
human condition, a condition between the two cities: a condition be-
tween radical temporality and eternity. Augustine's meditations on
time lay a foundation for a politics that can lead the soul, scattered
and stretched amidst the chaos of our time, back into what he holds to
be the integrity, the stability, and the unity necessary for a proper vi-
sion of human happiness.

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[100] For more on this view of politics in St. Augustine's thought, see Rob-
ert Austin Markus, *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of Saint
Augustine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). See also von
Heyking, *Augustine and Politics as Longing in the World*, 51–76.

AUTHORITY AND THE COMMON GOOD
IN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

WILLIAM A. FRANK

> Democracy carries in a fragile vessel
> the terrestrial hope . . . of humanity.
> –Jacques Maritain

AS A TYPE OF GOVERNMENT, DEMOCRACY HAS ASSUMED a variety of concrete historical forms. For instance, the direct participatory democracy of ancient Athens differs markedly from the representative democracy of a constitutional republic such as the United States of America. In general, the particularized forms of political regimes are not so much natural types, as inventions of art and reason worked out in historical circumstances. Much like the historical architectural forms we find in the buildings (homes, churches, and public institutions) and in the passageways (streets, bridges, and public squares) that embody the settlements in which we dwell, actual political structures are historical conventions that subsist in traditions shaped by creative choice. Though it is man's natural destiny to dwell in community, the history of his governance does not come about by natural necessity. Aristotle was right when he said that man is by nature a political animal;[1] it is no mere contingency that men dwell together in communities. But the form of that togetherness, at least at the most inclusive level of the city or nation-state, is not given along with the common end. Democracy is one of the historical alternatives. Democracy itself has assumed many different forms, and there is no reason to think that the democratic impulse in human governance has exhausted the historical possibilities for new structures.[2]

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    [1] *Politics* 1.2.1253a2, in *Aristotle, in Twenty-Three Volumes*, trans. H. Rackman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 9.
    [2] Contemporary efforts at democratization around the globe have generated an enormous literature on the identity and development of democracies.

Despite the different ways that the details are worked out and the many qualifications that are built into the actual practice, democratic governments rest upon an identity between those who are governed and those who govern. Abraham Lincoln's expression, "government of the people, by the people and for the people,"[3] captures the point nicely. The identity obtaining between those who are ruled and those who rule is constituted in the various ways that participation and representation are expressed in the practice of governance. In the direct participatory practice of ancient Athens, for instance, the idea of self-governance is evident: the individuals who follow the laws are the same ones who make, administer, and adjudicate the laws. In more representative democracies of the modern sort, the identity continues, even if it is attenuated, by the fact that representatives are elected to governing offices by those who are governed.

It is the purpose of this essay to reflect upon the interesting kind of identity that is forged in the activity of political participation and representation particular to democracy. In what follows we shall see how two essential principles of any government, of government as such—namely, the common good and authority—are mediated by the roles participation and representation play in democratic practice. In the end, we shall come to see how much the vitality—and fragility—of democracies rest upon the bonds of trust that exist among members of the democratic community.

I

It is helpful to see democracy's distinctive identity as a response to the broader, general necessities of government as such. In these first two sections, we leave off a direct consideration of democracy and turn to a general consideration of essential principles of government.

Our starting point is the empirical observation that men everywhere, as far back as historical memory takes us, have lived in com-

I have found the following studies helpful: Robert Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), and *The Global Divergence of Democracies*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).

[3] Gettysburg Address, November 11, 1863.

munities. Aristotle seems to say as much when he remarks that man is by nature a political animal. He understands that our societies are different from the hives of bees or the packs of wolves. Human societies are formed in, and sustained by, the exercise of practical reason and public speech. Among communities, there is a continuum of scale and adequacy: from the extended family to the tribe or clan, to the village, and to the larger more complete political society.[4] In this essay, our thoughts are chiefly keyed to the larger, complete societies of the *polis* or nation-state.

Thomas Aquinas observes that "government is nothing other than the directing of things governed to the end."[5] His simple phrase draws our attention both to *directing*, which is a kind of ordering reason that speaks with authority, and to the *end*, typically designated as the common good. Authority and the common good are the most essential concepts in the understanding of the nature of government.[6] The common good is an end to be achieved in the actual, concrete situation of a political society. Authority is practical reason that directs resources toward that shared end; it gives form and direction to common action for the sake of a common end.

Common Good. In order to view the living whole of a political society, it is helpful to envision it engaged in some united action. Such common action requires unifying bonds interconnecting subsidiary elements of the society. The connecting bonds are instituted and sustained by some sort of reason and volition. Political unities do not "just happen"; they are considered, decided, and maintained. A thought-experiment might help make this point. Imagine a settlement existing as a mere sum or collection of autonomous social units, say, families, business corporations, churches, each of which, as it were, governs itself relative to the respective limits of the household, the factory, or the worshipping congregation. Who in that settlement is responsible for protection, for standards of equity and justice in exchanges, for maintaining means of transportation and commerce,

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[4] *Politics* 1.2.1252a24–b35.
[5] *Summa theologiae* I, q. 103, a. 3 (Torino-Rome: Marietti, 1950); the translation is my own.
[6] In the following exposition I follow closely Yves Simon's *Philosophy of Democratic Government* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951). Some of the following themes are discussed in my "Authority As Nurse of Freedom and the Common Good," *Faith and Reason* 16 (1990): 371–86.

none of which are immediate concerns of the household, the corporation or the church? A moment's reflection reveals a confusion in this imagined scenario. It begins with a settlement that has distinct units—families, business corporations, churches, as I have imagined it. In other words, it posits an articulated settlement in the absence of a common good. The problem is that settlements arise in the first place only in the effort to achieve the common good.[7] There is something absurd about trying to depict a settlement without the conditions for there being a settlement in the first place. In other words, the collected elements that we have imagined as just being there, like the raw materials for the construction of a house, in fact materialize as functioning elements within a totality or whole. The common good is the end, in virtue of which the settlement or community strives for its structural and functional totality. The "whole" intended here is human life, in its completeness, to the degree it is realistically or practically possible.

The common good is not just one last element alongside other elements in the community. It is not the addition of a final institution or governmental office. The structural elements or components of a community would simply have incomplete meaning apart from the common life that they support. The common good is present to the degree that the human life that transpires in a community is complete. The effort to imagine the material elements of a human settlement, its institutions and offices, existing in the absence of the governing meaning of the common good, attempts an interesting kind of logical impossibility. It wants to speak about an organized entity but not allow any sense of the ordering principle to enter into the topic at hand.

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[7] Although the notion of the common good finds little favor in liberal political philosophies that are based on contract theory, the political theory developed in the Aristotelian and scholastic traditions is central to Catholic social teaching. One of the more sustained defenses of the importance of the common good in the twentieth century is Charles De Koninck's *De la primauté du bien commun contre les personalistes* (Québec: Éditions De L'Université Laval, 1943); an English translation by Sean Collins is published in *The Aquinas Review* 4 (1997): 1–132. For recent discussions of the common good see V. Bradley Lewis, "The Common Good in Classical Political Philosophy," http://faculty.cua.edu/lewisb/Common%20Good3.pdf, accessed 21 July 2006; forthcoming in *Current Issues in Catholic Higher Education*; Thomas V. Smith, "Aristotle on the Conditions for and Limits of the Common Good," *American Political Science Review* 93 (1999): 625–36; and Mark C. Murphy, "The Common Good," *Review of Metaphysics* 59 (2005): 133–64.

It would be like trying to imagine making moves in the game of chess without knowing the rules of the game.[8]

The common good works as a final cause, or what Aristotle understands as a *telos*. Given the confusion over the meaning of teleology, it is useful to cite Francis Slade's explanation of the difference between end (*telos*) and purpose.

> *End* as a translation of *telos* means what a thing will be that has become fully determined in its being, the defined, the complete, a condition of perfection, completion, fulfillment. End, as *telos*, signifies a continuing state of perfectedness. . . . [It] does not mean purpose. . . . *Purposes* are motives, "motor" propelling actions of various sorts. The words *motive* and *purpose* are words that denote something possessing an exclusively "mental existence," whose being is in consciousness. *Ends*, on the other hand, are characteristic of all kinds of things. . . . Ends are not executed by agents. Purposes require agents. "Man" has an end; individual men have intentions and purposes in executing actions.[9]

Applied to the case at hand, the common good is an *end* of community life given by nature. As a species, man does not choose to live in political communities. We may in fact live in imperfect or incomplete communities, some individuals could in principle "opt out" of society, and there may be cases of human deprivation in which civic development is arrested at the level of the household or clan. But these cases are understood as privations against the backdrop of the more perfect and normal condition of life in civic wholes, such as the *polis* or the nation-state. However, as we observed earlier, the end does not materialize through the forces of natural necessity. To the contrary, it is achieved only by human action, and hence needs must become a governing *purpose* of action by which a community establishes those institutions and laws ordered to the common good.

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[8] To use another analogy, it would be like trying to make sense of the words, lines, or stanzas of a poem without reading them for their meaning. In this comparison, the meaning of the poem—what we most achieve in our reading—is analogous to the common good of a community. The poem's meaning is the reason for the appearance of its material elements; similarly, the material elements of a community simply would not be there at all, or at best only incompletely, if not in the service of some particular form of common life. The logical principle cited here is discussed by Gian-Carlo Rota, "*Fundierung* as a Logical Concept," in his *Indiscrete Thoughts*, ed. Fabrizio Palombi (Boston, Basel, Berlin: Birkhäuser, 1997), 172–81.

[9] "On the Ontological Priority of Ends and Its Relevance to Narrative Arts" in *Beauty, Art, and the Polis*, ed. Alice Ramos (Washington, D.C.: American Maritain Association, 2000), 58–9.

A more substantive description of the common good would include, at a minimum, security and general prosperity. These goods are founded on material necessities realized in systems of transportation, business and commerce, public health, diplomacy and defense, utilities of water and energy. No body politic is secure or prosperous without there being a healthy "hum" to such operations and activities. There are also spiritual elements of the common good, which are realized in a society's educational institutions and its maintenance of its cultural, religious, artistic, and historical traditions. People find meaning in life by involvement in the elements of their spiritual heritage. Through its art, religion, culture, and history, a people finds its identity. These elements of social life keep before a people their origins and aspirations. Among the nontangible common goods we must also include systems of justice and governance. No society would be thought complete without the vital presence of the kinds of goods we have listed.[10]

Nor are these goods particular or private. The common good cannot be reduced to either a particular or a material good. It is a form that pertains to a whole that consists of parts. It belongs equally to each member of the social unit to which it belongs and is aimed at the fulfillment of each participant. It is not food, but the order of a society that provides for production and marketing of agricultural products. It is not this school, those books, or these scholars, but the end or goal of education and personal development to be achieved through them. It is not that museum, those dances, or these ceremonies, but the culture expressed, sustained, or cultivated through them. In other words, the common good is an animating function of the individuals active in society and the various particular institutions or laws that condition a society as a whole. What we must now look at is the source or cause that realizes the animating function in a given society or body politic.

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[10] See Jacques Maritain's comparable description of the elements on the common good in his *Person and the Common Good* (New York: Scribner's, 1947), 42–4.

II

Authority. Two things are needed in order for this end to be actualized, namely, motivation and direction. The people or the assembled social units must have a common desire for this end. They must also have a unified plan for common action. In short, they must be moved to the end, and they must settle on specific means to the end. It is the work of authority to articulate the common desire and to determine the unified means for the action that realizes the common good. Authority, then, is the efficient cause behind the formation of the ultimate "whole," the living corporate identity of civil society. Any well informed and rightly intentioned member of society would desire those goods that perfect the body politic; it is in fact incumbent on any responsible citizen. Yves Simon calls this kind of desire the *formal volition* of the common good. Governing personnel (whether citizens in assembly or elected officials) are obliged to will the common good with a more focused, more intent interest. It is their duty to draw from an understanding of the ends of political society concrete practices and policies suitable for the realization of the desired end. Simon refers to this effective desire as the *material intention* of the common good.[11]

The concept of authority is not yet fully established. After all, one can imagine a homogenous community of intelligent, informed, virtuous individuals gathered for the purpose of passing laws on matters that affect the lives of the whole society. For example, whether to wage war, extend suffrage, or restrict immigration would be specific political issues. We might go on to imagine that all of those assembled equally desire the contribution to the common good represented by the proposed law. The scenario furthermore requires we imagine the assembly's deliberations conclude in the *unanimous recognition* of a *uniquely determined means* to the end they all hold concretely in view. It depicts the community at the level of the largest totality—the city or nation-state—acting in unanimity of desire, judgment, and decision. In this scenario, no authority shows itself, since it is obviated by the unanimity of both attentive concern for the common good and choice of means to its ends. The main point is to emphasize that

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[11] On the distinction between the formal and material intention of the common good see Simon, *Philosophy of Democratic Government*, 36–48.

authority becomes necessary only when members of a society lack unanimity in their concern for the common good.[12]

The lack of unanimity can be due to any number of deficiencies on the part of community members—typically some combination of apathy, weak practical intelligence, inadequate knowledge, dominating shortsighted or private interests, and the bad will of greed, pride, or envy. But deficiencies do not alone give rise to authority. In practical reality, equally intelligent, informed, virtuous participants in a common venture can fail to arrive at unanimity due to the abundance or plenitude of acceptable means to the same end. Authority also becomes necessary when the modality of government shifts deliberative, decisive power away from the direct execution of the people to specific governing personnel, rulers, if you will, who are but a small fraction of those who are ruled. The criteria for determining rulers will differ by regime. In the case of modern democracies, the ruling officials are elected and charged with representing their constituents. Rulers in monarchies, aristocracies, and oligarchies are otherwise determined. But the important thing to keep in mind is that authority enters into the picture when effective unanimity among the totality of those ruled is not forthcoming for the sake of unity of action.

Two kinds of authority: paternal and essential. There are two kinds of authority, which Yves Simon distinguishes as "paternal" and "essential."[13] The paradigm instance of paternal authority is the action of a father who directs the activities of his family and its members, supplying their want of right judgment and desire with his own, in order that a household will achieve its ends. It is understood that in the process of maturation, those who now must play their part in obedience eventually will acquire their own capacity for self-governance. The idea of such authority is not limited to the governance of the father in the family, but extends to certain kinds of governance in social units of any scale. Paternal authority is marked by two features. First of all, it is substitutional, in the sense that it is meant to disappear when those subject to authority mature. Until the subject reaches his majority, the judgments of the authority figure substitute for the subject's personal, autonomous judgment. Secondly, it is pedagogical,

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[12] Ibid., 29–33.
[13] On the distinction between paternal and essential authority see ibid., 7–33.

meaning that it works for the goal of autonomy by communicating the habits necessary for independence and equality among citizens who have reached their majority. It aims at equality and the dismantling of a hierarchy explicit in the distinction between ruler and ruled. Some form of deficiency generates the need for paternal authority. For instance, in a complete political society, some subsidiary body might fail, and so the authorities of the state intervene until the subsidiary entity regains its relative autonomy. Yves Simon imagines the example of a state taking over a failed city school system, in order to restore it to its autonomy. The key point to remember is that "the function of paternal authority . . . is animated with the dynamism of autonomy."[14] Insofar as a political government exercises paternal authority it governs best when it governs least. Respect for such autonomy belongs to *any* just regime, democratic or otherwise. The notion of self-governance ingredient in the identity of democracy is not the same as liberation from paternal authority. The essence of democratic rule, therefore, is to be found beyond considerations of paternal authority.

The second kind of authority Simon calls "essential" authority. It is not fundamentally based in deficiencies among members of a given community. There are, in fact, reasons for authority that are due to human perfections and the intrinsic nature of the world of action. As we observed earlier, failure to arrive at unanimity can be a function of a plentitude of being. It can happen in circumstances where different minds, equally intelligent, experienced, and well intentioned, anticipating future action, differ as to the best means toward their common purpose. In addition, the indeterminate reality of the future and the complex of nondeterministic variables that figure into the means to the anticipated common action mean that there can be no certainty in judgments of practical reason. In these circumstances, practical judgment need not command universal assent on the basis of the evidence, even among discerning and objective audiences. And yet, common life requires common action, which in turn requires unity of judgment. Authority decides.

There is also a second justification of essential authority. It would be wrong to think that authority's reason, whose functions we have identified as the intention and volition of the realization of the

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[14] Ibid., 15.

common good of a political society, is necessarily calibrated to direct the internal governance of the subsidiary units of the body politic. It is not meant as a replacement for the local prudence, for instance, of parents in a family or the CEO of a private corporation. Respect for the relative autonomy of a nation-state's subsidiary units—its families, churches, corporations, cities and counties—is itself part of the common good. As we noted above, this is not to deny justified instances of intervention of higher authorities when subsidiary units fail. The unique, irreplaceable roles that subsidiary units play in the political economy require that they be restored to healthy autonomy when they are found seriously dysfunctional. Particular interests and goods thrive because subsidiary agents devote their energies and talents to them. Parents raise their children; teachers teach; entrepreneurs create goods and services; pastors shepherd their flocks. They can do this not only because higher government respects their autonomy, but because they need not divert their energies and talents to providing for the material elements of common good. Essential authority nurses the freedom and relative autonomy of judgment and action at subsidiary levels.

Authority's claim. A final point further clarifies the role that authority plays in fashioning the "being together" of a political society. The issue can be put best with a question: In a political society, why do those who are ruled obey their rulers? Here we are not really concerned with what Natan Sharansky[15] calls "fear societies," in which government authorities appropriate to themselves virtually all power and responsibility in a society and rule by the coercive forces of fear and intimidation. Fear societies are not *political* in the sense that rulers govern politically through public speech and reason and with the consent of the governed, however variously that consent is construed. Jean-Jacques Rousseau put the point at issue in a memorable phrase: "The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transform strength into right and obedience into duty."[16] What, then, is the basis for the right to govern and the duty to obey?

In the theory being developed here, the rights and duties of governance derive from the final causality of the common good as it is mediated through the practical reason of those who intend and will it. Without at least a formal desire for the common good on the part of

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[15] Natan Shatansky, *The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

[16] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Du contrat social* 1.3 (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1966), p. 44; the translation is my own.

any citizen, obedience to the law degenerates to a calculation of the particular harms and benefits that will accrue to onself through one's adherence to or violation of the law. A calculus of sanctions is thought to obviate the need for duty. In this framework, only particular actions and particular goods matter; common action and common goods lack substance, they do not figure into practical judgments. But Rousseau's belief that duty's obedience and government's right must be rooted in a force stronger than some sum of material power cannot be so easily dismissed with the assertion that the particular goods of one's self-interest suffice. Self-interest, however properly it is understood, is not sufficient. Attempts to build politics on the principles of individual autonomy and personal self-interest seem to envision the human person as essentially nonspiritual and self-centered. In other words, at the core of the human person, it posits no essential orientation to communion with other persons. Absent a natural inclination to communion, man does not have an essentially political nature, and any language about participation in common action for the sake of common goods is empty of substance. Obedience to the law and the right to make and administer civic law is a function of the claim the common good makes upon the members of a society. The fact that the ends of human life are achieved in lives lived in community generates the imperative at work in obedience to law.[17]

Let me sum up the main points on authority. Authority appears to be both necessary and good. Its good is ultimately rooted in the fact that cities or nation-states serve man's natural political ends. Its necessity is tied to the need for unity of direction in common action when the members of a community lack unanimity in their deliberations, which lack is the norm, generally and for the most part. The need for authority responds as much to the plentitude of human

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[17] Jacques Maritain's discussion of the same issue is apropos: "Authority and Power are two different things: *Power* is the force by means of which you can oblige others to obey you. *Authority* is the *right* to direct and command, to be listened to or obeyed by others. Authority requests Power. Power without authority is tyranny. Thus authority means right. If, in the cosmos, a nature, such as a human nature, can be preserved and developed only in a state of culture, and if the state of culture necessarily entails the existence in the social group of a function of commandment and government directed to the common good, then this function is demanded by Natural Law, and implies a *right* to command and govern . . . . [T]he relation of authority among men proceeds from Natural Law . . . . At the origin of the democratic sense, there is not the desire to 'obey only oneself,' as Rousseau put it, but rather the desire to obey only *because it is just.*" *Man and the State* (University of Chicago Press, 1951), 126–7.

genius and undeterminable richness of possibilities for action as to deficiencies among those to whom it gives direction. In addition, governmental authority is ordered to securing the vitality and relative autonomy of subsidiary units of the body politic. Finally, political life requires of its citizens the habits of duty and obedience, which in turn rests upon some measure of recognition of the common good of a people. It is the work of authority to understand the requirements of the common good and to bring about those actions that realize them.

III

Participation, Representation, and Trust. Authority and the common good are at work in distinctive ways in the specifically democratic forms of government. It is interesting to see how the various virtues and vices of democracy are a function of the way the dynamics of authority adapt to the requirements of a democratic regime. Earlier in our discussion of democracy, we noted the prominence of participation and representation. Every (enfranchised) citizen is expected to participate in the life of governing. Participation signifies personal agency in a common enterprise.[18] Representation signifies standing in for others, acting on their behalf. Because the ends of these actions finally come down to the common good, both participation and representation involve a special kind of care for others. I would like to develop this point by transferring our more immediate experience of personal moral action to the more remote reality of political action.

In accordance with the general form of individual, personal moral action, an acting person takes as his own good the good of another. For instance, in an act of generosity, a person will actualize his own perfection as a human being by extending himself in providing, let us say, shelter or solace to an unfortunate neighbor; all the while, the agent's direct intent is to look after the good of the neighbor. When acting morally, a person finds his own good precisely in bringing about the good of another person.[19] Political agency is similar, but with an important difference. When acting politically, the agent does

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[18] For a personalist exposition of participation and the common good see Karol Wojtyla, *The Acting Person*, trans. Andrezej Potocki (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979), 27–83; and Rocco Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II*, trans. Paolo Guietti and Francesca Murphy (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997), 168–76.

not directly, or at least not in the primary instance, aim at the good of
this or that particular individual. The political agent targets his ac-
tions to laws and policies that foster "the sum total of all those condi-
tions of social life which enable individuals, families, and organiza-
tions to achieve complete and efficacious fulfillment."[20] When acting
politically, one has to entertain the good of others at a more corporate
and remote level. At any stage of participation, be it at the fundamen-
tal level of voting or at the more specialized level of making, adjudicat-
ing, or executing the law, the person acting politically keeps in view
and promotes those common social conditions that allow all members
of society to seek and achieve their happiness. What is distinctive
about democratic government, therefore, is that it expects each mem-
ber of political society to exercise agency on behalf of and to take
some responsibility for the common good. It follows, then, that in the
practice of democratic government, citizens find themselves mutually
entrusting their own well-being to the effective judgment of one an-
other. The conferral of trust is, especially obvious in the case of
elected representatives. Yet insofar as it is the many individual voters
who agree to the democratic charter, citizens in a democracy entrust
themselves politically to one another more universally. The ties of
mutual trust give rise to a relatively immediate form of solidarity
among members of a democratic community, a social unity that is not
so thoroughly established in societies of more purely aristocratic or
oligarchic regimes.

It becomes evident that the participation and representation at
work in democratic action entail a kind of mutual trust and an active
concern for the structural good of the whole of a body politic. It is
precisely in this requirement that we encounter democracy's greatest
weakness. First of all, in order to bear the responsibilities of this
trust, a citizen must acquire a democratic civic character. Like moral
character in general, civic character results from a process of educa-
tion, which itself requires constant vigilance on the part of society's el-
ders. Secondly, it is not easy to trust others. Human frailty, with its
selfishness and malevolence, will always work its effects into the

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[19] Robert Sokolowski, *Moral Action* (Bloomington, IN: University of In-
diana Press, 1985); "What Is Moral Action?" *New Scholasticism* 63 (1989): 18–
37; and "Moral Thinking," in *Husserl and the Phenomenological Tradition*,
ed. Robert Sokolowski (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of Amer-
ica Press, 1988), 235–48.

[20] Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, *Compendium of the Social
Doctrine of the Church* (New York: Burns and Oates, 2005), #164.

warp and woof of public life. Trusting opens up possibilities for be-
trayal. Elected representatives can betray the trust invested in them
by the public, and ordinary citizens can renege on their duties to exer-
cise responsible participation at the levels of voting and the engage-
ment of public opinion.

The concept of trust that has arisen as an issue in our thoughts
about democracy is implicit in the commonly understood responsibil-
ities of democratic civic life. First of all, democratic government re-
quires from its populace a measure of informed intelligence regarding
political matters; its pursuit is neither a luxury nor a curiosity. Sec-
ond, citizens can credit themselves for the personnel and decisions of
those who legislate or administer the laws, either because it is they
themselves who do it, or because it is their votes that seat and can un-
seat those who do act. Third, political power takes its rise from the
collected body of citizens, each of whom is considered an equal be-
fore the law. Fourth, democracies esteem liberty as a privileged
value. Fifth, identity between the individual citizen and his city or na-
tion-state is based as much, if not more, on active participation in gov-
ernance than on birth or culture. Sixth, the need for civic virtue is at
least tacitly recognized. These demands specify the dignity and per-
sonal responsibility required for the mutual trust and the special iden-
tity between those who are governed and those who govern, and
which is fashioned in the practice of democratic life.[21]

IV

In this last section, I shall take up five challenges that beset dem-
ocratic governments within the contemporary setting. It is interesting
to see how in each case, what is at issue is the maintenance of the
identity between those who are governed and those who govern. This
identity, in turn, depends on the dynamics of participation and repre-
sentation, at the base of which lies the integrity of mutual trust among
members of the political community. It is through the nature and
quality of participation and representation particular to democratic
governance that authority and the common good are realized in the
constitution of a democratic people. Our consideration of the follow-
ing practical issues is not for the purpose of engaging controversy.
Rather, their consideration is useful for emphasizing the actuality of
the underlying topics of identity and trust at work in the way in which

modern democracies mediate authority and the common good through their various forms of participation and representation. As we have seen, the practice of democratic governance spins an interesting web out of ideas of identity, trust, participation, representation, authority, and the common good. Imagining how this web is stressed by the winds of history and the forces of actual practice illuminate both the genius and the fragility of democracy.

Accountability of elected representatives. It is important for political rulers to make public the reason at work in determining the means to the common good. They also have to make evident to the public a commitment to the common good as the dominating motivation in their making and administering of the laws. These requirements elevate civic understanding. Such public discussion acknowledges that rational articulation and determination of the public good motivates obedience to the law. In the specific case of democratic government, the public discussion of common means in their ordination to the common good is needed to vitalize the mutual trust at work in the participation and representation of democratic life. Nevertheless, there is the risk of giving the impression that obedience to the law is tied to the citizen's agreement with at least a majority of, if not all, the deliberative reasons and decisions of governing officials. The democratic practice of elections creates a special opportunity for

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[21] These qualities are captured in Pericles's praise of the public spirit of Athenian democracy in his famous funeral oration: " . . . our government is called a democracy, because its administration is in the hands, not of the few, but of the many; yet while as regards the law all men are on a equality for the settlement of their private disputes, as regards the value set on them it is as each man is in any way distinguished that he is preferred to public honors not because he belongs to a particular class, but because of personal merits; nor, again, on the ground of poverty is a man barred from a public career by the obscurity of rank if he but has it in him to do the state a service" (ch. 37). "And you will find united in the same persons an interest at once in private and in public affairs, and in others of us who give attention chiefly to business, you will find no lack of insight into political matters. For we alone regard the man who takes no part in public affairs, not as one who minds his own business, but as good for nothing; and we Athenians decide public questions for ourselves or at least endeavor to arrive at a sound understanding of them, in the belief that it is not debate that is a hindrance to action, but rather not to be instructed by debate before the time comes for action. For in truth we have this point also of superiority over other men, to be most daring in action and yet at the same time most given to reflection upon the ventures we mean to undertake . . ." (ch. 40). Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, bk. 2, trans. Charles Forster Smith, vol. 1 (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), 323–31.

confusion here. One might regard elected officials after the fashion of hired hands or managers employed to carry out the wishes of their constituents.[22] But the reality is otherwise. Part of the meaning of elections lies in the fact that through the voting mechanism citizens turn the winning candidates over to their own best judgment on behalf of their own best understanding of the public good. Election confers on them the office of authority, the autonomy of which must be respected. The mistaken view that citizens, often acting by the concerted efforts of lobbies or mass public opinion, retain authority can undermine the effectiveness of elected officials. It is certainly true that citizens retain the power to seat and unseat officials, but authority belongs directly to those who govern.[23] When there is confusion on this point, the prudence of authoritative personnel will be weakly exercised or diverted from its service to the common good. In the situations envisioned here, participation is employed to weaken representation.

Tendency to mediocrity. That democratic government inevitably gives rise to a society and culture of mediocrity is an old charge leveled against it. The idea is that the majority of any society represent low, common tastes and values. Elections, it is said, are won by appeal to the lowest common denominator in a society. Commitment to noble and virtuous interests is thought to belong to "the few," and their concerns will always be outvoted where there is broad, universal enfranchisement. The successful politician secures his seat by appealing to self-serving interests that are broadly common to his constituencies. The additional criticism that democracy is one short step away from demagoguery follows the same logic.[24] Something like this criticism was on the minds of America's founding fathers, when they divided the federal legislature into its two houses, and in their insistence on a bill of rights. The idea was to have institutional protections against the *de facto* tyranny of "the many" over "the few." This criti-

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[22] In this respect, Yves Simon talks about what he calls the mistaken "coach driver" theory of sovereignty, *Philosophy of Democratic Government*, 146–54.

[23] Once the people have designated their ruler, however, they give over their power to govern. It is invested in their designees. At this point, they lack authority and are obliged to obey. The fact that elected representatives are accountable to the people and the common good should not be understood as a basis for undercutting their authority; see Maritain, *Man and the State*, 132–6.

[24] Plato, *Republic*, bk. 9 is the classical locus of this line of criticism.

cism of democracy takes for granted a rather low estimation of the good sense and public spirit of the majority of citizens; it also assumes that there are small cadres of elites blessed with elevated good sense and enlightened judgments. The truth of these assumptions ought not to be readily granted. In a larger sense, however, the criticism points to a sure source of fragility in democratic government. Democracy will live up to the image of its detractors if its citizens' participation does not proceed from a just and dignified vision of the human person, which in turn only flourishes within the context of a community realizing the common good.

Pluralism and relativism. Given the intellectual and spiritual tendencies of contemporary liberal societies, the concept of the *"demos"* as a homogenous people of shared beliefs thins out under the pressure of ideological pluralism and moral relativism. Cultural and moral diversity becomes a problem insofar as democratic government requires a citizenry with shared fundamental commitments or values. Some minimal but sufficient sense of "being together" must animate both the people and their elected officials. In his *Man and the State*, Jacques Maritain spoke of the "Democratic Charter," which is a kind of political creed, a statement of the articles of public orthodoxy that must become second nature to a people who wish to govern themselves democratically.[25] He envisions a "creed of freedom," with "practical points of convergence" uniting men and women of different

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[25] "Such a charter would deal, for instance, with the following points: rights and liberties of the human person, political rights and liberties, social rights and social liberties, corresponding responsibilities; rights and duties of persons who are part of a family society, and liberties and obligations of the latter toward the body politic; mutual rights and duties of groups and the State; government of the people, by the people, and for the people; functions of authority in a political and social democracy, moral obligation, binding in conscience, regarding just laws as well as the Constitution which guarantees the people's liberties; exclusion of the resort to political coups (coups d'état) in a society that is truly free and ruled by laws whose change and evolution depend on the popular majority; human equality, justice between persons and the body politic, justice between the body politic and persons, civil friendship and the ideal of fraternity, religious freedom, mutual tolerance and mutual respect between various spiritual communities and schools of thought, civic self-devotion and love of the motherland, reverence for its history and heritage, and understanding of the various traditions that combine to create its unity; obligations of each person toward the common good of the body politic and obligations of each nation toward the common good of civilized society, and the necessity of becoming aware of the unity of the world and of the existence of a community of peoples." Maritain, *Man and State*, 112–13.

religious and philosophical commitments.[26] Democracy cannot be neutral to the values of freedom or law. It needs its *common faith*, which is a civic or temporal, not a religious or spiritual, faith.[27] The sheer quantity and diversity of peoples gathered together in contemporary nation-states preclude unity grounded in a common religion or metaphysical world view. As our previous analysis showed, the solidity of democracy's participation and representation is grounded in a network of mutual trust uniting the citizenry of a body politic. Who would entrust the well-being of one's self and one's own to agents who did not share one's basic vision of a just and good life and the basic social conditions necessary for securing these goods? The differences of pluralism can be stretched in a democratic society only so far as participation and representation are buoyed by a mutual trust in the use of social institutions for the maintenance of the common good.

    Oligarchy of special interests. In modern democratic republics, special interests or lobbies exercise influence of the democratic process disproportionate to their numbers. The dictum "One man, one vote" increasingly signifies less. Money, expertise, and technology, when brought together by special interests, greatly amplify the influence of a few on the laws of the community. When the influence of the few is perceived as overwhelming by the majority of citizens, popular participation fades. Democratic elements in a society are effectively suppressed by its "oligarchic" interests. The point here is not to condemn the activities of organized special interests but to counter-

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[26] Ibid., 109: "A society of free men implies basic tenets which are at the core of its very existence. A genuine democracy implies a fundamental agreement between minds and wills on the bases of a life in common; it is aware of itself and of its principles, and it must be capable of defending and promoting its own conception of social and political life; *it must bear within itself a common human creed, the creed of freedom.*"

[27] It is important to distinguish practical conclusions uniting democratic minds from their theoretical justifications, that is, from the philosophical and theological world-views that justify or ground those beliefs. The question of how much agreement one must have at the theoretical level, in order to share a body of practical conclusions at the level of public commitment, is a highly pragmatic matter. Needless to say, Maritain's "creed of freedom" is not meant to discourage, let alone substitute for, the practice of religion in confessional faiths. He accepts the crucial distinction and separation between temporal and spiritual authorities. Because it is probable that only religion and metaphysics, with their appeals to transcendent, divine reality, are able to provide theoretical grounds justifying the elements of the common charter, the political freedom for religious practice is essential to the lives of democratic people.

balance their influence by fostering closer immediate ties between
voter participation and the public deliberation and decision of their
representatives. Enfranchised citizens have to shoulder their respon-
sibilities to be informed on issues and candidates and on their elected
representatives' work on their behalf. This is not something that can
be delegated. By acquiescing to ignorance and apathy, they cede their
vote to organized, well-funded special interests. Participation wanes
and representation restricts itself to the interests of the active few.[28]

Technical reason supplants political prudence. A powerful
threat to democratic government lies in the reliance of modern gov-
ernments on bureaucracies that wield great regulative power. This
threat to democracy is not a matter of skewing one way or the other
the dynamics of participation and representation. Instead, it is a mat-
ter of supplanting political authority and usurping political power that
derives from the dynamics of participation and representation.

The problem of bureaucracy is closely connected with the appli-
cation of modern scientific modes of reasoning to political gover-
nance. The modes of reasoning and judgment proper to political pru-
dence are not the same as the methods of modern science. The truth
of prudence is tied to the irreducible conditions of particularity of
both the circumstances of action and the character of agents. It does
not enjoy the universality and unconditionality of mathematical scien-
tific knowledge. In accordance with the logic of a politics of pru-
dence, different judgments will compete with one another in the sort
of large and diverse societies typical of all contemporary nation-
states. Unless one moves to authoritarian or totalitarian regimes,
achieving the common good will require political and social structures
where legitimate and diverse judgments with respect to the means to
the ends of a common life can be argued, accommodated, and ulti-
mately put to the vote. The interesting challenge for governments of
large democratic societies is how to accede to the need for
bureaucracies of professional technocrats without compromising the
primacy of proper political authority.

It is important to recognize the tendency for the judgments of sci-
entific, technical experts to trump the judgments worked out in the

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[28] As a concrete practical matter, the health of most modern democratic
systems requires attention to the way their political parties mediate the rela-
tion between the electorate and their candidates. A democracy fails to the
degree that substantive participation, other than voting, is increasingly lim-
ited to the few, who stand out because of their wealth or fame.

political process among representative authorities whose warrants lie
in the interests and reasons of their constituents. Every person and
family and business is situated. The kind of thinking exercised in po-
litical representation requires imagination for the structures that
serve the flourishing of people as they actually live their lives. Politi-
cal reason, when it is prudential, aims to fashion the means to actual-
ize or perfect the already present ends of human society. By contrast,
it is the goal of technical, scientific reason, which is not truly political,
to fashion a social body by prescribing the "enlightened" purposes to
which the people must conform in their public lives. In effect, people
are required to conform to a universal rational template of a govern-
mental bureaucracy. In a true polity, however, laws do not derive
from the sort of reason or intellect that maintains an imperial stance
above the practice of a common life. Genuine political reason rises
up from within a particular society in the contest between partici-
pants in the social whole. Political reason manifests itself in the argu-
ment between different interests: most broadly, between the interests
of "the many" and those of "the few," each striving to set the condi-
tions for actualizing the good life on the terms that animate their cor-
porate life. The legitimate claims of these different interests cannot
be obviated or overcome in some universal political logic.[29] It is the
genius of democratic life to find, through its processes of participa-
tion and representation, those rational bases for mutual trust that
shall prove sufficient to sustain the social "whole" adequate to a rea-
sonably complete human life.[30]

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[29] My ideas contrasting the premodern notion of political prudence
against the modern concept of scientific rationality are indebted to Francis
Slade, "Rule as Sovereignty: The Universal and Homogeneous State" in *The
Truthful and the Good. Essays in Honor of Robert Sokolowski* (Dordrecht:
Kluwer, 1996), 159–80, and "Rule and Argument in Political Philosophy," in
Ethics and Theological Disclosures in the Thought of Robert Sokolowski,
ed. Guy Mansini and James G. Hart (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic Univer-
sity of America Press, 2003), 149–61; and to Robert Sokolowski, "The Person
and Political Life," *Thomist* 65 (2001): 505–27.

[30] Versions of this essay were read before the University of Dallas Phi-
losophy Department and the Ninth German-American Colloquium held in
Wilbad Kreuth, Germany. I am grateful to colleagues in both assemblies for
their critical comments.

THE CHAIN OF FREEDOM: MORAL AUTONOMY WITH COSMOPOLITAN INTENT

HANS FEGER

In man is the deepest abyss and the highest heaven.
–Schelling, *Philosophical Investigations*, 1809

ACCORDING TO KANT, in order to resolve the dispute in metaphysics, a position that excludes one's own partiality is required—a position of philosophical neutrality. In a letter to Herder,[1] he writes that a deep indifference towards his opinion or that of others characterizes his attitude as a critical philosopher, because it is not truth that causes conflict between people, but rather their mutual falsity. This existential lack of security, which emerges when experience and tradition no longer provide orientation and only the *conflict* of reason with itself remains,[2] is for Kant not only his personal point of departure, but also the methodological point of departure for his critical philosophy as a whole.[3] Reason authorizes itself to go to court or arbitration when it first sees indifference, powerlessness, and agony not as weakness or despair, but rather as a point of view from which it can support valid claims, dismiss unfounded presumptions, and eventually steer itself along the secure path of a science[4] with impartial and disinterested indifference.

This method of resolving conflict, which characterizes the position of the critical philosopher, is extremely modern.[5] It is certainly not a "polemic method"[6] in the sense of a *negative* critique that uses the "language of protest" to articulate a passionate "outrage over wrongness" (Adorno), as in the worthy tradition of the Frankfurt School; nor is it a "dogmatic method," in the sense of an affirmative critique that defends the pluralism of opinions and positions as its greatest asset and cultivates traditions. It is neither prosecutor nor defender; rather, it officiates as a judge who, between apologia and incrimination, "lets the arguments of reason speak out against one another in total freedom" and—in a sceptical manner—dissociates itself from both of them.[7] However, this position only really becomes the *critical* method in the sense of a judicial critique when it matures into reflexive self-critique, when it applies its own standards to the critic's

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[5] Ottfried Höffe placed this methodological feature of critical transcendental philosophy—that it creates legal peace—back at the center of critical philosophy. "Philosophisch aufschlußreicher ist ein Kritikalphabet, das das Gleichgewicht nicht einer List der Vernunft überläßt, die auf dem Markt der öffentlichen Diskurse beiden Seiten zu ihrem (relativen) Recht und dem Ganzen zur Balance verhilft. Systematisch überzeugender ist eine Kritik, die das Gleichgewicht zum Thema macht und aus sich heraus beides leistet, je nachdem die Emanzipation oder aber die Affirmation. In dieser sowohl inhaltlichen als auch intentional und methodisch neutralen, eben judikativen Kritik, liegt nicht, was Habermas befürchtet: ein zu hoher Anspruch. Als Richterin entzieht sich die Philosophie der Suggestion einer einfachen Alternative 'Emanzipation oder Affirmation' und präsentiert sich als eine 'dritte Option.'" See Ottfried Höffe, *"Kategorische Rechtsprinzipien." Ein Kontrapunkt der Moderne* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1995), esp. 33–50.

[6] In order to bring about peace in the dispute within metaphysics, according to Kant—as he explicates in the "Doctrine of Method" in the *Critique of Pure Reason*—the dogmatic method is not necessary, because it deceives philosophy (*CPR* [B 765]), nor is the *polemic* method, which is only a dogmatic unification of the same thing (*CPR* [B 767]); but neither is skepticism, which only wants to "establish . . . a doctrine of doubt" (*Reflection* 5037 [Ak. 18:69]), rather, the critical or "skeptical method" (*CPR* [B 451]), which alone remains, is on a sure footing "dadurch, daß sie in einem solchen auf beiden Seiten redlich gemeinten und mit Verstande geführten Streite den Punkt des Mißverständnisses zu entdecken sucht, um, wie weise Gesetzgeber thun, aus der Verlegenheit der Richter bei Rechtshändeln für sich selbst Belehrung von dem Mangelhaften und nicht genau Bestimmten in ihren Gesetzen zu ziehen (*CPR* [B 451 and following])."

[7] See *CPR* (B 535). Kant writes about the skeptical method, which he clearly differentiates from skepticism in his autobiographical reflections, in this sense: "Ich versuchte es gantz ernstlich, Sätze zu beweisen und ihr Gegentheil, nicht um eine Zweifellehre zu errichten, sondern weil ich eine illusion des Verstandes vermuthete, zu entdecken, worin sie stäke" (*Reflection* 5037 [Ak. 18:69]).

position as well, and consequently does not seek the decision's basis within the limits of a particular dispute, but outside them, in impartiality.[8] In philosophy, judicial critique is critical transcendental philosophy: it takes a step back to the conditions for the possibility of the dispute in order to settle it. Kant maintains that it is by using this transcendental process of arbitration that the dissent between fundamentally opposed positions becomes methodologically available at all.

This preliminary methodological remark is necessary in order to structure my thesis: it is Kant's basic insight into the essence of human freedom (and generally into the essence of human reason as well) that the proper application of freedom (or reason) also includes its thorough misuse, and that only Kant's transcendental legal process of critical ethics protects against this natural misuse of human freedom. Questions concerning the proper use of freedom, such as, how freedom positions itself in the individual ethics of each person when he/she wants to act morally; how it positions the community in legal ethics when it merges in a liberal state through the peacemaking function of the law; or how the community of states positions itself in international law, when, with cosmopolitan intent, freedom devotes itself to a utopian peace mission: These questions always concern the concept of freedom which has emerged from a critical process of arbitration, a concept which presumes a position of philosophical neutrality. It is through this critical process of arbitration that something first becomes apparent, which by deliberately modifying the expression "chain of being"[9] (the ancient belief in an immutable order in creation), I want to call the "chain of freedom," (the modern belief in an immutable order in self-creation). Of course, an image of self-creation like the 'chain of freedom' is always part of the process which it wants to see emerging. The discourse on freedom that Kant unfolds in his writings on the history of philosophy, especially in his essay *"Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent"* (1784), is a constitutive component of the moral perspective whose key concept is the notion of freedom. This is why critical philosophy, as Kant says, has

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[8] Kant differentiates skepticism in his work even as early as *Reflection* 3706: "Das heisst nicht philosophiren, wenn man lediglich darzuthun sucht, daß etwas wie ein Wahn, eine Täuschung des Verstandes sey, sondern man muß auch einsehen lernen, wie eine solche täuschung moglich wär[e]" (Ak. 17:242).

[9] See Spinoza's statement in the *Ethics* that all possibilities are actualities: 43.7 (1.16, cor. 1), 56.2 (1.33, sch. 2), 56.8 (1.35), 62.5 (Appendix to Part 1), 66.9 (2.7 cor). Leibniz, *Discourse* §3; Descartes, *Meditations* 110.4.

its own "chiliastic expectation,"[10] and why the critical philosopher is a prophet who himself "occasions and *produces* the events he predicts."[11] However, in this paper, I not only want to present the positive side of this moral image of history, which should also convey the historical process of freedom itself,[12] but I also want to point out where this process is endangered. I want to examine the predictions that Kant links to his concept of freedom from three points of view. These predictions are:

1. Freedom, as Kant understands it, has the inherent tendency in its law-governed form to become universal with a cosmopolitan intent. The categorical imperative, as a *law of self-preservation of freedom*, is just such a law-governed form.

2. In this process of universalization, freedom extends in stages from the moral to the legal form, and to the political constitution, whereby one link in the chain is so interlocked with the others that a reversal destabilizes the whole process.

3. This gradational process rejoins its origin—just like a chain— in that the highest form of the political organization of freedom, the global legal system, also has repercussions on the rights of individuals.

I

The Law of Self-Preservation of Freedom. To be confronted with the abyss of freedom—with the burden of responsibility—is certainly not, as false pathos often suggests, an act of liberation from obligations, nor a license to do as one pleases. Rather, it is a confrontation with the enigmatic side of modern subjectivity. Not only Kant's definition of transcendental freedom as the self-creation of the actor, but also his interpretation of the French Revolution as a moral tendency of the human race[13] clearly reveals the inner instability of hu-

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[10] Kant, *Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent* (Ak. 8:27), 8th sentence.

[11] Kant, *Contest of the Faculties* (Ak. 7:79).

[12] To give an example: Kant's theorem of "unsocial sociability," which he introduces in sentence four of his essay *Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent*, creates a potential for conflict whose peculiarity consists in interpreting even unethical behavior as expedient for historical process, but without legitimizing this unethical behavior as such. Kant interprets this kind of fictionalization of history as a motive for its own authentification of the idea of freedom.

[13] *Contest of the Faculties* (Ak. 7:85).

man freedom. No cause antedates it; no choice precedes it: even an empirically or psychologically evoked motivation, such as the will to preserve oneself, would not do justice to its absolute essence. Kant's concept of freedom that is linked to the idea of autonomy is based on a timeless, transcendental act. In Kant's view, an action is only free as a specific kind of causality: namely, as a spontaneous, timeless causality born out of freedom. This already reveals what critics of this concept of freedom have always objected to: namely, that Kant does not provide any theoretical proof of a transcendental freedom, since only something that is itself unrecognizable can constitute, for him, a justifiable ground. Nevertheless, on the other hand, it is precisely this lack of provability that also constitutes the strengths and the incontestability of the Kantian concept of freedom, or of what the idealistic tradition calls *transcendental act*. (1) It releases Kant from the metaphysical burden of proof, but without thereby discrediting freedom or absolute spontaneity as a metaphysical category.[14] (2) It remains intact as a *conditio sine qua non*, since without the foundation of an absolute spontaneity, a moral law could never be obligatory for the individual,[15] and moral phenomena such as conscience, remorse, and responsibility for one's own actions would be inexplicable. Finally, (3) it is the core of the peaceable evocation of the third antinomy (*CPR* B 560–86) which produces the proof that such an absolute spontaneity can mutually exist with natural causality consistently, and that, in principle, it does not have to cancel itself out: only as a *free* being can the human being transcend himself as a natural being.

Naturally, it is difficult to ground the Kantian term for freedom consequentially with the deontological argument of universalization.[16]

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[14] In his early reflections of the 1770s, Kant does not explicitly exclude the metaphysical dimension as well from this conception of freedom. He still writes in the Poelitz-postscript of his lectures on metaphysics: "Das Ich beweiset aber, dass ich selbst handele; ich bin ein Prinzip und kein Principatum ... Dadurch dass das Subjekt libertatem absolutam hat, weil es sich bewußt ist, beweiset es, daß es nicht subjetcum patiens, sondern agens sei..." Kant, *Vorlesungen über die Metaphysik*, ed. Karl Heinrich Ludwig Poelitz (Erfurt: Keyserschen Buchhandlung, 1821; repr. 1964), 206.

[15] Kant first stresses the antimetaphysical characteristic of his deduction in the deduction of moral law in the *Groundwork* (1785) in stating that "die Frage also, wie ein kategorischer Imperativ möglich sei, ... so weit beantwortet werden [kann], als man die einzige Voraussetzung angeben kann, unter der er allein möglich ist, nämlich die Idee der Freiheit, ... aber wie diese Voraussetzung selbst möglich sei, läßt sich durch keine menschliche Vernunft jemals einsehen (Ak. 4:461).

[16] See David Cummiskey, *Kantian Consequentialism* (New York: Oxford University Press 1996), 95–105.

Transcendental freedom is a dimension of moral action which precedes every moral decision. If one wants to translate this dimension of freedom into the world of consequential action, one needs to employ a helpful construction. Schelling's philosophy of the tragic here deepens the Kantian problematic of the beginning of moral behaviour, in that it explicates the problem using Greek tragedy.[17] Sophocles' tragedy, *Oedipus Rex*, shows a person who expiates an action for which he cannot be regarded as willingly responsible. To be "willingly responsible" for a transcendental act which precedes all our moral decisions is the problem of (aesthetic) transition. Oedipus is acting (in a tragic way) as if he had to be responsible for this transcendental act, an act which leads to catastrophe. Tragedy, in the view of the German Idealists, is the only way to show that something is happening beyond our moral decisions and moral actions—something of which we can only be aware in the negative form of the tragedy.

Precisely this idea of an absolute and hence unprovable capacity for self-creation also implies that it still has to be integrated into a second thesis; namely, that this capacity for self-creation must once again obey its own imperative. Human freedom is not inherently effective; rather, it is effective as a self-determined and therefore self-preserving freedom in the performance of actions. The individual's freedom is not a lawless freedom that more or less acts on its own initiative; as an absolute capacity for self-creation, it still requires a law-governed link to its effect in order to become evident. Moral principles cannot be based on any contingent desires or subjective ends.

The categorical imperative presents such a link. Despite a prevalent misunderstanding, this is not a behavioral guideline which seeks to express human insight into the reciprocity of sensible ways of behaving (like the "golden rule"), but rather a condition that must be fulfilled in order to enable one to act morally at all. It is not to be understood in a logically consistent way[18] as a *general precept* of moral behavior that one applies in certain cases (for example, not to break a promise, as it is often misunderstood in the Anglo-Saxon tradition[19]). Rather, it is a law of self-preservation of freedom that must be fulfilled

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[17] Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, *Philosophische Briefe über Dogmatismus und Kriticismus*, in *Sämmtliche Werke*, vol. 1 (Stuttgart/ Augsburg: Cotta, 1856–61), p. 337.

[18] In *CPrR*, Kant explicitly avoids talking about consequences that result from determining the will. The only place where he does this, (Ak. 5:24), only serves to reject *blissful happiness* as a possible consequence of absolutely determining the will.

if one wants to act morally, regardless of how one does this. The decisive question of how the categorical imperative provides a rationale for deontological principles can only be answered in such a fashion that one interprets this formula as a law of *self-preservation of freedom*. Actually, the categorical imperative only hinders in the sense that in this kind of conduct, the actor's disposition is misunderstood or lost.

Kant first explained this second thesis with great clarity in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, which makes a clean break with the material metaphysical premises of the concept of freedom in his early writings.[20] Since freedom—as moral law's basis of deduction—is an "unfathomable capacity," as he now calls it, consciousness of moral law itself becomes a "fact."[21] Therefore, as there is no ostensible proof, the argumentation is deployed indirectly: without the precondition that we are free, we are totally unable to be conscious of a moral law that places an absolute obligation on our will. The fact that we actually regard ourselves as free is thus indispensably tied to consciousness of the absolute obligation of moral law and is primarily mediated through this consciousness.

However, what is decisive about this justification is that it is arrived at by reversing the deductive sequence and that it now regresses from the *ratio cognoscendi* to the *ratio essendi*. We thereby do not simply understand a precondition that would otherwise have remained unknown to us. Rather, when we fulfill the demands of the moral imperative with its absolute obligation, only then do we first open up the inner possibility of this transcendental freedom. Only a will that is "driven to act"[22] by the moral maxim can be understood as a will in which the source of freedom does not run dry. This is certainly not a process of deprivation that concerns the self-determination of the acting individual alone. Indeed, Kant's entire political concept of freedom also takes this idea of moral self-determination as its starting point in such a way that one has to say that through Kant's moral imperative, one can study that to which moral laws, norms or universals, as well as legal principles and strategies

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[19] This doctrine of the transcendental act constitutes "the stumbling block for all *empiricists*," according to Kant: see *CPrR* (B 13).

[20] Compare to Klaus Düsing, "Spontaneität und Freiheit in Kants praktischer Philosophie," *Subjektivität und Freiheit* (Stuttgart: Fromann-Holzboog, 2002), 211–36.

[21] *CPrR* (Ak. 5:42); see also (Ak. 5:31).

[22] *CPrR* (Ak. 5:42).

of political justice, must always refer back if they are to be understood as the expression of a free human will. The modernity of Kant's categorical imperative consists precisely in raising questions about the intelligible core of moral codes, laws and norms, which may possibly have their source in a concealed repressive doctrine, thus protecting against their misuse. As a result of this inquiry, Kant did not expect that morals would improve, but rather that a moral culture would develop that leads to a law-governed peace. Conflicts, which in coming to a head can take on tragic form, are generated first of all where the source of freedom has run dry.

If one interprets the categorical imperative as a law of self-preservation of freedom—indeed, as a security measure against the self-endangerment of human freedom and the instability of modern autonomy—then one also gains access to a problematic that Kant first revealed in detail in his later work, *"Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone"* (1793). This is because the legality with which reason orders the will to link the cause and effect of freedom can also be corrupted, so radically that the legality is deliberately inverted. Kant called this disturbance in the relationship of the will with itself, which results in the inversion of the law of freedom, radical evil. The perversion of freedom is thus itself an act of freedom. Kant called it *radical* evil not because it would be completely or totally evil, but because it has its roots (Latin, *radix*) in what is "the persistent condition for the only value which people can give themselves"[23]: freedom. Evil, just like goodness, testifies to human autonomy and takes root in the freedom that is the prerequisite for every single action. It does not have its source in every single natural tendency that would be morally reprehensible; rather, it originates in the fundamental inclination to put natural tendencies generally in the place of moral laws and to make them into the most authoritative ground for determining action. Thus, it does not just deviate from moral law, but it deliberately contradicts moral law, whose maxims it inverts. Interpreted in this manner, evil is not an infirmity, deficiency, or dishonesty that could be made good through reform, remorse, or penance.[24] Radical evil is not "to be sought in tendencies but in the inverted maxim and thus in freedom itself."[25] Schelling, who will metaphysically reformulate this Kantian idea of radical evil, writes in his *Freiheitsschrift* (1809): "It is

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[23] *CPrR* (Ak. 5:86).
[24] See *Contest of Faculties* (Ak. 7:58).
[25] *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone* (Ak. 6:57).

in evil—the self-consuming and always self-destructive contradiction—that it aspires to become natural, precisely by destroying the bond of naturalness, and because of its high-spirited aspiration to be everything, it falls into non-existence."[26]

The evil that must also destroy itself again in the very act of its creation is therefore not the evil that is avenged by inflicting evil—as in paying someone back in their own coin according to the old principle of *lex talionis*. It depicts a contradiction that causes the source of freedom to run dry. In morally judging an evil deed, one does not therefore need to produce evidence "that it would necessarily harm others; as lawyers stipulate by definition. . . . Because it harms others all the time, if not exactly another person, but rather humanity in general, by making the source of justice unusable."[27] This evil is always already gradually at work if the will contradicts itself in its absolute relation to itself; for example, if an instrumental, pragmatic or egotistic way of dealing with oneself or other people displaces free self-determination. The principle of "muddling through" then rules. The depersonalization of ethics is not a perversion of freedom just because it makes a thing out of a person, but because it corrupts, spoils, and indeed can eventually even invert the relationship of the will to itself as self-legislation. The categorical imperative, however, has its *telos* in human freedom and not in the organization of necessities.

II

The Universalization of Freedom. If one interprets the categorical imperative as a law of freedom that prohibits freedom from contradicting itself and thus, as in the case of evil, from destroying itself too, then one gains access to the legal and political dimension of the law of freedom. Even the imputability of an act, and hence of the legal capacity as well, is only established in the freedom of the act. Without this imputability, a person performing an "act" could never be considered as the initiator of the effect.[28] Legally, when neither the

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[26] Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, *Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesender menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängeden Gegenstände* (1809) [=*Philosophical Investigations*], in *Ausgewählte Werke. Schriften von 1806–1813*, vol. 7 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983), 390 and following.

[27] *On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives*, ch. 1626 (Ak. 8:426).

[28] See *Metaphysics of Morals*, ch. 1148 (Ak. 6:223).

will nor the maxims that evoke an act, but instead the action alone is considered,[29] the self-determined will has to justify itself to a collective will. The law, as the epitome of the conditions under which a person's will can be united with that of others in accordance with a general law of freedom,[30] admittedly only judges "external (legal) freedom"[31] (which is also why innocence is always presumed in case of doubt[32]): In doing so, it also always refers back to the free self-determination of the individual. For it is only on this basis that legal principles can be desired and do not just have to be followed blindly. Hence, the coercion that the law is permitted to use is also just a *hindrance* to a *hindrance of freedom* and therefore "will thus be consonant with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law."[33]

As long as the authority of the law to coerce (Kant: "the authority to use coercions"[34]) only prosecutes claims that people bring against each other, its legitimacy is guaranteed. Thus, the legitimation of coercion is at the same time a limitation of coercion.[35] As in the case of the categorical imperative, the criterion for a legal system that can also be desired—that is, harmonizes with the freedom of the will—is whether in his generalizing self-questioning the (sovereign) legislator, in all of his decision-making, conceives of himself as an end-in-himself. However, this reduces his legitimacy as a ruler, for during the course of this self-questioning, he is no longer acting on his own authority (in the sense of the *potestas legibus soluta*): he is, rather, acting on the basis of a sovereignty that consists precisely in *renouncing absolute power.*

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[29] See ibid. (Ak. 6:225 and 230).

[30] See ibid. (Ak. 6:230).

[31] *Perpetual Peace* 8 (Ak. 8:350).

[32] Since what is right in accordance with external laws is just (iustum) (*Metaphysics of Morals* [Ak. 4:224]), the precondition for a respectable person (iusti) is an authority that lies inherently in the principle of innate freedom (ibid., Ak. 4:238).

[33] *Metaphysics of Morals* (Ak. 6:231).

[34] Letter to Heinrich Jung-Stilling (1789), no. 347 (Ak. 11:11).

[35] "Nicht schlechthin ist das Bestehen öffentlicher Gewalten gerecht, sondern nur sekundär und subsidiär zu einer—im großen und ganzen—gerechten Rechtsordnung." Ottfried Höffe, *Gerechtigkeit als Tausch? Zum politischen Projekt der Moderne* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1991), 34.

Still, what about imputability in politics, which is nevertheless target-oriented by preference? Kant promptly reduces politics to an "exercising of jurisprudence," and anchors it in this notion. The political calculation of purely instrumental politics that orients itself exclusively in relation to consequences, such as the "physical advantage" of the "expected welfare and happiness" of the state, or merely orients itself to a "moral advantage," contravenes the "absolute concept of the responsibility of the law."[36] Above all else, the true politician must be conscious of the legality of his actions. Yet because he must also orient himself toward political targets that are subject to calculation, a double role must be demanded of him: to be as cunning as a snake but with the constraining moral condition, "without falsity, like a dove."[37] A political regime can therefore only be established by someone who takes responsibility for its limits, who therefore guarantees what it does *not* decree—which is why "true politics," just like the law, "cannot take a step without having paid tribute to ethics beforehand."[38] And although Kant is anything but a moral preacher, he categorically warns: "Woe betide him who accepts policies that do not regard the laws of justice as sacred." The conflict between ethics and politics that is preprogrammed here can only be resolved through the constant updating of positive law, because this alone is the inalienable initial condition for a legal practice that progressively evolves towards increasing humanitarianism. Here, too, yet another link in the chain connects to the next one: politics refers to the law, and refers back to ethics; all the links are so interconnected with ethics that they simply cannot be separated from it without having to renounce themselves.

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[36] "The god of morality does not yield to Jupiter, the custodian of violence, for even Jupiter is still subject to fate. In short, reason is not sufficiently enlightened to discover the whole series of predetermining causes which would allow it to predict accurately the happy or unhappy consequences of human activities as dictated by the mechanism of nature; it can only hope that the result will meet with its wishes. But reason at all times shows us clearly enough what we have to do in order to remain in the paths of duty, as the result of wisdom require, and thus shows us the way toward our ultimate goal." Kant, *Perpetual Peace and other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals*, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997), Ak. 7:370.

[37] *Perpetual Peace* (Ak. 8:370).

[38] Ibid. (Ak. 8:380).

The development from a primitive to a modern, tolerant society that is able to opt out of the principle of revenge and retribution is consequently not a question of legal empiricism either. It is precisely the political pragmatist who does not perceive that he is afflicted with blindness in a tragic way, and does not know the real motives and goals of his own actions. The "pragmatist" for whom "ethics is pure theory"[39]—who assumes a separation between law and ethics—is, for Kant, like the wooden head in Phaedrus' fable: "a merely empirical doctrine of Right is a head that may be beautiful but unfortunately has no brain."[40] The conquest of the moral natural state is not a question of improving ethics or of moral correctness. Instead of conquering the moral natural state, a moral calculation would only strengthen it, indeed, promote a depersonalization of ethics, just as it is accompanied nowadays by an elimination of ethics from the law. The "good principle's state of constant battle that resides in every human being through evil"[41] can only be conquered by a community which does not enforce the law, but rather acknowledges the laws of virtue, free of all coercion. A legislation that follows a normative rule or a behavioral code is never able to promote internally the moral legislation of ethics.[42]

Thus the attitude of such legislation promotes, not an ever-increasing degree of morality,[43] but an "increasing number of actions governed by duty, whatever the particular motive behind these actions may be. In other words, the profit will result from man's good *deeds* as they grow ever more numerous and successful, that is, from the external phenomena of man's moral nature."[44] The ethics of both

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[39] *Perpetual Peace* (Ak. 8:371).

[40] *Metaphysics of Morals* (Ak. 6:230), translation following *The Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

[41] *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone* (Ak. 6:97).

[42] The only legislator for whom the laws that govern virtue are at the same time those that govern justice (in other words, "all *true obligations* must be understood as his commandments") is God as the moral ruler of the world.

[43] The opposite is also valid: *"Unconscientiousness* is not lack of conscience but rather the propensity to pay no heed to its judgment." *Metaphysics of Morals* (Ak. 6:401), translation after Mary Gregor.

[44] *Contest of Faculties* (Ak. 7:91).

political and legal structures are in principle of the same kind as those to which individuals orient themselves.[45] They are the epitome of the conditions under which a person's will "can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law."[46]

One could object here that we are demanding too much of such a moral principle, since it ought to be pursued in legal and political freedom, if we ask it to be the only source of legitimation. Thus we may hold that norms that have been handed down, that is, religious or collectively binding norms, must come to join it. But precisely in this instance, Kant's governmental philosophy is wonderfully clear. The relevance of the liberal, constitutional state[47] with respect to state power does not consist in subduing these, but in *constituting* them. Here, the law takes on the role of political power. This positive law knows no subjects over whom it rules, nor a political sovereign. Neither can its claim to legitimacy be derived from religious, traditional or patriotic roots; it rather obtains its source of legitimation from *the only thing that can relate to itself:* the autonomous subject. In turn, each and every subject is all that representatives of religious or traditional doctrines may coerce into reflecting upon their own respective limits.

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[45] See *Metaphysics of Morals* (Ak. 6:218). Ethics and legality differ only with regard to their driving force or motivation (Kant's *Nötigung*); for a legal act, "an external (legal) freedom" can admittedly be in agreement with the maxims of a moral legislation, but it does not have to happen out of obligation (see *Perpetual Peace* [Ak. 6:350]).

[46] *Metaphysics of Morals* (Ak. 6:230), translation after Mary Gregor.

[47] For Kant, the ideal form of government is—according to an ancient linguistic use of the word—the republican one. He rejects the democratic form with the argument that—as the counterpart to the monarchic—it only leads to despotism headed by the people (*Volksdespotismus*). But the government ought (in the modern understanding of a representative democracy) to unite the wills of all the people (*What is Enlightment* [Ak. 8:40]) within itself through a representative system (*Perpetual Peace* [Ak. 8:353]). For Kant, the state is "a society of people over which nobody other than itself has command or at its disposal" (*Perpetual Peace* [Ak. 8:344]). Thus, the decision to wage war can only be a legitimate decision "if citizens decide about it for themselves" (*Perpetual Peace* [Ak. 8:351]), and therefore it "requires . . . the approval of the citizens" (ibid.). This idea of government is very similar to the modern constitutional state. "A government that would be founded on the principle of good will against the people, like a father against his children," is for Kant "the greatest despotism imaginable" (*On the Common Saying* [Ak. 8:290]).

To argue that the legal system cannot ultimately legitimize its own claims to legitimacy, because it in turn first originates in the democratic legal process, scales down the problematic and does not trace legitimacy back to legality.[48] Then the autonomous citizen is only squeezed into the role of an election assistant, and not taken seriously in terms of his freedom.

A further objection concerns the uncertainty of whether compliance with the moral principle actually brings with it enough motivation for it to become anchored both legally and politically. The problem is that the motivation for *respect for the law* can only be derived from the awareness of the validity inherent in the law alone. Therefore, Kant regards it as extremely necessary to insert the motivational function of the idea of a moral image into his philosophy of history.[49] Such an image, like the *"Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent"* (1784), taken as a whole, legitimizes itself by teaching the interests of the individual to stop egoistically exploiting and to become oriented towards the common good. Other motives, as they are traditionally mediated by religion, are to be rejected by the secular constitutional state and be replaced by images of history and historical utopias that portray a moral progress of history. Such utopias differ from religious or ideological models precisely in that the individual can respond to them with moral designs for living and a cultural commitment, instead of just obeying and adapting them. The foundations of democracy are also based on this distinction: for only the constitutional state that not only grants its citizens negative rights—in the bad sense of tacit permission—but also wants their active participation in public life and encourages it, thus proves to be a democratic one.

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[48] See Wolfgang Böckenförde, *Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Säkularisation* (1967), in id., *Recht, Staat, Freiheit* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), 91–114.

[49] See my essay, *The Moral Image of History: Kant's Theory of a Historical Sign*, paper presented at the Beijing International Symposium on Kant's Moral Philosophy in Contemporary Perspective, Peking University, May 2004; published in *Journal of Yunnan University: Social Sciences Edition* 4 (2004): 46–56.

Only the chain of freedom that links together a *democratic* process in which civil rights are *actively* exercised leads to a solidarity whose obligation is also desired and which does not just exhaust itself in patriotic lip-service. On the other hand, *imposed* solidarity is *enforced* democracy, which leads neither to socialization, nor to legal responsibility, nor to a political culture that knows how to appreciate the achievements of a peaceful regime. Separatism, ghettoization, ethnic differences, and rhetorics of particularism[50] are the consequences. Only the solidarity that is freely desired without being legally enforced prevents the liberal constitutional state from eroding into a conglomerate of isolated and selfish "monads who only point their subjective rights at each other like weapons."[51] Indeed, it is precisely because of this participation of the individual in humanity that Kant rejects a utilitarian understanding of the state founded on the principle of happiness. "The best form of government is not the one under which it is most comfortable to live (*eudaemonia*), but the one under which the rights of the citizen are most secure."[52] The right to happiness is invalid—what is decisive is that one is *worthy* of happiness.[53]

III

The Transformation to Cosmopolitan Civil Rights. The universalization of freedom gradating from the national to the international legal system—thus, the transition from classical international law to what Kant calls the "cosmopolitan condition"—is the final link in the chain of freedom. To the same extent that national sovereignty declines, international regulations or a transnational legal system

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[50] "Eine Rhetorik des Partikularismus verhindert die Artikulation der universalistischen Restmotive, auf die gerade derjenige sich heute zu sttzen hat, dem die Verteidigung des kulturellen Pluralismus entschieden am Herzen liegt." Axel Honneth, "Universalismus und kulturelle Differenz," *Merkur* 45 (November 1991).

[51] Jürgen Habermas, "Zur Diskussion mit Kardinal Ratzinger," *Information Philosophie* (October 2004): 7–15, here 10.

[52] Kant, *Postscript*, sect. 3 (Ak. 23:257).

[53] *CPR* (B 838).

become necessary.[54] In the tradition of Kant's cosmopolitanism, an international system of collective security can only be established through the peacemaking effect of a legal condition that is multilateral; otherwise, it would only remain limited to the international protective measures of an imperial liberalism (or a hegemonic unilateralism in the tradition of John Stuart Mill's liberal nationalism).

Such an international legal system should not be understood merely as an extension of the national legal system, in the sense of an expansion of its sphere of influence. If one understands the transnational legal system to be merely an extension of the national one, one easily overlooks the fact that the transnational system only comes into existence by feeding back into each respective national legal system, which certainly cannot just be grafted onto it. This genesis of an international legal system has its origin in national law and, in turn, in individual law; but as it develops, it also has repercussions on the continued existence of national laws, and indeed, even individual laws, out of whose transformations it eventually acquires legitimacy. At this point, the chain of freedom comes to an end.

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[54] On the other hand, whoever has doubts about the mandatory nature of a global human rights system or at least a transnational code of ethics, falls back on the values that one's national state provides as orientation and on one's cultural-political conception of oneself, if one is still so liberal within one's national borders. The skeptic who contests a global legal system uses an argument already proposed by Hobbes: only that state that, like a colossus (Leviathan), wages war externally against all other states can internally maintain an artificially organized order which guarantees the freedom of the individual at most. Machiavelli has already proposed that it is only possible to manage a form of order that preserves freedom by adopting policies of maximum deterrence. These positions cannot provide a reason for this skepticism with regard to a global law-governed peace. The war of nations has, like the natural state among people, the status of a self-evident principle. Given this precondition, the domestic ethics of a national state cannot be extended to the intergovernmental level. Kant concludes: the principles that hold good for the peaceful coexistence of people are extendable; they also hold good for the peaceful coexistence of nations. There are not two different codes of ethics, as Hume asserts—one that applies to relations between people, and another to relations between nations—on the contrary, both are in principle the same. The skepticism with regard to a globalizing code of ethics, which exists in the conceptions of Hobbes and Machiavelli, is transformed by Kant into its opposite: only a code of ethics whose principles hold good beyond the borders of the community and the state are also good for the coexistence of people (see in detail the typology of this skepticism proposed by Wolfgang Kersting as a *kosmopolitischen Kognitivismus* or *geltungstheoretischen Kontextualismus*, and the skepticism of the *Sonderethikthese* (Kersting, *Recht, Gerechtigkeit und demokratische Tugend. Abhandlungen zur praktischen Philosophie der Gegenwart* [Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1997], 243–56).

This idea of Kant's becomes plausible if one rises to the challenge that the current idea of "democratization from the outside" entails.[55] The democratization of systems of rule that ought to contribute towards global security and stability is no longer aspired to through the classical policies of defense or balance of power (Metternich), but through the policy of peace that makes partners (and not just conquered ones) out of enemies, by integrating them into a democratic system of mutual cooperation. This democratization from the outside is a process which turns the evolving chain of freedom upside down: the influence does not spread from the bottom up, but from the top down; it does not affect the individual first, but instead affects the political system, by decentralizing it, breaking down its hierarchies, and at worst destabilizing it. From the point of view of international law, the protection of state sovereignty and the necessity of intervention in domestic affairs are becoming more and more incompatible with each other: democracy and republicanism become polarized.[56] But this destabilization and social polarization[57] (the so-called antagonism of

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[55] See Ernst-Otto Czepiel, "Demokratisierung von außen," *Merkur* 58 (2004): 467–79.

[56] One can see a lack of clarity in Kant's conception here. On the one hand, the universal legal principles target a cosmopolitan solution; on the other hand, they conflict with the verdict of the legal autonomy and sovereignty of the state which achieves the status of an empirical premise from the cosmopolitan aspect of the solution (see M. Lutz-Bachmann and J. Bohmann, eds., *Frieden durch Recht. Kants Friedensidee und das Problem einer neuen Weltordnung* [Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1996]). This problematic can only really be resolved generically: the lawful sovereignty of an individual state is the precondition for a sovereign international law that, in the course of its concrete definition, can and must in turn limit the legal sovereignty of the individual state in favor of the legal relations between states. (Kersting resolves the problematic by graduating the different forms of sovereignty; see "Philosophische Friedenstheorie und internationale Friedensordnung," in *Recht, Gerechtigkeit und demokratische Tugend*, 332 and following.) A difficulty here is raised by the question of whether, as with human rights, there also have to be national rights (in the sense of basic rights) that must remain inalienable and, therefore, may not be tampered with by the united will of the nations either. Ottfried Höffe writes in this way about a human right of states (Ottfried Höffe, ed., *Immanuel Kant: Zum ewigen Frieden* [Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995], 116 and following). Moreover, the problem contains potential for conflict with regard to how the sovereignty of a state can be limited in favor of the welfare of all states, if at the same time this state is interested in extending its power so that it can exercise the role of a supervisory power on a global level.

[57] The political left, which is universalistic, neutral, emancipated and ideologically critical, and the political right, which is antiuniversalistic, religious, patriotic and particular, will thus both become responsive as the two sides of a *single* position between the particular and the universal claim to legitimacy.

"unsocial sociability") are nevertheless necessary during a phase of systemic transformation, because they stimulate the process of democracy, which grinds to a halt due to state hierarchies and power structures. The effect which promotes democracy consists, on the one hand, of taking away the external threat from a system of rule, and with it the pressure exerted on its borders, whereby this pressure can be integrated into an interactive space of power distribution: On the other hand, it consists of developing the internal strengths of democratization and freedom and promoting these from the national to the international level—by making out of the legal citizen of a particular state, a legal person of a "common cosmopolitan entity."[58] Kant explicitly addresses both of these aspects when he makes the "perfect civil constitution . . . dependent on the problem of a law-governed relations among states"[59]—and not the other way round.

It is just as unlikely that an island of democracy—such as that which ought to emerge in the Middle East—can exist as a bastion of democracy that sees itself as a kind of universal monarchy of freedom in the line of succession to the Roman Empire. The reality to be achieved through a *peaceful* process of mutual cooperation is not, for Kant one single utopian world state, but rather the multiplicity of sovereign states that are united in a "large future federation of states."[60] This future "federation of states" is (only) a "negative surrogate"[61] for the idea of a world republic, because to him plurality is of a higher order than conformity. Yet neither is it just a loose collection of states that, in case of doubt, can revoke the federal association in favor of the national state, because otherwise its freedom would be endangered. What matters to Kant is the *individual citizen* and his transformation from a national citizen into a citizen of the world. For only as a citizen of the world does he first achieve the degree of institutional protection to which the universal claim of the categorical imperative has already entitled him.

Kant's idea of a cosmopolitan civil state is directly derived from the moral principle with which all rational subjects must comply if they want to regard themselves as free. This maxim also restricts the sovereignty of states if they expand to become a cosmopolitan civil

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[58] *On the Common Saying* (Ak. 8:311).
[59] *Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent* (Ak. 8:24).
[60] Ibid. (Ak. 8:128).
[61] Ibid.

state. The sovereign states which unite themselves in the federal state structure of a cosmopolitan civil state "buy the authorization for their national citizens to be world citizens at the cost of mediating their own status."[62]

So is it a duty of democratic states to establish an international legal system?[63] With reference to Kant's moral principle, one must definitely answer "yes" to this question: the dissent between national jurisdiction and an international legal system can only be resolved in principle by referring back to the moral core of human rights that must be maintained, even if these are *contrary* to the constraints of one's own culture.

There is a particular problem here, that raises the question of which authority is to be attributed with the required neutrality, when it comes to assessing moral principles or abstract legal principles within the terms of a political act that commits itself to a cosmopolitan intent. In Kant's opinion, this conflict, which already constantly recurs between law and politics, can only be resolved in favor of the formulation of moral demands and objectives when the public—that is, publicity and the media—takes on the function of a critical corrective. In Kant's later philosophy, the public is given the status of an informal institution which should keep the scope for action open. This should prevent politics from escaping into the idealism of the law, and prevent the law from being corrupted by political calculation. The forum of the world public demands a dimension of thought that involves anybody's standpoint[64]: that is, a dimension that lives up to the maxim of generalization that we should think in the categorical imperative.

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[62] Jürgen Habermas, *Der gespaltene Westen* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2004), 123.

[63] The vision of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (*Empire* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002]), that an empire of globally effective economic and cultural logic with no capital could arise, only becomes an acceptable vision if this decentralization of power is accompanied by an elimination of the state from law-governed relations whose internationalization, nevertheless, also has repercussions on the positive right of the national laws. For in this way, the Kantian vision—the vision of an understanding of the law whose principles retain their validity beyond the borders of the state also generally holding good for the 'coexistence of people—would be realized. The test of internationalization therefore has the same function as the generalizing maxim of the categorical imperative.

[64] "Eine Weltöffentlichkeit setzt genau jene Form unbegrenzter Kommunikation voraus, die Kants Ideal des gemeinen Menschenverstandes verlangt" (James Bohman, "Die Öffentlichkeit des Weltbürgers: Über Kants, 'negatives Surrogat,'" in *Frieden durch Recht*, ed. Lutz-Bachmann et al., 95).

At the same time, however, we must be warned about an idealistic overestimation here. When Kant says in his "transcendental formula ratified under public law"[65] that only those political maxims may be followed which need publicity in order to fulfil their aim, he does not mean that autonomy could be implemented. The pluralistic consensus is only the possible understanding that provides perspective, which is only entitled to the role of a critical inspector and corrective authority. A nascent world public is easily tempted to consider itself already as a cosmopolitan society, because through it—as Kant says—"the violation of rights in *one* place on the earth is felt throughout the world."[66] However, as an individual, one can never represent the viewpoint of universality[67]; just like the "positive idea of a world republic," this viewpoint has to be replaced by a "negative surrogate."[68]

This brings the argumentation back to the metaphysical core of the Kantian concept of freedom upon which the entire chain of freedom is based: the real position of universality is the position of freedom that is at the root of all our thoughts and actions—a position that always ought to be real, but never becomes fully real. It is not a position that can be coerced; neither has it the function of a "super-self" to which one must be subordinated. Thus, an ethical neutrality or indifference towards this position of freedom is just as morally unthinkable as the possibility of refusing to accept it. The laborious process of establishing human freedom, which the gradual legalization of human rights entails, is always accompanied by shortcomings and the suspicion that the world cannot be morally better anyway: but this is not an objection that can be raised against freedom.

The moral imperative is a promise that is not subject to temporal conditions. Along with it, the only thing that can be proclaimed is what follows in its wake. From an existential philosophical point of

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[65] *Perpetual Peace* (Ak. 8:381).

[66] Ibid. (Ak. 8:360).

[67] The post-political, multicultural universe of tolerance of all differences, from which nobody is excluded, is not a *real* tolerance of the negotiated coexistence of different groups; rather, it joins forces with its radical opposite, with the thoroughly contingent outbreaks of [right-wing] violence (Slavoj Zizek, *Ein Plädoyer für Intoleranz*, 2^d ed. [Vienna, 2001], 42 and following). Zizek has criticized the half-baked multiculturalism of radical liberalism as a hidden form of capitalistic colonialism—a position that deals with *every* local culture from a kind of empty global standpoint in the same way that the colonialist treats his colonial subjects (ibid., 70).

[68] *Perpetual Peace* (Ak. 8:360).

view, one has to say: we have already decided, and we must always, more or less adequately, abide by this decision. Kant deliberately throws us back into the crisis of modernity when he considers the discovery of freedom itself as a crisis. The moral decision alone—in its totally indispensable necessity—is the only self-aware relation to this location where a timeless act takes place; it accomplishes the paradox of supreme free choice, which consists in adopting what one has been chosen for. In this respect Schelling, who developed the Kantian metaphysics of freedom further, says: "Only thus is a beginning possible—a beginning that never ceases to be a beginning, a truly endless beginning. For it is also essential that the beginning must not know itself. Once an act has been done, it has been done forever. The decision that ought somehow to make a truly new beginning must not re-enter one's consciousness—not be recalled—which would effectively mean canceling it. Whoever reserves for himself the option of reviewing a decision never makes a beginning."[69]

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[69] Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, *Die Weltalter. Fragmente* (original versions of 1811 and 1813), ed. Manfred Schroeter (Munich: Biederstein; repr. 1979), 102. The central idea of Schelling's theology of freedom is that man's identification with God is only confirmed in and by God's radical self-reliance—a position that makes *negative theology* precisely into a modern and open theology that surpasses the frontiers dividing religions.

BOOK REVIEWS

BRENNAN, Tad. *The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duty, Fate*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. xii + 340 pp. Cloth, $45.00—This book provides a clear and witty introduction to Stoic moral philosophy. For students, it is a pathway into a complex subject about which we have very little in the way of easy primary texts. Specialists in ancient philosophy and contemporary ethics will also derive both pleasure and benefit from it.

The book is divided into eighteen chapters grouped into five sections: Introduction, Psychology, Ethics, Fate, and a Conclusion comprised by a single chapter. At the end of each section there are annotated suggestions for further reading. There are four indices to primary texts: one to the original source, another to *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, a third to Long and Sedley's *Hellenistic Philosophers*, and a fourth to Inwood and Gerson. Thus, you can use this book with your undergraduate subject in Hellenistic philosophy regardless of which of the two popular translations you have ordered. There is also a bibliography and a general index.

In the introductory chapters, Brennan distinguishes being a Stoic from being stoical by clearing away certain popular misconceptions about the nature of Stoic moral philosophy. He discusses the biographies of individual Stoic philosophers and the problems that our source material on Stoicism poses for an accurate reconstruction of their philosophy. He fills in some of the philosophical background through a brief discussion of eudaimonism and concludes with an initial overview of Stoic ethics. This overview allows the non-specialist reader to see the point of the more detailed chapters that follow.

Brennan begins section two with the foundation stone of Stoic psychology: impressions and our power of giving or withholding assent to them. Since the Stoics identify moral virtues with knowledge, Brennan turns in the next chapter to the difference between belief and knowledge. He provides a discussion of the controversial Stoic *kataleptic* impression that is sufficient for his purposes, and shows clearly the differences between Stoic *doxa* and our term 'belief,' and between Stoic *epistêmê* and our 'knowledge.' The road-testing of this material in the lecture theatre is amply evidenced by the way Brennan forestalls

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possible misunderstandings. This section culminates in a discussion of
the Stoic doctrines on impulse and emotions. This is the material that
will strike modern inheritors of Humean moral psychology as alien, for
the Stoics insist that desire is a voluntary assent to a proposition—an
act of the understanding. Brennan does a fine job of articulating this
view by means of clear definitions of key terms such as 'impulse' and
also of making it sympathetic.

The third section of the book carefully goes through the key concepts
of Stoic moral philosophy, beginning with the distinction between what
is good, bad, and indifferent (that is, everything whose benefit or harm
depends upon circumstances). Brennan then turns to the Stoic goal of
living (*homologia* with nature) and explains the various formulations of
this goal we find in various writers. The next chapter deals with *oikeiô-
sis* (appropriation) in order to explain how other people figure into
Stoic moral philosophy. Chapters 11 to 13 deal with the question of a
"proper function" or "befitting action" (*kathêkon*). These chapters are
more challenging and engage more deeply with the existing literature on
the subject. Brennan characterises them as "a friendly return toss" in an
on-going game of ball with Rachel Barney on the question of what hap-
pens in a Stoic's head when he reasons about what to do. Specialists
will find these chapters interesting and informative, though the line of
argument is accessible to students as well.

The fourth section of the book concentrates on the Stoic view on
causal determinism or fate. Here too the learning curve is steeper for
students, but the dividends for specialists richer. Brennan asks whether
the Stoics can utilise their account of modality to avoid the conclusion
that all future events are necessary and moral responsibility is incoher-
ent. The next chapter considers the Lazy Argument (Cicero, *De fato* 28–
9) and whether the Stoic doctrine of fate makes personal effort incoher-
ent. Brennan concludes that the doctrine of fate generates problems for
the Stoics to which they do not have adequate responses. Friends of
Chrysippus will doubtless want to protest, and Brennan provides them
with clearly articulated arguments with which they may attempt to take
issue.

This is a fine book—historically sensitive, but philosophically acute.
It is spiced with humor, as well. For example: "Indeed, one sometimes
gets the impression that the ancient Stoics killed themselves frequently
(though not more than once per Stoic) . . ." (p. 8). While by Stoic princi-
ples it cannot be counted a genuine good, I regard this book as among
the more preferred of the indifferent things I possess.—Dirk Baltzly,
Monash University.

BRUZINA, Ronald. *Edmund Husserl & Eugen Fink: Beginnings and Ends
in Phenomenology, 1928–1938*. Yale Studies in Hermeneutics. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2004. xv + 627 pp. Cloth, $50.00—This
comprehensive overview of the last ten years of Husserl's life is less a
summary of his mature thought than it is an analysis of the faithful col-

laboration towards a systematic phenomenology with his research assistant, Eugen Fink. Bruzina portrays the personal and working relationship between Husserl and Fink 'and analyzes in meticulous detail the course of Fink's thought as he brought to bear the thought of Heidegger, Dilthey, Kant, Nietzsche, and Hegel on the achievement of a systematic phenomenology of phenomenology. This book, the only exhaustive treatment of Fink's collaboration with Husserl in English, begins with a compelling portrait of the aging Husserl, increasingly alienated by his former student Heidegger and the political situation in the early Nazi years. The author puts his main thesis succinctly: "While Fink is clearly not intelligible without Husserl, reciprocally, in the last decade of his work, Husserl—that is, Husserl's phenomenology—is not explicable without Fink" (p. 32). The perpetual beginner, Husserl, took on Fink as a research assistant from 1930–34 originally as someone who could work through the revisions for a fuller version of the Cartesian Meditations and present to the world the Husserl-endorsed articles, "The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism" and "What Does the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl Want to Do?" A second stage of collaboration from 1934–37 concerned the laying out of a programmatic completion of Husserl's work and the readying of his Nachlass in which he claimed repeatedly his real philosophy was contained. What Fink was really engaged in, however, was a "system-clarifying, order- and method-refining contribution" which pointed to the need for the appropriation of new themes in phenomenology (p. 212). Fink's conception of phenomenology was simultaneously transcendental, constructive, ontological, and speculative; he did not consider himself a mere disciple of any "doctrine" of Husserl.

Bruzina's book examines the main concerns Fink brings to phenomenology in addressing both the weakness of a transcendentally uncritical phenomenological reduction and the spur given to his own thought by Heideggerian and Kantian self-critical philosophy. Influenced by Heidegger, Fink investigates the mode of being of transcendental subjectivity. In response to the question of how the reduction leads to the purification of the transcendental ego, Fink claims that in performing the *epoché* man un-humanizes (*entmenscht*) himself and un-naturalizes nature. Inspired in part by Nietzsche and life-philosophy, Fink argues that the subject-object correlation is not necessarily definitive in the conceptualization of the transcendental. But then the problem arises of how to conceive of temporality in terms other than those of the act-intentionality of objects.

Fink distinguishes three ways for philosophy to start. First, as in Husserl, one could start with the epistemological way, which fixes the subject-object relation but does not address the question of being. Second, as in Heidegger, one could start with the ontological way, which unthematically, however, makes use of the relation of cognition. Fink works out the third way, the "meontic conception of cognition," namely, the conception of the freedom from being on the part of spirit (p. 133). This last way thematizes the process of temporalization as a kind of play and characterizes time-horizonality as de-presencing (*Ent-gegenwärti-*

gung), which is the condition of possibility for bringing something to presence at all—it is part of a critique of Husserl's "presentialism," namely, the privileging of the present as fundamental.

Other key themes in the book are Fink's elaborations of the themes of the world and its pregivenness, the constitution of time in the revision of the Bernau and C-Manuscripts, life-philosophy, the meontic, language, and intersubjectivity. Fink worked on themes Husserl himself surprisingly thought necessary to develop in a phenomenological metaphysics, namely, birth and death, the teleology of transcendental subjectivity and historicity, and the being of God as the principle of this teleology.

A word of caution to the reader is in order. This stylistically dense book is not for beginning students in phenomenology or Husserl, except for the first biographical chapter. The *Tractatus-Logicus-Philosophicus* numbering style of the chapters is distracting, and concise summaries of where the argument stands at particular points in the book would have been helpful. Nonetheless, for the researcher in phenomenology this is an invaluable study of how ten years of Fink's original contributions to Husserlian phenomenology represented "the most sustained conversation of [Husserl's] life and at the same time the instigation to the most solitary meditation" (p. 518). One has the impression that Bruzina might make Husserl's words his own, when the latter said toward the end of his life that he considered Fink "the greatest phenomenon of phenomenology for me" (p. 69).—Daniel Dwyer, *Xavier University.*

CORRIGAN, Kevin, and Glazov-Corrigan, Elena. *Plato's Dialectic at Play: Argument, Structure, and Myth in the Symposium.* University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004. xi+266 pp. Cloth, $55.00—Although this bold book proceeds linearly through the *Symposium*, commenting on each section in turn, it would be misleading to characterize it as a reading of the dialogue. More truly, it is a wide-ranging set of searching reflections aimed to free us to receive the text's manifold of insights on a number of perennial Platonic themes; these include the process, goal, and synoptic reach of dialectic, the uniqueness of Socrates, and the philosophical power and value of art in the polyperspectival genre that the *Symposium*, most fully of all the dialogues, exhibits. To give a bare indication of the sea of provocations that awaits the reader of *Plato's Dialectic at Play*, let me offer three distillations.

(i) The authors' core claim is that Diotima's "ladder of ascent" is the "structural axis" that "gives direction and energy" (p. 2) to all that precedes and follows in the dialogue. After Phaedrus, whose wonder moves him to seek instruction, each of the next four speakers consigns Eros to a "closed, self-contained world" of his own (p. 146); drawing, respectively, on the resources of law and custom, the sciences, comedy, and sophistic rhetoric, each encomium unwittingly restricts Eros to a determinate "type" (p. 49). Socrates' turn to dialogue, both in his refutation of Agathon and in his fictional account of his exchanges with the priestess-prophetess Diotima, changes everything, opening up both dis-

course and Eros itself to the transcendent "other" that beauty is (p. 118); in particular, by re-appropriating their perspectives as the five steps in her "ladder of ascent," Socrates' Diotima "refashions and transforms" them (p. 150), relocating them within "the realm of the sacred" (p. 114) and converting them, now as modes of Eros, into ways of actively receiving "divine superabundance" (pp. 126ff.). Or, to offer a complementary characterization drawn from the authors' account of how Diotima's ascent performs the passage from "opinion" through "reason" to dialectical "understanding" that is charted in *Republic* 6–7: with "intelligence stirred up" (p. 210, quoting *Republic* 527e) by the internal "opposition" Socrates exposes in Agathon's account, the five portraits of Eros are shown to be not self-sufficient "things" but, rather, "divine images" (p. 209, quoting *Republic* 532c) of a "greater truth" and, so, rightly used as "stepping stones in the ascent to the beautiful" (pp. 210–11).

(ii) In its major final phase, of course, the dialogue ends not in Diotima's "mystical sublimity" (p. 166) but in the shattering of it by Alcibiades. Two of the implications the authors explore in his passionate portrayal of Socrates are particularly striking. First, his speech provides an unintended "test" of the way of life Diotima urges: in Alcibiades' witness to Socrates' "placeless" or "not of this world" character, concentrated in "seeking" and "teeming with temperance" (p. 173), the authors find confirmation of the transformative, identity-constituting power of "the search for divine beauty in the form of creative intersubjectivity" (p. 183). Second, Alcibiades' love for Socrates and, in his portrayal, Socrates' response to him testify against the familiar view that for Plato love is of the form, not the individual; on the contrary, in Alcibiades' passion we are shown love of the individual that is oblivious to the form (p. 175)—we see this also in Aristophanes' myth (pp. 107, 211) and in the devotions of Apollodorus and Aristodemus (p. 179)—whereas in Socrates' "care for others" (p. 186) we are shown a love of individuals that flows from "pursuit of the beautiful" (p. 182f., also 175, 235).

(iii) Repeatedly stepping back from the implications of structure for content to thematize the implications of these very implications for form, the authors also make interesting proposals at the level of the theory of literature. Citing criteria culled from Bakhtin, they argue that the *Symposium* is "the first novel in history" (pp. 6, 203). And keying from its novelistic strategy of including and setting into liberating interplay otherwise self-contained genres, the authors argue that the *Symposium* "enacts" (but does not state) (p. 217) a "positive theory of art" that counters and complements the negative theory that Socrates states in *Republic* 2–3 and 10 (pp. 215–18). They identify in the *Symposium*, not always in parody, the threefold removal from reality and the sorts of portrayals of gods and humans that Socrates in the *Republic* condemns (for example, pp. 11f., 18, 70–8, 102, 123–4, 173), and they mark with wonder Socrates' encouragement of the very crossing of the boundary between comedy and tragedy that he warns against at *Republic* 395a (p. 185). On their reading, what the doctrine of the *Republic* pre-emptively excludes, the performance of the *Symposium* includes, and, by the play of dialectic, allows to be transformed.

Are the authors persuasive? Ironically, the very abundance of their reflections can have the effect of making one desire closer exegesis and finer-grained structural analysis—and not only of texts outside the *Symposium*, above all the *Republic*, but also of some core passages in the *Symposium* itself. (One yearns, most of all, for a reading of Diotima's negative account of the self-disclosure of the beautiful at 211a–b, especially because Kevin Corrigan's previous studies of ancient religion and Plotinus qualify him so well to examine the connection of the form's transcendence with its "self-giving" [p. 129].) But the authors might well—and with justice—welcome this response as a mark of the success of the *Symposium* itself, under their "defamiliarizing" touch, in drawing us into its "placeless" and "recollective" play (pp. 146, 235–6).— Mitchell Miller, *Vassar College*

CURRIE, Gregory. *Arts and Minds*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (Clarendon), 2004. 281 pp. Paper, $35.00—The reader will find in Currie's book intelligent discussions of many puzzles debated by philosophers of art: the identity of artworks, the nature of genre, of interpretation, of imagination and aesthetic reasons, the relation of pretence to metacognition in children and non-human animals, the implications of unreliable narrators, or of imaginative resistance. There is also an informative encyclopedia article on cognitivist film theory, and one essay that is mainstream film criticism (focused on *The Searchers*). And there are, *passim*, pleasurable disquisitions on a number of philosophical nugget-puzzles: the relation of the A-series and B-series conceptions of time to different sorts of fiction and imagination; the grue-bleen problem; the etiological theory of functions; and the debate between "theory" and "simulation" theories of our knowledge of others.

Currie's writing is solidly within the analytic tradition. He gestures amiably in the direction of Ricoeur, but his irritation with Ricoeur's verbose vacuity bursts at the seams in several places, concluding that what looked like an "exciting thesis" collapses under scrutiny into "near tautology" (p. 90). He is no kinder to Proust, though granting that it is a character, not Proust as philosopher, who holds the absurd view that memory occasionally dips into a timeless coexistence of all of life's events. Currie rightly reminds us that if we are seriously looking for a theory of time, both literature, however poetic, and even experience itself, however compelling and "cognitively impenetrable," must yield to science. (Which is true, of course, but perhaps a little priggish as a comment on Proust, especially since the character's view might be correct in Proust's fiction. Why couldn't a fictional world have a fictional metaphysics if it makes for good literature?) Also, Currie's claim that no philosophy could change our experience of time may be too pessimistic. I can't *see* stars as distant in time, but, as Parfit and perhaps some mystics have argued, I can see time as either a succession of moments or, on the contrary, a global oneness.

The most interesting essays concern metarepresentation. This is a hot issue because of its connections with three important topics: the diagnosis and explanation of autism, the analysis of the notion of rationality, and the question of the proper characterization of animal intelligence. In the hundred years since C. Lloyd Morgan formulated his "canon" there has been a running dispute about the extent to which we should posit "higher" mental functions in explaining animal behavior. The notion of metarepresentation, involving indispensable reference to a level of representation taking perceptual representation as its object, promises a certain measure of clarification of that controversial idea of "higher" functions. Currie looks at this question with particular emphasis on simulations, pretense, and deception. In the notorious "broken wing" behavior of the plover, for example, are we dealing with genuine pretense, directed at the manipulation of a mental state of the predator? Or is the behavior of the plover best explained in terms of a selectionist hypothesis in which the plover requires no representation of any state of the predator? Currie's proposal is that simulation theory explains most pretending in children and animals, without recourse to metarepresentation. Like perception itself, simulation involves a non-conceptual component and a capacity for "seeing-as" requiring no higher-level awareness.

The last two chapters in "Mind" contain, respectively, some very speculative considerations about the evolutionary stages that made art possible, and a brief discussion of the relevance of evolution to art theory. The first addresses Steven Mithen's hypothesis that at a certain stage of evolution separate cognitive modules merged into a "fluid intelligence" (p. 231). Unlike Peter Carruthers, who has adduced both empirical and theoretical support for the view that language is the bridge between cognitive modules, Currie proposes no specific role for language. Instead he argues that a capacity for "pretend play" is the ingredient missing from Mithen's explanation. The last chapter discusses some applications to aesthetics of a common form of thought experiment that consists in asking: "If O had been different with respect to K properties, would it have merited a different aesthetic response?" (p. 245) One might quibble that the weight placed on this question is excessive. A respondent's assessment of the conditional 'if p then q' is likely to be very unreliable in grounding a prediction about that respondent's actual judgment assessment of q made in the light of p. But Currie uses this thought experiment in the service of subtle and perceptive remarks about legitimate and illegitimate ways in which evolutionary facts in the antecedent could lead to modifications of aesthetic judgments in the consequent. That, in turn, illuminates the leaky boundary between explanations and justifications of aesthetic judgments.

The book's lack of unified theme is also its charm. There will be something here for everyone.—Ronald de Sousa and Colin Chamberlain, *University of Toronto.*

DE MUL, Jos. *The Tragedy of Finitude: Dilthey's Hermeneutics of Life.* Translated by Tony Burrett. Yale Studies in Hermeneutics: New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2004. xviii + 423pp. Cloth, $48.00—Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) is a difficult thinker to come to terms with. His life-long project of writing a "critique of historical reason" was never completed and is handed down to us in fragments. Although his influence on the development of hermeneutics and the philosophy of the human sciences has been vast, his work was heavily criticized by several prominent neo-Kantians as well as Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, and Gadamer, and today he is not widely read. Finally, as Jos de Mul remarks in this excellent study, Dilthey was not averse to ambivalence or even contradiction, and his writing may be seen as the unstable meeting-point of many of the most consequential trends in nineteenth-century philosophy: "Dilthey's philosophy is the reaction of a nineteenth-century thinker, torn between romanticism and positivism, to the social, cultural, and spiritual upheavals of his time. His thinking is a reflection on the Industrial Revolution and the transformations of nature and mankind that went with it, on conservative Prussian politics, on the rise of the empirical human sciences, and—above all—on the growth of historical consciousness" (p. 366).

De Mul is an ambitious commentator. He reconstructs both biography and cultural context, and he interprets virtually all of Dilthey's more substantial writings while seeking to engage with his critics. In addition to extensive discussions of Dilthey's own writings, there are long sections on Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, Gadamer, and Derrida. In a book that may stand as one of the best and most thorough in the recent critical literature on Dilthey, de Mul successfully tackles all of these challenges.

Like Rudolf Makkreel, though with a somewhat different twist, de Mul situates Dilthey's project in relation to Kant's transcendental idealism. Dilthey agrees with Kant that objective knowledge (and reason in general) should be analyzed in terms of the structural conditions of possibility that both enable and set limits to it. However, Dilthey reacts against Kant's commitment to the ahistorical nature of these conditions, arguing that rather than pure *a priori* categories and concepts, what ultimately makes human knowledge possible is life (*Leben*), from which any possible categorical structure emerges. Dilthey's philosophy, de Mul claims, is best understood as a "transcendental-historical life philosophy." Like much of the contemporary philosophy (Brandom, Habermas, McDowell and others) it anticipates, it emphasizes the need to situate the human subject in historical and cultural contexts of meaning that exceed its full explicit grasp while at the same time insisting that historicism does not necessarily imply relativism. The "life-categories," derived from life itself, make up what Dilthey refers to as the historical *a priori* of those who belong to our life-form. It is perfectly possible, Dilthey claims, to acknowledge the essential finitude of the human orientation in the world—the impossibility of going beyond the boundaries of our own historical meaning-horizons—without thereby holding that the life-categories somehow must be arbitrary or irrationally adopted.

De Mul sees Dilthey moving from an epistemological (and, to some degree, psychological) type of argumentation to one that is decidedly ontological. Dilthey's *Leben* or *Lebensform* precedes the formation of the epistemic subject with its objectified object and forms a kind of pre-theoretical world that recedes into the background but can never be by-passed when engaging scientifically. When dealing with Husserl's and Heidegger's critiques, de Mul invokes this point. Both Husserl's attribution of psychologism and Heidegger's critique of the failure to respect the ontological difference fail to take into account the later Dilthey's deep-seated orientation toward ontology.

One of de Mul's most prominent theses is that Dilthey in almost all relevant respects should be regarded as a philosopher of finitude. As a result of his "being-limited" in time and space as well the impossibility of retrieving a traditional transcendental metaphysics, there is for Dilthey a tragic dimension to man—and to modern man in particular. While Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger have always been regarded as thinkers who have attributed a certain tragic dimension to human life, it is surprising but interesting to be told that Dilthey can be included in this group as well. Sounding almost Nietzschean, for Dilthey one of the tasks of hermeneutics, by offering understanding and form, is to transform the sense of limitation into "representations with which we can live" (p. 372).

De Mul's book serves as a poignant reminder that despite its many internal tensions and difficulties, Dilthey's thinking is still alive and relevant. Whether or not we can hope for a renewed scholarly interest of the same scope and intensity as has recently been seen with regard to figures such as Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger, this is a book that has the potential to spark off further research in Dilthey's many writings.—Espen Hammer, *University of Essex.*

GALLAGHER, Shaun. *How the Body Shapes the Mind.* Clarendon Press: Oxford, 2005. ix + 284 pp.—Phenomenology, the neurosciences and psychology combine to present mental activity as an "aspect of embodiment," steering a largely safe and sometimes explicitly Aristotelian course between Cartesianism and physicalism. Topics include body image and body schema, sense of agency (sense that I am responsible for an action or movement) and sense of ownership (sense that my bodily movements, sensations or thoughts are mine), body deafferentation (lack of internal sensation or "propioception" of certain body parts), phantom limbs, the neural basis of intersubjectivity, neonate imitation, linguistic gesture, the causes and philosophical implications of schizophrenia, and free will.

Interactions of the nervous system throughout the body allow the human being to distinguish himself from his environment and to recognize other selves as like himself. Dennett's "brain in a vat" could not have human consciousness for lack of body schemas. A body schema is a

particular system of non-conscious interaction of perceptions and motor actions (for example, sight and nerve impulses from parts of the body while walking allow for balance and not having to wonder whether it is we ourselves or surrounding objects which are in motion), while a body image is a set of perceptions of the body, together with beliefs and emotions regarding it. Certain body schemas are not learned but innate, and Gallagher theorizes that the phantom limb in people who have never had the limb is an effect of incomplete but partially present neural circuits (schemas) which also stimulate areas of the brain responsible for propioceptive awareness.

Apparently innate intermodal communication between visual sensation, neural motor commands, and proprioception seems to lie at the basis of awareness of one's distinct bodily self and of discrete objects. Empirical evidence refutes Locke and Piaget, for whom the human being must learn gradually to correlate the various sense data; in reality near newborns are able to visually recognize the shape of an object earlier given to them to explore orally without their having seen it. Newborns imitate facial expressions they see and over time try to improve the accuracy of the imitation, which presupposes a coordination of propioception and vision, an awareness of the other's and their own faces, and a distinction of themselves from the model they are imitating. Pace William James, the infant's experience is not simply "blooming, buzzing confusion" but rather capable of holistic perception. Gallagher does not mention the "common sense" (Aristotle and St. Thomas), but it seems clear that that is precisely what "intermodal communication" is.

Recognition of other selves and their intentions as similar to my own may be based in part in "mirror neurons" and intermodal communication: visually perceived behavior of other people is simultaneously sketched out by neural motor pre-commands to one's own body. Thus, intersubjectivity would be a "form of embodied practice." However, Gallagher criticizes theories of intersubjectivity based on internal simulation of others' behavior, and argues that the other's emotions and intentions are phenomenologically perceived, not inferred. He links this issue with autism, which involves inability to "read" other people's emotions and intentions in their embodied expressions and movements, as well as impaired "central coherence" or ability to recognize parts and purposes within wholes. Gallagher suggests that both impairments are aspects of a single type of neural malfunctioning. This reviewer was reminded of the duck-rabbit image: if St. Thomas's cogitative sense informing the brain would explain that example of differing visual "organizations" of the same shape, then Thomists should be interested in the neurological basis for many types of part-whole perception. However, Gallagher ultimately offers no satisfying neurological basis for the basic perception that other people have intentions as such.

On self-awareness, Gallagher integrates phenomenology of self-consciousness, time-consciousness and the "forward," pre-action neural motor functions known to be associated with the bodily sense of agency, and hypothesizes a neural function at the basis of protention, arguing that protention is the condition of possibility for a sense of agency. Sense of agency in normal people is protention of an activity combined with proprioception and sensory feedback of the action. Delu-

sions of control and inserted thoughts result from a failure of proten-
tion, without which a schizophrenic's actions are like surprises; since he
cannot attribute them to himself as the agent, he explains them as due to
some "force" or other person. Gallagher notes that impaired sense of
agency in schizophrenics does not affect sense of ownership: they may
conclude that thoughts passing through their minds are caused by other
minds, but they report the thoughts as being in *their* minds.

How the Body Shapes the Mind abounds in well-formulated phenom-
enological insights and tantalizing suggestions for understanding what
Thomists would consider as the action of the soul-informed body, the lo-
comotive power, the external and internal senses, the intellect and will.
It should be read by philosophers and neuroscientists alike.—Ansgar
Santogrossi, OSB. *Mt. Angel Seminary, Oregon. Seminario San José
de Cuernavaca, Mexico.*

HOFFMANN, Tobias, Jörn Müller, Matthias Perkams, editors. *Das Problem
der Willensschwäche in der mittelalterlichen Philosophie / The Prob-
lem of Weakness of Will in Medieval Philosophy [Recherches de Théolo-
gie et Philosophie médiévales, Bibliotheca 8].* Leuven-Paris-Dudley:
Peeters, 2006. iv + 377 pp. Paper, $87.00—This volume contains the ed-
ited proceedings of a 2004 international conference held at the Univer-
sity of Jena. The fourteen papers (including a valuable introductory
overview by the editors) on the treatment by different medieval thinkers
of "acting against one's better judgment" are in three languages: eight in
German, five in English, and one in French. The authors include such
widely known experts as Terence Irwin (on *akrasia* in Aristotle and St.
Thomas), Theo Kobusch (on late 13th century voluntarism), Timothy
Noone (on *incontinentia* in John Duns Scotus) and Risto Saarinen (on
weakness of will in the Renaissance and Reformation). These pieces
are ably matched by contributions from eight younger or less widely
known scholars. Each of the editors also authored a paper.

The inspiration for the conference goes back to the enthusiastic re-
ception for Saarinen's 1994 book, *Weakness of Will in Medieval
Thought. From Augustine to Buridan* (Leiden: Brill Academic Publish-
ers). Saarinen called attention to two phases of medieval concern for
this broad issue, one inspired by Augustine's ruminations on "acting un-
willingly" (*invitus facere*), the other a response to the publication of the
first complete Latin translation (by Robert Grosseteste) of the *Nicoma-
chean Ethics* in the late 1240s, which unleashed a torrent of commentar-
ies stretching into the Reformation and beyond, including of course re-
flection on Aristotle's struggles with the notion of *akrasia*.

As the editors point out (p. 24), their volume attempts to fill two re-
lated gaps. The first is the relative lack of modern systematic attention
to the treatment given to weakness of will by the wide variety of medi-
eval thinkers. Since the publication of Saarinen's book this is changing,
and the current volume will contribute to, and no doubt further, the

trend. But secondly, 20ᵗʰ century treatments of the topic tended to fall into one or the other of two mutually exclusive categories: studies of what a given medieval thinker (generally Thomas Aquinas) thought about weakness of will; or contemporary reflections on *akrasia* (for example, by Hare, Davidson, Vlastos and others), which if they had a historical dimension at all, looked almost exclusively to Plato and Aristotle as their sources of inspiration. What has thereby been overlooked is, first, the fact that medieval philosophers and theologians were themselves extremely interested in the views of Aristotle and various Platonists on this theme, and second, the possibility that "medieval thinking has delivered not only a historical but also a systematic contribution, still relevant today, to philosophical debate about weakness of will" (p. 8). A number of the chapters indeed make explicit reference to contemporary works by non-medievalists, a welcome development.

The essays in this book make abundantly clear that there is *no single* phenomenon at stake in this discussion. Aristotle's term, *akrasia* (literally, ungovernedness) was rendered into Latin by Grosseteste as *incontinentia*, the source of the English "incontinence", and it originally designated a largely epistemic failing. But, according to Christian Trottmann's essay, the first to speak of "weakness *of will*" was Bernard of Clairvaux in the 12ᵗʰ century, who was unfamiliar with Aristotle's concerns, and who interestingly connected such weakness with self-deception. The intellectual context for Bernard, as well as the other thinkers discussed in this book (Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, John of Damascus, Anselm, Abelard, Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and a substantial number of lesser-known voluntarists, intellectualists, and Renaissance and Reformation figures, as well as Luther) was clearly the concern—both pastoral and theoretical—of Christian moral theologians with sin and salvation (indeed, the editors identify six non-Aristotelian contexts for the medieval discussion). Beginning at the latest with Augustine, this concern led not only to the development of a concept and theory of the will that went far beyond what Aristotle had adumbrated, it also employed notions such as *divinely infused* virtues (particularly charity), unknown in Greek thought, to describe and explain (and indeed combat) *akrasia* and weakness of will. A majority of these approaches took not an epistemic, but rather a *voluntaristic* approach to the topic, locating the core failing in "a weakness in [the agent's] will, properly speaking" (p. 34).

One lacuna in this admirable collection is any attention to medieval Muslim and Jewish (or, for the most part, Eastern Christian) reflections on these themes. (A planned contribution on Meister Eckhart did not come to fruition.) But what the book does provide extremely well is both a set of detailed studies of individual figures major and minor, and the editors' enlightening overview of the field. Additional contributors not already mentioned include Christian Schäfer, Bernd Goebel, Alexander Fidora, Martin Tracy, and Alexander Brungs.—John M. Connolly, *Smith College.*

HOFMEISTER, Heimo. *Investigations in European Philosophy: A Transla-
tion of Heimo Hofmeister's Philosophisch Denken.* Translated by
David B. Greene. Problems in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 60.
Lewiston, New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2004. vi + 488 pp. Cloth,
$138.95—It is not easy to determine the genre of Heimo Hofmeister's in-
teresting and lucid *Investigations* because, though it is mostly an inter-
pretative history of European philosophy (quite strictly European rather
than Western, since no non-European philosopher is discussed), it in-
cludes as well several thematic chapters. There is a chapter summing
up classical logic as taught in the Middle Ages (and even including the
mnemonics—*Barbara, Darii, Cesare*, and so on—used by the Scholas-
tics to remember the types of valid syllogism) and theories of truth rec-
ognized today; as well as chapters on freedom and responsibility, moral-
ity, philosophical anthropology, time and history, religion, and other
philosophical topics. However, the interpretative history of European
philosophy that makes up two thirds of the book is, in my judgment, the
most creative and the most interesting part.

Hofmeister follows Heidegger in taking philosophy to be ontology, the
theory of the nature of being (is this why the German title of the book is
Philosophische Denken, as if Hofmeister's goal were to link what
Heidegger ultimately called "thinking" with its philosophical fore-
bears?). Accordingly, Hofmeister begins his history with Parmenides'
reflections on the radical opposition between being and nothing, rather
than, as is traditional, with Thales. As seen in Zeno's paradoxes, Par-
menides' reflections imply that being is unchanging and thus that both
becoming and our experience are illusions. As Hofmeister interprets
him, Plato aims to show that the objects of our experience are, though
less real than being itself as embodied in the Ideas, real nonetheless as
manifestations of the Ideas. This results from Plato's treatment of the
Good (which is the One) as above being. Thus "the one is not something
that is . . . But since being (what is) as the many shares in the One, then
this as the Good is that which gives Being, and *is* the One, as the ground
of the entity, the many. Going beyond Parmenides, this idea means that
manyness is to be grasped not only as the semblance of Being but as its
manifestation" (pp. 44–5).

Aristotle's philosophy is discussed in detail, but the main lesson is
how profoundly he agreed with Plato on the most basic issues: "Aristo-
tle's understanding of the *arche* complies wholly with Plato's. Where
Plato conceived the inner unity of the *arche* as the Idea of the Good, Ar-
istotle tries to elucidate this unity from the structure of what is, showing
it to be the intertwining of Being and becoming, appearance and truth"
(p. 79).

Most critical is the change that modern philosophy introduces.
Where, for Hofmeister, the Ancients held reason (or *nous*) to be imma-
nent in nature and thus our reason to be a kind of imitation of it, the
Moderns extracted reason from nature and placed it exclusively in the
human subject. Hofmeister attributes this change to Christianity's no-
tion of God as creator *ex nihilo*, which places reason on the side of the

personal God thereby removing it from the created world. This is an interesting idea, though it seems to reflect a Protestant reading of Christianity.

As Hofmeister recounts it, the attempt to find the ground of being in the subject runs from Descartes's attempt to ground knowledge on the ego's self-certainty shored up by God's veracity, through Kant's doctrine of the transcendental constitution of nature, to Hegel's argument that Kant's claim that we cannot know the thing-in-itself shows that reason must already know beyond the limits of phenomenal experience. After this, the story moves through the criticisms of Hegel by Marx and others, Husserl's phenomenological account of the constitution of being by subjectivity, Heidegger's reconstruction of the transcendent "subject" as *existing* and finite, to Gadamer's shift from analytic of being to hermeneutics of discourse. Concluding, Hofmeister bemoans the abandonment of the search for the ultimate ground of being and calls for its renewal.

A shortcoming of this telling of the story of European philosophy is, in my view, the short shrift given to natural science as a possible alternative path to an explanation of being. Hofmeister asserts the Heideggerian claim that natural science *presses* the givens of experience "into a formal, independently conceived mathematical scheme" (p. 75), rather than *discovers* nature's mathematical character (isn't this a question-begging claim, only believable if one already assumes that reality is not the way science portrays it?). Thus natural science is said to leave the real world behind in exchange for its own constructions and abstractions. Why reality fits so docilely into mathematical forms, and why sub-atomic particles and fields of force are more constructs and abstractions than Platonic ideas or Kantian categories, are not explained. If the method and possibilities of natural science had been investigated with the creativity and insight that Hofmeister applies to the ancient and modern philosophers, his conclusion might have been less bleak.—Jeffrey Reiman, *American University*.

HUNTER, Graeme. *Radical Protestantism in Spinoza's Thought.* Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005. vii + 196 pp. Cloth, $89.95—Hunter argues that Spinoza's *Theological-Political Treatise* presents a Christian teaching similar to that of the seventeenth-century radical Protestants known as Collegiants. Although this work is directed primarily at Spinoza scholars, Hunter intends all but Chapter Seven to be accessible to undergraduates. To this end, a concordance connecting the Gebhardt edition to standard English translations by Elwes and Shirley is appended to the text. Very well written, philosophically rich, and vigorously argued, this book merits attention from both of its intended audiences.

In his account of Spinoza's life, Hunter maintains that the excommunicated Spinoza found his closest friends among the Collegiants, and that, contrary to Nadler, Spinoza moved to Rijnsburg from Amsterdam because of its central place in Collegiant life (pp. 45–6; Steven Nadler, *Spinoza: A Life* [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999], p. 181).

Rejecting what he calls the "progressivist fallacy" that Spinoza anticipates the critiques of Christianity made by later thinkers, Hunter asserts that its corollary, the thesis that Spinoza hid this critique under a Christian veneer, vitiates the possibility of understanding his thought (p. 184). Hunter, however, does not consider Descartes' suggestion, in his letter of January 1642, for how a philosopher might write cautiously yet still be understood. To Regius, accused of heresy by the scholastic Voetius for his support of certain Cartesian positions, Descartes suggests that he not inflame antagonism by expressing new opinions. He should, instead, nominally retain the old ones while advancing new arguments, allowing those who understand to draw the correct conclusions.

The Christian theology Hunter finds in the *Theological-Political Treatise* is contained in the "core revelation," which he calls the Obedience Axiom (p. 116), and its seven consequences. It asserts the necessity of human obedience to God expressed in acts of justice and charity (p. 145). Chapter Seven argues that this theology is not only "fully compatible with what is taught in the *Ethics*" (p. 4), but also that its doctrines "illuminate the very parts of the *Ethics* with which they at first appear to conflict" (p. 5).

In resolving the apparent inconsistencies between the two works, Hunter ingeniously argues that philosophy and theology are referentially opaque explanatory contexts (pp. 165–9). This, he concludes, entitles the *Treatise* to refer to salvation in language suitable to the explanatory context of religion without contradicting the *Ethics* (p. 175). His application of this principle to the apparent conflict between the *Treatise's* account of salvation through charity with the *Ethics'* doctrine of salvation through intellectual love of God is one of the most philosophically rewarding sections of the book (pp. 169–75).

At times, Hunter's Spinoza seems to so reform Christianity that it becomes something else entirely. For example, he argues that the uniqueness of the world is a confirmation of its perfection because it entails that the world is as perfect as it can be. As nature is perfect, to understand it is to acquiesce with it. In asserting that this acquiescence is our true happiness and salvation (p. 156), however, Hunter seems to bring Spinoza closer to Stoicism than Christianity.

The arguments of Chapter Seven generally show meticulous attention to the texts. Hunter's discussion of the attack on the notion of providence in the Appendix to Part One of the *Ethics* skillfully argues that God's immutability is not incompatible with one of the necessary conditions for a providential order, the possibility of the world being other than it is (p. 155). Hunter does not, however, address the argument of the Demonstration to Proposition Thirty–three of Part One: If things could have been otherwise, God's nature could have been otherwise. That other nature, by Proposition Eleven, would have to exist. Therefore, absurdly, there would be two or more Gods.

Two great stumbling blocks to demonstrating the consistency of the *Theological-Political Treatise* with the *Ethics* are not adequately addressed by Hunter. He asserts that allowing even one revealed teaching, such as the Obedience Axiom, "puts in doubt the resolutely horizontal commitment to immanentism and naturalism with which Spinoza is usually credited" (p. 182). It is difficult, however, not to credit Spinoza with these doctrines, given their central place in the *Ethics*. Secondly, the command to love one's neighbor is inconsistent with both the grounding of cooperation in rational self-interest in Proposition Eighteen, Part Four, of the *Ethics*, and the clear assertions of psychological and ethical egoism in the immediately following propositions. Enlightened self-interest may recommend many actions consistent with Christian charity, but it departs from it when it comes to those too weak or removed from us in space or time to be useful. Spinoza could extend to some human beings the logic of the first Scholium to Proposition Thirty-seven, Part Four, of the *Ethics:* we may use sentient animals as we like because cooperating with them is without advantage.—Laura Byrne, *St. Francis Xavier University.*

KARAMANOLIS, George. *Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. x + 419 pp. Hardbound, $90.00—R. Sorabji has recommended that philosophy's history be read as a continuous, continuing story with due consideration to intermediate speculators and transmutations of notions in different contexts. G. Karamanolis's integrative historical exposition of a "tremendously difficult and complex" historical period is an important step towards this objective. (p. vii) Throughout, Karamanolis eschews the designations "Middle Platonism" or "Neoplatonism" since insufficient "doctrinal or ideological unity" justifies either. (pp. 27; 24, n. 73)

Chapter One centers on Antiochus of Ascalon (c. 130–68 BC), who displaced skeptical interpretations of Plato that prevailed in the Academy for two centuries until the time of Philo of Larissa. Having discerned unanimity in prior interpretations of Plato, Antiochus considered the Forms as "primarily concepts," and maintained "perceptual knowledge [to be] judgmental or propositional" in accord with Stoic positions (pp. 56, 66). "Mildly critical" of Aristotle's rejection of transcendent Forms, he nonetheless detected implicit agreement with Plato in relating them to essences and stability, thus granting ethics "incontrovertible theoretical foundations" to establish "different levels of good life" (pp. 71, 78). The more systematic Plutarch (45–120 AD), examined in Chapter Two, insisted that Plato's texts were the sources for Aristotle's categories, and that the latter's aporetic procedure evidenced deep accord with Plato's inquiries and conclusions (pp. 86, 123–5). Plutarch especially remarked such concerning relations of God to the world, soul to

its instrumental body, forms to soul's intellect, and of virtue as consist-
ing of agreement between emotion and reason (pp. 105–9, 110–1, 114,
120–1).

Chapter Three turns to Numenius (fl. c. 150 AD), who contrasted with
Plutarch by separating Aristotle's and Stoic doctrines from those of
Plato and Academic skepticism, and insisting that "all true philosophy
originated with Pythagoras," which Plato supposedly transmitted un-
clearly, thus giving rise to Academic skepticism (pp. 129–31). Anticipat-
ing Plotinus, Numenius considered Aristotle's God insufficiently tran-
scendent and postulated a hierarchy of demiurgic intellects to insulate
the highest, identified with the Form of the Good, from inappropriate at-
tributions (pp. 142–3). He insisted as well that the human soul is fore-
most that by which man thinks, not that by which man lives (p. 147).
Chapter Four examines Atticus (fl. 180 AD), who judged that Aristotle
purposefully and systematically had contradicted Plato (p. 158). In con-
trast to Aristotle's positions, Atticus argued that Plato's God is intellect
with a soul, and as intellect is identical with the Form of the Good, the
forms are in the soul as subordinated to the divine intellect. Forms im-
manent to the world constitute *dynameis* of what is transcendent, and
this parallels the human intellect as essentially involving soul, which
implies a sublation of desiring, remembering, and recognizing to ratio-
nal life (pp. 170-3).

Chapter Five concerns doctrines of Ammonius Saccas (fl. 230 AD),
who arguably contended that profound accord exists between the *nous*
of Plato's and Aristotle's doctrines (pp. 200–2). Such especially applies
to their concerns with the first principle as ultimate source of existence,
intelligibility, and goodness, which is unmoved, unchanging, immaterial,
and unique act of thinking-thought. Aristotle's criticisms of the Forms
may be viewed as coherent only if one disregards the full metaphysical
dimensions of demiurgic intellect portrayed in *Timaeus* (pp. 208–10).

Chapters Six and Seven respectively consider Plotinus (205–70 AD)
and Porphyry (c. 234–305 AD). While Karamanolis expresses reserva-
tions about some of Plotinus' criticisms of Aristotle's doctrine on soul,
he clearly presents Plotinus's doctrine of soul as rational substance that
is ontologically prior to body and not the latter's mere principle, for it
enlivens the body qualifiedly thorough a *dynamis*, which implies that
Aristotle's principal concerns were functions involving both soul and
body (pp. 220–4). Thus Plotinus makes use of the latter's doctrine "by
rewriting its metaphysics" (p. 228). This has implications in physics,
metaphysics, and ethics: Soul's activity is the essential source of time
and motion; the *megista gênê* of the *Sophist* must have metaphysical
priority in regard to the intelligible realm, while Aristotle's categories
only pertain in a limited way to the sensible; and personal life that does
not achieve identity of freedom, virtue and intellectual contemplation
attains only a likeness of perfect life (pp. 238–9, 235, 232). Porphyry de-
parts from several of Plotinus' criticisms of Aristotle as evidenced in his
view that Aristotle's *Physics* may contribute to interpreting the *Ti-
maeus*, for both works concur that matter and order were simultaneous
and that there was no point when the world did not exist (pp. 284, 280–
1). Moreover, by virtue of the soul's presence, different *energeiai* are

imparted to different bodily activities, and this is compatible with Aristotle's criticism of any simplistic tri-partation of soul's abilities, since such excludes the full range of soul's abilities (pp. 299–302). Finally, while Porphyry possibly held that Aristotle, like Plotinus, retained a hierarchy of substances, in a parallel way he distinguished four levels of virtues, political, cathartic, theoretical, and paradigmatic, implying that each pertains to a distinct order of application that admits of differing degrees of *eudaimonia*, which contrasts markedly with Plotinus' insistence that Aristotle's ethics only concerned *euzôia* (pp. 321, 303–5).

A first appendix portrays how certain early Peripatetics regarded Aristotle's doctrines as being largely in accord with and a development of Plato's while others offered extended criticisms of Platonic positions, and a second inventories major critical, exegetical works of Aristotle's writings, along with others that correlated both thinkers' positions and principles. An extensive bibliography along with detailed indexes of concepts and passages cited terminate this well-organized treatise.

This richly documented work rarely fails to mention pertinent authorities, although D. O'Brien's research on matter and soul in Plotinus is oddly absent. Yet the extensive influence of the figures examined herein on later portrayals of Plato and Aristotle will justify close study of these substantive reflections.—Michael Ewbank, *Logos Philosophical Institute.*

MEIER, Heinrich. *Leo Strauss and the Theologico-Political Problem.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. xxi + 183 pp. Cloth, $60.00— The dramatic tension of Leo Strauss's thought lies in the apparently unresolved problem of reason and revelation. No other political philosopher of the 20th century asserted so intransigently that philosophy and religion were profoundly opposed to one another, that no serious person could avoid confronting this problem, and that no attempt to split the difference, however necessary in practice, could be satisfying in principle. Yet while he asserted loudly the need for a genuine solution to the problem, Strauss left the question at an apparently inconclusive impasse: revelation has never refuted philosophy, but is under no obligation to do so; philosophy must refute revelation to justify its own activity, but has not done so. Yet all readers of Strauss recognize that Strauss's final allegiance was to philosophy, and so we face a quite serious problem: Strauss both demands a genuine, non-question-begging refutation of revelation, and yet fails to provide anything that even remotely looks like it could fit the bill.

In his new book, Heinrich Meier, the editor of Strauss's collected works in German and the author of books on Carl Schmitt and Strauss, suggests that Strauss's skeptical impasse is in the service of his readers' philosophical education. By sharpening the question to an almost unbearable degree and simultaneously refusing to reveal his own final thoughts on the matter, Strauss does all that he can to compel his readers to inquire for themselves into the truth of these questions. His read-

ers might have just grounds for complaint if philosophy were simply a matter of getting the right answers which could then be repeated with no loss of clarity. But if philosophy is a way of life that requires us to question every authority, his readers can hardly complain. They might even have to be grateful for the profound challenge which revelation—and Strauss's rendition thereof—poses to any unreflective sense of security in the life of reason. Meier, following Strauss, argues that would-be philosophers must confront the challenge of revelation, not merely for political or prudential reasons, but because philosophy cannot rationally justify itself without doing so. Otherwise the life of philosophy becomes that most absurd thing, the pretense to honesty combined with a dogmatic faith in reason. Be that as it may, many readers, including not a few sympathetic to Strauss, will be dissatisfied with this pedagogical esotericism. After all, it is hard to be sympathetic to a teaching that we don't even understand.

The great virtue of *Leo Strauss and the Theologico-Political Problem* is that it takes this discontent seriously, which all Strauss's readers must feel at one time or other, and shows that the skeptical impasse is not Strauss's last word on the topic. Meier is both an accomplished scholar, as his labors on Strauss's collected works show, and a penetrating, rigorous reader of works that communicate through their implications and silences as well as their explicit arguments. Both virtues are on display in this volume. The fruits of Meier's scholarly labors are visible in two hitherto unpublished Strauss lectures from the 1940s, included here in an appendix. Meier's readerly virtues are on display throughout the book, but especially in its first chapter, the core of which is a close commentary on one of those lectures, which Meier calls "Reason and Revelation" and says is "more outspoken" about the theologico-political problem than any other text in Strauss's corpus. Here Meier aims to expose for critical reflection Strauss's reflections on the requirements of an adequate answer to revelation and how Strauss proceeded in fulfilling those requirements. I leave the details of Strauss's argument and Meier's elaboration thereof for the interested reader; but suffice it to say that the lecture and Meier's commentary are well worth the price of admission and constitute a major contribution to the Strauss literature.

The other three essays in this book approach the central issue from somewhat different directions: the difficulty of disentangling a philosopher's true intention from his historically most influential doctrines, the mutually illuminating differences between political theology and political philosophy, and Socrates' turn to political philosophy as paradigmatic for Strauss's own enterprise. Of particular interest in my view is Meier's demonstration in Chapter 2 that Strauss's historical narrative of political philosophy—for example, in *Natural Right and History*—knowingly tends to distort the properly philosophic character of some modern thinkers—Rousseau is Meier's example. Contrary to Strauss's apparently moralistic rejection of the moderns, at least some modern thinkers prove to be concerned with "fundamental problems," and so Meier points to the appropriateness and even necessity of reading Strauss's interpretations against the grain, precisely from a point of view sympathetic to him. Needless to say, this recovery of philosophy from

distortion is only possible on the basis of an honest confrontation of philosophy's most challenging rivals. For this exacting treatment of Strauss's wrestling with these most difficult questions, both friends and critics of Strauss have reason to be grateful.—Thomas W. Merrill, *Annapolis, MD.*

MILLS, Jon. *The Unconscious Abyss: Hegel's Anticipation of Psychoanalysis.* Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002. 281 pp. Paper, $29.95—Jon Mills' avowed purpose is to bridge the gap between Hegel's philosophy and Freud's metapsychology. He will do that especially with regard to Freud's most fundamental concept, the unconscious. Even though Mills acknowledges that "Hegel makes very few references to the unconscious" (p. 1), and that Hegel never formulated a formal theory of the unconscious, Mills endeavors to make the unconscious, through what he terms "extrapolation," the overall theme of his book by giving a "systematic voice to Hegel's rather terse view of the unconscious abyss" (p. 1). The hope here is that juxtaposed against psychoanalytic theory, the ontology of the abyss will offer significant advances in psychodynamic thought, and eventually to what Mills calls "process psychology" or "dialectical psychoanalysis." Overall, this densely structured work presents interesting and cogent arguments relating Hegel's abyss to Freud's unconscious. The success of these arguments does not, however, come without its criticisms.

Mills argues for several key points, among which the chief is that Hegel provides a coherent and well articulated theory of the unconscious which assumes "groundwork" status for his entire philosophy (p. 61). In articulating his key thesis, Mills looks to historical influences that provide Hegel a "pathway" to form his systematic conceptualization of the unconscious. These influences range from theosophic Christianity of the soul to both Schelling's philosophy of identification as well as his revision of Kant's and Fichte's transcendental idealism. After examining the historical context relevant to Hegel's understanding of the unconscious, Mills details how the unconscious is the foundation for conscious spiritual life that plays a role in both mental health and illness. Here, Mills argues that what Hegel terms the soul attains for itself a *prereflective, non-propositional* self-awareness or unconscious self-consciousness that becomes the template for consciousness and self-conscious spirit (p. 84).

Next, Mills provides an extensive discussion of Hegel's relation to and anticipation of essential psychoanalytic concepts. In pursuing this discussion, Mills undertakes a developmental exegesis of Hegel's philosophical psychology and the operations of intuition, recollection, and thought within theoretical spirit. All of this culminates in the role of the abyss in the stages of presentation, imagination, and phantasy. Hegel's model of the mind, according to Mills, developmentally unfolds as sublation through internal divisions or differentiation and progresses as sentience, unconscious feeling, ego, consciousness, and self-consciousness

only to emerge as a self-articulating complex totality. It is through the articulation of the soul's developmental progress that Mills believes that we are able to see how the nascent ego becomes the central agency for both unconscious and conscious activity. According to Mills, spirit is the "actualization of a progressive ego expansion that culminates in pure self-consciousness" (p. 17).

From Hegel's anticipation of psychoanalysis, Mills moves to a discussion of the dialectic of desire, which he attributes to the appearance of self-consciousness. Desire, for Mills, is "originally the unconscious self-awareness of the feeling soul" (p. 142). Here, Mills states that the feeling soul attains an initial self-certainty of itself as an unconscious self-conscious, which becomes the logical and developmental model for spirit to unfold (p. 138). This unfolding enables one consciousness to recognize itself in the consciousness of another and, as such, unconscious self-familiarity becomes the precondition or precursor for actual thought. Mills himself sees the process of recognition through desire as saturated with conflict, despair and ultimately madness.

Lastly, Mills discusses Hegel's contributions to metapsychology and its implications for present day psychoanalysis. It is Mills's position that a remarkable similarity exists between Hegel's and Freud's ideas on the unconscious as the indispensable *psychic foundation* of the mind. Despite acknowledged differences, Hegelian and psychoanalytic conceptualizations of the unconscious share a multitude of similarities, especially in regard to the nature of desire and drive, ego development, madness and neurosis, and the role of the dialectic. Ultimately, Mills believes that Hegel and psychoanalysis should be comfortable with each other as a conflation of the Hegelian universal and the Freudian particular.

While Mills's work has been criticized particularly with regard to his extensive reliance on the notes (*Zusatz*) within the Hegelian texts as well as the lack of direct statements on Hegel's part concerning the unconscious itself, the book is a well written and extensively argued text that aims to show the unconscious as the foundation for conscious and self-conscious life. The Hegelian dialectic *process* is, Mills believes, essential for the psychoanalytic understanding of the structure and functional operations of the psyche. One might expect a text bringing Lacan and Hegel together (due in no small part to the influence of Kojève on Lacan), but it is unusual to argue for a close relationship between the materialism of psychoanalysis and the philosophy of Hegel. Yet, this relationship is exactly what Mills very insightfully brings about.—William L. Remley and Wilfried Ver Eecke, *Georgetown University*.

MISAK, Cheryl, editor. *The Cambridge Companion to Peirce*. Cambridge University Press, 2004. 376 pp. Cloth, $85.00; paper, $26.99.—Misak's introductory essay, "Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914)," notes that Peirce's theory of inquiry posits a path of the form "belief—surprise—doubt—inquiry—belief" and aims for beliefs that fit with experience.

She is concerned that Peirce allows a permanently fixed belief, no matter how it is fixed, to be true. What then of beliefs that are fixed by a charismatic guru? She deprecates Peirce's confidence that believers will be thrown into doubt by observing others who don't share the belief. Although Peirce says that this impulse is "too strong in man to be suppressed, without danger of destroying the human species" (W 3, 250), she thinks this psychological hypothesis is false. Misak instead proposes that the aim of inquiry "is to get beliefs which are not merely fixed, but fixed in such a way that they fit with and respond to the evidence." The reader might want to compare Levi on this point.

Misak's essay is followed by Sami Pihlström's context-setting "Peirce's Place in the Pragmatist Tradition." Peirce confines the pragmatic maxim to scientific method, according to him, whereas James (and later Dewey) expand it to include ethical and political issues. Later in the volume, Misak implicitly takes issue on this score, writing, "I have argued that Peirce's thoughts about ethics and science can be brought into harmony—that we ought to see Peirce as holding that vital matters fall under the scope of truth, knowledge, and what he calls the scientific method of inquiry" (p. 165).

Boler's essay, "Peirce and Medieval Thought," ends by defending an idealist interpretation of Peirce, despite Peirce's writing, "Every philosopher who denies the doctrine of Immediate Perception—including idealists of every stripe—by that denial cuts off all possibility of ever cognizing a relation" (CP 5.56, 1903). He thinks this misleading, because the doctrine of Immediate Perception, as "a form of Direct Realism," is opposed to representationalism rather than idealism. His objective idealism remains in place: if knowledge is possible, "the real as the object of knowledge must be idea-like." Besides, Peirce's doctrine of Immediate Perception is not a matter of perceiving ordinary physical objects as such, but has to do rather with the brute encounter of Secondness. We still need to introduce the aspects of Firstness and Thirdness to provide any intellectual content to experience.

The least to be inferred from this issue and Peirce's concern about "cognizing a relation" is suggested by Randall Dipert at the end of his contribution, "Peirce's deductive Logic," where he rues "perhaps our worst failing in our appraisal of Peirce's philosophy," namely, "a continuing unwillingness to take up relations not as a privileged historical or even logical subject, but as a philosophical and specifically metaphysical topic. Are relations (2^d or 3^d place or higher) real? What is it for a relation to be real—as opposed to its relata existing?" (p. 318)

David Wiggins' "Reflections on Inquiry and Truth Arising from Peirce's Method for the Fixation of Belief" suggests it is time to "supersede" Peirce's dictum that "The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed by all who investigate is what we mean by truth, and the object represented in this opinion is real," in favor of "the core Peirceanism" that views the idea of inquiry "as a process that gathers rational strength as it gathers force and gathers force as it gathers rational strength" (p. 90). A principle of charity translates his dictum into something like, "Believe what you will—end the irritation of doubt however you like—only provided that the belief with which you conquer doubt will stick, provided it really will conquer doubt" (98). This is a powerful essay.

Christopher Hookway's "Truth, Reality, and Convergence" takes a tack opposed to Wiggins's, defending Peirce's theory of truth as convergence, especially by showing that it is separable from what Bernard Williams called the absolute conception of reality. The latter implies that (1), "if a proposition is true, then anyone who inquires 'into the nature of reality' (well enough and long enough) is fated to believe it" (p. 130). But Peirce's theory implies rather (2), "If a proposition is true, then anyone who investigates some question to which that proposition provides the answer is fated to believe it." Hookway applies his distinction to secondary qualities: Unless all inquirers must possess visual apparatus like ours, (1) will entail that color propositions cannot be true and that their objects are not real, whereas (2) has no such entailment: "it requires only that those capable of understanding questions about colours are capable of finding their answers" (p. 131).

Cheryl Misak's "C. S. Peirce on Vital Matters" offers a cognitivist interpretation of Peirce's thinking about ethics and other "vital" matters. Peirce ties ethics to instinct, but "instinct can be folded into the cognitive view" (p. 152), for "Peirce builds instinct into the scientific method—the method of abduction, deduction, and induction. Abduction guesses at an explanation for a surprising experience, and "thus science advances by 'the spontaneous conjectures of instinctive reason'" (p. 159, CP 6.475, 1908; 5.604, 1901).

Douglas Anderson's "Peirce's Common Sense Marriage of Religion and Science" finds in Peirce a clear division of labor between religion and science. Religion is entitled to "its vague beliefs" in order to effect its practical work, but "as natural curiosity leads us to inquire about these ideas, we move from religion to science, from practice to theory" (p. 184). He rejects the image of two incompatible Peirces, a reasonable scientific Peirce and a less reasonable transcendentalist Peirce. His philosophy of religion "works in concert with his theory of inquiry and his pragmaticism" (p. 190).

Sandra Rosenthal's "Peirce's Pragmatic Account of Perception" holds that appearances for Peirce "are not the building blocks of perception, as held by phenomenalist positions of various sorts, but rather a level of thought brought about by a change of focus when a problem arises" (p. 197). Such appearances provide not the absolute certainty of foundationalist claims but "pragmatic certainty" (p. 200).

T. L. Short's "The Development of Peirce's Theory of Signs" tracks the changes in Peirce's theory of signs in the course of his career. There is a fundamental unchanging conception of a sign that stipulates a triadic relation with three relata—sign, object, interpretant. "Significance is not a direct relation of sign to object; instead, the significance of a sign is determined by the interpretant which that sign elicits" (p. 215). What changes dramatically, however, is the idea that in every case the interpretant of a sign is another sign of the same object. Nonconceptual interpretants and nonhuman interpreters are acknowledged: "Semeiotics thereby became a study not only of natural signs but also of natural processes of interpretation. And that suggests a way in which the human mind may be located within nature, namely, as a development of more

primitive semeiotic capacities." (p. 223). Short's essay is certainly among the strongest in the collection, admirably combining refined Peirce scholarship with insightful interpretation.

Peter Skagestad's "Peirce's Semeiotic Model of the Mind" includes a pleasing discussion of the following passage from Peirce: "A psychologist cuts out a lobe of my brain (nihil animale a me alienum puto) and then, when I find I cannot express myself, he says, 'You see, your faculty of language was localized in that lobe.' No doubt it was, and so, if he had filched my inkstand, I should not have been able to continue my discussion until I had got another. Yea, the very thoughts would not come to me. So my faculty of discussion is equally localized in my inkstand" (CP 7.366). Space prohibits a summary of his discussion, but the reader will be rewarded for checking it out.

Isaac Levi's "Beware of Syllogism: Statistical Reasoning and Conjecturing According to Peirce" suggests that by the end of his career, Peirce "had jettisoned the narrow antipsychologistic view of the logic of scientific inference with which he had begun" (p. 283), opposing probabilism of the sort widely endorsed by philosophers who embrace Bayesianism, supportive of the importance of forming testable conjectures, but in opposition to both probabilists and Popperians in favoring ampliative induction.—Wesley Cooper, *University of Alberta*.

RESCHER, Nicholas. *Cognitive Harmony: The Role of Systemic Harmony in the Constitution of Knowledge*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005. ix + 118 pp. Cloth, $25.95.
——— *Realism and Pragmatic Epistemology*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005. xi + 126 pp. Cloth, $25.95.
——— *Epistemic Logic: A Survey of the Logic of Knowledge*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005. ix + 140 pp. Cloth, $25.95.—These three short books on the theory of knowledge are intended to complement each other but can also be read independently. *Epistemic Logic* is intended as a systematic introduction to its topic; the other two briefly lay out the author's views on their respective subjects without relying on his earlier work or entering into current debates. For this reason, I consider them simply in themselves.

Cognitive Harmony is a thoughtful introduction to the role of systematicity in knowledge and inquiry. Like its companion volumes, it provides an exposition rather than a thorough defense of the author's views; nevertheless, Rescher develops the main thread of his argument through distinctions, brief arguments, and historical reflections that serve to introduce the landscape as well as the path he takes through it.

In its early chapters, the book provides a provocative reflection on the relation between order in the world and order in our thought. After a brief historical survey with Kant's Copernican revolution as its pivot, Rescher endorses a Hegelian perspective that begins by insisting that nothing counts as "known" unless it coheres systematically with the rest of what is known. From this principle is derived the general systematic-

ity first of our knowledge as a whole, and then of the world that we posit as its object. This approach is aptly characterized by the phrase "justificatory idealism," used in *Realism and Pragmatic Epistemology* to suggest that, lacking any direct access to the real, we are nevertheless drawn to posit it as a counterpart to the ideal realm that constitutes our thought.

It is precisely Rescher's position on the relation between the ideal and the real that grounds his pragmatic approach to cognitive harmony—that is, to systematicity considered as possessing a positive cognitive value. The value is necessarily that of a regulative ideal of inquiry, associated primarily with thought and only secondarily with the "world." A harmonious worldview, that is, is one whose components are so related as to be intelligible, rationally organized, and relatively secure.

Rescher's pragmatism, however, is meant to be compatible with a kind of realism. We cannot model the harmony of our thoughts on a harmonious world to which we have no direct access; nevertheless, the achievement of cognitive harmony depends on the world's cooperating. We must proceed in our inquiries as if reality were ordered, and to the extent that we succeed, our supposition is justified.

In the second half of *Cognitive Harmony*, Rescher turns to several more specific issues that arise within his jointly pragmatic and realistic framework. The first is inductive reasoning, which he justifies on what he calls economic grounds: common sense requires us to begin by testing the simplest plausible hypotheses, beginning with straightforward inductive generalizations. Here also, however, the initial pragmatic impetus is refined and tempered, as our experience of inquiry and, indirectly, of the world, provides an independent reason to trust our increasingly sophisticated inductive methods. The second part of the book also discusses the need to distinguish between more important and less important claims within the system of our putative knowledge. Here, after some initial clarifications, most of the chapter is spent looking for ways to discern and quantify importance, including, practically but fallibly, citation counting.

By contrast with its overall emphasis on the sciences, *Cognitive Harmony*'s final chapter asks "why philosophy itself must be systemically harmonious" (p. 92). This forceful warning against the dangers of overspecialization in philosophy can easily stand apart from the rest of the book; it is a healthy reminder for professional philosophers and could also be assigned to any student with a couple of philosophy classes under his belt.

In discussing Rescher's approach to cognitive harmony I have stressed his pragmatism, and this certainly reflects his own emphasis. Nevertheless, *Cognitive Harmony* manages to avoid—not inappropriately—a direct confrontation with question on which our understanding of Rescher's particular version of pragmatism turns, namely, its relation to his realism. This is, of course, the main topic of *Realism and Pragmatic Epistemology*. Unfortunately, *Realism* too fails to answer the question directly and clearly: either Rescher is sitting on the fence, or he fails to make his position clear.

His central argument begins with the claim that there can be no evidence, in the strict sense, for realism, because there is no evidential route from claims about how things appear to us to claims about how things are. It is immediately unclear, however, how this claim coheres with Rescher's thesis that our very cognitive limitations count as powerful evidence for a world that goes beyond our experience. Ignoring this tension, he goes on to argue that the justification for our realism is pragmatic: being a realist is the only effective way to pursue our cognitive purposes. This would be a step forward if we knew what exactly he thinks our cognitive purposes are. Specifically, are our inquiries aimed ultimately at the truth as such, or at something more practical?

Toward the beginning of the book, Rescher states that without realism we cannot "operate the idea of truth as agreement with reality," or "preserve the distinction between appearance and reality" (p. 21). In a pragmatic framework, this begs the question of what further purpose the ideas of truth, reality, and appearance may serve. Is reality simply another useful idea? Rescher's "justificatory idealism" posits the real as a counterpart to our own thoughts about it. He does insist that the realism thus pragmatically justified is afterward "retrojustified" experientially through its cognitive effectiveness. Again we ask, effectiveness for what?

In the end, Rescher claims that "practical rationality encompasses theoretical rationality" (p. 56 ff.) in such a way that the ultimate criterion of all rationality is the positive or negative affect that accompanies our successes and failures in getting around in the world. His pragmatism thus appears to be thoroughgoing: realism is a "useful" position in the ordinary sense of serving purposes other than the desire for truth itself. To be a realist is nothing but to behave like a realist. To be fair, there are indications—such as the argument from our cognitive limitations mentioned above—that Rescher may want to be more of a realist than this, but these indications confuse rather than modify the main thread of the argument.

In the end, the very terms in which Rescher sets up his problem preclude any straightforward commitment to realism. The philosopher does not, in fact, live in a world of "mere" appearances, wondering what if anything lies beyond them. He lives, rather, in a personal world of life and experience all of whose constituents are real by the very fact that they form part of that world. And he is spontaneously a realist in a stronger sense because he knows that as far as he or anyone can tell, this personal world is part of a world larger and richer than the part of it that intersects directly with his own reality as a subject of experience. (It goes without saying that we humans cannot afford to be bothered by the qualification, "as far as I can tell.")

Of course, there is no objection to approaching realism from a pragmatic point of view as well, and Rescher's tour of this approach remains quite helpful. In the later chapters of the book, he discusses several methodological issues, much as in *Cognitive Harmony* he takes up the question of induction. He first discusses the pragmatic-epistemic grounds for preferring specific to general claims in cases of conflict, and then goes on to argue for an exception in the case of counterfactual reasoning, where lawlike general claims are preserved, if possible, to struc-

ture the world within which the more specific counterfactual is being considered. In another chapter, he discusses whether and in what cases we can simplify our reasoning by treating remote possibilities as impossible. Finally, he addresses the logical structure of and justification for "default reasoning," in which we assume that what usually is the case is presently the case. These three chapters do not contribute to the main argument of the book, for which Rescher in fact only claims a "unity of topic and theme" (p. xi).

In the final chapter, Rescher insists again that "our only cognitive access to reality comes via a model that we make of reality to serve as its artifactually thought-contrived surrogate" (p. 105), and discusses the "cognitive myopia" that follows from this. This chapter might simply have rounded off an important theme from earlier in the book, but unfortunately, its initial premise is so formulated that it entails not only an opposition between appearance and reality, but also a strong claim about the theory-ladenness of observation. The latter is an issue that Rescher has not discussed at all, and about which much more would need to be said were the issues raised in this chapter to be discussed seriously.

Epistemic Logic is not so closely connected to the other two books as they are to each other. It introduces the logic of knowledge by developing a system to model the chief formal dimensions of knowledge and ignorance in a community of competent but finite knowers. Its eighteen brief chapters cover such topics as deductivity and knowledge ampliation, metaknowledge, group knowledge, interrogative as opposed to propositional knowledge, modality, vagrant predicates, and insolubilia. This requires, of course, making a number of philosophical decisions concerning what it means to know something and what kind of knowers we are talking about. Rescher's positions are invariably reasonable and moderate; and despite the book's brevity they all receive at least some defense.

Because it is concerned more to develop a formal system than to discuss the issues in depth, *Epistemic Logic* is philosophically modest by comparison with its companion volumes. Rescher does, however, pursue a serious philosophical interest in the book, one that dominates its final chapters and, unfortunately, is not carried through very convincingly. This interest is in the limitations of human knowledge, which in itself of course is a highly interesting topic. Rescher's mistake is to confuse the simple formal results available to the beginning epistemic logician with substantive insights about human knowers and their limitations.

For example, Rescher correctly observes the impossibility of anyone's knowing that a specific proposition is both true and unknown, and he correctly infers from this that if there are any unknown truths—as we assume there are in a system of finite knowers—there will also be unknowable truths, namely, the true propositions stating that the unknown truths are true but unknown. He also points out that we cannot identify specific instantiations of vagrant predicates such as "an idea that no one has considered"; and that if everyone has at least one real secret, then the conjunction of all secrets is a truth unknown by anyone.

Now although such facts may rightly interest the logician, Rescher exaggerates their philosophical importance, perhaps the better to connect *Epistemic Logic* with the more serious philosophical discussions in its companions. Thus in a final chapter, he briefly discusses the implications of our cognitive limitations for realism and for the progress of science. Although these issues are tenuously connected with the trivial formal conclusions that he has already reached, they mostly constitute a change of subject.

One might even say that the book as a whole—and perhaps its subject matter, if Rescher's introduction is as competent as it appears to be—is characterized by a tension between formalization and real philosophical work. If the logic of knowledge is a subdiscipline that generates nontrivial, perhaps unexpected results by using a highly formal approach, then an introductory text should at least gesture toward some of these results, so as to justify the bother and the inevitable oversimplification that accompanies formalization. In fact—though some may disagree— just about everything Rescher accomplishes in *Epistemic Logic* could have been done more quickly and followed more easily in plain English prose, with the occasional x or p thrown in for convenience. This would make it obvious, though, how little philosophical work has actually been done.

There is one argument in the book that really does appear to require a purely formal presentation: in chapter 12, Rescher gives the proof of J. J. MacIntosh's modal collapse theorem and shows that by running a less general version of the same argument, we can conclude that in a community of finite knowers some truths will be not only unknown but actually unknowable. The careful reader, however, will notice that the final argument relies entirely on the obvious, above-mentioned fact that it is impossible to know the truth that p is a truth that no one knows. Although this is the only sort of unknowable truth that the argument uncovers, Rescher goes on to illustrate the conclusion by referring to a completely unconnected sort of unknowable truth having to do with secrets. The forest of unnecessary though clever formal argumentation has obscured the one tree that matters, and so the conclusion appears to be more significant that it really is.

For the most part, however, the book's organization and Rescher's explanations do make for an effective presentation of the material, and those interested in a brief introduction to epistemic logic should find it helpful. Unfortunately, its clarity is partly spoiled by two typographical problems. First and most important, it appears that only the book's prose has been proofread, and not its many formulae. The latter are rife with typographical errors, many due to cutting and pasting a similar formula without making the necessary changes. Second, the book is poorly laid out: all offset material, including the formulae, is printed immediately below the preceding text and is followed by a full line of white space. This can be confusing when, as is not infrequently the case, the offset formula pertains primarily or exclusively to the text that follows it.—Christopher V. Mirus, *University of Dallas.*

SCOTT, Dominic. *Plato's Meno*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. x + 238 pp. Cloth, $90.00—As part of the Cambridge Studies in the Dialogues of Plato, Scott's *Plato's Meno* is an excellent contribution. His approach to the dialogue is a balance between those commentators who discount the dramatic elements of the dialogue as mere dressage for analytical arguments and those who excessively focus on the drama at the expense of philosophical scrutiny. The book closely follows the dialogue's content in sixteen short chapters, with an introduction, conclusion, and three appendices. Scott concludes his book about the nature and purpose of the dialogue form, with particular attention to the relationship between "Socrates on trial" and Meno's moral education.

The first theme, "Socrates on trial," is Plato's challenge to the historical Socrates' philosophy through the character Meno. The first challenge is Meno's inability to understand Socrates' "unitarian assumption"—different types of virtue must have a common property— when he attempts to define virtue for Socrates (72d2–73a5). Socrates must defend his assumption in argumentation in the next two efforts to define virtue rather than just stating it as in the *Euthyphro*. The second challenge is whether *elenchus* is beneficial to the interlocutor (79e7–80b7). Although the *elenchus* in principle is highly beneficial by leading others to further inquire, it may be counterproductive to those refuted and guide them into skepticism, sophistry, and corruption. Socrates' defense of *elenchus* can be found in the slave boy demonstration, where the boy's process of recollection forces Meno to reflect upon his own conversation with Socrates and thereby revealing the benefits of *elenchus*.

The third challenge to the historical Socrates is prompted by Meno's paradox (80d5–e5) that leads to "the problem of discovery": Socrates believes that we have a duty to discover. However, Socrates' epistemological principles of "foreknowledge"—knowledge must be derived from pre-existent knowledge—and "priority of definitions"—knowledge requires definitional form first—conflicts with the Socratic dictum to discover, for if there were no pre-existent knowledge to start with except for definitional knowledge, then we could not discover anything, since we already know the object of inquiry. Socrates' theory of recollection provides a path out of this paradox in that we discover something we already know but had forgotten about it. At a conscious level we begin with mere belief in our search for definitions, but subconsciously we have knowledge that we have forgotten and only need to recollect.

The final challenge is Socrates' use of the "method of hypothesis" instead of definitional inquiry to understand virtue. Scott's answer to why Socrates would employ the second best method over the first is that Plato sought a compromise between Socratic methodological purity in pursuing definitional inquiry and the practical necessity of how to acquire virtue. A pursuit in definitional inquiry risks an indefinite postponement of practical questions, while practical necessity may slip into erroneous assumptions without close examination. Thus, in response to Meno's question about whether virtue is acquirable, Socrates

provides a tentative answer by his "method of hypothesis" that virtue is acquirable by recollection and divine dispensation, but these conclusions can be revised at a later point.

The second theme is the progress of Meno's moral education. Unlike Anytus, who becomes annoyed and therefore disengages with Socrates, Meno continues to converse with Socrates in understanding whether virtue is teachable. In this joint pursuit, Meno has learned the values of mildness, replaced eristic with dialectics, and is led by Socrates to the position that virtue can be obtained by recollection. Clearly at the end of the dialogue Meno has not attained virtue, but he has been set on the right path for the discovery of it. The character Meno therefore unifies Scott's two themes: he guides the reader in the right direction by challenging the historical Socrates and Meno himself becomes better for it.

At the end of the dialogue, Socrates proclaims that virtue can be taught in two ways: it can be recollected as knowledge with the right kind of questioning, and it comes as true belief by way of divine dispensation. Virtue consequentially can be known either as knowledge or belief. Scott points out that these conclusions, especially about divine dispensation, should not be treated ironically, because they fit into the structure of the dialogue: the ten pages about the Athenian leaders who had acquired virtue but were unsuccessful in passing it down to their sons directly answers Meno's initial question about whether virtue is acquirable and indirectly favors knowledge over belief.

Scott's interpretation of the *Meno* has raised challenging questions and offers fresh answers that are supported by a close reading of the dialogue. By focusing on the internal content of the dialogue, Scott demonstrates the unity of the *Meno*, as opposed to those who have charged that the dialogue is seriously flawed and incomplete. It makes a serious contribution to the study of Plato and should not be neglected.—Lee Trepanier, *Saginaw Valley State University.*

STAUFFER, Devin. *The Unity of Plato's* Gorgias: *Rhetoric, Justice and the Philosophic Life.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. vi + 191 pp. Cloth, $75.00.—This book of exceptional quality vindicates definitively the unity of the *Gorgias.* If scholars have hitherto struggled to explain what issue (or issues) bind(s) together this difficult Platonic dialogue, Professor Stauffer succeeds in showing that it is the issue of rhetoric, considered in light of Socrates' characteristic refutations about justice and virtue, which holds the key to the dialogue's unity. Stauffer's argument is masterful. Written in crystal clear prose, his book ought to become a standard reference for students of philosophy for decades to come.

In the opening scene of the dialogue, Socrates seeks out Gorgias in an apparent attempt to learn from him what the power of rhetoric is, but it is soon clear that Socrates already knows the subject thoroughly. This fact raises an obvious question: if not knowledge of rhetoric's power and nature, what *is* Socrates after? This question becomes the thread of

Stauffer's book as he develops the following thesis: Socrates would like to establish "a friendship and an alliance" with Gorgias to protect himself against looming political persecution (p. 39). Socrates' precarious predicament in Athens is the result of his "Delphic mission," for his public refutations about justice and virtue have aroused considerable anger among his fellow-citizens. Socrates thus sees in the rhetorician Gorgias a possible public defender of the justice of his way of life. To be sure, Gorgias exhibits some grave deficiencies. Most importantly, he has little appreciation of the power of justice over the human soul; but this deficiency might be remediable, says Stauffer, who argues that Socrates' conversations with Polus and Callicles should be read as indirect continuations of his conversation with Gorgias. In those conversations, Socrates introduces himself further to Gorgias by sketching his activity and predicament, but he also pursues two additional goals: (1) To bring Gorgias to "a better understanding of justice and its power in the human soul," and (2) To outline "a new, more just form of rhetoric," and thereby suggest "a nobler use to which Gorgias might put his powers" (p. 41).

Socrates' conversation with Polus contributes especially to the attainment of goal (1). In a well-known passage, Socrates refutes Polus and gets him to concede that to commit an injustice is worse than to suffer one (471e2–481b5). This is a remarkable achievement for Socrates, given Polus's expressed admiration for successful practitioners of injustice in the early parts of their conversation. Though Stauffer rightly questions the adequacy of Socrates' refutation, he shows that his victory over Polus is not underserved, for it is rooted in the latter's enduring attachment to justice and nobility. Through his refutation of a seemingly hard-boiled interlocutor, Socrates teaches Gorgias "something more general about the depth of the human concern for justice" (p. 64).

The paradoxical character of Socrates' moral position causes Callicles' entry into the dialogue. Stauffer offers a penetrating analysis of Callicles' long speech in which he attacks justice while eulogizing the active life and denouncing the corruption of philosophy. Stauffer shows that there lurks beneath Callicles' apparent "harsh realism" a deep attachment to noble manliness (p. 87). Indeed, Callicles' attack on philosophy is rooted in a standard of nobility which, though it "lacks clarity as to its central principle," contains an important element of public-spiritedness (p. 92). Stauffer goes on to show that the positions successively defended by Callicles in the dialogue not only testify to his enduring concern for virtue, they must even be viewed as so-many (failed) attempts to solve the "infuriating" problem of the vulnerability or weakness of the virtuous (p. 118). Though Callicles is admittedly repeatedly tempted, throughout the dialogue, by radical positions "that would ultimately deprive virtue of any meaning," he is so tempted precisely because he cannot embrace any view that leaves virtue vulnerable and exposed to attack (p. 118). As for Socrates' second goal, he pursues it in a number of ways. The most important is perhaps his articulation of a doctrine of virtue, and of virtue's relation to the cosmic order, which has spawned enthusiastic scholarship (506c5–508c3). More generally, the noble rhetoric whose development Socrates is envisaging would depict

philosophy publicly as at once "critical of ordinary politics [. . .] as it usually operates," and yet "ultimately supportive of the highest aspirations and deepest yearnings of ordinary citizens" and even "as something like the moral conscience of the city" (pp. 178–9).

The *Gorgias* is, on one level, a failure: Socrates' friendship with Gorgias never materializes, and Socrates goes on to be tried and executed by the Athenians. But an alliance between rhetoric and philosophy *is* eventually concluded, not between these two men, but through the Platonic corpus as a whole, every part of which is an introduction to philosophy in the form of a (partly) rhetorical defense of its most famous practitioner. By guiding the reader's reflections on the tension between philosophy and the city while illuminating the character of Plato's literary-rhetorical project for alleviating that tension, Stauffer brilliantly sets the stage for a comparison between ancient and modern approaches to the problem of enlightenment.—Eric Buzzetti, *Concordia University*.

SWEENEY, Eileen C. *Logic, Theology, and Poetry in Boethius, Abelard, and Alan of Lille: Words in the Absence of Things*. The New Middle Ages. New York: Palgrave, 2006. xii + 236 pp. Cloth, $65.00—Augustine is never far from view in this study of the relationship between thought, words, and reality as found in the three philosophers and poets of its title. But one of the work's telling features is that, after the first page, Augustine is never the primary subject of study. Sweeney has not written a history of Augustinian sign theory, but an exposition of how a few later thinkers exhibit the problem of Augustinian signification: that things are also signs that signify God, but, since God cannot be expressed by a sign, they fail to signify their ultimate referent. This failure recoils on our ordinary use of language, leaving us in "a world of words/signs in the absence of things" (p. 1).

Aside from a brief introduction and conclusion, the book divides into three major sections, one each for Boethius, Abelard, and Alan of Lille. Each section is comprehensive enough to form a general introduction to the work of its subject, but more interesting for the specialist will be Sweeney's use of sign theory to argue against traditional characterizations of the three as realists and rationalists. Boethius, for example, seems to be a realist, but in fact he "attempts to carve out a space between the extremes of conventionalism and realism, based on the distinction *and* relation of convention and thing" (p. 10). Alan, too, seems to be a realist, but he uses realism only to carve the problem of knowledge "into even starker relief," rather than to solve it (p. 145). Where Boethius refuses the extremes of conventionalism and realism in an attempt to find a mean, Alan simply poses the problem of the two extremes, neither of which can be accepted. Sweeney approaches the apparent rationalism of Abelard and Alan in a similar fashion. Abelard makes confident claims about the power of reason, but he never lets them stand by themselves. For instance, after he suggests that the trinity can be rationally comprehended, his claim "is quickly counterbal-

anced by very pessimistic reflections on the lack of utility and substance of such knowledge" (p. 93). Likewise, Alan uses the logical structure of natural scientific treatises to talk about God, as though he were developing a theological science, but he "does not take them to be transparent and unproblematic means of transmission of his ideas" (p. 128). In fact, he uses this structure with the goal of disorienting his reader. The Boethius, Abelard, and Alan of Lille we see here are not confident in the powers of reason to grasp either God or the world. Each in his own way uses the form of his text to undercut its ability to signify things in a direct and uncomplicated way.

By devoting each of the three sections of her book to a single subject, without accounting for the historical development of sign theory in the sometimes dramatic stretches of time between them, Sweeney leaves the reader open to the impression that the differences between her three subjects are owing not to their places in the development of sign theory, but to differences in their personalities and lives. Certain passages in the book suggest that this is in fact the impression Sweeney intends. She describes Boethius, for example, as a man trying to synthesize the seemingly contradictory positions required by the life he lived as both "Roman and Greek, citizen and theologian, politician and philosopher" (p. 60). His attempts to form a hierarchy of perspectives, each of which sees something of the truth, are "the formal and linguistic counterparts" of that life. The form of Abelard's work, too, seems to derive from his personality. His "tendency to turn all narratives into narratives of conflict is a manifestation of the desire for authenticity in his own work and an uncanny ability to sniff out the absence of it in others" (p. 63). In his logic and theology, this desire manifests itself as the presentation of opposed positions without a sense of how they could be reconciled. In his poetry, it manifests itself as the resistance to finding "happy endings" (p. 96).

This juxtaposition of poetry, theology, and logic, is one of the book's great strengths, as it allows Sweeney to draw exceptionally complete portraits of her three subjects. Theology and logic win out in terms of the length of the discussions she devotes to them, but she several times suggests that the most complete expression of their "narrative of estrangement and longing" may be found in their poetry (p. 4). As she says in regard to Boethius, whose reasoning fails to reconcile the disparate perspectives of his life: "where reason falls short, poetry steps in" (p. 60).—L. Michael Harrington, *University of Dallas.*

THOMSON, Keith. *Before Darwin: Reconciling God and Nature.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005. xiv + 314 pp. Hardcover, $ 25.00. The focus of Thomson's book is to trace out for the reader the dialectical debate in England on the question of our knowledge of nature and its relationship to our possible knowledge of God and/or the historicity of the Bible, with an emphasis on the creation accounts in Genesis. The

primary time frame of the book is the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries with an emphasis on 19th century years leading up to Charles Darwin's publication of his evolutionary theory on November 24, 1859, *On The Origin of the Species*, advocating the principle of natural selection.

In the above timeframe in England, there emerged five viewpoints in regard to the above debate, and some of these viewpoints can be traced back to the ancient Greeks. The first viewpoint is that of the Deists, who claimed that there is evidence that there is a God who created the universe, but God left the world to function on its own without God's further involvement. The second viewpoint is that of the Theists who were trying to defend a literal interpretation of the Bible and biblical history. The third viewpoint is that of those theists who thought that one could discover the existence of God and many of His attributes from the study of nature without any reference to the Scriptures *per se*. Thus they hoped to develop a purely rational natural theology. The fourth viewpoint was that of the Atheist who held that there was insufficient or no evidence for the existence God. The fifth viewpoint was the Agnostic who claimed the question of God remains unanswerable. The agnostic position was that viewpoint reported to be the position held by Charles Darwin whose crisis in faith was the result of the devastating loss of his ten year old daughter which he could not reconcile with Christian religious beliefs.

The general framework for the debate according to the author was the mechanistic notion of the world *à la* Descartes and Newton, in conjunction with an understanding of rationality in terms of the philosophy of David Hume. Thus in this context much of the debate seems to have been whether one can answer the question of reconciling God with 18th century philosophy/science of nature within the confines of reason alone as defined by Hume. The question became whether the developing discipline of geology, and its understanding of the age of the earth and the various views of the changes in the formation of the earth over time, are compatible with religion and the existence of God. This seemed to create a great difficulty for those who wanted to hold to a literal interpretation of, for example, the flood, and how some understood this in regard to the stability of the species of living things and geological formations. According the author, the Deists and the agnostics were not really at the center of the debate.

The center of the debate according to the author is between the atheists and those who believe that one can develop a natural theology.

Thus we have, for example, William Paley's argument that if one discovers a watch with all its integral parts and intricacies involved in the parts working in unison to correctly report the time, one should rightly and reasonably conclude that, while the parts separate from one another do not require an intelligent designer, the intrinsic order of the parts in a watch directing them to the telling of the time does require an intelligent designer to account for their unity of function in determining the time.

In contrast, we have the various atheistic views of a natural history and their presuppositions: (1) that the world as we know it originated out of chaos by a chance event which produced matter and all its forces, (2) that all life forms originated out of non-life by chance without any

external agent being involved, (3) that second causes or secondary causes do not require a primary to explain any of the events or existence of things living or non-living in the world, (4) that through the super-fecundity of living things, mutation, and natural selection can explain the existence of all the variations of life, as we know it, and (5) that a rational God would create a world without evil or suffering. In my view, this seems to be a position that has made the assumptions of scientism and Darwinism an object of something akin to a religious faith rather than a matter of that which is more or less probable as a final explanation.

Thus in dissent to the above we have many who are well aware of the atheistic arguments and yet see an irreducible complexity in the simplest of living creature (for example, Michael Behe) that can only be explained by the existence of an external designing intelligence. Thus the dialectical debate is far from over.—Joseph J. Califano, *St. John's University*.

VAN INWAGEN, Peter. *The Problem of Evil*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. xiv + 183 pp. Cloth, $35.00—In this book based upon his 2003 Gifford lectures, Peter van Inwagen examines and presents his own resolution of the ancient and much discussed problem of evil. His fundamental conclusion is that the atheist's position that the existence of evil establishes the non-existence of an omnipotent and morally perfect being we call God is a philosophical failure, where the term "failure" is in fact a technical term. To set the stage for this conclusion, van Inwagen discusses his basic conception of God, a conception that he argues is true to the tradition of ordinary believers. He then defines what it is for a philosophical argument to be a success or a failure. Setting his argument in the context of a debate between an ideally rational atheist (charmingly called Atheist) and an ideally rational theist (analogously, Theist) in the hopes of convincing an audience of ideally rational neutral agnostics to their positions, van Inwagen divides the problem into several arenas: the global problem (evidence against the existence of God drawn from the existence of vast amounts of truly horrendous evil), the local problem (evidence drawn from the existence of any particular case of evil, since surely God could prevent that case), the suffering of non-human animals (for example, Rowe's fawn), and the hiddenness of God, although, as van Inwagen points out, the latter issue is not essentially connected to the problem of evil. Van Inwagen argues that none of these cases constitutes a successful argument against the existence of God.

Van Inwagen is careful to state that his account is not a theodicy, but a weaker response: that of a defense. The heart of a defense is to explain why God allows evils in the world without claiming that this explanation comprises God's actual reason, in order to raise doubts about the veracity of the atheist's interpretation. Van Inwagen's central reason

involves the idea that God desires the redemption of fallen human be-
ings, for which free will is a crucial and necessary component, but
which explains the prevalence of evil. He admits that this alone is not
sufficient, for free will might not be a great enough good to outweigh all
the evils in the world, and it alone resolves neither the local problem of
evil nor the problem of non-human animal suffering in any rigorous way.
For these worries, van Inwagen argues that it is impossible to draw any
non-arbitrary line for the minimum amount of evil that a perfectly good,
all-powerful God would be permitted to allow in the world.

Van Inwagen is an analytic philosopher *par excellence*, and for some,
this will be a virtue of his account, while for others, it will be a vice. Re-
gardless, in my view, although it relies on the very common free will de-
fense, this book presents a succinct and often novel discussion of the
problem of evil, as well as other pertinent issues that arise along the
way, such as the nature of God, the nature of philosophical argument,
the relationship between free will and determinism, and the problem of
free will and omniscience. There are some curious lacunae. For exam-
ple, although van Inwagen claims to be giving the traditional account of
God's attributes (a very interesting discussion centered around
Anselm's notion of God as that being than which nothing greater can be
conceived), there is no discussion of divine simplicity. Of course for
many, simplicity is unwanted baggage, but it is surprising given its his-
torical importance that there was no mention of it, not even in the notes.
Van Inwagen situates his discussion within a particular context, stress-
ing the importance of doing so, but in the end, his context is that of a
philosopher's idealized thought-experiment, which is not what comes to
mind for many who emphasize the importance of context. With any ar-
gument based on thought-experiments, there is the worry about what
constitutes evidence for and against it, since one cannot rely on empiri-
cal evidence. And while his discussion of philosophical success and fail-
ure is fascinating, in my view, his final criterion is too strong and unduly
narrow, which is a concern given that his project is to show the failure
of a particular argument. One might worry that a strong criterion could
unfairly weight the argument in van Inwagen's favor.

Finally, after some rather crabby remarks about the distinction be-
tween sex and gender, van Inwagen goes on to acknowledge the prob-
lem of gender-laden language when discussing God and ends his discus-
sion of the hiddenness of God with a lovely analogy involving the
abilities of women. In my view, this represents some of the ways in
which feminists have made a positive impact upon the so-called philo-
sophical mainstream.—Colleen McCluskey, *Saint Louis University.*

WALLACE, Robert M. *Hegel's Philosophy of Reality, Freedom and God.*
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. xxxiii + 346pp. Cloth,
$75.00—This is a terrific book. It is also, at the same time, a disappoint-
ing book. Its disappointments are closely connected to its very substan-
tial achievements.

The central topic here is Hegel's political philosophy—as presented principally in the *Philosophy of Right*—and Wallace's primary commitment is to read the political philosophy explicitly in the light of Hegel's larger philosophical system.   In doing so, he embraces the now-dominant and highly salutary tendency to understand Hegel's political thought essentially as an instance or embodiment of—and hence as deeply and inextricably embedded in—the broader metaphysical categories of Hegelian philosophical science. This is clearly how Hegel himself understood it, and it is hard to see how one could adequately interpret, say, the *Philosophy of Right* by reading it in isolation.

What distinguishes Wallace's work, and what makes it a highly important contribution, is that it traces the systemic roots of Hegel's political thought more intensively, deeply, and persuasively than any other work with which I am familiar (and I certainly include here my own work on Hegel). Specifically, Wallace uncovers and analyzes in considerable detail the precise arguments of Hegel's logic—in both its larger and lesser iterations—that directly inform and underwrite the arguments of the *Philosophy of Right*. Emblematic here—and in many ways central to the substantive account of the book—is a careful and quite compelling analysis of Hegel's concept of political and moral freedom. In Wallace's account, Hegelian freedom is simply one manifestation of the logic's so-called doctrine of being and, in particular, its analysis of "true infinity." According to this analysis, the "reality" of a thing is constituted both by its relationships to other things—they negate it by establishing its limits, that is, they are what it isn't—and by the fact that the recognition of those limits is, in and of itself, the transcending of them. Thus, a thing has reality—it is truly infinite—"in being with itself in its other." Wallace shows how this formula, found in Section 94 of the *Lesser Logic*, is explicitly invoked in Section 7 of the *Philosophy of Right*: "'I' is with itself in its limitation in this other." The *Philosophy of Right*'s concept of freedom is, therefore, nothing other than an instance of the logic's metaphysics of being, negation and infinity.

I find the account entirely persuasive and, indeed, exciting, not only in itself but in its theoretical upshots. For example, it gives Wallace a powerful tool for explaining just how it is that Hegel attempts to refute Kantian dualism. For Kant, there is a strong and irresolvable opposition between our inclinations—for example, physical desires or impulses—and our rational will. For Hegel, on the other hand (and to paraphrase Wallace's argument very roughly), inclinations are finite things that have not transcended their limits, hence are not fully real; but they acquire reality—they become part of an infinite structure of interrelationships—when they have been thoughtfully and objectively evaluated and chosen by a moral agent. The moral agent decides on objective grounds which desires he or she ought to cultivate or otherwise acquire. In this way, the subjective element of desire "is itself in its limitation with its other," and the result is that the sharp Kantian contradiction between freedom and necessity is shown to be false.

There is, to be sure, much to argue with here, especially at the level of exegetical detail. For example, my own reading of sections 94–6 of the *Lesser Logic* is rather different from Wallace's. To my mind, the notion

of true infinity suggests, in the end, a kind of monadology—perhaps reading Hegel as a latter-day, higher-order Parmenides—according to which the untold features of the world in fact compose a single, seamless web in which every "thing" is bound up with or part-and-parcel of every other thing; each thing, therefore, is merely one phase or aspect of the whole, inseparable from and organically connected to the others. I think the text best supports such a reading, but I could be wrong. On the larger substantive questions, however, Wallace's account seems to me right on the money, time after time. Thus, his approach leads him to conclude that Hegel does not want to extirpate desire but to rationalize it, that is, render it *geistig*; that he understands thought to be more fundamental than being; that his conception of God is "based neither on religion, as such, nor on faith" but is, rather, based on an objective, metaphysical analysis. In short, I believe that Wallace's Hegel is, indeed, the real Hegel; and I include here not simply the account of moral and political freedom, but also the striking account of God and nature that one finds in the latter half of the book.

So why disappointing? In *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, Josiah Royce says that "If Hegel taught anything, then what he taught can be conveyed in an utterly non-Hegelian vocabulary, or else Hegel is but a king of the rags and tatters of flimsy terminology, and no king of thought at all." My own judgment—certainly arguable—is that Wallace fails adequately to free himself from Hegelian language. Consider the following passage, which seems to me typical: "Since an 'infinity' that is over against and flatly opposed to the finite, is limited by the finite and thus fails to be infinite, true infinity must include the finite by being the finite's superseding of itself. . . . Rather than being, on the one hand, and arriving (or, in fact, not arriving) at the goal of pure freedom (and goodness), on the other, the finite something constantly comes (fully) *into* being by creating pure freedom and goodness, *by* transcending itself" (p. 78). On the one hand, this strikes me as quite correct, and impressively so: again, Wallace has gotten Hegel right, and that's no mean feat. On the other hand, I'm not sure that I know what this passage is saying philosophically. The flip-side of Wallace's strenuous and highly successful effort to reconstruct the lineaments of Hegel's system is that it all too often leaves him imprisoned within what might be, for all we know, an arcane, idiosyncratic and irrelevant structure of self-referentiality. To put the point most crudely, what we lack here are real examples—typically the hard currency of philosophical analysis—that can connect Hegelian discourse to our own concrete, on-the-ground intuitions and conceptions.

Is Hegel right? Should we revise our intuitions and conceptions—or our explicit understanding of them—in the light of Hegelian analysis? To the degree that we permit Hegelian language to whirl around itself in an isolated, hermetically sealed and self-reinforcing universe of discourse, we cannot answer such questions. Yet it seems to me that those are, in the end, the questions that count. Nonetheless: this is a very important book, must reading for students of Hegel's political thought and probably for Hegel scholars in general.—Peter Steinberger, *Reed College.*

WAXMAN, Wayne. *Kant and the Empiricists: Understanding Understanding*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. xiv + 592pp. Hardcover, $60.00—The expansive first volume of *Kant and the Empiricists* is a highly ambitious and original book. Waxman's goal is to show that the transcendental philosophy of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is an extension, and in one sense a completion, of the philosophical projects of Locke, Berkeley and, most importantly, Hume. A defense of this provocative thesis requires that Waxman identify a common element that unites Kant with his British counterparts in spite of the latter's empiricism. For Waxman this element is what he calls *sensibilism*, the thesis that all ideas (perceptions in the case of Hume and representations in the case of Kant) originate in and have no existence independently of or prior to an immediate presence to consciousness in perception. It is their acceptance of this thesis that separates Kant and the Empiricists from modern Rationalists (Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibniz) and, more importantly, forces them to address a common problem whose solution is not fully articulated until the *Critique*.

The problem, in short, is to show that sense and the activity of the mind are both *necessary* and *sufficient* to account for our possession of the concepts central to traditional metaphysics (space, time, substance, cause and effect, etc.), concepts that for Rationalists have their origin in the intellect alone. The sensibilist responses to this problem, Waxman maintains, are best understood as stages in the development of a single method, *psychologism*. For Waxman, psychologism is the attempt (1) to trace concepts back to their origins in sense and reflection in order to determine (2) if the operations of the mind make any essential contribution to their content and, if so, (3) to show that this result justifies limiting the use of these concepts to what the mind perceives through sense.

Thus it is sensibilism that unites the Empiricists with Kant in Waxman's view and psychologism that reveals the continuity of thought between them. This continuity takes the following form. (1) Locke points the way to psychologism by showing that an investigation of the origins of ideas in the mind can give "a complete account of the nature, working, and vocation [. . .] of the human understanding" (p. 11). (2) Berkeley builds on Locke—in particular, on his solution to the Molyneux problem—and develops an early but incomplete version of psychologism by using the separability and likeness principles to defend his idealism. (3) Hume perfects psychologism in its empiricist form by resolving the operations of the mind into instances of a single principle, the association of perceptions. (4) And Kant transforms psychologism, saving it from skeptical conclusions implicit in Hume's associationism by introducing two *a priori* yet sensible elements of knowledge, the pure intuitions of space and time.

Waxman develops (1)–(3) in chapters 5–9, 10–14, and 15–20, which deal extensively with the theories of understanding of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. A full defense of (4) will come in the second volume of the book, *Time out of Mind*. Waxman gives it a preliminary defense in chapters 1–3, however, in which he attempts to secure the initial plausibility of his thesis by arguing, first, that Hume not only *could* accept Kant's account of mathematics without abandoning or compromising

any of his own principles but also that he *would* have been led to Kant's account had he been aware that his own was vulnerable to skeptical attack and, second, that Kant's account of the pure intuition of time provides a solution to the concerns about personal identity Hume raises in the Appendix to the *Treatise*. Chapter 4 argues for the continued relevance of early modern theories of human understanding and against the view that nineteenth and twentieth-century developments in mathematics, logic, linguistics, and cognitive science have made many of these theories obsolete.

Waxman's thesis naturally raises two questions. The first is whether he can maintain his claim that Kant's project is psychologist in the sense he outlines or, indeed, in any sense that lets us characterize it as continuous with the projects of Locke, Berkeley and Hume given that Kant often draws a sharp line between his project and those of the Empiricists. The second is whether Kant was familiar enough with the texts Waxman discusses for the affinities he charts to be, as Waxman suggests (pp. 11, 17, 221, 318, 434, 555), cases of actual influence. Much of the answer to the first question is arguably the burden of *Time out of Mind*, though Waxman does address it in a preliminary fashion in chapter 2–E. But apart from two footnotes (pp. 22, 317), Waxman does not discuss transmission. And this topic does deserve at least a preliminary treatment in volume one since there is strong evidence that Kant had not read two texts central to Waxman's narrative before writing the *Critique*: Hume's *Treatise* and Berkley's *Principles*.—Brian Chance, *University of Pennsylvania*.

WENTWORTH, Nigel. *The Phenomenology of Painting*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. xv + 268 pp. Cloth, $80.00—Nigel Wentworth is both a painter and a philosopher, dual competencies that shape and enrich this illuminating study. As a painter he finds that most philosophers have failed to grasp what is vital to the creation and experience of paintings; as a philosopher he intends to remedy the situation by turning to the practice of painting as the painter actually experiences it. His approach draws on what he describes as the "ontological phenomenology" of Heidegger and particularly of Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology thus understood attempts to remain faithful to the way in which the process of making and viewing paintings is originally given. Traditional accounts of painting, the author argues, have been developed from a third-person, "objectivist" perspective rather than from the perspective of the painter's lived experience. The author's phenomenological account is intended to illuminate the pre-reflective, engaged activity of the painter in the actual practice of painting, and of the spectator in the practice of seeing.

A principal theoretical fallout from the traditional approach is the privileging of intention, reducing the painter's practice to a cognitive, reflective enterprise. The author's claim is not that intentions have no place in art; the artist, after all, ordinarily embarks on a painting with

some subject in mind, often a very specific one. His point is rather that the painter has neither a precise conception of the final product in advance, nor a transparent anticipation of the process of painting it. The practice of painting is not an intellectual exercise, a crisp deployment of means toward an end, but a totality in the Heideggerian sense, a contextual whole embracing interlacing and mutually dependent elements, and expressing a "lived" or "habitual" body's way of being-in-the-world.

Among the ingredients forming this whole are the artist's materials. Far from being neutral objects with universal properties, brush and paint gain their significance from their use in a specific context, which is grounded in the painter's unique response to a situation. The "used brush" (p. 31) of one artist therefore differs from that of another, and the difference displays itself in the artist's action and in the painting that results.

Paintings, however, are not just brushed paint. In fact, the artist's materials become materials of painting only to the degree that they enter into an ensemble that also includes plastic and figurative elements. The plastic elements are color, line, tone, form, texture, and the like: the figurative elements body forth the real things that we perceive. Although the world possesses both figurative and plastic aspects, these are not the foci of attention in everyday perception. It is the painter who has learned to isolate these aspects, letting them "call forth" to him with "a lived significance" (p. 68). His project is to translate them into the plastic and figurative elements of the painting. Not all paintings have figurative elements, of course; but if they do, they are not separable from the plastic elements. The former are built into the latter, and the translation of the figurative aspects of experience into paint occurs only in the translation of the plastic elements.

A successful painting, the author argues, is one that "works." A painting works when the materials and elements that have gone into it form a unified whole, an ensemble in which everything has its place, nothing stands out as alien, and nothing needs to be added to make it better. By subtly developing this idea in terms of painter, work, and viewer, the author revivifies what might seem to be an exhausted dogma, showing how compelling it is.

The painting as ensemble is an expressive whole, not a simple representation or description of the world. What it expresses is the painter's unique experience of being-in-the-world. It is "the concretisation of a particular lived experience or 'world'" (p. 119) into which the attuned viewer can enter and thereby experience a new mode of being (painting's profound educational function). This does not mean that the painting has a message that can be formulated in conventional or "secondary" language. Painting is a kind of "primary language," marked by innovation, reinvention, expression, searching, and openness. It is a process occurring through the painter's felt-responses to situations in the world and to what does and does not work in the painting. It is shaped by the painter's personal development, and by the world of painting and the larger world in which he finds himself. The practice of painting, then, is social and historical, and must be learned and absorbed over time.

As much as one sympathizes with the author's opposition between a sensuous, prereflective relation to paintings and a reflective, intellectual relation, one wonders whether he pushes the distinction too far. We do have intellects, and they can play a key role in our experience of paintings. Rather than sharpening the dualism between the sensuous and the intellectual, it might prove more fruitful to take the two as moments of a blended experience. The author is certainly correct, however, in insisting that paintings are first of all pictorial, not intellectual objects. Failure to see this opens the door to ideological interpretations that reduce paintings to illustrations of ideas, missing the essential point that each painting is a unique expression of the painter, his world, and the venerable but always open practice in which he labors.—John B. Brough, *Georgetown University*.

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CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES*

PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS

Quinean Skepticism about De Re Modality after David Lewis, JOHN DIVERS

The classic articulation of Quine's skepticism about de re modalizing is his Reference and Modality argument against the semantic and metaphysical coherence of de re modal predication. Lewis's theory of de re modality allows us to construct a response to Quine that shows up a crucial flaw in that argument. Moreover, Lewis's counterpart theory of de re modality is one that an exacting Quinean should find ideologically congenial. So what scope remains for a neo-Quinean, but post-counterpart-theoretic, skepticism about de re modalizing? I consider, but resist, the natural thought that such skepticism ought to focus on the apparent ontological commitments of counterpart theory. Rather, I suggest, the natural and proper focus for a skepticism about de re modalizing is the continuing absence of any substantial account of the utility or function of de re modal judgement—an account that would rid us of the temptation simply to abstain from making such judgements.

*"Only in the contemplation of Beauty is human life worth living"
(Plato, Symposium 211d)*, ALEXANDER NEHAMAS

Socrates' speech in Plato's Symposium presents an extraordinary account of the phenomenology of love (*erôs*) and the attractiveness of beauty which is relatively independent of the metaphysics of the theory of Forms with which Plato connects it. The central elements in that account are, first, the tendency of beauty to draw its followers into further interaction with the object of their love and, second, the necessary link between the desire to "possess" beauty and the urge to produce beauty of one's own in response to it. It is a further remarkable feature of Plato's view that, understood in these terms, love and beauty bear no essential relation to moral virtue. In addition,

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Plato's analysis applies to every human erotic relationship, not only to paed-
erasty, and to the beauty of art as well.

Hegel's Dialectics as a Semantic Theory: An Analytic Reading,
    FRANCESCO BERTO

This paper presents an analytic interpretation of Hegel's dialectical logic
as a general semantic theory. The main intuition is based upon the inferential
insight that an essential part of what it is to grasp a conceptual content con-
sists in mastering its connections with the concepts it entails, and with the
concepts that entail it. Hegel's dialectics assumes as its starting point ordi-
nary language: it investigates the meanings of conceptual terms by explicat-
ing their theoretical correlations and inferential semantic settlement. Since
ordinary language expressions can be vague and the class of their synonyms
can be incoherent, dialectics also has to reshape meanings and intensional
contents. In Hegel's own words: "The loftier business of logic [...] is to clarify
these categories and in them to raise mind to freedom and truth."

Heidegger, Measurement and the 'Intelligibility' of Science, DENIS
    MCMANUS

This paper provides a reading, and defense, of Heidegger's early re-
marks on scientific knowledge. It draws on an interpretation of the "pri-
macy" that Heidegger ascribes to the "ready-to-hand" over the "present-at-
hand" and on an examination—informed by that interpretation—of practices
of measurement. Understood in the recommended way, Heidegger's remarks
cast doubt on our understanding of a question about the "intelligibility" of our
thought—understood as a "fit" between thought and world—and provide a
sense for the Heideggerian claim that we must reject realism and idealism,
since species of both respond to this question. Heidegger's view does, how-
ever, leave room for another form of "unintelligibility" to which thought may
succumb. But the question of where and when such failures arise is best
characterised as one of value or self-knowledge, and it is in his discussion of
authenticity that Heidegger addresses this question.

Pictorial Realism, CATHARINE ABELL

I propose a number of criteria for the adequacy of an account of picto-
rial realism. Such an account must: explain the epistemic significance of re-
alistic pictures; explain why accuracy and detail are salient to realism; be
consistent with an accurate account of depiction; and explain the features of
pictorial realism. I identify six features of pictorial realism. I then propose an

account of realism as a measure of the information pictures provide about how their objects would look, were one to see them. This account meets the criteria I have identified and is superior to alternative accounts of realism.

In Support of Content Theories of Art, JOHN DILWORTH

A content theory of art would identify an artwork with the meaningful or representational content of some concrete artistic vehicle, such as the intentional, expressive, stylistic, and subject matter-related content embodied in, or resulting from, acts of intentional artistic expression by artists. Perhaps surprisingly, the resultant view that an artwork is nothing but content seems to have been without theoretical defenders until very recently, leaving a significant theoretical gap in the literature. I present some basic arguments in defence of such a view, including the following. Content views of linguistic communication are ubiquitous, so why should they not be applicable in artistic cases as well? Also, propositional accounts of language involve two kinds of content (the proposition expressed by a sentence, plus the worldly state of affairs it represents), both of which kinds can be used in explaining artworks. In addition, the differing modal properties of artworks and concrete artefacts can be used to show that artworks could not be, or include, such physical artefacts.

Physicalism and Our Knowledge of Intrinsic Properties, ALYSSA
       NEY

This paper examines recent arguments by Rae Langton and David Lewis intended to prove Humility: the thesis that we have no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of substances. I argue that at best, these arguments are internally incoherent. They at once presuppose a strong version of physicalism according to which physical science is in a position to give a complete list of the fundamental properties of reality, and at the same time various metaphysical principles which in actuality challenge the completeness of the list of properties given by science. Although these arguments are unsound, their consideration enables us to draw important conclusions regarding the tension between the metaphysician's practice of positing intrinsic properties that give colour to the world, and the scientific attempt at giving a complete account of all phenomena.

The Co-Instantiation Thesis, ANN WHITTLE

The co-instantiation thesis is pivotal to a significant solution to the problem of causal exclusion. But this thesis has been subject to some powerful objections. In this paper, I argue that these difficulties arise because the thesis lacks the necessary metaphysical framework in which its claims should be interpreted and understood. Once this framework is in place, we see that the co-instantiation thesis can answer its critics. The result is a rehabilitated co-instantiation solution to the troubling problem of causal exclusion. But questions remain concerning the viability of certain of its applications.

Causes and Probability-Raisers of Processes, SUNGHO CHOI

Schaffer proposes a new account of probabilistic causation that synthe-
sizes the probability-raising and process-linkage views on causation. The
driving idea of Schaffer's account is that, although an effect does not invari-
ably depend on its cause, a process linked to the effect does. In this paper,
however, I will advance counterexamples to Schaffer's account and then
demonstrate that Schaffer's possible responses to them do not work. Finally,
I will argue that my counterexamples suggest that the driving idea of Schaf-
fer's account is misdirected.

Computational Modeling vs. Computational Explanation: Is
   Everything a Turing Machine, and Does It Matter to the
   Philosophy of Mind? GUALTIERO PICCININI

According to pancomputationalism, everything is a computing system.
In this paper, I distinguish between different varieties of pancomputational-
ism. I find that although some varieties are more plausible than others, only
the strongest variety is relevant to the philosophy of mind, but only the most
trivial varieties are true. As a side effect of this exercise, I offer a clarified dis-
tinction between computational modelling and computational explanation.

Descriptions: Predicates or Quantifiers? BERIT BROGAARD

In this paper I revisit the main arguments for a predicate analysis of de-
scriptions in order to determine whether they do in fact undermine Russell's
theory. I argue that while the arguments without doubt provide powerful evi-
dence against Russell's original theory, it is far from clear that they tell
against a quantificational account of descriptions.

Remembering Without Knowing, SVEN BERNECKER

This paper challenges the standard conception of memory as a form of
knowledge. Unlike knowledge, memory implies neither belief nor justifica-
tion.

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Socratic Epagôgê and Socratic Induction, MARK L. MCPHERRAN

Aristotle holds that it was Socrates who first made frequent, systematic
use of *epagôgê* in his elenctic investigations of various definitions of the vir-
tues (Meta. 1078b7–32). Plato and Xenophon also target *epagôgê* as an inno-
vative, distinguishing mark of Socratic methodology when they have So-

crates' interlocutors complain that Socrates prattles on far too much about "his favorite topic" (Mem. 1.2.37)—blacksmiths, cobblers, cooks, physicians, and other such tiresome craftspeople—in order to generate and test general principles concerning the alleged craft of virtue. It is remarkable, then, how little secondary literature exists on this subject—moreover, several of the few accounts we do have naively assume that *epagôgê* is the same as modern inductive generalization. Others are in conflict as to whether, for example, we can find any legitimate instances of probabilistic inductive epagôgê in the Socratic dialogues. This paper addresses these and other issues by offering a new, critical account of Socratic *epagôgê*—one tied to its occurrences in several key Socratic *elenchoi*.

The Summoner Approach: A New Method of Plato Interpretation, MIRIAM BYRD

The traditional "doctrinal" approach to interpreting Plato's dialogues has been criticized in recent literature on grounds that it can neither account for the structural complexities of the dialogues nor resolve conflicts within or between dialogues. Accordingly, a non-doctrinal, dramatic approach has been offered in its place. In response to this literature, I argue that, though the doctrinal approach is flawed, the non-doctrinal, dramatic approach does not provide a viable alternative. Instead, I offer a revised doctrinal approach based upon Socrates' discussion of "summoners" in Republic 522e–525a and supported by the *Meno.*

The Functioning of Philosophy in Aquinas, J.L.A. WEST

I argue that for Aquinas philosophy is a necessary tool of theology and that philosophy is not changed by its theological context. Rather, the subalternation of disciplines results in a reciprocal relation between philosophy and theology. This is understood in terms of the distinction between what is better known in itself and what is better known to us. This view is defended by (1) reinterpreting Aquinas' use of the metaphor of the water of philosophy being transformed into the wine of theology; and (2) his position that the theological use of philosophy is an instance of grace perfecting nature.

Can God Make a Picasso? William Ockham and Walter Chatton on Divine Power and Real Relations, RONDO KEELE

This article focuses on one aspect of the late mediaeval debate over divine power, as it was discussed by Oxford philosophers Walter Chatton (d. 1343) and William Ockham (d. 1347). Chatton and Ockham would have agreed, for example, that God is ultimately responsible for the existence of the works of Pablo Picasso, but they would not agree over wheher it violates God's omnipotence to say that he cannot make something that Picasso made, for example, the painting *Guernica,* without using Picasso himself as an intermediate cause. The context of their dispute was a larger debate regarding the ontological status of relations. This article (1) explains how these two issues, omnipotence and relations, became so interestingly tangled together,

(2) tries to see which of the two men mentioned above got the better of their exchange, and finally (3) draws out some important consequences for fourteenth-century discussions of causality, occasionalism, and omnipotence.

Berkeley and the Spatiality of Vision, RICK GUSH

Berkeley's "Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision" presents a theory of various aspects of the spatial content of visual experience that attempts to undercut not only the optico-geometric accounts of, e.g., Descartes and Malebranche, but also elements of the empiricist account of Locke. My task in this paper is to shed light on some features of Berkeley's account that have not been adequately appreciated. After rehearsing a more detailed Lockean critique of the notion that depth is a proper object of vision, Berkeley directs arguments he takes to be entirely parallel against the notion that vision has two-dimensional planar contents as proper objects. I show that this argument fails due to an illicit slide unnoticed by both Berkeley and his commentators—a slide present but innocuously so in the case of depth. Berkeley's positive account, according to which the apparent spatial content of vision is a matter of associations between, on the one hand, tactile and motor contents, and on the other hand nonspatial visual contents, also fails because of an illicit slide—again, unnoticed by Berkeley and his commentators. I close by discerning the salvageable and correct core of Berkeley's theory of the spatiality of vision.

Berkeley and Bodily Resurrection, MARC A. HIGHT

Establishing and defending the Christian faith serves as both a guide and a limit to Berkeley's intriguing metaphysics. I take Berkeley seriously when he says that his aim is to promote the consideration of God and the truth of Christianity. In this paper I discuss and engage Berkeley's superficially weak argument (which I call the natural analogy argument) in defense of the plausibility of the doctrine of bodily resurrection. When his immaterialist resources are properly applied, the argument has more merit than one might initially believe. I conclude by speculating that Berkeley had reason to believe that immaterialism was a better fit with Christianity than materialism.

Kant's Idealism and the Secondary Quality Analogy, LUCY ALLAIS

Interpretations of Kant's transcendental idealism have been dominated by two extreme views: phenomenalist and merely epistemic readings. There are serious objections to both of these extremes, and the aim of this paper is to develop a middle ground between the two. In the *Prolegomena*, Kant suggests that his idealism about appearances can be understood in terms of an analogy with secondary qualities like color. Commentators have rejected this option because they have assumed that the analogy should be read in terms of either a Lockean or a Berkelean account of qualities such as color, and have argued, rightly, that neither can provide the basis for a coherent interpretation of Kant's position. I argue that the account of color that the analogy requires is one within the context of a direct theory of perception, as op-

posed to Locke's representative account. Using this account of color, the secondary quality analogy enables us to explain how appearances can be mind-dependent without existing in the mind.

Naming and the Analogy of Being: McInerny and the Denial of a Proper Analogy of Being, PAUL SYMINGTON

This paper addresses the question of whether there is a proper analogy of being according to both meaning and being. I disagree with Ralph McInerny's understanding of how things are named through concepts and argue that McInerny's account does not allow for the thing represented by the name to be known in itself. In his understanding of analogy, only ideas of things may be known. This results in a wholesale inability to name things at all and thereby forces McInerny to relegate naming to a purely logical concern. As a consequence, for McInerny, since naming becomes only a logical concern, being itself cannot be known as analogous according to being and meaning since naming only involves the naming of ideas, not of things.

Aquinas according to the Horizon of Distance: Jean-Luc Marion's Phenomenological Reading of Thomistic Analogy, DEREK J. MORROW

Ever since the publication of *Dieu sans l'être* in 1982, Jean-Luc Marion's various (and varying) pronouncements on the status and meaning of esse in Aquinas have excited a good deal of interest and controversy among Thomists. Marion's evolving understanding of Thomistic metaphysics in general, and of Thomistic analogy in particular, has been commended for its openness to correction even as it has been criticized for what many still regard as its residual deficiencies. All such criticisms, however, neglect to take account of the phenomenological provenance of Marion's concerns, and to this extent they risk misunderstanding them. Ironically, Marion's phenomenological approach to Aquinas intends to safeguard precisely what his Thomist critics think he has jettisoned: namely, our ability to speak about God in a way that says something meaningful—or perhaps better, reveals something meaningful—about God to us. The apophatic language Marion uses to make this point should be taken as a reminder to his fellow Christians (and especially to those who happen to be Thomists) who rightfully desire to speak of God about the danger that is involved in doing so. If we interpret Aquinas's use of the divine names according to the phenomenological horizon of distance and thus think the various names of God "according to truly theological determinations," Marion suggests, we can avoid the danger of lapsing into a conceptual idolatry of univocal predication that occludes their phenomenological disclosiveness.

Vindicating Kant's Morality, ROBERT ARP

Among others, four significant criticisms have been leveled against Kant's morality. These criticisms are that Kant's morality lacks a motivational component, that it ignores the spiritual dimensions of morality espoused by a virtue-based ethics, that it overemphasizes the principle of autonomy in neglecting the communal context of morality, and that it lacks a theological foundation in being detached from God. In this paper I attempt to show that, when understood in the broader context of his religious doctrines and the overall philosophical project of the architectonic of reason, Kant's morality has a strong motivational component, supports the forming of a virtuous character as an essential element in a complete moral life, must be grounded in a community so as to realize peace and happiness for rational individuals, and is linked, ultimately, to a theological foundation.

Self-Communication, Motivational Narrative, and Knowledge of the Human Person, JOSHUA MILLER

The self-communication of being and the human person's intellectual vocation to draw it gradually into logos are important themes in the writing of W. Norris Clarke. This paper addresses two related obstacles to understanding the person's individual essence: (1) the limited intellectual reach of the potential knower, who has no access to another's subjectivity, (2) the person's inability to reveal her individual essence in any one act and the need for it to be gradually unfolded. These obstacles can be partially surmounted through motivational narrative, as developed by Arthur Miller, wherein persons describe those actions to which they are uniquely inclined and that bring profound fulfillment. The privileged recipient has rich access into the narrator's subjectivity and opportunity to see in the story an ontologically stable pattern of motivated behavior that expresses her individual essence.

Assessing Anscombe, ANDREW BEARDS

Elizabeth Anscombe (1919–2001) was a significant figure in twentieth-century philosophy. Her work is characterized by the attempt to retrieve and deploy some of the insights of Aristotle and Aquinas in the light of the philosophical perspectives of her mentor, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Bernard Lonergan was also a twentieth-century thinker concerned to retrieve and develop perspectives from the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition in the context of modern and post-modern thought. This article attempts to initiate a critical dialogue between the thought of these two philosophers. Anscombe's philosophical views on topics such as self-knowledge, conscious intention, and the foundations of ethics are discussed and critically evaluated. The article also includes a critical reappraisal of the celebrated debate between Anscombe and C. S. Lewis.

Why It Matters that I'm Not Insane: The Role of the Madness Argument in Descartes's First Meditation, FRED ABLONDI

Descartes's First Meditation employs a series of arguments designed to generate the worry that the senses might not provide sufficient evidence to justify one's taking as certain one's beliefs about the way the world is. As the meditator considers what principle describes the conditions under which it is possible to attain certain knowledge, one after another doubt-generating device is ushered in, until at last he finds himself like someone caught in a whirlpool, able neither to stand firm nor to swim out. In this paper, I examine one of those devices, namely, what is often referred to as the Madness Argument. In particular, I want to discuss its relation to the Dream Argument and its function in The Meditations as a whole. My position stands in contrast to the interpretations of Anthony Kenny, Margaret Wilson, Michael Williams, and, more recently, Janet Broughton and Catherine Wilson.

Black and White and the Inverted Spectrum, JUSTIN BROACKES

To the familiar idea of an undetectable spectrum inversion some have added the idea of inverted earth. This new combination of ideas is even harder to make coherent, particularly as it applies to a supposed inversion of black and white counteracted by an environmental switch of these. Black and white exhibit asymmetries in their connections with illumination, shadow and visibility, which rule out their being reversed. And since the most saturated yellow is light and the most saturated blue dark, yellow and blue could not be reversed unless light and dark could be. The difficulties suggest some more general morals for how to think of the role of "qualia" in colour perception.

Physicalism Could Be True Even if Mary Learns Something New, BARBARA MONTERO

Mary knows all there is to know about physics, chemistry and neurophysiology, yet has never experienced colour. Most philosophers think that if Mary learns something genuinely new upon seeing colour for the first time, then physicalism is false. I argue, however, that physicalism is consistent with Mary's acquisition of new information. Indeed, even if she has perfect powers of deduction, and higher-level physical facts are *a priori* deducible from lower-level ones, Mary may still lack concepts which are required in order to deduce from the lower-level physical facts what it is like to see red.

Understanding Hume's Natural History of Religion, P.J.E. KAIL

Hume's "Natural History of Religion" offers a naturalized account of the causes of religious thought, an investigation into its "origins" rather than its "foundation in reason." Hume thinks that if we consider only the causes of religious belief, we are provided with a reason to suspend the belief. I seek to explain why this is so, and what role the argument plays in Hume's wider campaign against the rational acceptability of religious belief. In particular, I argue that the work threatens a form of fideism which maintains that it is rationally permissible to maintain religious belief in the absence of evidence or of arguments in its favour. I also discuss the "argument from common consent," and the relative superiority of Hume's account of the origins of religious belief.

How to Defend the Cohabitation Theory, SIMON LANGFORD

The best known defence of the cohabitation theory of personal fission (and fusion) is due to David Lewis. This suffered damaging criticism from Derek Parfit. Though others have developed versions of the cohabitation theory, the theory's advocates, with the exception of Eugene Mills, have been reticent about how to handle Parfit-style objections. I develop a broadly Lewisian cohabitation theory, and show how Parfit's objection can be defused in a way which avoids the costs Mills incurs in his own response to Parfit. The result, I claim, is a plausible new approach to personal survival.

Testimony and Lies, DAN O'BRIEN

In certain situations, lies can be used to pass on knowledge. The kinds of cases I focus on are those involving a speaker's devious manipulation of the hearer's irrational or prejudiced thought. These cases show that sometimes a speaker's knowledge of a hearer's mind is necessary for the testimonial transmission of knowledge. They also support a "seeding" model of knowledge transmission, rather than one that is akin to the postal delivery of complete parcels of information.

Mortal Harm, STEVEN LUPER

The harm thesis says that death may harm the individual who dies. The posthumous harm thesis says that posthumous events may harm those who die. Epicurus rejects both theses, claiming that there is no subject who is harmed, no clear harm which is received, and no clear time when any harm is received. Feldman rescues the harm thesis with solutions to Epicurus' three puzzles based on his own version of the deprivation account of harm. But many critics, among them Lamont, Grey, Feit and Bradley, have rejected Feldman's solution to the timing puzzle, offering their own solutions in its place. I discuss these solutions to the timing puzzle, and defend the view that while we are alive we may incur harm for which death and posthumous events are responsible.

Dreaming, Calculating, Thinking: Wittgenstein and Anti-Realism about the Past, WILLIAM CHILD

For the anti-realist, the truth about a subject's past thoughts and attitudes is determined by what he is subsequently disposed to judge about them. The argument for an anti-realist interpretation of Wittgenstein's view of past-tense statements seems plausible in three cases: dreams, calculating in the head, and thinking. Wittgenstein is indeed an anti-realist about dreaming. His account of calculating in the head suggests anti-realism about the past, but turns out to be essentially realistic. He does not endorse general anti-realism about past thoughts; but his treatment does in some cases involve elements of anti-realism, unacceptable in some instances but possibly correct in others.

Subtractability and Concreteness, ROSS P. CAMERON

I consider David Efird and Tom Stoneham's recent version of the subtraction argument for metaphysical nihilism, the view that there could have been no concrete objects at all. I argue that the two premises of their argument are only jointly acceptable if the quantifiers in one range over a different set of objects from those which the quantifiers in the other range over, in which case the argument is invalid. So either the argument is invalid or we should not accept both its premises.

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Dream Immorality, JULIA DRIVER

This paper focuses on an underappreciated issue that dreams raise for moral evaluation: is immorality possible in dreams? The evaluatiotial internalist is committed to answering "yes." This is because the internalist account of moral evaluation holds that the moral quality of a person's actions, what a person does, her agency in any given case is completely determined by factors that are internal to that agency, such as the person's motives and/or intentions. Actual production of either good or bad effects is completely irrelevant to the moral evaluation of that agency. Since agency can be expressed in a dream, the internalist is committed to dream immorality. Some may take this as a reductio of evaluational internalism, but whether or not this is the case the issue reveals what such a theory is committed to.

In this paper I explore the significance of dreams to morality, and argue that the absurdity of dream immorality supports an account of moral evaluation with an externalist component, rather than a purely internalist account of moral evaluation.

The Domain of Authority, DUDLEY KNOWLES

If the commands of authority are peremptory and content-independent directives, it is a great puzzle why any rational autonomous agent should accept them as morally binding, as Robert Paul Wolff and others have argued. I analyse the peremptory and content-independent quality of authoritative directives and argue that all earthly authorities operate within a specified domain. I investigate three candidates for the role of universally applicable boundary conditions—morality, harm to self, and absurdity. I conclude that commands are authoritative only when *intra vires*, i.e. issued within the proper domain of the authority. Wolff's challenge is not met, hut it is shown to be less forbidding.

Wittgenstein, Plato, and the Historical Socrates, M.W. ROWE

This essay examines the profound affinities between Wittgenstein and the historical Socrates. The first five sections argue that similarities between their personalities and circumstances can explain a comparable pattern of philosophical development. The next nine show that many apparently chance similarities between the two men's lives and receptions can be explained by their shared conceptions of philosophical method. The last three sections consider the difficulty of practising this method through writing, and examine the solutions which Plato and Wittgenstein adopted.

God and First Person in Berkeley, GEORGE BOTTERILL

Berkeley claims idealism provides a novel argument for the existence of God. But familiar interpretations of his argument fail to support the conclusion that there is a single omnipotent spirit. A satisfying reconstruction should explain the way Berkeley moves between first person singular and plural, as well as providing a powerful argument, once idealism is accepted. The new interpretation offered here represents the argument as an inference to the best explanation of a shared reality. Consequently, his use of the first person must be taken as 'exemplary' rather than 'Cartesian'. This explains the freedom of movement in the text between singular and plural. However, it also reveals Berkeley as side-stepping sceptical doubt.

Bertrand Russell's Naturalistic Epistemology, RICHARD F. KITCHENER

Bertrand Russell is widely considered to be one of the founders of analytic philosophy, epistemology, and philosophy of science. Individuals have usually stressed his early philosophical contributions as seminal in this regards. But Russell also had another side—a naturalistic side—leading him towards a naturalistic epistemology and naturalistic philosophy of science of the type Quine later made famous. My goal is to provide an outline of Russell's naturalistic epistemology and the underlying philosophical motivations for such a move. After briefly presenting Russell's conception of the nature of philosophy, I sketch his theory of philosophical method, which is a version of the method of analysis. This provides the underpinnings for a discussion

of his Naturalistic Epistemology, which led him to adopt a version of a behavioristic epistemology. Although Russell vacillated on the question of the adequacy of such an account, it provided a major element in his later philosophical views. I suggest that we must reevaluate our conception of the history of analytic philosophy and, in particular, our understanding of Russell's place in the history of 20th century philosophy.

The Good Sense of Nonsense: A Reading of Wittgenstein's Tractatus as Nonself-Repudiating, DANIELE MOYAL-SHARROCK

This paper aims to return Wittgenstein's Tractatus to its original stature by showing that it is not the self-repudiating work commentators take it to be, but the consistent masterpiece its author believed it was at the time he wrote it. The Tractatus has been considered self-repudiating for two reasons: it refers to its own propositions as "nonsensical," and it makes what Peter Hacker calls "paradoxical ineffability claims"—that is, its remarks are themselves instances of what it says cannot be said. I address the first problem by showing that, on Wittgenstein's view, nonsense is primarily a technically descriptive, not a defamatory, qualification, and is not indicative of Wittgenstein rejecting or disavowing his own Tractarian "propositions." I then dissolve the paradoxical ineffability claim by making a technical distinction, based on Wittgenstein's own theory and practice, between saying and speaking.

On the Physical Aspect of Heraclitus' Psychology, GABOR BERTEGH

The paper first discusses the metaphysical framework that allows the soul's integration into the physical world. A close examination of B36, supported by the comparative evidence of some other early theories of the soul, suggests that the word *psuchê* could function as both a mass term and a count noun for Heraclitus. There is a stuff in the world, alongside other physical elements, that manifests mental functions. Humans, and possibly other beings, show mental functions in so far as they have a portion of that stuff. Turning to the physical characterization of the soul, the paper argues that B36 is entirely consistent with the ancient testimonies that say that *psuchê* for Heraclitus is exhalation. But exhalations cover all states of matter from the lowest moist part of atmospheric air to the fire of celestial bodies. If so, psuchê for Heraclitus is both air and fire. The fact that *psuchê* can manifest the whole range of physical properties along the dry-wet axis guarantees that souls can show different intellectual and ethical properties as well. Moreover, Sextus Empiricus, supported by some other sources, provides us with an answer how portions of soul stuff are individuated into individual souls. The paper closes with a brief discussion of the question whether, and if so

with what qualifications, we can apply the term "physicalism" to Presocratic theories of the soul.

Why Is the Sophist *a Sequel to the* Theaetetus*?* CHARLES H. KAHN

The *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* both stand in the shadow of the *Parmenides*, to which they refer. I propose to interpret these two dialogues as Plato's first move in the project of reshaping his metaphysics with the double aim of avoiding problems raised in the *Parmenides* and applying his general theory to the philosophy of nature. The classical doctrine of Forms is subject to revision, but Plato's fundamental metaphysics is preserved in the *Philebus* as well as in the *Timaeus*. The most important change is the explicit enlargement of the notion of Being to include the nature of things that change.

This reshaping of the metaphysics is prepared in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist* by an analysis of sensory phenomena in the former and, in the latter, a new account of Forms as a network of mutual connections and exclusions. The division of labor between the two dialogues is symbolized by the role of Heraclitus in the former and that of Parmenides in the latter. Theaetetus asks for a discussion of Parmenides as well, but Socrates will not undertake it. For that we need the visitor from Elea. Hence the *Theaetetus* deals with becoming and flux but not with being; that topic is reserved for Eleatic treatment in the Sophist. But the problems of falsity and Not-Being, formulated in the first dialogue, cannot be resolved without the considerations of truth and Being, reserved for the later dialogue. That is why there must be a sequel to the *Theaetetus*.

Ethics in Stoic Philosophy, JULIA ANNAS

When examining the role of Stoic ethics within Stoic philosophy as a whole, it is useful for us to look at the Stoic view of the way in which philosophy is made up of parts. The aim is a synoptic and integrated understanding of the theoremata of all the parts, something which can be achieved in a variety of ways, either by subsequent integration of separate study of the three parts or by proceeding through "mixed" presentations, which can be made at varying levels of understanding.

In two presentations of Stoic ethics we find initially baffling claims about the life of virtue being "the same as" or "equivalent to" the life according to nature. These indicate approaches in which understanding of ethical concepts was enlarged and enriched by study of physics. Interpretation which makes physics in these passages into ethical foundations answers poorly to the ancient texts and raises severe difficulties as an interpretation of Stoicism. Two texts which have been taken to commit Stoics to a foundationalist view of the relation of ethics and physics do not in fact do so; rather, they fit well into the holistic view of philosophy and its parts.

Galen and the Stoics: Mortal Enemies or Blood Brothers?
CHRISTOPHER GILL

Galen is well known as a critic of Stoicism, mainly for his massive attack on Stoic (or at least, Chrysippean) psychology in *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* (PHP) 2-5. Galen attacks both Chrysippus' location of the ruling part of the psyche in the heart and his unified or monistic picture of human psychology. However, if we consider Galen's thought more broadly, this has a good deal in common with Stoicism, including a (largely) physicalist conception of psychology and a strongly teleological view of natural entities, shared features which are acknowledged in several treatises outside PHP. Why, then, is Galen such a remorseless and negative critic of Stoicism in PHP? Various factors are relevant, including the shaping influence on Galen of the Platonic-Aristotelian (part-based) psychological framework. But, it is suggested here, an important underlying factor is the contrast between two ways of thinking about the part-whole relationship, a "composition" and a "structure" approach or an atomistic and holistic approach. This contrast is most evident and explicit in one section of PHP 5, where Galen, criticising Chrysippus' holistic psychology, denies that the Stoic thinker is entitled to use the concept of part at all. But the contrast is also seen as pervading Galen's response to Stoic thought more generally, in PHP and elsewhere, in ways that inform his explicit disagreements with Stoic theory. Stoicism is presented here as having a consistently "structure" (or holistic) approach. Galen's approach is seen as more mixed, sometimes sharing, or aspiring towards, a holistic picture, and yet sometimes (especially in PHP 5), adopting a strongly "composition" or atomistic standpoint. This (partial) contrast in conceptual frameworks is presented as offering a new perspective on Galen's critique of Stoic psychology in PHP and on his relationship to Stoic thought more generally.

Moral Psychology and the Unity of the Virtues, SUSAN WOLF

The ancient Greeks subscribed to the thesis of the Unity of Virtue, according to which the possession of one virtue is closely related to the possession of all the others. Yet empirical observation seems to contradict this thesis at every turn. What could the Greeks have been thinking of? The paper offers an interpretation and a tentative defense of a qualified version of the thesis. It argues that, as the Greeks recognized, virtue essentially involves knowledge—specifically, evaluative knowledge of what matters. Furthermore, such knowledge is essentially holistic. Perfect and complete possession of one virtue thus requires the knowledge that is needed for the possession of every other virtue. The enterprise of trying to reconcile the normative view embodied in this conception of virtue with empirical observation also

serves as a case study for the field of moral psychology in which empirical and normative claims are often deeply and confusingly intertwined.

The Gap Is Semantic, Not Epistemological, GIUSSEPINA D'ORO

This paper explores an alternative to the metaphysical challenge to physicalism posed by Jackson and Kripke and to the epistemological one exemplified by the positions of Nagel, Levine and McGinn. On this alternative the mind-body gap is neither ontological nor epistemological, but semantic. I claim that it is because the gap is semantic that the mind-body problem is a quintessentially philosophical problem that is not likely to wither away as our natural scientific knowledge advances.

Restrictive Consequentialism and Real Friendship, EDMUND HENDEN

A familiar objection to restrictive consequentialism is that a restrictive consequentialist is incapable of having true friendships. In this paper I distinguish between an instrumentalist and a non-instrumentalist version of this objection and argue that while the restrictive consequentialist can answer the non-instrumentalist version, restrictive consequentialism may still seem vulnerable to the instrumentalist version. I then suggest a consequentialist reply that I argue also works against this version of the objection. Central to this reply is the claim that a restrictive consequentialist is capable of true friendship if the value she aims for is not merely seen as a function of her self-regarding desires, but includes as a central constituent a form of objective value often referred to as "flourishing" or "self-realization."

What is Animalism, JENS JOHANSSON

One increasingly popular approach to personal identity is called "animalism." Unfortunately, it is unclear just what the doctrine says. In this paper, I criticise several different ways of stating animalism, and put forward one formulation that I find more promising.

Logic and Grammar, HARTLEY SLATER

I have written a number of articles recently that have a rather remarkable character. They all point out trivial grammatical facts that, at great cost, have not been respected in twentieth century Logic. A major continuous strand in my previous work, with this same character, I will first summarise, to locate the kind of fact that is involved. But then I shall present an overview of the more recent and more varied points I have made, which demonstrate the far larger extent of basic grammar that has been overlooked or suppressed. I end with some remarks about how this phenomenon can have arisen—principally through logicians not being attentive enough to their own language, and occupying themselves, instead, with often quite imaginary languages.

*Do Fallibilist Accounts of the Growth of Knowledge Underestimate
and Endanger Science?* JOHN WETTERSTON

All fallibilist theories may appear to be defective, because they allegedly underestimate the security of at least some scientific knowledge and thereby leave science less defensible than it otherwise might be. When they call all scientific knowledge conjectural they may seem at first blush to underestimate the superiority of science vis a vis pseudo-science. Fallibilists apparently fail to account for the fact that science turns theory into facts, because even "facts" are held only provisionally. This impression is false: the relatively secure establishment of facts can be accounted for with a fallibilist view. After theories have been honed through sharp criticism, there is often no reason to doubt some aspects of them. These aspects are what we regard to be factual knowledge, even though these facts are also provisionally accepted as such. We then explain the newly won factual knowledge with deeper theories, which often correct our factual knowledge in spite of its apparent security. Theories of justification add nothing useful to the fallibilists' observation that science finds the best theories because it has the highest standards of criticism. Fallibilist theories today give the best account and defence of science. We may abandon the quest for some kind of assurance that goes beyond the determination that some theory can answer all known objections to it and take up more interesting problems, such as how we can find new objections and how criticism may be improved and made institutionally secure.

Sorting Out the Anti-Doomsday Arguments: A Reply to Sowers, TOM ADAMS

Sowers's (2002) claim that his thought experiment shows that a currently living person is not a random sample is refuted. His thought experiment is reduced to a probability model, and is shown to be identical to one previously developed by Dieks. The status of the Doomsday Argument is left unresolved, since Dieks's refutation attempt is disputed in the literature.

Vagueness Without Context Change, ROSANNA KEEFE

In this paper I offer a critique of the recent popular strategy of giving a contextualist account of vagueness. Such accounts maintain that truth-values of vague sentences can change with changes of context induced by confronting different entities (e.g. different pairs through a sorites series). I claim that appealing to context does not help in solving the sorites paradox, nor does it give us new insights into vagueness *per se*. Furthermore, the contextual variation to which the contextualist is committed is problematic in

various ways. For example, it yields the consequence that much of our every-day (non-soritical) reasoning is fallacious, and it renders us ignorant of what we and others have said.

Duress, Deception, and the Validity of a Promise, DAVID OWENS

An invalid promise is one whose breach does not wrong the promisee. I describe two different accounts of why duress and deception invalidate promises. According to the fault account duress and deception invalidate a promise just when it was wrong for the promisee to induce the promisor to promise in that way. According to the injury account, duress and deception invalidate a promise just when by inducing the promise in that way the promisee wrongs the promisor. I demonstrate that the injury account is superior. I then argue that in this respect promising is like any exercise of a normative power. I conclude by distinguishing two theories of promissory obligation, a widely held view which I call the information interest theory and an alternative which I call the authority interest theory. I argue that the points established earlier support the authority interest theory over its rival.

Personal Identity and Practical Concerns, DAVID W. SHOEMAKER

Many philosophers have taken there to be an important relation between personal identity and several of our practical concerns (among them moral responsibility, compensation, and self-concern). I articulate four natural methodological assumptions made by those wanting to construct a theory of the relation between identity and practical concerns, and I point out powerful objections to each assumption, objections constituting serious methodological obstacles to the overall project. I then attempt to offer replies to each general objection in a way that leaves the project intact, albeit significantly changed. Perhaps the most important change stems from the recognition that the practical concerns motivating investigation into personal identity turn out to be not univocal, as is typically thought, such that each of the different practical concerns may actually be related to personal identity in very different ways.

Wide or Narrow Scope? JOHN BROOME

This paper is a response to "Why Be Rational?" by Niko Kolodny. Kolodny argues that we have no reason to satisfy the requirements of rationality. His argument assumes that these requirements have a logically narrow scope. To see what the question of scope turns on, this comment provides a semantics for 'requirement.' It shows that requirements of rationality have a wide scope, at least under one sense of 'requirement.' Consequently Kolodny's conclusion cannot be derived.

State or Process Requirements? NIKO KOLODNY

In his "Wide or Narrow Scope?," John Broome questions my contention in "Why Be Rational?" that certain rational requirements are narrow scope.

The source of our disagreement, I suspect, is that Broome believes that the relevant rational requirements govern states, whereas I believe that they govern processes. If they govern states, then the debate over scope is sterile. The difference between narrow- and wide-scope state requirements is only as important as the difference between not violating a requirement and satisfying one. Broome's observations about conflicting narrow-scope state requirements only corroborate this. Why, then, have we thought that there was an important difference? Perhaps, I conjecture, because there is an important difference between narrow- and wide-scope process requirements, and we have implicitly taken process requirements as our topic. I clarify and try to defend my argument that some process requirements are narrow scope, so that if there were reasons to conform to rational requirements, there would be implausible bootstrapping. I then reformulate Broome's observations about conflicting narrow-scope state requirements as an argument against narrow-scope process requirements, and suggest a reply.

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